WI: No ABDACOM

[HJ Tulp]

WI: No ABDACOM

The American-British-Dutch-Australian (ABDA) Command was a short-lived and very unsuccessful attempt at establishing a unified command for the allied defense of South East Asia against the Japanese Empire. The problems started at it’s conception:

• It was only after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that ABDACOM was established. The U.S. refused anything but the most rudimental of cooperation in name of neutrality. Without U.S. backing the United Kingdom didn’t want to commit to the defense of the Dutch East Indies and even though the Netherlands became pretty eager for a deal in 1940 it’s century-old tradition of neutrality was hard to shake off.
  
  
• While negotiations were still very much in the early phase the U.S. and the U.K. announced the establishment of ABDACOM thus without consulting the Netherlands and Australia. This understandably caused a lot of bad blood.
  
  
• The political decision-making was totally in the hands of the United Kingdom and the U.S. even though a great part of the forces present were Dutch and Australian.
  
  
• To make matters worse the command structure was filled with officers from, you guessed it, the United Kingdom and the United States.
  
  
• To complete the picture, the Naval Air Service was added to ABDAAIR (the air force component) instead of ABDAFLOAT (the naval component) which caused a lack of information or ‘eyes’ for ABDAFLOAT and made any RNLN attempt to fight the war according to their doctrine an impossibility
  

The above caused a focus of the defense of Singapore above all and when that went belly up the UK/US decided to give up the rest of the project, handed over the keys to the Dutch and made the hell out of dodge.

What if ABDACOM isn’t established? What was the alternative? Zones of interest under national commands? Bilateral agreements on an ad-hoc or island-by-island basis? What would the effect be on the war-effort? One could say that it couldn’t get worse than OTL. Or can it?

 

[Cryhavoc101]

In terms of Naval effort and logistics as well as the majority of the air power in the region the US and Britain were the major players while the relative handful of warships the Dutch provided were largely obsolete - perhaps the 2 light crusiers could be considered modern?

Australia had committed a Division to Singapore minus a Brigade in Timor IIRC and 4 ships but was otherwise fully committed in North Africa and the Med with the balance of the RAN and the majority of the 2nd AIF

The available land forces of the Dutch were but a fraction of what the British and USA had committed to the region and were incapable of dending DEI let alone of being usefully moved elsewhere - on the other hand limited US and British forces were on hand to try and reinforce them

So yes it made perfect sense for the USA and Britain to lead the formation of ABDA and then invite the Dutch and Australians in

The defence of Singapore as a priority for the British made perfect sense as it was a major base and transport hub - if the Japanese had failed in Malaya/Singapore then their entire strategy in the region is undone

As it was no one of the 4 nations of ABDA had enough forces in the region

 

[Oldbill]

You pointed out one of the major problems in the organization (very good synopsis btw) which was putting the Dutch Naval Air service under ABDAAIR. That organization was a integral part of the well thought plan the Dutch had for the NEI, had it remained it would have better enabled (through more efficient reconnaissance) ABDAAFLOAT to resist and at least bloody the Japanese. Destroying or mauling an invasion convoy would have seriously set back the Japanese timetable, with all the attendant knock-on effects. This has possibilities for a good TL IMO. Good catch!

 

[Driftless]

Pre-war, wasn't there an element within each country's local commanders of either "Since I'm on the far side of the world, I'll do it my way", or even benign competition with their colonial neighbors? So, when the fighting starts and the US, Britain, and the Dutch are already knocked backwards, having suffered grievous losses elsewhere. The necessary change of mindset from their individual national interests to theater wide strategic planning and cooperation as allies was a too large of a hurdle to cross in the short time-frame?

Give them more time and resources and the situation becomes somewhat better?

 

[Oldbill]

Pre-war, wasn't there an element within each country's local commanders of either "Since I'm on the far side of the world, I'll do it my way", or even benign competition with their colonial neighbors? So, when the fighting starts and the US, Britain, and the Dutch are already knocked backwards, having suffered grievous losses elsewhere. The necessary change of mindset from their individual national interests to theater wide strategic planning and cooperation as allies was a too large of a hurdle to cross in the short time-frame?

Give them more time and resources and the situation becomes somewhat better?

