WI: Israel maintained it's 1978 occupation of South Lebanon

[A Piece of History]

In 1978, in response to the Coastal Road massacre, Israel invaded Lebanon as part of Operation Litani, named after the Litani River, the south of which the Israelis would occupy. When the UN Security Council passed Resolution 425, which called for immediate Israeli withdrawal, Israel withdrew from South Lebanon, but backed a Christian-Shi'a militia called the South Lebanon Army in guarding a 19 kilometre security zone, along with a UN-backed peacekeeping force. The PLO, despite officially declaring a ceasefire, turned a blind eye as factions violated said ceasefire after fleeing north of the Litani River and the South Lebanon Army even shelled the UN peacekeeping force, killing eight UN peacekeepers, and later kidnapping three peacekeepers, killing two of them.

In 1982, after a PLO-aligned faction called the Abu Nidal Organization attempted to assassinate Israel's ambassador to the United Kingdom, Israel would again invade South Lebanon, creating a security zone in 1985 which would persist until 2000.

What if Israel ignored UN Resolution 425 and maintained a physical presence in Lebanon to deter the PLO, even expanding north of the Litani River if security needs necessitated such an action?

 

[Marc Anthony]

In 1978, in response to the Coastal Road massacre, Israel invaded Lebanon as part of Operation Litani, named after the Litani River, the south of which the Israelis would occupy. When the UN Security Council passed Resolution 425, which called for immediate Israeli withdrawal, Israel withdrew from South Lebanon, but backed a Christian-Shi'a militia called the South Lebanon Army in guarding a 19 kilometre security zone, along with a UN-backed peacekeeping force. The PLO, despite officially declaring a ceasefire, turned a blind eye as factions violated said ceasefire after fleeing north of the Litani River and the South Lebanon Army even shelled the UN peacekeeping force, killing eight UN peacekeepers, and later kidnapping three peacekeepers, killing two of them.

In 1982, after a PLO-aligned faction called the Abu Nidal Organization attempted to assassinate Israel's ambassador to the United Kingdom, Israel would again invade South Lebanon, creating a security zone in 1985 which would persist until 2000.

What if Israel ignored UN Resolution 425 and maintained a physical presence in Lebanon to deter the PLO, even expanding north of the Litani River if security needs necessitated such an action?

it would be like with the security strip, casualty rates rising until there would be a withdrawl unless the israelis create a south lebanese buffer state and exit but it would require constant intervention.

 

[Saint_007]

In 1978, in response to the Coastal Road massacre, Israel invaded Lebanon as part of Operation Litani, named after the Litani River, the south of which the Israelis would occupy. When the UN Security Council passed Resolution 425, which called for immediate Israeli withdrawal, Israel withdrew from South Lebanon, but backed a Christian-Shi'a militia called the South Lebanon Army in guarding a 19 kilometre security zone, along with a UN-backed peacekeeping force. The PLO, despite officially declaring a ceasefire, turned a blind eye as factions violated said ceasefire after fleeing north of the Litani River and the South Lebanon Army even shelled the UN peacekeeping force, killing eight UN peacekeepers, and later kidnapping three peacekeepers, killing two of them.

In 1982, after a PLO-aligned faction called the Abu Nidal Organization attempted to assassinate Israel's ambassador to the United Kingdom, Israel would again invade South Lebanon, creating a security zone in 1985 which would persist until 2000.

What if Israel ignored UN Resolution 425 and maintained a physical presence in Lebanon to deter the PLO, even expanding north of the Litani River if security needs necessitated such an action?

You will note it wasn't the PLO that forced Israel to leave in the end. While the South Lebanon strip was a deterrent to Palestinian attacks, it just meant the growing Shi'ite resistance, namely Hezbollah, will bleed Israel more and more until Tel Aviv decides enough is enough and leaves anyways. The South Lebanon occupation was becoming their Vietnam, a long, expensive, and bleeding fiasco into which the IDF pours more men and materiel with little benefit. Hezbollah has every reason to want Israel out, and the only way Israel could have removed them was by deporting every Lebanese citizen south of the Leitani, which would draw international outrage.

Their allies, the SLA were an even worse version of the ARVN, since the ARVN at least had some units that could fight. The SLA were weak auxiliaries consisting of local conscripts with poor morale lead by a core of Phalangist officers who were no longer welcome in the rest of Lebanon. The troops were infiltrated to the core, and when given the choice to surrender by Hezbollah most of the rank and file laid down their arms while the officers and their families had to skedaddle to Israel to avoid getting summarily executed by Hezbollah troops, or being dragged back to Beirut to face a collective court martial for treason. France offered sanctuary to the SLA officers, only to immediately withdraw it when official Lebanese protests likened the SLA leadership to that of Vichy France.

