What it says on the tin. Basically every bad thing that happened to Austria in the 19th century happened under his watch. Let's say he kicks it and Maximilian or Karl Ludwig get the throne in 1848 instead. Does the Danubian monarchy fare any better? Are they any better prepared for the deluge of armed conflicts they would lose? Obviously this is too early so as to butterfly OTL's WW1.
Are the defeats inevitable w/o Franz Josef?
And that assumes that the wars take place at all. If Max is smart enough not to send that crackbrained ultimatum to Sardinia, there may not be a war in 1859, esp if he offers a generous measure of self-rule to Lombardy and Venetia. That in turn butterflies the Prussian mobilisation, which triggered the quarrel between Wilhelm I and Parliament which brought Bismarck to power. Quite a different 1860s.
What it says on the tin. Basically every bad thing that happened to Austria in the 19th century happened under his watch. Let's say he kicks it and Maximilian or Karl Ludwig get the throne in 1848 instead. Does the Danubian monarchy fare any better? Are they any better prepared for the deluge of armed conflicts they would lose? Obviously this is too early so as to butterfly OTL's WW1.
But I've gotten the impression that Garibaldi
& Napoleon III were spoiling for a war against AH in 1859 IOTL(how else, they
figured, could they liberate Italy?) In other
words, if the ultimatum had never been
issued, G & N would simply have found
another way to ignite an AH- Piedmont
conflict.
The irony is that the Franco-Italian War was fought for the exact same reasons as Bismarck's wars in the next decade. And Napoléon didn't (IMO) see that Bismarck was using the same tactics to unite Germany that he himself had used to unite Italy (find a common enemy).
But I've gotten the impression that Garibaldi
& Napoleon III were spoiling for a war against AH in 1859 IOTL(how else, they
figured, could they liberate Italy?) In other
words, if the ultimatum had never been
issued, G & N would simply have found
another way to ignite an AH- Piedmont
conflict.
There is another: Catholicism, especially the kind that lead to the Zentrum and the various People's Parties or Christian Democrat parties in the xx century. Enlarging the franchise could have counter-intuitive effects in the suport for pro-Habsburg parties.The empires needed some kind trains-national confront to reform around, the problem was that only one at the time was socialism. Which was obvious unacceptable to the Habsburgs.
I don' think many defeats were inevitable even with Franz J.Are the defeats inevitable w/o Franz Josef?
It was Max who appointed Admiral Tegethoff, the victor of Lissa. If his choice of generals is as good, the Austrian army may fare a good deal better than OTL.
And that assumes that the wars take place at all. If Max is smart enough not to send that crackbrained ultimatum to Sardinia, there may not be a war in 1859, esp if he offers a generous measure of self-rule to Lombardy and Venetia. That in turn butterflies the Prussian mobilisation, which triggered the quarrel between Wilhelm I and Parliament which brought Bismarck to power. Quite a different 1860s.
This seems 1 largly incorrect and 2 very revisionist that aside what kind of logic is "avoid becoming a Prussian protectorate by becoming a Russian one"Franz Joseph's problem was that he could never accept that he owed his throne to the Russian army. Because of this, he stupidly pursued anti-Russian policies throughout his reign that eventually destroyed his Empire.
Any other Austrian could have made the better choice of keeping the Russian alliance. Franz Ferdinand certainly would though he comes later. Franz Joseph should have accepted Nicholas I offer to partition the Balkans and resist the Anglo-French coalition in the Crimea. He choose instead to needle the Russians. This lead to his defeat in Italy and his later defeat by the Prussians. Within twenty years, he had reduced his empire and become a protectorate of the Prussians. If he had accepted Russian predominance, he could have at least kept his lands
I don't see whats to argue about. Austria could never be the equal of Russia nor could she be the equal of Prussia if Russia was hostile. The correct solution is to make peace with your neighbor especially one who has clearly demonstrated a benevolent attitude towards you.This seems 1 largly incorrect and 2 very revisionist that aside what kind of logic is "avoid becoming a Prussian protectorate by becoming a Russian one"
1. FJI owed his throne to the post-Metternich kamarilla (mostly von Bach, Schwarzenberg and his mother). Otherwise, Ferdinand wouldn't have been swept under the rug and FJI wouldn't have been on the throne until 75 instead of being shoved into the throne he was hardly ready for.Franz Joseph's problem was that he could never accept that he owed his throne to the Russian army. Because of this, he stupidly pursued anti-Russian policies throughout his reign that eventually destroyed his Empire.
