True although they also assumed the British were going to make peace, that is out the window so there is one POD. The other POD is the Italians have better intelligence or Mussolini tells them to shut up and follow orders and they do and are surprised in a good way (for them).
WI: France really fights on from 1940?
- Thread starter tomo pauk
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True although they also assumed the British were going to make peace, that is out the window so there is one POD. The other POD is the Italians have better intelligence or Mussolini tells them to shut up and follow orders and they do and are surprised in a good way (for them).
I hate to be that guy, but the Germans were in no position to try and invade the United States.
Yet, the worse thing the Axis have to work with is that their prioritizing their resources in land-based operations which is their best bet since Germany understood that it's navy and the raiding fleets are just no match for one of the naval powers across the oceans.
So I don't see why the US shouldn't get rid of the old stockpiles to the Allies. It benefits both parties - one gets weapons to kill Germans with and the other gets money in the long-term.
If the Axis somehow destroys the French forces in North Africa and magically get their forces in Britain, there is little they can do to compete with the US Navy. Problem? Submarines don't do well against destroyers and... we... our love of destroyers went too far.
Driftless
Donor
The more aggressive Italian option raises some questions from me(I have no clue on the answers):
* How long would it take the Italians to organize and commence an assault on Malta?
* From my limited knowledge, the Maltese shores are pretty rocky. Are there sufficient beaches, or would the Italians try to take the ports on the hop?
* How well were they prepared to make an amphibious assault - from an equipment standpoint?
* Considering the comparatively heavy losses to the Kriegsmarine in the Norway Campaign and France still in the fight in the South, do the British consider a Sealion even less likely under the circumstance? They're still going to keep a strong force at home to deal with the survivors: the twins and the various crusiers. Still, with limited threat of invasion, how much of the RN do they retain for home defense and how much of the fleet might be available for use elsewhere?
As I noted above, I have no clue on the answers to those questions.
* How long would it take the Italians to organize and commence an assault on Malta?
* From my limited knowledge, the Maltese shores are pretty rocky. Are there sufficient beaches, or would the Italians try to take the ports on the hop?
* How well were they prepared to make an amphibious assault - from an equipment standpoint?
* Considering the comparatively heavy losses to the Kriegsmarine in the Norway Campaign and France still in the fight in the South, do the British consider a Sealion even less likely under the circumstance? They're still going to keep a strong force at home to deal with the survivors: the twins and the various crusiers. Still, with limited threat of invasion, how much of the RN do they retain for home defense and how much of the fleet might be available for use elsewhere?
As I noted above, I have no clue on the answers to those questions.
Deleted member 1487
Well if the Italian pre-war intel is better they had an invasion plan ready to go, it is just up to Mussolini to communicate his desire to seize the island ASAP with enough of a heads up. Probably May is too late to do so in June, but perhaps July might be viable. There are a limited number of beaches to assault plus Italy does have some special parachute units, but not a full division. The Italians also had special marine infantry. The San Marco Regiment, which was supposed to be perhaps the most elite unit in the Italian military and got a lot of praise from the Germans and British alike. They even fought of the British commandos and captured 200 of them around Tobruk in 1942. They were preparing for some landings in France in 1940 and were used for marine landings in Yugoslavia in 1941, so they'd probably be ideal for the initial assault force on Malta.
The DG10/42 Plan was conceived in 1938 and based on my limited research the Italians would have had problems with supplies, joint service cooperation, and overall effectiveness of some units. That said, I think in July 1940 they could have succeeded by sheer weight of numbers but it would likely would have been a blood bath and probably has knock on effects for future operations. There is also this, some good points by wiking:
https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/sealion-small-malta.279740/
https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/sealion-small-malta.279740/
Right. This "Grim Economic Realities" page shows just how much the US economy tilted the scales:
http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm
Not much in the short run. Sending ground combat forces to the Italian ports to embark for Lybia is going to take a few weeks. There also the question of how much more the Italian cargo fleet can handle at that point. It was a bit disorganized after the surprise DoW & already embarking reinforcements to build up the 10th Army.
More Important would be however much German AF can be sent south and crowded onto the Italian airfields in Sicilly, Calabria, ect... OTL it took six weeks to establish the bases on French airfields for the BoB. In this case there is further to send the ground crew, their kit, the spare parts, fuel, HQ kit, ect... & last there is the interference from the closing weeks of the campaign to the south coast. Would the senior German leaders leave the evacuation ports unmolested so as to send the air force on to Sicilly, or is the rebasing exercise delayed until the evacuation is ended?
