What would have happened if Japan had not attacked Pearl Harbor? If Japan had left USA alone and directed her forces against another country, say USSR, would USA have entered the WWII directly or continued her policy of only supporting the allies indirectly? And if USA had avoided direct involvement, how would it have affected the end result of the War?
WI:No Pearl Harbour Attack in WW II?
- Thread starter Kishan
- Start date
US interests in China were driving a powerful lobby opposing the Japanese action there, one effect of which was to get the US to impose an embargo on some trade items, most importantly oil, in June 1940 after the fall of France and the subsequent occupation of French Indochina by Japan.
Japan was unable to continue the campaign in China without imported oil, having very little domestic production.
The major oil producer in the region was the Dutch East Indies, which at the time was loyal to Queen Wilhelmina and her government-in-exile in London. The Dutch were under the impression that it was a Japanese strategic goal not to trade with the Netherlands, but instead to conquer and annex the DEI to exploit the oil directly.
Prewar Dutch strategy was to focus on air and naval forces with which too repel a Japanese attack, rather than try to keep sufficient ground forces in being to do so. Dutch shipbuilding and aircraft construction was inadequate to supply the required forces, and so they were reliant on imported materiel (particularly aircraft) from the US, and indeed the Dutch strategy always depended on US and UK support against a Japanese invasion.
So when the US declared an embargo, so did the DEI (as did the UK for similar reasons).
Now, Japan's medium-term strategic goal (continue the war in China) is unachievable without its short-term strategic goal (secure sufficient oil supplies by conquering the Dutch East Indies). The question is, if Japan attacks just the DEI, will the US (and the UK) allow this to happen unimpeded?
The danger to Japan is, if the US does choose to intervene, a) along with the embargo it has also passed a shipbuilding bill that will give it dramatic numerical superiority over the IJN, and b) the Phillipines are in a perfect position for air, surface, and sub units to interdict the sea lines of communication between Japan or its newly-annexed territory in FIC and the oil in the DEI. There is a symmetrical threat from the UK and the colony of Malaya and the naval base at Singapore.
So the short answer is, if Japan doesn't choose to knock the US out of the war first, then going for the DEI is very risky if the US decides to scale up its response from embargo to open war - and it's clearly committed to building up its military to be able to do so.
If Japan had directed its forces against the USSR:
The Red Army had given the IJA a bloody nose in 1939 at Khalkin Gol, the armistice from which was the green light for Stalin to invade Poland. The Far East military districts had not had their forces drawn down to fight the Germans in 1941 (though the Central Asian military districts did have their forces redeployed to defend Moscow) and it is very likely that Japan would have found, despite probable air superiority, that their dramatic inferiority in armor and artillery would have seen another defeat. And then they'd run out of oil and have to go home anyway. And the British might also declare war (as Churchill was desperate to keep Stalin fighting Germany) and see what the RN could do to Japanese shipping, particularly when the need to supply troops in Kamchatka or wherever would mean that Japan would lack the sealift to supply a land offensive against Malaya.
Japan was unable to continue the campaign in China without imported oil, having very little domestic production.
The major oil producer in the region was the Dutch East Indies, which at the time was loyal to Queen Wilhelmina and her government-in-exile in London. The Dutch were under the impression that it was a Japanese strategic goal not to trade with the Netherlands, but instead to conquer and annex the DEI to exploit the oil directly.
Prewar Dutch strategy was to focus on air and naval forces with which too repel a Japanese attack, rather than try to keep sufficient ground forces in being to do so. Dutch shipbuilding and aircraft construction was inadequate to supply the required forces, and so they were reliant on imported materiel (particularly aircraft) from the US, and indeed the Dutch strategy always depended on US and UK support against a Japanese invasion.
So when the US declared an embargo, so did the DEI (as did the UK for similar reasons).
Now, Japan's medium-term strategic goal (continue the war in China) is unachievable without its short-term strategic goal (secure sufficient oil supplies by conquering the Dutch East Indies). The question is, if Japan attacks just the DEI, will the US (and the UK) allow this to happen unimpeded?
The danger to Japan is, if the US does choose to intervene, a) along with the embargo it has also passed a shipbuilding bill that will give it dramatic numerical superiority over the IJN, and b) the Phillipines are in a perfect position for air, surface, and sub units to interdict the sea lines of communication between Japan or its newly-annexed territory in FIC and the oil in the DEI. There is a symmetrical threat from the UK and the colony of Malaya and the naval base at Singapore.
So the short answer is, if Japan doesn't choose to knock the US out of the war first, then going for the DEI is very risky if the US decides to scale up its response from embargo to open war - and it's clearly committed to building up its military to be able to do so.
