WI: May 1943 - Naval Battle at Attu

[GuildedAgeNostalgia]

1) The Battle of Attu was a campaign fought in the American Aleutian islands. Japan had invaded and taken a few of the islands in 1942. America would counterattack, which resulted in the ferocious 20 day battle on the island of Attu, where 3,000 Japanese soldiers tried to hold off a American invasion force of 15,000 soldiers. Although the Americans were able to recapture the island, Japanese resistance was stiffer than planned, and the American invasion force took heavy casualties, from both combat and the poor weather conditions.

Battle of Attu - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

2) What is relatively unknown about the Battle of Attu however, is that as it was ongoing the Japanese navy was actually assembling a fleet in Japan to launch another operation in the Aleutian islands. This fleet's goal was to both rescue the Japanese garrison on Attu and land a decisive blow against the American navy in that region. The Japanese naval taskforce consisted of (as the link above states):

- 4 aircraft carriers (Zuikaku, Shōkaku, Jun'yō, Hiyō)
- 3 battleships (Musashi, Kongō, Haruna)
- 7 cruisers (Mogami, Kumano, Suzuya, Tone, Chikuma, Agano, Ōyodo)
- 11 destroyers

In the end however, Attu would fall to the Americans before the Japanese naval force could be deployed to the region.

3) My question(s) for this thread are the following:
- What would happen if the Japanese garrison on Attu could hold out for a couple/few more weeks so that the Japanese naval force could arrive on scene?
- Did the Americans through code breaking know that a Japanese fleet was going to be deployed towards the Aleutians?
- Was was the strength of the American fleet in that area during the Aleutians Islands Campaign, and was it enough to stop the Japanese naval force?
- Would the American naval forces in the area withdraw? Would they be forced to abandon the American forces on Attu? What would be the effects of a Japanese military victory at Attu?

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

The Essex arrived in th Pacific in May 1943, after a speedy workup. How prepared she was for actual combat is a open question. The Saratoga was operational & in the S Pac, the Enterprise was in Puget Sound for a badly needed refit. So basically its the Saratoga as the only combat worthy carrier guaranteed, backed by the just arrived Essex.

 

[McPherson]

3) My question(s) for this thread are the following:
- What would happen if the Japanese garrison on Attu could hold out for a couple/few more weeks so that the Japanese naval force could arrive on scene?

They could not. their food situation was critical.

- Did the Americans through code breaking know that a Japanese fleet was going to be deployed towards the Aleutians?

Yes.

- Was was the strength of the American fleet in that area during the Aleutians Islands Campaign, and was it enough to stop the Japanese naval force?

It would not But there was enough land based air power to make Japanese operations with the fleet they were prepared to send "iffy".

- Would the American naval forces in the area withdraw? Would they be forced to abandon the American forces on Attu? What would be the effects of a Japanese military victory at Attu?

No. Buckner and Fletcher would fight.

 

[CalBear]

If the Japanese had sailed they would have flattened the American forces available. Nearest American Carrier win Pearl, 1,000 miles futher away. The U.S. had one CVE, the Nassau, and she was grass green with air group that had only arrived on board five days prior to leaving port. Three old BB Idaho, Nevada and Pennsylvania, three CA, three Omaha class CL and 19 destroyers (including the screening ships for the transports) .

The U.S. did have a substantial land based Air Corps contingent on Kiska that might have been able to counter the IJN carrier planes (had over 100 fighters (but only about 1/3 had the legs to get over Attu from Adak Island, along with 30 medium bombers and 24 heavys. But the Japanese surface force, even if the IJN airpower is removed for the scenario (either by weather or successful interdiction) would simply be overwhelming.

Americans would have been obliterated. Been the biggest defeat of the War, hell, the biggest defeat, by far, for the USN in its history.

 

[McPherson]

If the Japanese had sailed they would have flattened the American forces available. Nearest American Carrier win Pearl, 1,000 miles futher away. The U.S. had one CVE, the Nassau, and she was grass green with air group that had only arrived on board five days prior to leaving port. Three old BB Idaho, Nevada and Pennsylvania, three CA, three Omaha class CL and 19 destroyers (including the screening ships for the transports) .

The U.S. did have a substantial land based Air Corps contingent on Kiska that might have been able to counter the IJN carrier planes (had over 100 fighters (but only about 1/3 had the legs to get over Attu from Adak Island, along with 30 medium bombers and 24 heavys. But the Japanese surface force, even if the IJN airpower is removed for the scenario (either by weather or successful interdiction) would simply be overwhelming.

Americans would have been obliterated. Been the biggest defeat of the War, hell, the biggest defeat, by far, for the USN in its history.

