They already had Churchill tanks in independent tank brigades, 3 of which served in NW Europe.
WI more Allied heavy tanks in World War II?
- Thread starter Pennsylvania
- Start date
They already had Churchill tanks in independent tank brigades, 3 of which served in NW Europe.
Pennsylvania
Banned
The Germans fielded their Heavy Tanks in Battalions. I figured that the Americans would field their Heavy Tanks in Battalions that are organic to the Regimental level (in Armored Regiments) or to the Divisional level (in Infantry divisions).
In these Heavy Tank Battalions, there would be 3 Companies of 10 Pershings or Meades, a Company of 10 Warrens or Hancocks, and a Battery of 10 M12 Gun Motor Carriages. 3 Companies for providing the main combat forces (of which one can be kept in reserve), plus 2 Company-level support units (anti-tank support and artillery support). A Headquarters & Headquarters Company, as well as a Battalion-level motor pool of spare tanks, would also be included in the Battalion.
The British would probably field a similar Battalion (similarly organic to Tank Regiments or Infantry Divisions), with 3 Companies of 10 Black Princes each, a Company of 10 Tortoises, and a Battery of 10 M12 Gun Motor Carriages.
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FBKampfer
Banned
Research. Sword beach was in the sector of the 716th Division, with initial defense only consisting of a handful of companies (so figure about 1000 men) and supporting artillery.
Initial defense was relatively stiff, but very quickly eliminated outside of isolated strong points such as Ouistraham and the town of Hermanville-sur-Mar, and a few especially stubborn knots of soldiers. Within about an hour and a half, the beach itself and the immediate area was largely secured, and all but one of the exits cleared by the REC.
Only Utah was more lightly opposed in the initial landings.
Read through this thread and thought I’d add my two cents.
1. Belton Cooper’s book and its rebuttal on Amazon.
General take away though was maybe opposite of what he intended in cutting down the Sherman, and separate from where there’s nonsense in his book. My impression was it wasn’t just that the Germans were being swamped with Shermans by production, but that even the knocked out ones were coming back like zombies unless they were burnt out and the metallurgy of the armor ruined. That could happen because the maintenance and recovery assets were so much better than the German ones, and the commonality of parts was far better. Also key here is ownership of the battlefield afterward – can’t recover from where you don’t own. Then there’s basic readiness of vehicles – reading on any of the German heavy stuff is not pleasant. So that’s production rate, recovery-maintenance assets, recovery access, readiness as arguably 4, rather than just 1 force multiplier swamping the Germans. Supports somewhat the merit of Sherman’s commonality, reinforces importance of good logistics.
2. United States verses German Equipment-Isaac D. White.
Curious as to how many here have read this. Eisenhower writes White commanding 2nd Armored Division to get first-hand opinion from White and from his troops on good-bad of US Tanks in March 1945 after they’d gone into rest phase after completing Roer Campaign. Impressive that the response came back in 2 days. It’s interesting to read, because it’s from Private up to Division commander responding. There’s a lot in there, but some key points:
a. Big complaint was not about having more armor, but having a gun that could hit at long range, and that could penetrate. What’s interesting is they just kept firing after bouncing many shots off. There was a telling and knowledgeable comment about Germans purposely making higher velocity guns by boosting the powder charge and that US was just adapting directly from anti-aircraft guns. Nerfs the 76mm and 90mm somewhat.
A lot of unhappiness that the 90mm wasn’t even good enough.
b. Flotation – the troops had empirically tested and found the German heavies sunk into the mud less than even American light tanks. Driving in mud compromised otherwise good mobility.
c. Sites and visibility – US didn’t have muzzle brakes, so the second shots were firing through smoke from the first shot. German site didn’t give as good a big picture to select targets, but a better small picture to hit with.
3. French experience with the Panther using it postwar, found this on WOT – which I don’t play, but do play ASL. The episode of Tank overhaul backs up some this too. This goes back to the above about how serviceable and reliable what got to the field was.
https://worldoftanks.com/en/news/chieftain/chieftains-hatch-french-panthers/
Short answer was that Panther was not very reliable.
Some of the comments seem to be dependent on the terrain fought over – Roer was more long range shots, verses Normandy and Bulge – where turret traverse speed, short barrels helped the Shermans.
Overall I get an impression of bureaucracy, lack of communication, and speed of communication from the field, or just plain ignoring the field, and arrogance – you’re fighting, but we know better than you, regarding getting a better, heavier US vehicle into the field. On the other hand from other reading and listening/watching I’d put American developing and fielding far over German. Didn’t know until recently that King Tigers burnt down to hulks, because of seals were bad and fumes would build up in engine compartments, get ignited, and burn the vehicles out - because of the increase in weight from the original design basis. There’s a lot of hindsight second-guessing choices made. What I’ve also read is that there was a lot of false starts and development time to even get to what became the M26, and going down the wrong path with electric drive on the T25(?) - think you need the M26 before you get the other heavies, or at least you want to know it works. When you consider the Soviet verses the American experience against the Germans and their tanks its much more continuous and longer. June '44 to May '45 is not a long time to experience-react-respond, and even in that time, the acute periods are pretty episodic.