I believe all of them had prewar plans, none of which really applied in OTL, because who in the hell would have believed the near ASB situation that developed? Hitler swallows small countries, knocks France out of the war (a big one) Italy throws its hat in with Adolf, THEN the US PacFlt gets curb stomped at PH. USN torpedoes suck, the Brits are curb stomped in Malaya, and the shoestring operations of the IJA/IJN succeed beyond their wildest fantasies. THEN there are all the failures that occurred in smaller fashion. Seriously, if one of us wrote a TL like that, the pitchforks and torches would be out. Having said that Driftless, you have a point. I don't think its so much doing it their own way, as not having time to develop and implement the necessary plans and policies for interallied co-operation. If, as HJ as stated, the Dutch keep their naval air arm under ABDAAFLOAT, then the ABDA naval forces might eek out a victory, even a pyrrhic one will change things. The Dutch strategy of vectoring their ships and submarines based on aircraft sightings, then attriting the enemy was a good one, particular if enough of a surface fleet was also present. Could they hold the NEI? Very doubtful with what ABDA had. But again, they could delay the Japanese, and that will shortly pay dividends. I believe Admiral Hart knew before PH that the PI could not be held, the destruction of the FEAAF and torpedo stores only sped up the ordering of the Asiatic Fleet's to Dutch waters. That left only two nations with locations of strategic importance, the NEI and Singapore. If Singapore had Montgomery instead of Percival (not that Percival was entirely to blame) Singapore and Malaya may not have been held, but could have held longer. By having two locations their respective nations believed had to be held, neither got the amount of resources needed. I honestly don't know how they would have decided on how to split the baby in that circumstance, it may have been impossible.

 

[HJ Tulp]

First of all thanks for your response!

Secondly I'd like to respond to some of your statements .

In terms of Naval effort and logistics as well as the majority of the air power in the region the US and Britain were the major players while the relative handful of warships the Dutch provided were largely obsolete - perhaps the 2 light crusiers could be considered modern?

If you look at the whole ABDACOM-controlled area certainly the US and the UK were overwhelmingly larger players than Australia and the Netherlands. Is it fair to include all that though? Why was Burma part of it? It was a British territory that was defended by British forces.

This is something that happens in other areas as well. The Phillipines for example were practically an American affair bar a attack on Davao by Dutch Dorniers. In Malaysia it was less clear cut but was it still necessary to put it under 'unified' control? Did it help the situation? It seems to me that the only thing that the inclusion of the whole of South East Asia into ABDACOM did was overcomplicate things and give the US and the UK a excuse to steamroll the smaller parties and (ab)use their assets.

So yes it made perfect sense for the USA and Britain to lead the formation of ABDA and then invite the Dutch and Australians in.

Except this is not what happened. The US and the UK announced that the Netherlands and Australia were part of ABDACOM and that was that. When the agreement was finally ammended the fall of Java was imminent.

The defence of Singapore as a priority for the British made perfect sense as it was a major base and transport hub - if the Japanese had failed in Malaya/Singapore then their entire strategy in the region is undone

I agree that holding Singapore could have that effect on the Japanese wareffort (though wouldn't holding the oilports on Borneo have the same effect?) and so did the Dutch government which supported that effort with all it got to spare and more.

However what I meant was that, Singapore being a British possession and Wavell being a British general, it was practically the only thing ABDACOM was doing. ABDAFLAOT was mostly concerned with protecting convoys to Singapore (which weren't that threatened AFAICT) instead of supporting actions like led to the Battle of Balikpapan. Isn't it telling that once Singapore fell Wavell abandoned the project and fled Java?

As it was no one of the 4 nations of ABDA had enough forces in the region

This is of course the root of all problems!

I do wonder if you have any idea what the alternative for ABDACOM could be though as that's what I started this thread for
I mean couldn't it be arranged in the way it was after ABDACOMs dissolution?

 

[HJ Tulp]

You pointed out one of the major problems in the organization (very good synopsis btw) which was putting the Dutch Naval Air service under ABDAAIR. That organization was a integral part of the well thought plan the Dutch had for the NEI, had it remained it would have better enabled (through more efficient reconnaissance) ABDAAFLOAT to resist and at least bloody the Japanese. Destroying or mauling an invasion convoy would have seriously set back the Japanese timetable, with all the attendant knock-on effects. This has possibilities for a good TL IMO. Good catch!