Disagree. The weather up there makes flattop operations very problematical. Also, the SAG could not stay as it will be needed to fight further south. And what about tanker support? Lacking. This is one time and one place where the coin of the realm is land-based air and it is king. Hosagaya, Boshiro found that one out the hard way. My biggest concern besides the weather is the distances. Dutch Harbor to Attu is about 1250 km. Getting heavy and medium bomber support is weather dependent.

If the Japanese cannot shell the Marines out of Henderson Field, then the 7th Division could probably gut it out. The IJA garrison is likely dead meat because of their supply crisis.

And that is where it comes down; the supply crisis. The Americans can and the Japanese cannot.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Whats the weather forecast for the week.

 

[Dorknought]

Its worthwhile highlighting the 'Battle of the Pips' to show the challenges of fighting a naval battle in the Aleutians:

Warned by intelligence that the Japanese were on the move, the Americans had been patrolling west of Kiska, and on 22 July a group of PBYs picked up seven radar echoes ("pips") moving east. The targets were tracked for six hours before the aircraft were forced to return to base to refuel. Kinkaid ordered a powerful force under Griffin consisting of 3 battleships, 5 cruisers, and 9 destroyers, to intercept.

On the night of 25-26 July, this force was steaming 90 miles south-southwest of Kiska in perfect weather conditions. An hour after midnight, Mississippi's SC radar detected seven radar echoes fifteen miles northeast. Four other ships confirmed the radar contacts and the fleet opened fire. Wichita could clearly see both the seven echoes and the peak of Kiska volcano 76 miles away. Twenty minutes later, the echoes were reported to have change course, and shortly thereafter the echoes began disappearing from radar. However, no visual contact was ever made and no wreckage was found.

The Navy officially concluded that the ships had been firing at spurious radar echoes from distant mountain ranges. It is not implausible that a distant target could appear to be 15 miles away; range aliasing is a problem for most radars. But the echoes were not along the bearing of any of the Aleutian volcanoes, and the bearings from different ships were slightly different, converging on the same point fifteen miles away. It seems clear that something was there.

A number of theories have been presented to explain the echoes. One possibility is that the echoes were from large flocks of Dusky Shearwaters, a species of seabird that flies over the ocean looking for plankton to feed on. The disappearance of the echoes would correspond to the birds settling on the ocean surface to feed. However, it is hard to imagine even the most complacent seabirds being undisturbed by the fall of large-caliber shells in their midst.

 

[seyak]

Interesting scenario here. Does anyone know how US estimated the risk of IJN intervention? This happened only few months after the Battle of Komondorski Islands, which showed that the occupied islands were not abandoned by Japan. Later in 1943 US invaded Tarawa and the invasion was protected by much heavier TF 50 (included 6CV and 6 fast BB).

 

[Dorknought]

An even more lopsided battle was set to occur off Biak near New Guinea in June 1944. The IJN was trying a third attempt to reinforce. They had assembled Group A with cruisers Aoba and Kinu and destroyers Shikinami, Uranami, Yamagumo and Nowake, and Group B with the minelayers Itsukushima and Tsugaru, a tank landing ship, freighters and submarine chasers. This was to be covered by Vice Admiral Matome Ugaki’s task force comprising the super-battleships Yamato and Musashi, heavy cruisers Myoko and Haguro, light cruiser Noshiro, and destroyers Shimakaze, Okinami and Asagumo. The allied force was Rear Admiral V. A. C. Crutchley’s comprising the Australian heavy cruiser Australia, US light cruisers Phoenix and Boise and the US Destroyer Divisions 42, 47 and 48 (Fletcher, Jenkins, Radford, La Valette, Hutchins, Daly, Beale, Bache, Abner Read, Mullany, Trathen, and Australian Arunta and Warramunga). The US attack on Saipan meant the Japanese cancelled the operation against Biak.

 

[McPherson]

Interesting scenario here. Does anyone know how US estimated the risk of IJN intervention? This happened only few months after the Battle of Komondorski Islands, which showed that the occupied islands were not abandoned by Japan. Later in 1943 US invaded Tarawa and the invasion was protected by much heavier TF 50 (included 6CV and 6 fast BB).

HyperWar: At Close Quarters [Part V] *(Describes PT boat operations. Yes, the Americans sent PT boats to the Aleutian Islands. Did you think that they were being rational up there?)