If Japan had directed its forces against the USSR:
The Red Army had given the IJA a bloody nose in 1939 at Khalkin Gol, the armistice from which was the green light for Stalin to invade Poland. The Far East military districts had not had their forces drawn down to fight the Germans in 1941 (though the Central Asian military districts did have their forces redeployed to defend Moscow) and it is very likely that Japan would have found, despite probable air superiority, that their dramatic inferiority in armor and artillery would have seen another defeat. And then they'd run out of oil and have to go home anyway. And the British might also declare war (as Churchill was desperate to keep Stalin fighting Germany) and see what the RN could do to Japanese shipping, particularly when the need to supply troops in Kamchatka or wherever would mean that Japan would lack the sealift to supply a land offensive against Malaya.
Excellent; thanks for the content. I'm pretty new to AH, but it wouldn't surprise me if this were one of the most discussed WI scenarios on the forum.
But, as I said, I'm new here, so I wonder if anyone knows what the political ramifications might be if the US declared war due to Japan seizing the Dutch East Indies. I recall there being a substantial isolationist sentiment in America after WWI; the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor mostly silenced the nay-sayers, but how would it go down if there was no sense of betrayal, no sneak attack directly against U.S. forces to force Congress' hand?
Your answer does a fantastic job of answering why Japan perceived a preemptive strike against the USA as necessary to securing the supplies it needed to continue its own war efforts, but I wonder how they might have acted if their ambassador had his finger a bit more on the pulse of US opinion re: foreign policy.
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Saphroneth
Banned
Without the Pearl attack, the invasion of the Philippines (which were, at the time, a close US ally and in effect a colony) is played up the same way.
Question is: is this risk better or worse than the one assumed OTL ? (and we all know how that went...)
Looking at the issue from a historical perspective, Japan won its war with Russia not so much because of Tsushima, but because the Russians lost the will to fight - had they not, its possible, maybe even likely, that Russian land forces would have eventually defeated Japanese ones. However, by attacking Pearl Harbor, Japan pretty much made sure that American opinion would never* waver from support of the war effort, a fact which was probably recognized by Yamamoto:
Isoroku Yamamoto said:
He knew that the key to victory was not so much a military but a political one. However, by attacking the US directly, the Japanese pretty much threw any chance of a political solution out the window.
If, by attacking only Dutch and British colonies, they objectively still retain even a sliver of hope of reaching a political solution with the US later on, then that is, IMHO, a better strategy than the one pursued OTL, which had a 0% probability of success.
Japan almost had to if it wanted to expand its Empire. Not attacking the U.S. would have been smarter if the US stayed out of the war but if they didn't and the U.S Pacific Fleet was at full strength the war would have been over quicker most likely and the Philippines might not have fallen. They couldn't risk it.
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British Republic
Banned
The Long Night Falls TL (which was one of the reasons why I joined AH, which I found interesting, although the end result was in my view a bad thing) sort of covers it, however it does have other factors at play:
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=169831
Basically Japan dicovers and extracts the Manchurian oilfields in the 20s, focuses on China and the USSR, forms a closer relationship with Germany and Italy, further develop its navy and air force, increases the mechanization of the army and avoids any attack on America or the Phillipines. Along with the fact that since PH or the invasion of the Phillipines did not happen, America only sends milltary aid to the allies...
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=169831
Basically Japan dicovers and extracts the Manchurian oilfields in the 20s, focuses on China and the USSR, forms a closer relationship with Germany and Italy, further develop its navy and air force, increases the mechanization of the army and avoids any attack on America or the Phillipines. Along with the fact that since PH or the invasion of the Phillipines did not happen, America only sends milltary aid to the allies...
My timeline Japanese did a bit of both. Taking on the Communists and then the Entente (Allies) and the U.S. Obviously I have a few PODs that explain how this could happen and how successful it is. It's currently mid 1943 in my timeline with a war that is possibly worse than OTL. Check it out if you wish.
NOTE: My timeline is NOT the most realistic or even all that realistic. However it is a scenario I wanted to write about and is somewhat realistic and not a wank for any single nation. So if you go into my timeline and see things that are not 100% realistic no need to complain about it, I realize they aren't. I plan to rectify some-many of them in my revision once the timeline is done.
NOTE: My timeline is NOT the most realistic or even all that realistic. However it is a scenario I wanted to write about and is somewhat realistic and not a wank for any single nation. So if you go into my timeline and see things that are not 100% realistic no need to complain about it, I realize they aren't. I plan to rectify some-many of them in my revision once the timeline is done.
British Republic
Banned
Well I found it it quite interesting (I also liked the his USAO thread) and quite workable however the authors views where controversal (hence he got banned)
Controversial how? Was it personal views or views within the timeline?
British Republic
Banned
AH Wiki said:
As Eurofed he did say (a few times) that he was cultural assimilation and that he wanted to see fewer nations and a more united world. In general I don't diagree but I am not going to be keen on wiping out or forcing whole ethnic groups for the sake it.
