WI: French victory at Ramillies, Marlborough dies on the field

By this point of the War of The Spanish Succession, the French had already lost at Blenheim and Bavaria had fallen to the alliance; but France was still in a decent position, they seemingly had the advantage in Italy and held most of the Spanish Netherlands, only having the disadvantage on the Spanish front. Ramillies changed everything, the victory allowed Marlborough to conquer most of the Spanish Netherlands, and later attempt and invasion of Northern France; Vendome was called from Italy to take command of the Netherlands front, this allowed Prince Eugene to easily relieve Turin and conquer all Bourbon possessions in Italy with an impressive speed, which would later allow him to lay siege to Toulon, provoking the French to destroy most of their Mediterranean fleet, even though the siege failed.

During the battle, there was a moment, where Marlborough was being chased by French dragoons, his horse was shot and Marlborough fall, though he was lucky, since he escaped unharmed. The POD is Marlborough suffering serious damage from this fall, making him unable to escape, either dying right there or being captured and dying in the aftermath of the Battle.

The British cavalry by this point was starting to break formation, thanks to a French countercharge, and Marlborough gave his cavalry the motivation it needed to withstand the French charge till reinforcements arrive. Let's assume that the moral blow of the death/capture of Marlborough is enough for the French charge to have more success with its charge, thus the French cavalry won't be progressively forced back once allied reinforcements arrive, and its right flank won't break; French reinforcements arrive and the allies are overwhelmed . At the end, the French eventually win the battle, it wouldn't be an outstanding victory, as it was for the allies OTL, but an important one, nonetheless. Allowing the French to consolidate their position in the region and start to advance progressively.

Things to take into consideration:
- Louis XIV was actually planning to make peace by this point, but he clearly wanted a favourable peace. I'm not sure if he would start peace talks by this point or if he would push his luck and wait for the siege of Turin to be over.
- Since the battle was not lost Vendome won't be called from Italy. I don't know if Turin would fall in this TL, but it has a good change to be a victory. Vendome was probably the most experienced general at dealing with Eugene, he constantly halted his advance through Lombardy, something which his replacement, the Duc of Orleans, completely failed to do; he knew how Eugene operated and managed to repulse him multiple times. Adding this to the fact that with a victory at Ramillies, more troops could be disposed to the Italian front, he could probably prevent Eugene to relieve Turin. And even if he fails to do it, the defeat won't be nearly as disastrous, at least preventing something like the Siege of Toulon.
- If the war is prolonged even more for some reason, with the siege of Toulon being prevented. The French would have a slight numerical advantage in the Mediterranean Sea.
Given this conditions, would France achieve a better peace deal than in OTL? How could it look? Would France achieve victory in the Italian front? Would Villeroi be able to capitalize on his victory and take all of the Spanish Netherlands?
 
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The big factors in the aftermath of this reversal of fortune:

-death of Marlborough deprives the Allies of their best general, and keeps Eugene occupied in Italy. Eugene won't be sent to save the low countries, but if France (at some point) looks to be threatening Austria from that direction, he'll be shifted to protect. This aspect (death of Marlborough/pre-occupation of Eugene) is a MAJOR blow to the Allies.

-France is not humiliated, nor does it lose massive resources in the TTL avoidance of a rout. France is very tired at this point, but it isn't teetering on collapse.

France likely continues to make gains in Spanish Netherlands, while the Dutch are scared out of their gourd. Exhaustion may limit the gains.

Louis XIV wanted a 'fair' peace, but he was known for snatching defeat from the jaws of victory. I wouldn't count on him quitting while ahead. Instead, he very well might look to get even further ahead, or defining 'fair' as France gets 90% of what they want while throwing a crumb or two to the Allies, then wondering why the Allies don't agree. Meanwhile, the Allies want to strike back and get their own victory to set the tone for the peace talks. Then it's France's turn to get a victory before talking. Rinse and repeat until one side wins, or utter exhaustion brings both sides to the table.

France will want Spain and Italy, although they likely give up parts of Italy to gain Lorraine and/or Spanish Netherlands. Dutch want some sort of barrier, but may drop out of the Alliance if it looks like France will keep advancing into Dutch Republic. Savoy likely switches sides again, with France throwing them a crumb to help break the Alliance. Britain may see the cause as lost and agree to letting France get most of what they want. Austria will want to continue, but they can't do it on their own.

Or, France pushes its hand too far, suffers a major loss, and we're back to OTL results.
 
The big factors in the aftermath of this reversal of fortune:

-death of Marlborough deprives the Allies of their best general, and keeps Eugene occupied in Italy. Eugene won't be sent to save the low countries, but if France (at some point) looks to be threatening Austria from that direction, he'll be shifted to protect. This aspect (death of Marlborough/pre-occupation of Eugene) is a MAJOR blow to the Allies.

-France is not humiliated, nor does it lose massive resources in the TTL avoidance of a rout. France is very tired at this point, but it isn't teetering on collapse.

France likely continues to make gains in Spanish Netherlands, while the Dutch are scared out of their gourd. Exhaustion may limit the gains.