USN Combat Narrative: The Aleutians Campaign​

Summary: By sigint and air reconnaissance. And by submarine patrols and by SAG sweeps, the Americans watched the Japanese. The Battle of the Komandorski Islands was such a sweep. The really interesting thing about this campaign is how the Americans kept timidly edging forward one island at a time to establish a string of fighter and bomber bases toward Attu. As a practical matter, the weather killed more Americans and Japanese than they did each other before Operation Landcrab. This might be one place where even the Russians might find it too tough to fight. A naval battle (^^^) in that region is clearly insane. That the IJN IGHQ section thought it was a good idea to try, shows:

1. The Imperial General Headquarters Naval Section was filled with crazy people,
2. Not too many Japanese people, besides whalers and crabbers have been to the Aleutian Islands.
3. Not too many Americans had been to the Aleutian Islands either. 1. and 2. apply to the War and Navy Departments in Washington. Crazy people were not restricted to the Japanese military high command.

 

[Kantai Kessen]

If the Japanese had sailed they would have flattened the American forces available. Nearest American Carrier win Pearl, 1,000 miles futher away. The U.S. had one CVE, the Nassau, and she was grass green with air group that had only arrived on board five days prior to leaving port. Three old BB Idaho, Nevada and Pennsylvania, three CA, three Omaha class CL and 19 destroyers (including the screening ships for the transports) .

The U.S. did have a substantial land based Air Corps contingent on Kiska that might have been able to counter the IJN carrier planes (had over 100 fighters (but only about 1/3 had the legs to get over Attu from Adak Island, along with 30 medium bombers and 24 heavys. But the Japanese surface force, even if the IJN airpower is removed for the scenario (either by weather or successful interdiction) would simply be overwhelming.

Americans would have been obliterated. Been the biggest defeat of the War, hell, the biggest defeat, by far, for the USN in its history.

@CalBear, @McPherson , if the Nassau and the land-based air cancels out the four Japanese fleet carriers, I think - the supply problem and the crazy nature of the Aleutians out of the picture - we'd have a surface action.

So according to Cal, the Americans have 3BB, 3CA, 3 CL, 19DD.
The Japanese have 1BBB, 2BC (Kongos aren't battleships and we know it), 4CA, 1CAV (Mogami), 2CL, 11DD.

I don't actually think the surface action is that simple. Assuming that some destroyers are left behind to screen the transports, this put the DD force relatively even. I think the American CL force has a slight advantage; the Omaha-class ain't great, but it's 3 to 2 and the Agano and Oyodo are not heavily armed or particularly tough either. Agano does have the advantage of an 8 Long Lance broadside with a full set of reloads, which might help in a brawl.

I don't know which three CAs the Americans are bringing, but they are up against four very powerful cruisers and a not-so-useful one. Given the effectiveness of the Japanese cruiser force, I think the Japanese will win this one.

That leaves the battleships; possibly the most interesting part of this engagement. Kongo and Haruna stand no chance against a Standard in a gun-fight; their best chance of survival is to run away, or team up together on one. However, Musashi - the largest and, at this point in time, most powerful battleship on the planet (she happens to be my favourite battleship ever, actually) - has been designed to take on three Standards at once and win. Nevada for sure is vulnerable to her; I think Pennsylvania and Idaho can last longer, being bigger and newer, but Musashi out-displaces them combined. This is also before IJN gunnery went down the drain-hole so her shooting will actually be decent.

The weather conditions and the terrain may actually negate the USN's radar advantage as it causes them to shoot at weird and wonderful things, but I am not sure how much of an effect there would be. Overall, though, I don't think the US force would get obliterated as @CalBear said. They'd take heavy losses, but I don't think it would be a whitewash.

Remember also that the USN force would be commanded by our favourite admiral, Frank Jack Fletcher. He is a cruiser specialist. Expect good results from him. Who commands the IJN force?

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Remember also that the USN force would be commanded by our favourite admiral, Frank Jack Fletcher. He is a cruiser specialist. Expect good results from him. Who commands the IJN force?

Fletchers brief cruiser div command in S Pac suggests he understood the current lessons and possibilities for surface battles. His plans or doctrine for intervening against Japanese supply operations @ Guadalcanal look better than what other executed a the battle of Tassafaronga. Night of day the battle is mostly likely to occur under extreme low visibility conditions. This puts everything on the USN possession of radar. Even as it was used off Guadalcanal it trumped Japanese training at night observation. If Fletcher seeks a 'low visibility' fight he can harass & pick at a larger Japanese flotilla, hopefully getting in some useful torpedo hits.

 

[McPherson]

Fletchers brief cruiser div command in S Pac suggests he understood the current lessons and possibilities for surface battles. His plans or doctrine for intervening against Japanese supply operations @ Guadalcanal look better than what other executed a the battle of Tassafaronga. Night of day the battle is mostly likely to occur under extreme low visibility conditions. This puts everything on the USN possession of radar. Even as it was used off Guadalcanal it trumped Japanese training at night observation. If Fletcher seeks a 'low visibility' fight he can harass & pick at a larger Japanese flotilla, hopefully getting in some useful torpedo hits.

