III. THE PARTITION OF THE SOUTHERN NETHERLANDS: THE LOW COUNTRIES INTO OUR OWN HANDS
A. THE BRINGING IN AND OUT OF A THIRD PARTY
Townshend starts his reasoning with a reference to James Stanhope (1673-1721), the deceased architect of the European peace system of the Quadruple Alliance. The Netherlands, in the disappeared statesman’s views, should be apportioned to the Duke of Lorrain (sovereign over territories encircled and repeatedly occupied by France). In case this would exceed the Duke’s financial and administrative capability, Stanhope saw a possible union with Cologne or Treves. The latter two ecclesiastical German electorates ought to be ‘secularised’ and the present rulers (princes of the church, implying their title ends with their lives and cannot pass on to their children, as was the case with secular princes) duly compensated. Consequently, the Duke would rule a buffer state stretching from the Lys to the Rhine, become a sensu lato territorial neighbour to the electorate of Hannover and be able to meddle seriously in both European and German political affairs. However, many practical and legal inconveniencies rendered this ‘solution’ rather fictitious: to begin with, the Imperial Diet would have to pronounce itself on the
recomposition or the secularization of territories sending delegates (and even two electors in the college choosing the Emperor) to Regensburg42. ‘It was the vainest of imaginations to think it could ever be brought to bear’.
Nevertheless, this was not the main reason for Townshend to reject Stanhope’s chimerical idea. ‘[…] neither can I see any reason why England & Holland should be looking out for a third prince to give these Dominions to, after the Experience they have had for many years, that when they are in weak hands, the excessive Burthen of defending them lies wholly upon those two powers, & when they are in hands in some degree strong enough to defend them, they are made use of against them43’.
B. THE BRITISH CLAIM ON FLANDERS
The originality of Townshend’s plan boils down to the following idea: ‘so much of these [the Low Countries] countrys as is absolutely necessary for their security, ought to be put into their own hands respectively, and so much […] should be allotted to each of those powers […, f. 108v.] that what remains may safely be put into the hands of France44’. In other words: the hypothesis to be avoided at all costs, is and remains the occupation of the Low Countries by France. However, this only comes into being when French domination reaches a critical point. If Britain and Holland, together, or with the help of a third power45, manage to separately control and isolate the choke points, a minimal French presence would not be an obstacle to the stability of the situation.
Townshend has his list ready: ‘Ipres, Newport, Ostend, Plassendahl46 & Bruges, with a territory annexed to them sufficient to maintain the garrisons in these places […] & to keep the fortifications in repair’. Ghent, however, is excluded from it:
As to Ghent, its situation with respect to Trade, standing upon the Schelde, & having a Canal which leads to Bruges & thence to Ostend, it should in my opinion be declared a free town under the protection of England & the States & no other Dutys ought to be suffer’d [109r] to be imposed or laid on goods there, than such only as should be sufficient to support the government and magistracy of the town47.
This looks like a new Anglo-Dutch Condominium (1706-1715), after the system that controlled Brabant and substantial parts of Flanders after the battle of Ramillies48. Townshend allots further territories to the Dutch: ‘Antwerp & Dendermonde & so much of the Country as they should be given49’. Finally, ’the rest’ (the Duchy of Brabant, the County of Namur, the County of Chiny, the Duchy of Luxemburg, the city of Tournai) falls upon ‘France & such other princes as may be agreed upon’. In other words, Britain and Holland claim the coastal zone and indirectly control administration in Ghent50.
However, Townshend is oblivious of one crucial cultural factor: religion. In Horace Walpole’s words, ‘the Gentry and common people I fear are so bigoted, and so absolutely under the influence of the priests, that they will never sit quiet under the government of protestant powers, tho’never so mild and easy, and tho’ their religion and priviledges be entirely preserved to them51’. Both in the long (the failed union of the XVII Provinces) and the middle run (Anglo-Dutch occupation during the War of the Spanish Succession52), cultural issues have had a devastating effect on bringing two nations as diverse as the Southern Netherlands and the Dutch Republic together, making a ‘civil government’ nearly impracticable.
C. THE BALANCE OF POWER REVERSED ?
As a well versed ‘honnête homme’, Townshend includes a preliminary refutatio of his formulated scheme. First, ‘taking the Low Countries from the Emp[ero]r would be weakening him too much & consequently overturning the Balance of Power in Europe’53. An argument not at all convincing, since ‘the Emperor does not draw one shilling of money from those countrys, neither can he call away one Regiment from thence to the assistance of any other part of his Dominions54’. Even more, weakening Charles VI would be to the advantage of the other powers:
He will then indeed have it no longer in his power to engage us in a warr, whenever he thinks fitt, upon terms never so unreasonable (as whilst those [f. 110r.] countrys are in his hands he really may) nor treat us ill, & force us into all the unreasonable measures he thinks fitt to prescribe.
Consequently, the arbitrium of the Emperor to engage a European war is considerably reduced. The Maritime Powers ‘shall not be less in a condition […] to help him, whenever the Balance of Power requires it […] the Emp[ero]r, by losing these countrys, will have lost the unreasonable hold he has over Us, & must make it his principal aim to cultivate the friendship of the King & the States, because having lost the means of obliging us to do whatever he pleased […] he will be forced to make his court to us himself, in order to have our assistance for preserving Sicily & his dominions in Italy’.
However laudable the objective and elaborated the preventive attack on criticism may be, Walpole sees weaknesses. Both in method and in heavy dependence on political conjuncture. As of August 1725, he interprets the Imperial threat as real, but still far from material. Sudden ill health with children being not uncommon at the time, either the Archduchess or Don Carlos could die before Charles VI himself. Moreover, the marriage had until then only been a rumor and in no sense a publicly announced diplomatic fact. Firmness should thus be expressed in negotiations, and not in confrontational threats of intervention55.
In order to achieve the latter (bringing the Emperor to reason through talks), France, Britain and Holland are tied together through the system of the Triple (Holland-Britain-France, 1717) and Quadruple Alliances (cf. supra). If the Emperor was to effectively announce a wedding between his eldest daughter and Don Carlos, Townshend’s plan could be brought in as a modality of execution against the Emperor. But not in any way as a preventive means of action.
To Walpole’s impression, the Balance of Power-thinking by which Townshend is guided, is a concept of the diplomatic community, but does not represent the confrontational and xenophobic public opinion56. ‘[…] the people of England and Holland must see in a [f. 123 r.] clearer light than I apprehend they do at present, how dangerous the Emperor’s views are like to be to the liberties of Europe, before they will relish a disposition which will interfere with some popular notions of their own, and is contrary to the maxims upon which the present possession of the low countries is founded, as expressed in the 2. Article of the Barrier Treaty’57.
