An excellent point.
In the Marianas, land-based air support was not available. At Normandy, it was available in spades.
WI: More ships assigned to bombard Normandy on D-Day.
- Thread starter Ming777
- Start date
An excellent point.
In the Marianas, land-based air support was not available. At Normandy, it was available in spades.
Saphroneth
Banned
Okay, so - HMS Shootbeach, British monitor built for shore support.
200 feet in length, 35 feet beam and 6 feet draft. 936 tons displacement.
Only armament 2 8" guns in one turret, with 150 rounds per gun. Excellent stability as a gun platform, good in all weathers. 4" of belt armour and 4" of turret, no other armour. 10 knots max speed, 8 knots cruise, fuel for 1,000 nautical miles.
OTL in WW1, HMS M15 (540 tons) was three months from laying down to commission. If we assume this takes twice as long, then you can imagine at least two or three builds' worth available for Normandy.
200 feet in length, 35 feet beam and 6 feet draft. 936 tons displacement.
Only armament 2 8" guns in one turret, with 150 rounds per gun. Excellent stability as a gun platform, good in all weathers. 4" of belt armour and 4" of turret, no other armour. 10 knots max speed, 8 knots cruise, fuel for 1,000 nautical miles.
OTL in WW1, HMS M15 (540 tons) was three months from laying down to commission. If we assume this takes twice as long, then you can imagine at least two or three builds' worth available for Normandy.
DK Brown's Nelson to Vanguard mentions a small Monitor designed in 1942 carrying 2×6 inch guns at speed of 15 kts on 1250 tons with a draught of 6ft. The design was rejected as it cost £285,000 and would delay the frigate and landing craft programs. Presumably it would have used frigate machinery like the LST Mk III.
In the notes on the left hand side of the page it quotes a diary entry from Stanley Goodall from the 20th Feb 1943. "6inch monitor.Controller was horrified at size and cost. He had a little sketch of enemy coasters but they apparently all guns, no endurance and low speed inztead of our 15 knots."
In the notes on the left hand side of the page it quotes a diary entry from Stanley Goodall from the 20th Feb 1943. "6inch monitor.Controller was horrified at size and cost. He had a little sketch of enemy coasters but they apparently all guns, no endurance and low speed inztead of our 15 knots."
Napalm was introduce in a tactical role in Europe in July, 1944. What if they had the fighter-bombers drench the landing sites in the stuff before the first wave hits?
except the doctrine wasn't there yet. It developed during the Normandy campaign. In the Pacific the Marine Corps had excellent doctrine and even better coordination. They just didn't have thousands of tactical aircraft. On the other hand, the Japanese didn't have nearly as many troops or vehicles to shoot up either.
Carpet bombing was supposed to make up for some of that, but on D Day because of poor weather and lack of practice, Omaha saw most of the bombing that was supposed to help fall too far inland and merely kill a lot of Norman cows.
The main reason that Omaha went badly was not through lack of NGS bombardment - it was a combination of tougher than expected defences and the assault waves getting scattered with some not even landing on Omaha at all!
They had 2 Battleships and 3 Crusiers + 12 DDs in direct support.
With Hindsight I think 2 things could change - the DDs could follow in the first wave to the 1000 meters mark and directly engage the defences (this could be done on all beaches) - and this was eventually what they did - got to love those destroyer captains!
Secondly and I got this from a now sadly late relative who was a coxwain on one of the LSTs on one of the British beaches - the US DD tanks were launched to far out - this in an effort to reduce risk to the valuable LSTs - the British decided quite late (almost on the eve of the assault according to him) to sod that plan and drop the tanks into the surf as close as they could get them to the beach. As it was many still sunk despite the much shorter distance. But enough made it - certainly more made it than the 743rd Tank Battalions 2 swimmer companies did.
If they do the same a Omaha along with the destroyers drawing fire and providing point blank 4.7" - 5" direct support then I think the 116th/29th and 16th/1st along with the 743 Tank Battalion will be able to get much better lodgements and are far more likely to achieve their initial objectives.
A combination of the initial direct support from the DDs and landing the Duplex Drive Sherman's much closer to the beach.
With the Destroyers along with the leading waves there is also a much reduced chance of sub units getting scattered and landing on the wrong beaches.