It may be early September before the first GAF bomber groups start sorties against the Allies in Tunisia or their fleets blockading Lybia. Will French heavy artillery be hammering Tripoli by then?
Deleted member 1487
AFAIK IOTL the first reinforcements to the 10th Army weren't sent until July, while the majority of 10th army reinforcements came from the 5th Army around Tripoli, which at some point started to get hollowed out to build up for the invasion of Egypt, ultimately getting absorbed into it entirely. ITTL the 5th Army isn't getting stripped down due to the threat from non-Vichy France, while the invasion of Egypt isn't even going to be planned given that Tunisia might be up for grabs. If anything 5th army might get that build up to take Tunisia to secure supply lines to Libya and further isolate Malta.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Malta_(World_War_II)#Luftwaffe_arrives_(January–April_1941)
IOTL the first Luftwaffe units appeared extremely quickly in January once the order was given to move and were already flying operations within days of arrival despite the need to build up Italian airfields in the region to handle the hundreds of Luftwaffe aircraft coming in.
The situation for the BoB was quite a bit different because the Luftwaffe had to effectively build up bases from scratch in Northern France and rebuild all the infrastructure leading from Germany to the French coast that they had wrecked during the invasion.
Likely the BoB is off the table while the hunt for the French evacuation is on. The question is what if anything could or even should be spared to send to Italy in the meantime and what could be sustained in the race to the French southern coast? If anything the limitation is going to be how quickly and far Luftwaffe forces could move up with the army as it pushes south. In fact the Italians might even be keeping the majority of their air units in their north to push into Southern France and seize Corsica. Of course by the end of June the German army was very far south as it was:
By July Marseilles would probably be in Axis hands and then the Axis air forces could deploy where ordered. The problem is what does Hitler consider more important, going after Britain or France? I'm inclined to say France because though closer Britain was a significantly tougher nut to crack than the French and securing Italy in it's position in the Mediterranean would probably be easier and secure more strategic benefits than trying to set up for something like Sealion.
I don't see why given the situation as of the armistice IOTL as illustrated in the map above. By July Marseilles should be either taken or blockaded and surrounded. It might even be as early as late July or early August for the GAF to be bombing Malta and potentially helping against Tunisia.
Given that the Italian 5th Army as of June had 8 combat divisions in 3 corps in west Libya to guard against the French in Tunisia might they not be able to seize the Mareth Line in July? They outnumbered the French defenders of Tunisia quite handily and the French during/shortly after evacuating wouldn't really be immediately able to shift forces to help them. Given that the British were able to virtually bounce the line in 1943 and the French were relatively weaker in 1940 than the the Axis defenders were in 1943 the French might well find themselves with a nasty surprise when the Italians attack.
Strictly in logical terms the Allied fleets at hand could waive this one away. However things were a bit disorganized in all directions. There is some possibility the Italians could in July or August pull this one off while the Allied fleet is busy with its trousers around their ankles. What then? The Allied fleet still shows up, if day late. Like the Brits in 1940 the Italians can't make much use of the island without a decent size air group aboard, and the support base under it. The likely result is a isolated Italian garrison trying to keep aloft the assorted bombers that fly in looking for fuel. In the long run is a British embarrassment & a Italian dead end.
Equally likely at the other end of the spectrum is the Allies luck out & the Cape Matapan battle is played out earlier and larger & any paratroops that land run out of ammunition and lunch while the Italian fleet survivors flee north.
Malta was a big propaganda item in 1941-42. But in 1940 the ability to use it to affect events in the Central Med depends on a powerful air group, submarines, even some surface ships, and plentiful supplies. It was lacking in all that in June 1940 & the ability of the Italians to speedily build it up is problematic.
Deleted member 1487
You do realize that Sicily is 90 miles away and the closest potential Allied air/naval base is many times further away right? Submarines or surface vessels aren't going to do the Allies any good trying to interdict an Axis island with large naval and airbases within less than 100 miles (i.e. a few dozen minutes in flight time). Besides the entire point is to deny it as a base for the Allies to use to threaten Axis supply lines. With it out of the way there is a short, direct, and much easier patrolled shipping lane to Libya than the long detour routes around Malta taken IOTL with plenty of places for the Allies to ambush and sink convoys without significant support near at hand. Malta then even allows air support groups to be based closer to the central shipping lanes to allow for top cover of convoys racing to Tripoli, while the islands Pantelleria and Lampedusa helps provide some early warning/basing to the west of Malta and closer to Tunisia. In fact taking it dramatically helps the Italian shipping shortage issue, because it makes the routes much shorter and quicker, especially since they will have to avoid Tunisia ITTL.
