WI the Enterprise in Pearl Harbor?

McPherson

Banned
Generally agree. Her planes would be on Ford Island, I think, and her pilots would be ashore. I don't see damage being much different; the Akagi and Kaga air groups were assigned the battleships, the less-experienced Hiryu and Soryu air groups were assigned to the 'carrier' side of Ford Island. So take the hits on Utah, Raleigh and the one on Helena (the pilot correctly identified Utah, flew over the Ford Island and went for the 'big' cruiser moored at 1010 Dock) and assign them to Enterprise. The second wave dive bombers will have a target for their light bombs if she settles on an even keel, and complete wrecking her if she hasn't capsized. She may be salvaged, but she is out of the war. Her pilots are her real asset, and they will have replacement planes very soon from the States, and will find employment on other carriers as attrition wears them down. After Coral Sea, VT-6 might go to Midway on Yorktown instead of VT-3.
a. Yorktown class armor schemes would enable a shambles of the superstructure to Vals' bombs but IJN SAPPYs unless of the 550 lb AP "special purpose" variety will utterly fail against the hanger deck armor of a Yorktown as they did at Coral Sea.
As for impact, the US may forego the Doolittle Raid. Hornet was in the right place at the right time to pick up Doolittle, but she needs a veteran carrier escort. Otherwise, I don't think TF 39 will reinforce the Home Fleet, Wilcox will bring them west early and Wasp will take Enterprise's place. Hopefully Wasp will get to participate in the 'makee-learn' raids. Coral Sea could go as historic, or Hornet and/or Wasp could reinforce Fletcher and Fitch. That might mean Yorktown gets away with less damage. I think Lexington will still be lost; the early torpedo hit caused the fuel leak that was eventually set-off by the generator. But that lesson in damage control still gets learned.
b. USS Saratoga and maybe a time delay. FDR really wanted a publicity stunt. USS Wasp will not change her TROM that much, either. Remember that idiot, Stark, still calls the shots until April 1942. It takes that long to show his incompetence as CNO. So, figure 3 vs. 3 at Coral Sea and this time, the Sara will show what a properly trained pre-war USN CV air-group can do. Only fret is the Buffaloes. It will be an USNAS pilot bloodbath to put down Zuikaku and Shōkaku.
Eastern Solomons could see Fletcher refuel Wasp closer to the battle-zone, and if she misses her appointment with I-19, she could also participate in Santa Cruz. That might mean her loss.

My thoughts,
c. Have to relieve Ghormley sooner (with Wilson Brown or Aubrey Fitch?) and make sure Miles Browning breaks his neck falling down a ladder. Ship Halsey to Washington to take over Bu-Air and have him sort out the Wildcat and the Buffalo and send Tower to the Aleutians. As for Turner, can the Marines use him for target practice? Then Fletcher or Kincaid has a very good chance at the Santa Cruz. I think Eastern Solomons actually replaces Midway as the Kido Butai death knell in this hypothetical.
 
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The War still ends at the same place, the same time. That's the problem with all these WI on the pacific war threads.
In reality, most of these TL should instead focus on the aftermath.

For instance, was there someone famous who served on the Enterprise?
Or you could make up someone famous who died in OTL who served on a ship not sunk in this ATL (though here, you're just making stuff up).
 

McPherson

Banned
In reality, most of these TL should instead focus on the aftermath.

For instance, was there someone famous who served on the Enterprise?
Or you could make up someone famous who died in OTL who served on a ship not sunk in this ATL (though here, you're just making stuff up).
William Halsey and Miles Browning. Kill them both and you improve PACFLT's chances 200%.
 
I was going to say this belongs in ASB, but then I remembered that the Star Trek ship was named after a real ship.
Enterprise is actually one of the oldest ship names in the US navy. The first USS Enterprise was commissioned in 1776, and a captured British ship then named the Enterprise was operated by the Continental Army on Lake Champlain in 1775. There have 6 other ships of the name since, including the recently decommissioned Big E.
 
Enterprise is actually one of the oldest ship names in the US navy. The first USS Enterprise was commissioned in 1776, and a captured British ship then named the Enterprise was operated by the Continental Army on Lake Champlain in 1775. There have 6 other ships of the name since, including the recently decommissioned Big E.
Seven more actually, not including CVN-80, which is yet to be commissioned. Also, the first HMS Enterprise was itself stolen, from the French.
 
I guess the American march across the Pacific will be delayed, plus other changes, here and there ...