Louis XIV wanted a 'fair' peace, but he was known for snatching defeat from the jaws of victory. I wouldn't count on him quitting while ahead. Instead, he very well might look to get even further ahead, or defining 'fair' as France gets 90% of what they want while throwing a crumb or two to the Allies, then wondering why the Allies don't agree. Meanwhile, the Allies want to strike back and get their own victory to set the tone for the peace talks. Then it's France's turn to get a victory before talking. Rinse and repeat until one side wins, or utter exhaustion brings both sides to the table.

France will want Spain and Italy, although they likely give up parts of Italy to gain Lorraine and/or Spanish Netherlands. Dutch want some sort of barrier, but may drop out of the Alliance if it looks like France will keep advancing into Dutch Republic. Savoy likely switches sides again, with France throwing them a crumb to help break the Alliance. Britain may see the cause as lost and agree to letting France get most of what they want. Austria will want to continue, but they can't do it on their own.

Or, France pushes its hand too far, suffers a major loss, and we're back to OTL results.
I think that if Vendome manages to keep stalling Eugene, until Turin falls; and the battle of Almansa goes as in OTL. Then, Louis XIV would search for peace, since the conditions of what he saw as a favourable peace are there, he's winning in every front of the war, and the hegemony of France in Europe is clear.

Spain and Italy would be basically confirmed, but Gibraltar may be ceded to England, and Lombardy may pass to their again Savoyan allies in exchange of Savoie and Nice, or maybe to Austria. The allies would probably accept the annexation of Lorraine, since it's already surrounded. Maximilian Emanuel wanted the Netherlands, and was already their governor and Duke of Luxembourg; Britain and the Netherlands would be favourable to Bavarian Netherlands, preferring them over Spanish or French ones.

Thinking about it, if the war is really prolonged, it's probably better for the allies to just give up on Italy, when Eugene is just stalled by Vendome. Since, Villars is in Lorraine preparing to cross the Rhine and hopefully reach Bavaria (he managed to reach the Neckar by middle 1707, but was forced to retreat thanks to Dutch and Hannoverian reinforcements). Villars is not an easy opponent, and the French actually have troops to spare from other fronts. And the Dutch will progressively grow tired from the war. A prolonged war doesn't look promising for the allies.
 
I think that if Vendome manages to keep stalling Eugene, until Turin falls; and the battle of Almansa goes as in OTL. Then, Louis XIV would search for peace, since the conditions of what he saw as a favourable peace are there, he's winning in every front of the war, and the hegemony of France in Europe is clear.

Spain and Italy would be basically confirmed, but Gibraltar may be ceded to England, and Lombardy may pass to their again Savoyan allies in exchange of Savoie and Nice, or maybe to Austria. The allies would probably accept the annexation of Lorraine, since it's already surrounded. Maximilian Emanuel wanted the Netherlands, and was already their governor and Duke of Luxembourg; Britain and the Netherlands would be favourable to Bavarian Netherlands, preferring them over Spanish or French ones.

Thinking about it, if the war is really prolonged, it's probably better for the allies to just give up on Italy, when Eugene is just stalled by Vendome. Since, Villars is in Lorraine preparing to cross the Rhine and hopefully reach Bavaria (he managed to reach the Neckar by middle 1707, but was forced to retreat thanks to Dutch and Hannoverian reinforcements). Villars is not an easy opponent, and the French actually have troops to spare from other fronts. And the Dutch will progressively grow tired from the war. A prolonged war doesn't look promising for the allies.
Agreed. France should be in good position to win the war. The caveat is that Louis XIV may push for too much, demanding terms the Allies will have to be forced to accept. And combine this with the basic fear of French hegemony comes to life. This alone may prolong the war.

The loss of Marlborough is what really deals the biggest blow to the Allies. I don't know enough about the other Allied generals to estimate their chances. M has very big shoes to fill.
 
The loss of Marlborough is what really deals the biggest blow to the Allies. I don't know enough about the other Allied generals to estimate their chances. M has very big shoes to fill.

It's not just his role as a general in the field - Marlborough was effectively doing the jobs of C-in-C BEF, SACEUR, CDS, Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, and Ambassador to half the great powers. That's an absolutely cavernous hole in British grand strategy.
 
It's not just his role as a general in the field - Marlborough was effectively doing the jobs of C-in-C BEF, SACEUR, CDS, Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, and Ambassador to half the great powers. That's an absolutely cavernous hole in British grand strategy.
Of course he also filled half those roles for the Dutch republic, sometimes unwillingly (for the Dutch). With him removed sooner, the Republic will need to kick itself into gear rather than be scrambling when his removal and British drop-out were basically simultaneous. It might lead to the quip about the peace being at and about the Dutch, but without the Dutch, being a bit less of a thing.

Or alternatively, the British may drop out even earlier, leading to a bigger loss for the allies. This war was definitely one of the more stereotypical 'perfidious Albion' cases, and so far as I can tell Marlborough was one of those less interested in a separate peace with France.
 