Thanks! For a successful execution of the Dutch 1920-1936 plan for the defense of Java there are still a couple of things (like numbers in the air and on/under sea) that need to change but it could at least give ABDAFLAOT more of a chance to hurt the Japanese invasion instead of the mostly useless efforts of the Combined Strike Force.

Pre-war, wasn't there an element within each country's local commanders of either "Since I'm on the far side of the world, I'll do it my way", or even benign competition with their colonial neighbors? So, when the fighting starts and the US, Britain, and the Dutch are already knocked backwards, having suffered grievous losses elsewhere.

No basically. Every colonialist in South East Asia knew that Japan was the major if not only threat (bar Asian nationalists of course) and expected that all three nations (the Netherlands, the US and the UK) would fight alongside eachother. The power imbalance between the Anglos on one side and Japan on the other side seem to safeguard the colonies.

Of course then starts WWII and like Oldbill says priorities shift to Europe and the Atlantic. What is more, because there is war in Europe the US has to keep the UK and the Netherlands at a safe distance not to violate it's neutrality stance. So you have the NEI being the price, the UK unwilling (and unable) to defend it without the US and the US unwilling to be drawn in the war. And in the end still getting it.

The necessary change of mindset from their individual national interests to theater wide strategic planning and cooperation as allies was a too large of a hurdle to cross in the short time-frame?

To quote conversation between a British admiral and the Dutch C-in-C Helfrich:

Helfrich: I send my subs to that hell on the Malayan coast for you and now we need help you abandon us?

British admiral: I do sympathise with you and your phlight but in the end I am a British officer and had to safeguard British interests.

To symbolise that nations (and especially the great powers) always do what is in their own best interests.

I believe all of them had prewar plans, none of which really applied in OTL, because who in the hell would have believed the near ASB situation that developed? Hitler swallows small countries, knocks France out of the war (a big one) Italy throws its hat in with Adolf, THEN the US PacFlt gets curb stomped at PH. USN torpedoes suck, the Brits are curb stomped in Malaya, and the shoestring operations of the IJA/IJN succeed beyond their wildest fantasies. THEN there are all the failures that occurred in smaller fashion. Seriously, if one of us wrote a TL like that, the pitchforks and torches would be out. Having said that Driftless, you have a point. I don't think its so much doing it their own way, as not having time to develop and implement the necessary plans and policies for interallied co-operation. If, as HJ as stated, the Dutch keep their naval air arm under ABDAAFLOAT, then the ABDA naval forces might eek out a victory, even a pyrrhic one will change things. The Dutch strategy of vectoring their ships and submarines based on aircraft sightings, then attriting the enemy was a good one, particular if enough of a surface fleet was also present. Could they hold the NEI? Very doubtful with what ABDA had. But again, they could delay the Japanese, and that will shortly pay dividends. I believe Admiral Hart knew before PH that the PI could not be held, the destruction of the FEAAF and torpedo stores only sped up the ordering of the Asiatic Fleet's to Dutch waters. That left only two nations with locations of strategic importance, the NEI and Singapore. If Singapore had Montgomery instead of Percival (not that Percival was entirely to blame) Singapore and Malaya may not have been held, but could have held longer. By having two locations their respective nations believed had to be held, neither got the amount of resources needed. I honestly don't know how they would have decided on how to split the baby in that circumstance, it may have been impossible.

Interesting observations. I think that there have been multiple excellent TLs that have shown the Japanese blade to be a sharp blade but a brittle one. Problem is that the Allied effort was riddled with institutional incompetence. It's hard to change that.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

To quote conversation between a British admiral and the Dutch C-in-C Helfrich:

Helfrich: I send my subs to that hell on the Malayan coast for you and now we need help you abandon us?

British admiral: I do sympathise with you and your phlight but in the end I am a British officer and had to safeguard British interests.

To symbolise that nations (and especially the great powers) always do what is in their own best interests.

That is slightly disengenuous in that every ship USA, Britain and Australia sent to defend Java (2 CC, 1 CL and 8 DDs) only 4 US DDs made it out and these ships pretty much represented everything that was available to be sent in the region - and even then they were badly out matched by the Japanese forces arrayed against them.

Also the British Commonwealth and US forces (despite being neutral at the time) were busy fighting the Germans, Italians and Vichy French across half the globe which is why they only could spare 4th tier forces for the region which were incapable of matching the Japanese 1st tier forces arayed agasint them.