Also having a dozen Destroyers that close would be a massive morale boost for the assaulting troops especially those of the inexperienced 29th Division.
Conversely the German defender being engaged by destroyers would no longer have the luxury of having 'free shots' at the assaulting US Infantry, Tanks and Engineers - not to mention that particular situation of being engaged by 4.7" and 5" shell (as well as rapid fire light cannon) being somewhat vexing.
The risk? Possible damage to destroyers and the valuable LSTs - but I think that it would have been worth it! Especially given the
They had 2 Battleships and 3 Crusiers + 12 DDs in direct support.
With Hindsight I think 2 things could change - the DDs could follow in the first wave to the 1000 meters mark and directly engage the defences (this could be done on all beaches) - and this was eventually what they did - got to love those destroyer captains!
Secondly and I got this from a now sadly late relative who was a coxwain on one of the LSTs on one of the British beaches - the US DD tanks were launched to far out - this in an effort to reduce risk to the valuable LSTs - the British decided quite late (almost on the eve of the assault according to him) to sod that plan and drop the tanks into the surf as close as they could get them to the beach. As it was many still sunk despite the much shorter distance. But enough made it - certainly more made it than the 743rd Tank Battalions 2 swimmer companies did.
If they do the same a Omaha along with the destroyers drawing fire and providing point blank 4.7" - 5" direct support then I think the 116th/29th and 16th/1st along with the 743 Tank Battalion will be able to get much better lodgements and are far more likely to achieve their initial objectives.
A combination of the initial direct support from the DDs and landing the Duplex Drive Sherman's much closer to the beach.
With the Destroyers along with the leading waves there is also a much reduced chance of sub units getting scattered and landing on the wrong beaches.
Also having a dozen Destroyers that close would be a massive morale boost for the assaulting troops especially those of the inexperienced 29th Division.
Conversely the German defender being engaged by destroyers would no longer have the luxury of having 'free shots' at the assaulting US Infantry, Tanks and Engineers - not to mention that particular situation of being engaged by 4.7" and 5" shell (as well as rapid fire light cannon) being somewhat vexing.
The risk? Possible damage to destroyers and the valuable LSTs - but I think that it would have been worth it! Especially given the
some LVTs would have been helpful too..they would have done better in the choppy conditions offshore than the DD Tanks actually did
Admiral Beez
Banned
That covers off the KGV. But where were Nelson, Royal Sovereign, Revenge, Resolution, QE, Malaya or Valiant?
Was the French battleship Richelieu considered to join the bombardment force?
It could, but it would have required a very different fire plan.
First note when the naval fires started. At the start of nautical twilight or in laymans terms when it was light enough to see the largest landmarks on the shore line. Roughly 05:15, I'd have to check the books to pin down the exact moments for each beach. There are a number of reasons reasons for this, but the effect was a very short naval bombardment. Barely 30 minutes in the case of UTAH Beach, about 45 minutes for OMAHA beach, and longer increments for each sucessive Canadian and British beach. Second note the targets. The BB were predominatly aimed at the defending heavy batteries, the big guns of the coastal artillery. The cruisers and destroyers were aimed at the lighter beach defenses, the MG and AT cannon bunkers.
Second: Note that during the pre H Hour preparatory fires very little was aimed inland at the German field artillery & other positions. Significant NGF attacks inland did not start until about fifteen minutes before H Hour for each individual beach.
Third: All the German defenders were in their battle positions before 05:00, before the naval and air preparatory attacks started. Most of the air attacks tapered off at 01:00 before the airbourne drops started at 01:30. So between 01:00 & 05:30/06:00 there was very little fire falling on the inland German positions.
Why is this important? The German soldiers defending the coast did not sleep there. They were billeted inland, usually 1 to 5 kilometers. On a ordinary night the MG and gun bunkers were manned by two guards, the OP & CP by maybe two or three watch standers, and a scatter of sentries in between. It is correct a 'Invasion Imminent' warning had been sent out on 3rd June, but that warning had been issues before and given the weather was difficult to take seriously. The soldiers habeen working extended hours at defense construction and training. the commanders were reluctant to damage those two tasks by further exhausting them with a full alert. Some additional sentries were posted & the result was the beach defenses were manned at less than 25% strength at 01:00.