I’d like to hear from those knowledgeable about whether the M6 was any good and worth the effort. In general seems like what would have been more workable than a new heavy tank, was speeding up and getting all the improvements that get to an M4A3E8 sooner, with more HVAP ammo.
Normandy, 21st Panzer on D-Day:
Luck’s book outlines how accurate naval gun fire, namely 15” fire, stops tank attacks – flips over Tiger I’s. I would not want to face off against even 5” guns on a US destroyer with any WW2 tank. Keep in mind that’s a much more accurately fire directed Jagdtiger gun we are talking about. It just gets worse as you go up.
1. Belton Cooper’s book and its rebuttal on Amazon.
General take away though was maybe opposite of what he intended in cutting down the Sherman, and separate from where there’s nonsense in his book. My impression was it wasn’t just that the Germans were being swamped with Shermans by production, but that even the knocked out ones were coming back like zombies unless they were burnt out and the metallurgy of the armor ruined. That could happen because the maintenance and recovery assets were so much better than the German ones, and the commonality of parts was far better. Also key here is ownership of the battlefield afterward – can’t recover from where you don’t own. Then there’s basic readiness of vehicles – reading on any of the German heavy stuff is not pleasant. So that’s production rate, recovery-maintenance assets, recovery access, readiness as arguably 4, rather than just 1 force multiplier swamping the Germans. Supports somewhat the merit of Sherman’s commonality, reinforces importance of good logistics.
2. United States verses German Equipment-Isaac D. White.
Curious as to how many here have read this. Eisenhower writes White commanding 2nd Armored Division to get first-hand opinion from White and from his troops on good-bad of US Tanks in March 1945 after they’d gone into rest phase after completing Roer Campaign. Impressive that the response came back in 2 days. It’s interesting to read, because it’s from Private up to Division commander responding. There’s a lot in there, but some key points:
a. Big complaint was not about having more armor, but having a gun that could hit at long range, and that could penetrate. What’s interesting is they just kept firing after bouncing many shots off. There was a telling and knowledgeable comment about Germans purposely making higher velocity guns by boosting the powder charge and that US was just adapting directly from anti-aircraft guns. Nerfs the 76mm and 90mm somewhat.
A lot of unhappiness that the 90mm wasn’t even good enough.
b. Flotation – the troops had empirically tested and found the German heavies sunk into the mud less than even American light tanks. Driving in mud compromised otherwise good mobility.
c. Sites and visibility – US didn’t have muzzle brakes, so the second shots were firing through smoke from the first shot. German site didn’t give as good a big picture to select targets, but a better small picture to hit with.
3. French experience with the Panther using it postwar, found this on WOT – which I don’t play, but do play ASL. The episode of Tank overhaul backs up some this too. This goes back to the above about how serviceable and reliable what got to the field was.
https://worldoftanks.com/en/news/chieftain/chieftains-hatch-french-panthers/
Short answer was that Panther was not very reliable.
Some of the comments seem to be dependent on the terrain fought over – Roer was more long range shots, verses Normandy and Bulge – where turret traverse speed, short barrels helped the Shermans.
Overall I get an impression of bureaucracy, lack of communication, and speed of communication from the field, or just plain ignoring the field, and arrogance – you’re fighting, but we know better than you, regarding getting a better, heavier US vehicle into the field. On the other hand from other reading and listening/watching I’d put American developing and fielding far over German. Didn’t know until recently that King Tigers burnt down to hulks, because of seals were bad and fumes would build up in engine compartments, get ignited, and burn the vehicles out - because of the increase in weight from the original design basis. There’s a lot of hindsight second-guessing choices made. What I’ve also read is that there was a lot of false starts and development time to even get to what became the M26, and going down the wrong path with electric drive on the T25(?) - think you need the M26 before you get the other heavies, or at least you want to know it works. When you consider the Soviet verses the American experience against the Germans and their tanks its much more continuous and longer. June '44 to May '45 is not a long time to experience-react-respond, and even in that time, the acute periods are pretty episodic.
I’d like to hear from those knowledgeable about whether the M6 was any good and worth the effort. In general seems like what would have been more workable than a new heavy tank, was speeding up and getting all the improvements that get to an M4A3E8 sooner, with more HVAP ammo.