But it doesn't really matter if the Marines are only ashore on Iwo Jima instead of Okinawa - or still stuck on Tinian - on August 6, 1945.

Why would it be delayed? The Japanese may perform a little bit better in 1942, but are still restrained by their logistics, so can't perform that much better. When the Essex-spam gets online, things happen pretty much as OTL.

Losing a carrier will hurt. Losing Enterprise will really hurt, because she was the designated "elite" carrier. She had an oversize crew of "picked men" who were to be cadres for the many new carrier crews that would be needed.

I think everyone is working from the assumption that an Enterprise that is caught at Pearl Harbor is an Enterprise that gets sunk. I think that's a sound assumption. (We could even assume that she gets an Oklahoma fate - a constructive loss. Being a top priority for IJN targeting, she *would* draw more than her share of ordnance.)

But while losing Enterprise *would* hurt, I think it's easy to overstate the butterflies.
  • Replacing the carrier: The U.S. had six other fleet carriers, three of them (Lexington, Yorktown, Saratoga) in the Pacific on Dec. 7. [EDIT: Sorry, Yorktown was in the Atlantic, but transferred to PACFLT on Dcember 16.] In our timeline, Hornet would leave for the Pacific in February, when she left to tak part in the Doolittle Raid. Wasp would follow that late that summer. Here one expects that Hornet's transfer would be accelerated, and, likely, so would Wasp's. That solves the immediate shortfall. But it's possible there is a slight long-term knock-on effect, as FDR might very well push harder (or with less Navy resistance) for Independence-class CVL conversions. These might get accelerated by a few months, though of course Nimitz is still not going to get any to play with until 1943 no matter what. There just isn't much that can be done to accelerate the Essexes, though if you *wanted* to, I suppose you could steal the slipways that Alaska and Guam are about to occupy . . . but given that the Alaskas were also favored by FDR, this seems unlikely, I suspect (alas).
  • Replacing the crews: A lot would depend on just when Enterprise arrived. The longer she has been in port, the fewer crew will be on board to get killed; whereas if she is literally arriving at the moment of attack, a lot of her aircraft are going to be in the air, and thus in a positon to fight. Either way, the casualty rates on the battleships suggest that it's unlikely Enterprise would lose a majority of her personnel. With an open hanger deck, it also means fewer can be trapped below. I would not expect much knock-on effect here. Most of her pilots and crew end up getting transferred to other PACFLT carriers...though if Dick Best winds up missing Midway as a result, it's quite possible that Nagumo might escape with one deck intact.
  • Replacing commanders: Now, if Halsey is somehow killed, that could make for more interesting butterflies, because it could mean that Spruance never gets to command at Midway (or perhaps ever), because Halsey expressly recommended him for the job; and that could have a real effect on the course of the battle; on the other hand, the USN saves a lot of typhoon damage in 1944-45. But there's fair odds Halsey's on shore, so...
But one carrier (however beloved and effective) simply is not likely to have any significant impact on the course of the war. The war situation in summer 1945 is surely going to be basically the same as it was in OTL.
 
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a. Yorktown class armor schemes would enable a shambles of the superstructure to Vals' bombs but IJN SAPPYs unless of the 550 lb AP "special purpose" variety will utterly fail against the hanger deck armor of a Yorktown as they did at Coral Sea.

It is a fair point about the 550lb bombs, but the IJN air group commanders will divert whatever is necessary to finish off Enterprise. The attack plan testimony and documentation makes clear just how highly they prioritized the carriers.

This could, however, modestly reduce damage inflicted on battleship row in the first wave...

b. USS Saratoga and maybe a time delay. FDR really wanted a publicity stunt. USS Wasp will not change her TROM that much, either. Remember that idiot, Stark, still calls the shots until April 1942. It takes that long to show his incompetence as CNO. So, figure 3 vs. 3 at Coral Sea and this time, the Sara will show what a properly trained pre-war USN CV air-group can do. Only fret is the Buffaloes. It will be an USNAS pilot bloodbath to put down Zuikaku and Shōkaku.

I'm with you on the first two sentences, fully. (Though probably not *much* of a delay. As you say, FDR wanted that stunt, bad.)

But however much you loathe Stark, we have to face the reality that the loss of a prime fleet carrier is going to change how key people in Washington think here. Everyone has just gotten a salutary lession in the power of carrier-based air, and now they're down a signficant slice of same.