When the paratrooper drops started at 01:30 the alarm imeadiatly went out & by 02:00 orders were arriving at the barracks & sleeping quarters to battle stations. So some 50,000 German soldiers were on the road on foot, horse, and unarmored autos headed to their combat posts. By most German accounts they had all reached their posts between 04:30 & 05:00. Many survivors remembered breakfast was being distributed to the battle positions shortly before dawn.
So, lets assume the NGF ships, including any extras are not quiet until first light. Lets imagine for a moment a fire plan was written to have then fire on the beach defenses, and the approaches from inland from sometime between 01:30 & 02:30. That would then require the German garrison run a guantlet of incoming fires for three hours to reach their battle stations, and do this in the dark.
I'll leave folks to draw their own conclusions on what this might to the strength and morale of the beach defenses when the first assault wave grounded.
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A few notes on the OTL NGF bombardment & its effects.
As mentioned in the preceeding post the preparatory fires before the assault lasted less than a hour on most beaches. The damage was relatively light. On OMAHA Beach there were 12 AT guns of various calibers from 5cm to one 8.8cm gun in the bunkers. I've never found evidence a single cannon was knocked out. Over 40 MG covered the beach, and its not clear if a single MG was damaged. Its similar on UTAH Beach. One 8.8cm AT gun was put out of action and some MG, but by the air strike and not naval fires. Similarly on the Commonwealth beaches there is evidence one or two AT guns were out of action and a handful of MG, but the vast majority were still firing when the first assault wave touched beach.
I spent half of my 20+ years service in the artillery and am familiar with the ammunition effects. Even for 14 or 15 inch naval projectiles a hit within a couple of meters of a heavy bunker is essential to cause any significant damage. The bunkers the Germans built were designed specifically to resist large caliber ammunition, and sustained bombardment. To actually destroy the bunkers a direct hit was necessary. A lot of big explosions 100, 50, or 10 meters away had only momentary suppresive effects.
As mentioned in the preceeding post the preparatory fires before the assault lasted less than a hour on most beaches. The damage was relatively light. On OMAHA Beach there were 12 AT guns of various calibers from 5cm to one 8.8cm gun in the bunkers. I've never found evidence a single cannon was knocked out. Over 40 MG covered the beach, and its not clear if a single MG was damaged. Its similar on UTAH Beach. One 8.8cm AT gun was put out of action and some MG, but by the air strike and not naval fires. Similarly on the Commonwealth beaches there is evidence one or two AT guns were out of action and a handful of MG, but the vast majority were still firing when the first assault wave touched beach.
I spent half of my 20+ years service in the artillery and am familiar with the ammunition effects. Even for 14 or 15 inch naval projectiles a hit within a couple of meters of a heavy bunker is essential to cause any significant damage. The bunkers the Germans built were designed specifically to resist large caliber ammunition, and sustained bombardment. To actually destroy the bunkers a direct hit was necessary. A lot of big explosions 100, 50, or 10 meters away had only momentary suppresive effects.
A LVT can cross the 300+ meters of open beach from the waters edge to the seawall and dunes in less than two minutes, how long does it take a laden infantry man to run that far?
The landings on the Commonwealth beaches were delayed 30 to 90 minutes on each sucessive beach. This was to gain enough rising tide to cross the mudflats or shoals off those beaches. The LVT was able to cross those at any water level. Their use would have allowed the Brits and Canadians to assault @ 06:30 or earlier. Vs 07:00 or later.
UTAH Beach was backed by flooded fields, complicating the advance inland. with LVT crossing the innudation could have occured at many different points vs only the five causeways.
We know from the interrogation of the Geman prisoners, and post battle study of the bunkers that none of the dozen AT guns covering the Beach were out of action from the bombardment.
At 06:30 the low tide would have caused the destroyers to ground beyond 1000 meters from shore. They did not close in to that range until well after 08:00 when the water was much deeper. The bottom gradient off all five beaches is very slight with low tide shoals 2000+ meters off shore. This is the reason the floating docks of the Mullberry harbors extended so far from the beach, they had to have the pierheads in deep enough water the shallower draft cargo ships and lighters could reach them at low tide.