Normandy, 21st Panzer on D-Day:
Luck’s book outlines how accurate naval gun fire, namely 15” fire, stops tank attacks – flips over Tiger I’s. I would not want to face off against even 5” guns on a US destroyer with any WW2 tank. Keep in mind that’s a much more accurately fire directed Jagdtiger gun we are talking about. It just gets worse as you go up.
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Obergruppenführer Smith
Banned
Okay, someone was trolling. Muzzle brakes actually impair vision by pushing the fume and dusts all around, so why would NOT having one restrict visibility more?
FBKampfer
Banned
It's worth noting that troops in the field tend to be notoriously unreliable sources of information.
The 90mm was actually superior to the Tiger I's 88mm L/56. Further boosting the powder charge wouldn't significantly increase performance. A longer barrel would be far more effective.
Secondly, the 90mm was sufficient to kill any vehicle in the German inventory save the Tiger II, the Elephant, and the Jagdtiger out to 1600m, or approximately four times the average range of engagement.
Secondly, of such vehicles, fewer that 120 were encountered by the Allies on the Western Front.
Consider reports that the 76mm HE shell was underpowered (a complaint stemming from the improved AT performance, exactly what the field troops had been clamoring for), despite performance comparable to every other gun of comprable caliber and velocity, leading to the widespread myth that the 76mm's HE shell was "poor".
US troops insisted on piling extra crap on their tanks, despite most of the material used being insufficient or entirely unsuited to protect from shaped charge warheads.
The widespread (and largely unfounded) belief that the M4 had a particular propensity for catching fire (attributed to a number of reasons, depending on what unit you asked, ranging from the gasoline engine, the ammunition stowage location, to hydrolic fluid or paint).
Soldiers believe, and make requests based on, information that is incorrect, incomplete, out of context, or in some cases wholly inaccurate.
The 90mm was actually superior to the Tiger I's 88mm L/56. Further boosting the powder charge wouldn't significantly increase performance. A longer barrel would be far more effective.
Secondly, the 90mm was sufficient to kill any vehicle in the German inventory save the Tiger II, the Elephant, and the Jagdtiger out to 1600m, or approximately four times the average range of engagement.
Secondly, of such vehicles, fewer that 120 were encountered by the Allies on the Western Front.
Consider reports that the 76mm HE shell was underpowered (a complaint stemming from the improved AT performance, exactly what the field troops had been clamoring for), despite performance comparable to every other gun of comprable caliber and velocity, leading to the widespread myth that the 76mm's HE shell was "poor".
US troops insisted on piling extra crap on their tanks, despite most of the material used being insufficient or entirely unsuited to protect from shaped charge warheads.
The widespread (and largely unfounded) belief that the M4 had a particular propensity for catching fire (attributed to a number of reasons, depending on what unit you asked, ranging from the gasoline engine, the ammunition stowage location, to hydrolic fluid or paint).
Soldiers believe, and make requests based on, information that is incorrect, incomplete, out of context, or in some cases wholly inaccurate.
Or given their previous examples of domestic armor, the British had a much higher tolerance for unreliability than the Americans.
Not that different than any of the other beaches; except that when the Germans started adding concrete to the fortifications, and creating a more in-depth defence in Normandy, they started from here.
Latest research shows that casualties on Sword have been undercounted (by being focused on the infantry units only); casualties were also reduced by the successful assault getting off the beaches quickly.
There was this guy called Leonardo da Vinci he was a decent painter and inventor look him up I think you will find he came up with an idea for a tank long before the 20th Century.
The Sherman like all American armor had one huge advantage, when hit American ammunition tended to sizzle before exploding and American tanks were easy to escape from.On avrage when an American tank was hit only one crew member died. German tanks were harder to escape from.
Regarding organisation I concluded that these would replace the Tank Destroyer Battalion within a given Infantry division across the US Army Divisions serving in the ETO with the M10s/M18/M36 (built in fewer numbers) pushed down to the formally towed AT Battalion
So simply rename any Tank Destroyer Battalion - ie the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion which was the US Army's 1st 'The Big Red One' Infantry Divisions integral Tank Destroyer Battalion would simply become 601st Heavy Tank Battalion - replacing the M10s it had OTL with M6s and very likely requiring a change to the Recovery vehicles.
In this sense the tank would be used as an Infantry support breakthrough tank like the Churchill was and also as it had a 3" gun - as a tank destroyer - late war it would be replaced by something like the T29 but with the long 90mm
The Armoured divisions would retain the M4 and M3/M5 light tank as their principle tank.
Regarding having heavy tanks slowing down any advance across Europe - asides from post Normandy breakout when else would a 22 MPH tank (which is still very respectable in terms of WW2 - PzVI Tiger was 28 MPH theoretical max on road - Churchill was Max 15 MPH, IS3 was 24 MPH) hold things up?