It was a shame he had such views considering the threads he created (minus the crimes against humanity Fascist Europe ended up doing in TLNF), anyway I am not defending him and I agree the mods did the right thing, I don't want to push this thread off topic so I that is all i have to say...
He did not seem to be a Neo-Nazi, but you get the impression the end result in TLNF was in his view a positive one (for Facist Europe), he was also crtical of the British in general (which I found a bit harsh)
British Republic
Banned
Your welcome, I brought his thread up because it shows how the Axis powers could do "well" out of WW2, Japan in the long run fails to sustain GEACPS to a certain extent and only remains Korea and Manchuria as part of Japan itself, with the likes of China and SEA as puppet states...
It won't be directly because of that. It will be because of a later casus belli. The US doesn't want to leap to the defence of a colonial power; however, it will trumpet things like "freedom of navigation" while sending the Navy steaming around inviting trouble, and either use a later outrage in China (which is a US interest) or an actual attack on a US-flagged ship (which is pretty much guaranteed somewhere along the way) to justify entry into the war.
The US doesn't actually want to go to war yet. Every day that passes it gets stronger relative to Japan - the various US war plans always envisaged a 1-2 year buildup of overwhelming force, during which time the Philippines would fall, and then launching a campaign to take everything back. But it does want to go to war. Well, regime change that left Japan introverted and isolationist and not intervening in China would do. As long as isolationist doesn't involve any trade barriers to US companies seeking to do business there. Anyway, once Vinson gets the navy funding through Congress, it's just a matter of waiting until the correlation of forces tilts inexorably in the direction of the US.
To some extent it was an accurate assessment - the US establishment's position identified Japan as a competitor for commerce and influence in the Pacific, to be defeated and preferably turned into a client state. It just wasn't committed to spending the money to do so militarily before June 1940, and wasn't prepared politically to spend the blood to do so in December 1941 when the choice was taken away from Roosevelt. In terms of identifying the influences on US policy, for instance, SecWar Stimson was one of the members of the Price Committee, which was one of the China Lobby pressure groups that had been pushing for support to Chiang since 1937.
Yes, this too.
Japanese naval strategy was an extension of Mahan's - destroy the enemy fleet with a decisive battle and then attrite their economy and army by strangling their commerce with a blockade. The Japanese version accepted that the disparity in battleship forces (the Washington Naval Treaties had set the US, UK, and Japan at 5:5:3 tonnages respectively) required an additional phase to the campaign to degrade the enemy battle line before the final engagement. The kantai kessen approach was broadly:
- Capture the Philippines
- Taunt the Americans about their maternal odours and rodent parentage
- When the USN obligingly sails its battleships to Manila, use a combination of submarines, night-time destroyer torpedo attacks, and air strikes from both carriers and land-based bombers to whittle down the opposing force, until it turns up weak enough to be sunk by the mighty battlewagons of the IJN.
- Accept the inevitable armistice from the weak-willed Americans and be back in Kure in time for tea and medals.
US strategy was a similar approach approach, kind of, except that it involved putting troops and airfields on all the islands between Hawaii and Luzon and fielding huge numbers of escorts (at Leyte Gulf, the USN had more ships than the Japanese had aircraft) to ensure that the fleet advanced largely untroubled by pesky little air raids, nighttime surface actions, or submarines, at which point the massive advantage in weight of metal would mean that the opposing force would be weak enough to be sunk by the mighty battlewagons of the USN. Along the way it would evolve to make that "by the mighty carrier air groups of the USN", but it's the thought that counts.
@Magnum: a lot of the US establishment is looking to take Japan down a peg or two.. or all pegs, really. Everybody expects that war is coming; they are not even all wrong about how easy it will be. Letting Japan get hold of DEI oil and Malayan rubber (and the income therefrom) is guaranteeing a further trouble in China because Japan will then be able to carry on its war there.
A war over "freedom of navigation" wouldn't be quite as attractive to the American public, especially when they have Hitler to deal with. Sure, the deck is obviously stacked in the US' favor, and sure in all likelihood they will come out on top.
However, I repeat my stance that a situation where Japan actively courts American public opinion, behaves defensively against the US and keeps offering status quo ante after attacked over such a flimsy pretext as "freedom of navigation" is much more likely (as in "has a probability greater than 0") to come to a political solution with the US. The OTL course of action had 0% chance of success.
Freedom of navigation is the excuse to put ships in harm's way.
The casus belli is always going to be a bloody shirt, after they get harmed doing so.
As long as Japan is engaged in China pushing to "Manchurianize" the whole country, as Cordell Hull put it, it's going to end up being pushed by the US to and beyond the point of war, because the US' conclusion is that its vital national interests will be served by so doing and that it's going to win the war in question. The antebellum status quo that the US wants is the 1936 one, or even more generous than that. No IJA campaign in China, and no Manchukuo. There is no faction in Japan that can abide that; one that tried would face internal rebellion and assassination from within the junior officer corps.