The Battle of the Pips has already been mentioned. Komandorski Islands was mostly an optical directed gunfight. Radar does really weird things in extreme wet and hot and cold atmospheric conditions. I agree Fletcher knew his tactics.

 

[PMN1]

What does the US know about the Musashi at this time?

 

[Cryhavoc101]

The Essex arrived in th Pacific in May 1943, after a speedy workup. How prepared she was for actual combat is a open question. The Saratoga was operational & in the S Pac, the Enterprise was in Puget Sound for a badly needed refit. So basically its the Saratoga as the only combat worthy carrier guaranteed, backed by the just arrived Essex.

USS Saratoga was working with USS Robin from April 43 till end of July (USS Robin) to reduce the 4:1 disparity in flattops to 4:2 before the Essex class, light and Escort carrier pez dispenser finally began to deliver combat capable CVs, CVLs and CVEs to the pacific in large numbers.

While the USS Robin did not fire shots in anger during this time she did sortie with Sara several times in case the Japanese interfered with other ops as well as both ships making a sortie to the Coral Sea against a suspected Japanese carrier sortie which turned out to be false.

Had the Japanese sortied as suggested by the OP then Sara and Robin would have been part of the response.

Interestingly USS Robin acted as a fighter carrier with USS Saratoga acting as the Strike carrier (with Sara sending all but 12 of her fighters to Robin and Robin sending her Avengers to Sara - giving Robin 60 Wildcats).

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Interestingly USS Robin acted as a fighter carrier with USS Saratoga acting as the Strike carrier (with Sara sending all but 12 of her fighters to Robin and Robin sending her Avengers to Sara - giving Robin 60 Wildcats).

Given the difficulties in communication and doctrines it only makes sense to divide the responsibilities. It was discovered early on that mixed TF were beyond difficult.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Given the difficulties in communication and doctrines it only makes sense to divide the responsibilities. It was discovered early on that mixed TF were beyond difficult.

They seemed to have managed

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Still its doing things the hard way. Better had there been options.

 

[CalBear]

Disagree. The weather up there makes flattop operations very problematical. Also, the SAG could not stay as it will be needed to fight further south. And what about tanker support? Lacking. This is one time and one place where the coin of the realm is land-based air and it is king. Hosagaya, Boshiro found that one out the hard way. My biggest concern besides the weather is the distances. Dutch Harbor to Attu is about 1250 km. Getting heavy and medium bomber support is weather dependent.

If the Japanese cannot shell the Marines out of Henderson Field, then the 7th Division could probably gut it out. The IJA garrison is likely dead meat because of their supply crisis.

And that is where it comes down; the supply crisis. The Americans can and the Japanese cannot.

If the carriers are taken out of the equation, which is entirely possible given the ever changing weather conditions in the far North Pacific region (the initial American landing were delayed by heavy fog, a condition that remained an issue throughout the battle) or by interference by P-38s out of Amchitka (these were also rather hit & miss due to weather) it then comes down to the surface forces. The Air Corps had reserved 1/3 of its bomber strength to support naval operations, but that only amounts to 8 B-24 and 10 B-25 (and unlike their compatriots in the warm waters of the Bismarck Sea the 11th Air Force pilots were not trained in skip bombing, so their effectiveness against 24+ knot warships is, at best, questionable).

I completely agree that the American surface force would engage, Kinkaid was a pretty aggressive commander, he isn't going to abandon the landing force, and one of his Group commanders, Admiral McMorris had fought a major engagement in the Aleutians already. Unfortunately neither of his other Group commanders had much in the way of surface warfare experience ( and the battleship group was under the command of Klingman, owner of the unfortunate "we will obliterate it" statement regarding the Tarawa bombardment). The forces were also separated into three different groups, with each having their own separate orders and AO, and at lest a portion of the Destroyer force would have to remain with the transports to provide ASW coverage. The U.S. ships were also there to act as shore bombardment forces, with the preponderance of their shells being HC and not AP. Perhaps most worrying is that, unlike other IJN/USN battleship engagements this isn't a near peer (Washington vs. Kirishima) or very lopsided (Surigao Strait) U.S. advantage.

The three American standards are literally the ships that Musashi and her sister were designed to kill while outnumbered. None of the Standards will do well against 46 cm gunfire, while the Musashi will be relatively well protected from 14" gunfire. The scenario provides the IJN with the exact combat profile they had trained for since Tsushima (I don't worship at the Church of the Long Lance, but is was a very formidable weapon in the right circumstances, one that required respect). In this fight, with the Japanese having seven cruisers (including three Mogami and two Tone with their huge torpedo armament) and the American battleships limited to ~20 knots, that spells serious trouble.

 

[GuildedAgeNostalgia]

So if the US fleet is defeated, what happens to the ground forces on Attu?