A large map to illustrate the point:
https://weaponsandwarfare.files.wor...is_shipping_routes_summer_and_autumn_1941.jpg
Edit:
Just found this map of naval mine fields which may hinder the French navy trying to operate in the Central Mediterranean:
The Italians taking Malta in summer 1940 has less to do with gaining something they can use and more denying it to the Allies and splitting the Allied position in the Med. If the French really are serious about fighting on from North Africa and the rest of the Empire, I see Axis attention turning toward continuing to pursue the French with the Italians going after Malta to help fence off the British in Egypt and the French in Syria and also invading Tunisia. German forces will flow (primarily air forces) once they become available.
...
Edit:
Just found this map of naval mine fields which may hinder the French navy trying to operate in the Central Mediterranean:
The map dates most of the mine fields on it to 1941-43. The fields flanking Panatelleria were started summer of 1940. The Brits were to a large degree unaware of them being laid, and they were unable to interfere in any practical way. Conversely the French have a cluster of all weather airfields clustered around Bizerte & Tunis, & more along the littoral south. They had the aircraft for supporting frequent air patrols. They also have a fleet at hand with light craft suitable for patrolling the strait & interdicting the Italian mine layers. The multilayered barrage depicted for 1941-43 on this map would not have much reality for the Allied fleet of July-September 1940. In 1941 the Brits passed multiple ship columns through the straits during Operation TIGER. Losses from mines were not notable.
The ports of Bizerte & Tunis are not "potential" naval bases? Scaling the map Bizerte is less than 180 NM from Gouzo as the ship floats. However 90 mile to Sicily is relevant only if the Italian fleet is based in the south Sicilian fishing ports. The actual home bases are La Spezia & Taranto, with harbors like Naples or Messinia as other departure points. ..which are more than 180 NM distant.
Which it was not effectively equipped to do in June 1940 anyway. For much of 1940 Italian losses from Malta were bearable. It was interdiction from Alexandria that scared them. Through 1941 & 1942 interdiction from distant Egypt cost the Italian cargo fleet more than Malta based interdiction. The multiple naval battles and any Italian defeats were by fleets based in Alexandria & other points in the eastern Med. Malta had its role, but that was after a build up of many months extending into 1941. Beyond that Malta represents a single air base complex. Tunisia has two groups of air bases in the north and a extended series of airfields all the way south to Mareth. Scale the map distance from Sfax or Mareth to Tripoli & judge how the Italian cargo ships can evade routine interdiction flights vs the Tripoli harbor from those, or direct from Tunis for that matter. To put it another way the cargo route eventually must turn towards increasing Allied strength. Either air interdiction sorties from the Tunisian littoral, or cruiser, destroyer, & submarines waiting under fighter cover.
Deleted member 1487
What is your source about the laying of minefields in 1940? I can't seem to find much about it.
In Summer 1940 the French are far more preoccupied by what is going on in France and the evacuation in TTL. The Bizerte airfields and naval base are the core of French basing in the country from what I've been able to find, so anything that would likely be staged against the Italians would have to come from there. There is not a base in Tunis that I can find, either in WW2 or now. The airfield near Tunis was a civilian one and only opened in 1938, only servicing about 5800 people annually. Any idea what was actually based in Tunisia in terms of aircraft? From what I've been able to find the French hollowed out their forces in Tunisia and North Africa in general to fight in Europe. I'm sure they'll bring quite a few in during the evacuation, but that doesn't mean they'd be available for operations against the Italians for some time. What sort of fleet was available in Summer 1940 that isn't involved in the evacuation and not headed to Oran? That is where the fleet ended up IOTL in June. During the Malta convoys the RN did hit mines in the 1940 field area:
https://books.google.com/books?id=tdbEAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA240&lpg=PA240&dq=italian+minefields+pantelleria&source=bl&ots=6BymDs_uVS&sig=ACfU3U35ZOMPkuVtkmzrMOir__yzoib0WQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjUwfn01rfhAhUDF6wKHRHHDl0Q6AEwCHoECC0QAQ#v=onepage&q=italian minefields pantelleria&f=false
Of course there are the Italian submarines, aircraft, torpedo boats, and various light craft as well.