Either way, if the Doolittle Raid occurs within a couple weeks either side of OTL's date, it is hard to see how Saratoga can take part in Coral Sea, if she is assigned to Doolittle...

c. Have to relieve Ghormley sooner (with Wilson Brown or Aubrey Fitch?) and make sure Miles Browning breaks his neck falling down a ladder. Ship Halsey to Washington to take over Bu-Air and have him sort out the Wildcat and the Buffalo and send Tower to the Aleutians. As for Turner, can the Marines use him for target practice? Then Fletcher or Kincaid has a very good chance at the Santa Cruz. I think Eastern Solomons actually replaces Midway as the Kido Butai death knell in this hypothetical.

I know you hate Halsey; so I'm just going to file all this as wishcasting. There's just no way Halsey doesn't keep sea-going command for as long as he's alive. He was far, far too well protected in high places, starting with Nimitz and King. In the immediate short term, Halsey just keeps Carrier Division 2, and Saratoga gets slotted in to replace Enterprise, with some shuffling of squadrons. Once Hornet arrives, the decks likely get shuffled around again. But Halsey won't be going anywhere, until the shingles put him in the hospital.
 
Seven more actually, not including CVN-80, which is yet to be commissioned. Also, the first HMS Enterprise was itself stolen, from the French.
Ha ! I knew it .... "The problem with the French is that they have no (word for) Enterprise" ...
That's because it was stolen by the British who then lost it to the Americans !!
 
Ha ! I knew it .... "The problem with the French is that they have no (word for) Enterprise" ...
That's because it was stolen by the British who then lost it to the Americans !!
Not really, there's been seven vessels bearing the name HMS Enterprise since that one got stolen.
 
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Not really, there's been seven vessels bearing the name HMS Enterprise since that one got stolen.
Sorry == my poor attempt at humour ... the correct quote is, I believe, "The trouble with the French is that they don’t have a word for entrepreneur" (supposed said by President George W. Bush's to British Prime Minister Tony Blair)
 
Sorry == my poor attempt at humour ... the correct quote is, I believe, "The trouble with the French is that they don’t have a word for entrepreneur" (supposed said by President George W. Bush's to British Prime Minister Tony Blair)
Ah, right.
 
They were more interested in the battleships. From The Japanese Navy in World War II (p. 53). Naval Institute Press. Kindle Edition.

Author Mitsuo Fuchida.

Issued 2200, 6 December; received 1036, 7 December​
Activities in Pearl Harbor on the morning of 5 December:​
Arrived: Oklahoma and Nevada (having been out for eight days)​
Departed: Lexington and five heavy cruisers Ships in harbor as of 1800, 5 December: 8 BB, 3 CL, 16 DD In docks: 4 CL (Honolulu class), 5 DD​
Issued 1700, 7 December; received 1900, 7 December​
No balloons, no torpedo-defense nets deployed around battleships. No indications observed from enemy radio activity that ocean patrol flights are being made in Hawaiian area. Lexington left harbor yesterday (5 December, local time) and recovered planes. Enterprise is also thought to be operating at sea with her planes on board.​
Issued 1800, 7 December; received 2050, 7 December​
Utah and a seaplane tender entered harbor in the evening of 5 December. (They had left harbor on 4 December.) Ships in harbor as of 6 December: 9 BB, 3 CL, 3 seaplane tenders, 17 DD In docks: 4 CL, 3 DD All carriers and heavy cruisers are at sea. No special reports on the fleet. Oahu is quiet and Imperial General Staff is fully convinced of success. These reports had presumably been sent from Honolulu, but I do not know the details.​

On 6 December, after fueling the Second Carrier Division and the Screening Force, the Second Tanker Train broke off from the task force. On the next day the First Tanker Train fueled the screen again and departed. Our force then increased speed to twenty-four knots and raced toward Pearl Harbor. On the carrier decks planes were lined up wing to wing for their final check. Maintenance crews and flying crews worked assiduously to complete final preparation of their planes.

About this time we received Admiral Yamamoto’s message for going to war: “The rise or fall of the empire depends upon this battle; everyone will do his duty with utmost efforts.” The message was immediately relayed to all hands, and the “Z” flag was hoisted on the Akagi’s mast. This was the same signal flag that had been run up on the Mikasa almost thirty years before in the Straits of Tsushima.

At 1225 on 7 December (1725, 6 December in Honolulu) a message came in from the submarine I-72: “American fleet is not in Lahaina anchorage.”

This anchorage was used for training because it was open and deep. If the Pacific Fleet had been there, we would have had our best chance for success, and we had hoped accordingly. Receipt of the negative information, however, blasted our hopes for such an opportunity.