Quite simply, if Israel decided to stay in South Lebanon, it would be a much bloodier version of Gaza; Hezbollah are a meaner, more disciplined bunch with better connections and tactics, and could bleed out the IDF presence much more efficiently than the Palestinians could. The Israeli newspapers made a huge fuss at the time about having to pull a last stand if necessary to preserve Israel if the IDF abandoned the South Lebanon "security belt", but it was clear that no matter how unpopular the decision, Ehud Barak did the right thing by pulling out of Lebanon. Even Ariel Sharon, when he got elected as PM shortly afterwards, didn't contest the withdrawal or remark on it, knowing full well as the architect of the 1982 invasion (he was Minister of Defense at the time, and the subsequent fiasco forced his retirement from the IDF completely) he bore the greatest responsibility for the losses sustained during the occupation period.

Basically, the winning move was not to play. Israel should have just stayed back, supplied the Phalangists, and stuck to air strikes and limited interventions to break PLO presence, not a full-on invasion. They miscalculated Lebanese resistance and wound up paying the price in blood for 18 years.

 

[White Aurora]

You will note it wasn't the PLO that forced Israel to leave in the end. While the South Lebanon strip was a deterrent to Palestinian attacks, it just meant the growing Shi'ite resistance, namely Hezbollah, will bleed Israel more and more until Tel Aviv decides enough is enough and leaves anyways. The South Lebanon occupation was becoming their Vietnam, a long, expensive, and bleeding fiasco into which the IDF pours more men and materiel with little benefit. Hezbollah has every reason to want Israel out, and the only way Israel could have removed them was by deporting every Lebanese citizen south of the Leitani, which would draw international outrage.

Their allies, the SLA were an even worse version of the ARVN, since the ARVN at least had some units that could fight. The SLA were weak auxiliaries consisting of local conscripts with poor morale lead by a core of Phalangist officers who were no longer welcome in the rest of Lebanon. The troops were infiltrated to the core, and when given the choice to surrender by Hezbollah most of the rank and file laid down their arms while the officers and their families had to skedaddle to Israel to avoid getting summarily executed by Hezbollah troops, or being dragged back to Beirut to face a collective court martial for treason. France offered sanctuary to the SLA officers, only to immediately withdraw it when official Lebanese protests likened the SLA leadership to that of Vichy France.

Quite simply, if Israel decided to stay in South Lebanon, it would be a much bloodier version of Gaza; Hezbollah are a meaner, more disciplined bunch with better connections and tactics, and could bleed out the IDF presence much more efficiently than the Palestinians could. The Israeli newspapers made a huge fuss at the time about having to pull a last stand if necessary to preserve Israel if the IDF abandoned the South Lebanon "security belt", but it was clear that no matter how unpopular the decision, Ehud Barak did the right thing by pulling out of Lebanon. Even Ariel Sharon, when he got elected as PM shortly afterwards, didn't contest the withdrawal or remark on it, knowing full well as the architect of the 1982 invasion (he was Minister of Defense at the time, and the subsequent fiasco forced his retirement from the IDF completely) he bore the greatest responsibility for the losses sustained during the occupation period.

Basically, the winning move was not to play. Israel should have just stayed back, supplied the Phalangists, and stuck to air strikes and limited interventions to break PLO presence, not a full-on invasion. They miscalculated Lebanese resistance and wound up paying the price in blood for 18 years.

Your comment is spot-on. I have the exact same view on the first Lebanon war.

 

[marathag]

In 1970s, the Shias lived mostly in the Southern half of Lebanon. PLO incursions lead to Israeli reprisals, leading to the 1978 Litani River invasion, leading to many Shia families going north to Refugee Camps. Then they left, some families returned but not many. This is ontop of what the Civil War was doing.

Crossborder raids restarted over the next four years, Despite UNIFIL Blue Helmets, leading to more Army reprisals, to full Invasion in 1982, with another huge wave of Refugees going North, again.

The terrible condition in the camps and aid from Iran got us to OTLs Hezbollah.

But this TL is different, no 2nd invasion and resulting population fleeing into already overpopulated camps: prime recruiting grounds won't be as fertile in this ALT 1982, and the Israeli Army and Lebanese allies(such as they were under Haddad) a bit more vigilant on not letting the PLO back in than the worthless UNIFIL