Bizerte was the only base of significance I can find during WW2, but the French fleet IOTL was based in Oran. So Taranto is still closer. The French were also concerned about having the fleet in a base too close to the enemy, though for both sides the light craft would be closer to the front as well, plus of course the ever critical air bases, which favored the Italians if the French decided to try and project to help Malta...but how could they during June or July given the need to focus on evacuation and then reorganization during it's aftermath? IOTL about half the fleet in Europe was based in Toulon, half in Oran, so if the entire fleet left Europe they'd be pretty badly overloading the capacity in North Africa.
Well, per what has been posted here and in other threads on the subject Malta was poorly held in 1940 as it was thought to be indefensible in the event of attack and it was only late in 1940 that the Brits started to base more and more forces there. I personally don't see how the POD convinces the Italians to attack as their intel was faulty about how well defended it was and it deterred them, but apparently they had all the necessary forces and equipment to do so if they chose to. The French fleet in June and probably July is spoken for, as is the Royal Navy, so there really isn't a force that could be rapidly deployed to save Malta, while Britain didn't even want to try IOTL nor did the French want to bother with it, in fact suggesting the British concede it to Italy to keep them neutral:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Malta_(World_War_II)#Background
The French did have some airfields throughout Tunisia, but they mostly weren't military ones (there was one near the Mareth Line at Gabes that was a pre-war military airfield to support the line, it was only in limited use by the Allies after they took it so who knows what it's capacity was). The Tunis one was a low capacity civilian one opened in 1938, while the other ones outside of Bizerte were even worse. Bizerte was the main military complex, both air and naval, so any continuous activity would have to be initially based out of there until the other fields could be improved and expanded to handle the continuous, heavy military traffic you're suggesting.
http://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/ams/africa/txu-oclc-6589746-sheet3-4th-ed.jpg
This map suggests that the Italians had a lot more military fields near Tripoli than the French to supply air cover for convoys when they turned toward French territory/Tripoli.
I wonder if the French would make a play for Pantelleria ITTL when they could spare the forces. It would certainly open up the potential for naval operations in the Italian areas south of Sicily.
It's a pity you weren't around in 1940 to explain this to Roosevelt and Marshall and Congress and the newspapers. But then, if you had been around in 1940, you wouldn't know any better than they did what the Axis might or might not be capable of.
What was known then was that Germany had just achieved an utterly astonishing victory over France, employing a raft of new technologies and tactics that were apparently irresistible. What more Germany could do was unknown.
The sentiments I described were quite widely held by senior American military men at the time.
At least six months. It will take lots of time for...
- getting the government set up and functioning after the move from France
- getting the army command set up and functioning after the move from France
- putting the troops evacuated from France in some kind of order (e.g. getting regiments and other formations re-assembled)
- sorting out a new command structure (i.e. firing lots of generals who failed and promoting other officers who succeeded)
- re-equipping the evacuated troops, most of whom will have abandoned everything except their clothing and small arms
- replacing start-of-war equipment which has just been proved useless with new stuff (which has to be decided on, designed, procured, distributed to troops, and troops trained to use it)
All this has to be accomplished using the very limited resources of French North Africa.
Which raises the question of where Benny the Moose makes his next move here.
Does he carry on with the plan to throw the British out of Egypt?
or
Does he strike west and try to smash the French while they're regrouping in France?
or
Does he go full Benny the Moose and try both at more or less the same time?
Deleted member 1487
Given how long the build up took for the invasion of Egypt and how they pretty much disbanded the 5th Army opposite Tunisia to make it happen it seems like and either-or situation rather than both even for Musso. Plus without France surrendering like IOTL there really isn't evidence that there might be a peace deal any time soon, so Benny is going to really have to consider this is the long haul rather than something where he can take risks so that in the short term he can get negotiation benefits before the enemy can organize a counterattack. I'm putting my money on Tunisia being the focus due to how dangerous that territory could be to Italy trying to hold Libya, plus the French are disorganized, and the 5th Army is already built up with 8 divisions and on top of that the Italians were considering an offensive against Tunisia first before the French surrendered IOTL.
This might help:
https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/UK-Med-I/UK-Med-I-5.html
French and British forces don't seem all that strong compared to what the Italians had in Libya as of May-June.
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Deleted member 1487
IOTL the only way the Italians got the forces to invade Egypt (with bad results) was by stripping out the defense forces they had in the west of Libya. Since the Brits are so weak in Egypt, but covered by the large desert between Libya and the Nile Delta, it really is only safe to attack the French and defend against the Brits.