It was now obvious that the warships were either in Pearl Harbor or at sea. Admiral Nagumo was thumbing through the message log to check on battleships reported to be in Pearl Harbor. Completing the count, he looked up and said to the staff members, “All of their battleships are now in. Will any of them leave today?”

The intelligence officer, Lieutenant Commander Ono, was the first to reply: “Five of their eight battleships reached port on the twenty-ninth, and two others left that day, returning on the sixth. There is one more that has remained in harbor all this time, supposedly under repair, or perhaps in dry dock. The five ships that arrived on the twenty-ninth have been there eight days, and it is time for them to leave. I suspect they may go out today.”

“Today is Saturday, 6 December,” said Chief of Staff Kusaka. “Their general practice is to leave on Tuesday, which would be the ninth.”

“It is most regrettable,” said Genda, the operations officer, “that no carriers are in.”

“On 29 November,” Ono explained, “the Enterprise left harbor accompanied by two battleships, two heavy cruisers, and twelve destroyers. The two battleships returned on the sixth, but the rest have not yet come back. The Lexington came in on the twenty-ninth and left with five heavy cruisers on the sixth. Thus, the Enterprise ought to return today. The Saratoga is under repair at San Diego, and the Wasp is in the Atlantic. But the Yorktown and the Hornet belonging to the Pacific Fleet must be out here. They may have arrived with the Enterprise today.”

“If that happens,” said Genda, “I don’t care if all eight of the battleships are away.” “As an airman,” remarked Oishi, “you naturally place much importance on carriers. Of course it would be good if we could get three of them, but I think it would be better if we get all eight of the battleships.”

Then Chief of Staff Kusaka, who had always been strong on statistical studies of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, spoke: “There is only a slight chance that carriers may enter the harbor on Saturday, and it seems unlikely that the battleships would leave on Saturday or Sunday. We may take it for granted that all eight battleships will be in the harbor tomorrow. We can’t do anything about carriers that are not there. I think we should attack Pearl Harbor tomorrow.”
Thus he set the stage for the decision of the task force commander, which was made known on the evening of 7 December, when Admiral Nagumo gave his appraisal of the enemy situation:

1) Enemy strength in the Hawaiian area consists of eight battleships, two carriers, and about ten heavy and six light cruisers. The carriers and heavy cruisers seem to be at sea, but the others are in the harbor. Those operating at sea are most likely in the training area south of Maui; they are not in Lahaina.
2) Unless an unforeseen situation develops tonight, our attack will be launched upon Pearl Harbor.
3) So far there is no indication that the enemy has been alerted, but that is no reason to relax our security.
 
Losing a carrier will hurt. Losing Enterprise will really hurt, because she was the designated "elite" carrier. She had an oversize crew of "picked men" who were to be cadres for the many new carrier crews that would be needed.
How many of them would be onboard and not in their homes on the island
 
Killing a carrier might have given Nagumo the nerve to stick around and launch additional raids against Pearl Harbor. Destroying the fuel tanks and repair facilities would have been as big a blow as sinking the ships.
It would certainly not do the latter. Those facilities were way down the list of priorities, any third wave would have kept attacking the same targets the first two had, especially if the Enterprise had needed to be hit first. And that wave would have been a terrible idea for a variety of reasons, probably resulting in a large number of Japanese aircraft being destroyed.
 
They were more interested in the battleships. From The Japanese Navy in World War II (p. 53). Naval Institute Press. Kindle Edition.

thanks for that, DN.

Zimm's book on Pearl makes it clear Yamamoto was counting on getting the battleships. In one of the pre-attack briefs, Genda told the pilots, 'get the carriers and the battleships' but that was Genda, not Yamamoto.

At Washington, the Japanese wanted a 7:10 ratio in battleships. The American pushed them to take 6:10. The Japanese mis-interpreted this to think if the ratio were higher, the USN wouldn't go on the offensive across the Pacific. As we know, the reality was the US had broken the Japanese codes, and knew while the delegation had been told to ask for 7:10, they were also told to accept 6:10. Yamamoto wanted 4 battleships out of action for six months at Pearl Harbor, factoring in completion of then-building new battleships. He got a little better than that, five, with two of of those permanently out of the war.