Regarding muzzle breaks - this is to reduce recoil and therefore in respects to a tank - the length that the breech recoils within the turret - and it can reduce this up to 50% - however the down side is that the gasses are vented to either side of the gun and this makes life very unpleasant for any exposed crew or supporting infantry so is why it is rarely seen on a modern MBT (you often see it on artillery but the crew can get away with wearing proper ear defenders and are unlikely to be operating near to infantry).
When you do see a muzzle break on a WW2 or post war tank its generally a compromise in that the gun is probably too big for the turret - so the 88mm/56 on the Tiger, the long 75mm on the Panther and the 17 pounder on the Firefly (the concussion of the 17 pounder on the firefly was apparently so violent that it would suck loose objects such as maps and berets etc out of the hatch if left open) the later upgunned Pz4s all needed a muzzle brake to 'control' the recoil of the breech.
So simply rename any Tank Destroyer Battalion - ie the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion which was the US Army's 1st 'The Big Red One' Infantry Divisions integral Tank Destroyer Battalion would simply become 601st Heavy Tank Battalion - replacing the M10s it had OTL with M6s and very likely requiring a change to the Recovery vehicles.
In this sense the tank would be used as an Infantry support breakthrough tank like the Churchill was and also as it had a 3" gun - as a tank destroyer - late war it would be replaced by something like the T29 but with the long 90mm
The Armoured divisions would retain the M4 and M3/M5 light tank as their principle tank.
Regarding having heavy tanks slowing down any advance across Europe - asides from post Normandy breakout when else would a 22 MPH tank (which is still very respectable in terms of WW2 - PzVI Tiger was 28 MPH theoretical max on road - Churchill was Max 15 MPH, IS3 was 24 MPH) hold things up?
Regarding muzzle breaks - this is to reduce recoil and therefore in respects to a tank - the length that the breech recoils within the turret - and it can reduce this up to 50% - however the down side is that the gasses are vented to either side of the gun and this makes life very unpleasant for any exposed crew or supporting infantry so is why it is rarely seen on a modern MBT (you often see it on artillery but the crew can get away with wearing proper ear defenders and are unlikely to be operating near to infantry).
When you do see a muzzle break on a WW2 or post war tank its generally a compromise in that the gun is probably too big for the turret - so the 88mm/56 on the Tiger, the long 75mm on the Panther and the 17 pounder on the Firefly (the concussion of the 17 pounder on the firefly was apparently so violent that it would suck loose objects such as maps and berets etc out of the hatch if left open) the later upgunned Pz4s all needed a muzzle brake to 'control' the recoil of the breech.
In addition to their greater reliability this is the other very well liked aspect of American Tanks by British Crews over their own WW2 tanks
As a then svelt 20 something year old many moons ago at a Bovington Tankfest it once took me a good 30 odd seconds to get out of the gunner's chair in an M4 - there is a lot going on in that turret - so getting out of other nations tanks must have been a bloody nightmare - particulalrly if it was on fire!
If the tank was on fire you might be sufficiently motivated to get out faster.
I know the driver's hatch on a Tiger wasn't directly over the head of the driver and the original hatch on the T-34 looks like a death sentence to anybody in the turret.
I think it would experience continuous modification like the M4 did (it had thousands during its production run)
I think the 37mm would not have made it into serial Production vehicles in my opinion - it is too clunky and an outmoded idea by 1942
The 2nd Bow MG also would go.
The Frontal hull would eventually become a single cast piece - likely more sloped and thicker replacement (101mm?)
Likely the turret would be revised in layout and improved method of production - the Layout had already been criticized before it was supposed to enter production so this might have been addressed by the time serial production started - again expect to see increased armour / thicker mantle.
The suspension is a Volute Spring type so should serve with few problems and very reliable / easy to repair over all other types (maybe with exception Horstmann type - but it's already similar)
Tracks look fairly wide - so probably little revision here
The gun very likely would be improved at some point to a 90 mm - the 105 is just too much gun IMO and more than is required - I expect this to start replacing earlier M6s during mid 44 at the earliest (M36 Jackson started arriving in ETO after Normandy in OTL) - possibly see 1 M6/90mm tank in each Platoon (Like the Firefly in British and Canadian Units) on this TLs D-Day increasing in numbers as production/delivery of the up gunned tank allows.
The 'M29' Heavy tank having been rushed into serial production starts arriving in limited numbers in December 1944 and only a 3rd of US Army Heavy Tank Battalions have converted by VE Day - with the M6 series carrying most of the 'Heavy Tank' Burden up to this point.
Over 30,000 changes according to Hunnicutt.
This serial production of the M6 might also encourage development of higher power engines across the board.