Any other Austrian could have made the better choice of keeping the Russian alliance. Franz Ferdinand certainly would though he comes later. Franz Joseph should have accepted Nicholas I offer to partition the Balkans and resist the Anglo-French coalition in the Crimea. He choose instead to needle the Russians. This lead to his defeat in Italy and his later defeat by the Prussians. Within twenty years, he had reduced his empire and become a protectorate of the Prussians. If he had accepted Russian predominance, he could have at least kept his lands
This was done indeed under Taaffe at the turn of the century. But arguably it was a bit too late by then.There is another: Catholicism, especially the kind that lead to the Zentrum and the various People's Parties or Christian Democrat parties in the xx century. Enlarging the franchise could have counter-intuitive effects in the suport for pro-Habsburg parties.
OK, it's really kind of irritating just how bad a rap Franz Josef tends to get on this site. Yes the man was a dyed in the wool, unapologetic conservative more at home with soldiers than politicians, but the man was no idiot. He steered his Empire through sixty-eight years of deep uncertainty, political changes and two major military defeats without once being in danger of a revolution or dissolution ( FJ can't be blamed for 1848 and it's aftermath while, despite what people believe, the Empire wasn't in danger of collapsing in the aftermath of the Seven Weeks' War).
I think you're only half-correct. Yes, his choices were mediocre at best post-Radetzky, but Benedeki was Radetzky's chief of staff and, frankly, we can't pin the blame on Benedeki for Austria's defeat against Prussia. There were far too many factors leading to that. I don't know enough about Gyulai to defend him properly.The problem with Franz Josef was not so much his politics as his bad choice of military commanders.
By and large, Austrian Emperors had usually taken a back seat where military matters were concerned, entrusting their armies to professionals like Eugene or Radetzky, or at most to an Archduke if they had one who showed military skill. Thus FJ inherited from his predecessors the set of generals who were to save his throne in 1848-9. Hs own appointments, however, were to vary from mediocre to ruddy awful. Hence Austria's poor performance over the next decade or two.
That's the crucial area where Max might have done better. Of course nothing is certain, and his choice of Tegethoff may have been a fluke. But he could hardly have chosen worse than Gyulai, and might have done better than Benedek.
All reasonable, but I'd blame FJ at least for his stifling of the War Ministry during neoabsolutism, which made ir very hard to create a modern army chiefs of staff structure. The whole neoabsolutist policies were imho short-sighted and wasteful, although probably understandable in the wake of the political and psychological shock that 1848/49 was.I think you're only half-correct. Yes, his choices were mediocre at best post-Radetzky, but Benedeki was Radetzky's chief of staff and, frankly, we can't pin the blame on Benedeki for Austria's defeat against Prussia. There were far too many factors leading to that. I don't know enough about Gyulai to defend him properly.
One must absolutely remember, and this isn't very-well known it seems, but Austrian politicians at that time were still wary of having to deal with 'another Wallenstein' and ambitious/highly competent generals. Von Gablenz, who led the oft-forgotten but absolutely needed for the victory Austrian Corps during the Second Slesvig War, is a victim of that and the severe corruption/patronage/gambling problem in the higher ranks of the Austrian army. Even Radetzky was a victim, tossed aside and ignored after 1849.
Austria had some severe issues in military culture and while I don't know enough about the other militaries of the time, I have a feeling that those problems are not only Austrian ones (except perhaps the specifically Austrian Wallenstein-fear).