Regards,
 

McPherson

Banned
It is a fair point about the 550lb bombs, but the IJN air group commanders will divert whatever is necessary to finish off Enterprise. The attack plan testimony and documentation makes clear just how highly they prioritized the carriers.
Others have commented on Japanese planning priorities and errors.
This could, however, modestly reduce damage inflicted on battleship row in the first wave...
The battleship damage allocation specifically to the Kates used in the level bomber role seems to suggest not. The Japanese IJN were about the only ones who used what we now know as a "strike coordinator" at that time who could / would change that priority as the strike was / is in progress, but we have no record that Genda's plan was priority altered in any fashion during either the first or second wave. MOO, but later evidence suggests that the IJN staffers and tacticians were plan-wedded to the extent, that if the Americans "three cigared" them, the Americans could count on the Nishimura type IJN performances and slaughter them accordingly.
I'm with you on the first two sentences, fully. (Though probably not *much* of a delay. As you say, FDR wanted that stunt, bad.)
To be fair, with the news as of February 1942, he needed something for political and war morale reasons. I am NOW of two minds about Spruance's assessment. Spruance knew about Coral Sea and its results when he called it poor war making. He thought USS Enterprise should have been at Coral Sea, not escorting USS Hornet. Coral Sea had not happened when planning for the Doolittle Tokyo raid started. Lae Salamaua had not happened either. I am about where FDR was, with the knowledge he had at that time, as to his reasoning as I detail dig into the stunt. Very Lincolnesque as a strategist, and very conscious of American morale was FDR.

The Americans needed a win somewhere and could not wait for tactical battle results to get it.
But however much you loathe Stark, we have to face the reality that the loss of a prime fleet carrier is going to change how key people in Washington think here. Everyone has just gotten a salutary lesson in the power of carrier-based air, and now they're down a significant slice of same.
They were down USS Saratoga before Coral Sea. Change that Japanese torpedo of 11 January 1942 and it is 3 vs. 3 at Coral Sea. Nimitz wanted that air-sea battle for the same reason FDR wanted the Doolittle stunt. Nimitz needed a morale win. He was sort of confident in the FRUMEL info he had and thought he could risk the battle. Stark had very little input as to Nimitz's reasons or moves after that April and May as these events unfolded. Before April and May, Stark was holding up LANTFLT assets that Nimitz wanted to shore PACFLT war-losses. TBH, USS Wasp had to stay with LANTFLT because the Mediterranean Sea theater was red-11s across the board and the British were in big naval trouble. So she was where she would be needed, except we know how the British threw her first Malta run down the crapper. That meant a delay getting her to PACFLT.
Either way, if the Doolittle Raid occurs within a couple weeks either side of OTL's date, it is hard to see how Saratoga can take part in Coral Sea, if she is assigned to Doolittle...
I have to agree with this assessment. However ... this puts DeWitt Ramsey in command of the raid, not Halsey. Ramsey was a much better tactician and air minded officer. He was also a hustler. No dawdling or sloppy staff work from his team. And while Marc Mitscher technically held date of rank on him, as USS Saratoga was the escort and the presumed fighting flattop in any naval action during the raid... it would be USS Saratoga making that speed run from Pearl to Noumea, and leading the charge. Mitscher would not lead it. Funny is it, that even HALSEY thought so little of Mitscher, that he nominated Spruance, as his replacement?
I know you hate Halsey; so I'm just going to file all this as wish-casting. There's just no way Halsey doesn't keep sea-going command for as long as he's alive. He was far, far too well protected in high places, starting with Nimitz and King. In the immediate short term, Halsey just keeps Carrier Division 2, and Saratoga gets slotted in to replace Enterprise, with some shuffling of squadrons. Once Hornet arrives, the decks likely get shuffled around again. But Halsey won't be going anywhere, until the shingles put him in the hospital.
As a flag-waver and hurrah man leading the charge, Halsey was a good admiral for when things soured at Cactus. Parking him at Bu-Air still actually helps the USN since he would bring enthusiasm and high energy to a moribund outfit that would need his kind of hurrahism; because anybody, even a corpse, or an idiot, or DeWitt Ramsey would be so much better than the utterly incompetent and imbecilic obstructionist and technologically ignorant John Tower. Whatever gripes I have about Halsey, the man knew enough about aircraft that he understood the USN fighter line was in deep trouble and it needed to change fast.
 
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It would certainly not do the latter. Those facilities were way down the list of priorities, any third wave would have kept attacking the same targets the first two had, especially if the Enterprise had needed to be hit first. And that wave would have been a terrible idea for a variety of reasons, probably resulting in a large number of Japanese aircraft being destroyed.

Just so. And we've had so many threads here to beat that point thoroughly to death. :)
 
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