Perhaps the truth of the matter is that the Democracies of mainland europe had given the Japanese a massive window of opportunity by burying their heads in the sands during the 30s - not doing enough to rearm and then after being defeated by Germany blame Britain as the last European Democracy standing and the USA for not doing enough to defend their interests which they themselves had done far far too little to defend.

 

[HJ Tulp]

That is slightly disengenuous in that every ship USA, Britain and Australia sent to defend Java (2 CC, 1 CL and 8 DDs) only 4 US DDs made it out and these ships pretty much represented everything that was available to be sent in the region - and even then they were badly out matched by the Japanese forces arrayed against them.

Also the British Commonwealth and US forces (despite being neutral at the time) were busy fighting the Germans, Italians and Vichy French across half the globe which is why they only could spare 4th tier forces for the region which were incapable of matching the Japanese 1st tier forces arayed agasint them.

Oh I wholeheartedly agree that Helfrich was designious! Especially as this conversation was after the Combined Strike Force (with US and UK ships) was destroyed.

I do think that it symbolises how international politics work: a country always puts it's own interests before that of other countries. Helfrich may have helped the British by sending air and naval units to Malaya but that was because he thought that the British would do the same. So in Dutch interests, not out of charity.

Perhaps the truth of the matter is that the Democracies of mainland europe had given the Japanese a massive window of opportunity by burying their heads in the sands during the 30s - not doing enough to rearm and then after being defeated by Germany blame Britain as the last European Democracy standing and the USA for not doing enough to defend their interests which they themselves had done far far too little to defend.

Let's face it, outside of the Axis no country rearmed quickly or massively enough. No reason together snippy at a whole continent

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

WI: No ABDACOM

The American-British-Dutch-Australian (ABDA) Command was a short-lived and very unsuccessful attempt at establishing a unified command for the allied defense of South East Asia against the Japanese Empire. The problems started at it’s conception:

• It was only after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that ABDACOM was established. The U.S. refused anything but the most rudimental of cooperation in name of neutrality. Without U.S. backing the United Kingdom didn’t want to commit to the defense of the Dutch East Indies and even though the Netherlands became pretty eager for a deal in 1940 it’s century-old tradition of neutrality was hard to shake off.

The pre war efforts may have been more than rudimentary. The Commonwealth, Dutch, and US intelligence services in the S Pac were exchanging information. The US War Warning order of 26 Nov issued to the Pacific and Panama Commands was based in part on collective indicators from all three. The Brits relayed to the US the 6th Dec air reconissance spottings of Japanese war convoys heading from the S China Sea into the Gulf of Siam. Also Brit Adm Phillips had been in Manila 5 & 6 December to confer with MacArthur on mutual defense plans. This was in follow up to previous staff conferences. Someone managed to write a book on the subject, 'Secret Allies in the Pacific' if I recall the name correctly.

 

[HJ Tulp]

The pre war efforts may have been more than rudimentary. The Commonwealth, Dutch, and US intelligence services in the S Pac were exchanging information. The US War Warning order of 26 Nov issued to the Pacific and Panama Commands was based in part on collective indicators from all three. The Brits relayed to the US the 6th Dec air reconissance spottings of Japanese war convoys heading from the S China Sea into the Gulf of Siam. Also Brit Adm Phillips had been in Manila 5 & 6 December to confer with MacArthur on mutual defense plans. This was in follow up to previous staff conferences. Someone managed to write a book on the subject, 'Secret Allies in the Pacific' if I recall the name correctly.

Oh there was certainly some level of cooporation before Pearl Harbour. See for example the PLENAPS ('Plans for the employment of naval and airforces, including army air forces of the associated powers in the Eastern theatre in the event of war with Japan'). The Dutch agreed to send a substantial part of their naval and air units to Malaya when the war would break out (and supplies were send in advance) and units of the Asiatic Fleet refueled at Tarakan late November 1941.

Discussions (without Australia, the Netherlands or China) about ABDACOM didn't start until the Arcadia Conference of the 22nd of December though with the establishment of ABDACOM announced on the 1st of January. As said before, it was only on the eve of destruction that the agreement was altered enough to satisfy the lesser partners. The preparations could all have been done before the war with ABDACOM established right after the attack on Pearl Harbour.