Of course he also filled half those roles for the Dutch republic, sometimes unwillingly (for the Dutch). With him removed sooner, the Republic will need to kick itself into gear rather than be scrambling when his removal and British drop-out were basically simultaneous. It might lead to the quip about the peace being at and about the Dutch, but without the Dutch, being a bit less of a thing.

Or alternatively, the British may drop out even earlier, leading to a bigger loss for the allies. This war was definitely one of the more stereotypical 'perfidious Albion' cases, and so far as I can tell Marlborough was one of those less interested in a separate peace with France.
Were do you get the ideas from that he fulfilled those roles for the Dutch? He was commander in chief of the combined Anglo-Dutch army in the Spanish Netherlands. Not more than that for the Dutch
 
Were do you get the ideas from that he fulfilled those roles for the Dutch? He was commander in chief of the combined Anglo-Dutch army in the Spanish Netherlands. Not more than that for the Dutch
He also determined the Dutch grand strategy, to some extent, because that was THE Dutch Army (of course for Blenheim it was split, between Marlborough and his recommendation for Dutch commander, Overkirk). And he was William's Ambassador-Extraordinary for the second Grand Alliance.
In 1709, Marlborough moved in lock-step with Dutch foreign policy, leading to no peace.

So sure, I exaggerate a bit. But Dutch military & foreign-strategic policymaking was all about Marlborough's position as SACEUR. And his abilityto pushthe no peace without Spain in England (which ultimately proved a blunder when the new English government bypassed it as untenable and instead got all the rewards, leaving the remaining allies holding the bag - also to Marlborough's chagrin).
 
He also determined the Dutch grand strategy, to some extent, because that was THE Dutch Army
Well I am not denying the he was very influential, but we should indeed not exaggerate. He was faced with severe limitations on his power. Marlborough was only allowed to command the Dutch troops that were part of the combined field army. He always had to formulate his operational plans in consultation with the highest Dutch general (first Athlone, then Overkirk and then Tilly), who was also authorised to ask his subordinates for advice. He had to take all his decisions in agreement with the Dutch commander and the field deputies and Marlborough was not allowed to give orders to the Dutch troops independently of the Dutch senior officers.

It is also clear when you look at the actual campaigns. Like in 1708 and 1709 when Marlborough wanted to take Ypres, but was denied that both times and made to besiege Lille and Tournai. So he didn't even have control over Dutch strategy in this theater. Let alone of the rest.

But Dutch military & foreign-strategic policymaking was all about Marlborough's position as SACEUR. And his abilityto pushthe no peace without Spain in England
Do you mean that they agreed with his foreigh policy? That was clearly not the case. The Dutch cared little for what happened in Spain and 'No Peace Without Spain' was not a Dutch slogan.
 
Well I am not denying the he was very influential, but we should indeed not exaggerate. He was faced with severe limitations on his power. Marlborough was only allowed to command the Dutch troops that were part of the combined field army. He always had to formulate his operational plans in consultation with the highest Dutch general (first Athlone, then Overkirk and then Tilly), who was also authorised to ask his subordinates for advice. He had to take all his decisions in agreement with the Dutch commander and the field deputies and Marlborough was not allowed to give orders to the Dutch troops independently of the Dutch senior officers.

It is also clear when you look at the actual campaigns. Like in 1708 and 1709 when Marlborough wanted to take Ypres, but was denied that both times and made to besiege Lille and Tournai. So he didn't even have control over Dutch strategy in this theater. Let alone of the rest.


Do you mean that they agreed with his foreigh policy? That was clearly not the case. The Dutch cared little for what happened in Spain and 'No Peace Without Spain' was not a Dutch slogan.
My understanding is that Marlborough stretched the limits of his authority (possibly even exceeded) at Blenheim, where he took Dutch forces further than what the Dutch wanted. Did the Dutch keep a closer eye on him after that, installing counter balances to keep him from going against their strategy/thinking to such an extent? Although Blenheim worked out quite well, a loss there probably dooms the allied effort. While Marlborough was skilled enough to not need luck, he was aided immensely by the Bavarian commander working at cross purposes with the French, leading to disaster for the French/Bavarians.
 
My understanding is that Marlborough stretched the limits of his authority (possibly even exceeded) at Blenheim, where he took Dutch forces further than what the Dutch wanted. Did the Dutch keep a closer eye on him after that, installing counter balances to keep him from going against their strategy/thinking to such an extent? Although Blenheim worked out quite well, a loss there probably dooms the allied effort. While Marlborough was skilled enough to not need luck, he was aided immensely by the Bavarian commander working at cross purposes with the French, leading to disaster for the French/Bavarians.
During the march up to Blenheim he wasn't given the same restrictions. Although it is true that he took the Dutch forces further than the was officially allowed to by the States-General, it can be assumed that he informed Anthonie Heinsius, the Dutch Grand Pensionary, and Adriaan van Geldermalsen of his plan to link up with Imperial forces. And the Dutch did not install counter balances after Blenheim, but at the start of the war in 1702.
 
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