Re: Tanks. 36 tanks made it to OMAHA Beach between 06:40 & 07:30 approx 30 of those were destroyed by defending AT guns by 07:30. the survivors either found defilade cover in their first minutes ashore, or backed up into the water & 'hid' among the landing craft. The effectiveness of the German AT guns there cannot be understated.
Re: NGF OMAHA Beach. There were six NGF spotting teams landed in the first wave on O Beach. I've never found any worthwhile evidence any were combat effective after the first few minutes ashore. Some of the radios were drowned in the water, some damaged by enemy fire, most sat unused because the operators were dead or wounded. The many accounts I've seen strongly suggest there was no useful activity on the NGF radio ciricut for up to two hours. The earliest evidence is that a 1st Sgt Presley in the 29th ID managed to get ahold of a NGF radio and make contact around 08:20 & 08:30. This may have been the message/s that caused the order to the destroyers to be issued. Between 08:30 & 09:00 one more & possibly two NGF radios came back on and started sending target info.
Why is this important? The German bunkers were heavily cammoflaged, buried, placed in defilade to the sea & obscured by haze and grass fires. Even at 1000 meters it was extremely difficult to spot them among the brush, buildings, and rubble. I spent several years as a artillery FO & can attest spotting such targets is a challenge. Without someone close in, under 500 meters, to spot the bunker the ships are going to waste a lot of time searching the landscape & shooting on false targets.
In general there was a complete collapse of radio communications on O Beach during the morning. A few battalion or regimental CP managed a handful of radio messages, but nothing adaquate for running a battle or managing fire support. From around 08:30 radio communication started to revive, but it was around noon before anything close to normal traffic occurred.
Had radio communications worked as they did on UTAH or the other beaches things could have been different on O beach. As on the others the bunkers could have been targeted for the NGF ships, mostly the cruisers 10,000 meters out, and salvos of 15 & 20 cm rounds directed on the bunkers.
Radio communications would have resolved many other problems hours sooner. The follow up waves could have been directed to the correct locations vs repeating the mislandings of the first wave. The sucess of the early infiltration of the bluffs could have been exploited faster. Reduction of the bunkers in the nests guarding the beach exits would have occured faster.
On UTAH Beach the bombing technique worked better & the defense was suppressed, nuetralized even.
1. The 9th AF medium bombers were trained to attack from lower altitudes. In this case the Group leaders took them below the overcast so they could see the targets. The heavy bombers of 8th AF had near zero training for low altitude attacks. The idea of dropping below the overcast was wholly alien to them.
2. the bombing runs ran paralle to the beach, not perpendicular as on O Beach.
3. The bunker clusters or "Reistance Nests" on U Beach were less obscured in the relatively flat dune land as opposed to hidden in the bluffs, gulleys, & high dunes overlooking O Beach.
As Carl S says the issue is not the number of guns firing its the number of shells hitting.
One of the lessons of WW1 ( Brit and German version) is predicted bombardment does not damage prepared positions except by luck. To do that you need direct fire or an observer controlling the fire.
That means either a 3 '' or better gun getting in position to see a target or a guy with a radio doing the same. After that its single rounds. You dont actually need many ships, you need many observers.
One of the lessons of WW1 ( Brit and German version) is predicted bombardment does not damage prepared positions except by luck. To do that you need direct fire or an observer controlling the fire.
That means either a 3 '' or better gun getting in position to see a target or a guy with a radio doing the same. After that its single rounds. You dont actually need many ships, you need many observers.
Archibald
Banned
Now that's an interesting idea, so I've checked wikipedia Richelieu page
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_battleship_Richelieu#Refit_in_New_York_City
And guess what ?
That's a crying shame ! The Richelieu was one hell of a battleship, and could have been useful on D-day as a French participation in the landings (for the record, the only french troups commited to D-day were the Kieffer commando 177 men that landed at the Pointe du Hoc)
Surely that should be Sword beach?
Yes
"A force of 176 French Marine Commandos from No. 10 (Inter-Allied) Commando, commanded by Commandant Philippe Kieffer landed with No. 4 Commando"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No._10_(Inter-Allied)_Commando
Immortalised in the film the Longest day
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fzd1gCc5CO8