WI: Biafran, Katangan and/or West Papuan separatism worked out.

[PecuTheGreat]

The Biafran and Katangan separatist wars and their failures came to define how the international community treated separatism and the failure of West Papuan separatism came to influence how the UN chatter on self-determination was views as in practice.

If these Separatist wars and movements ended with success how would the world deal with Separatism?.

All these states also saw support from former colonial powers which either had control of the region (Belgium for Katanga, Netherlands for West Papua) or had historic and current designs for the region (France for Biafra) as well as support and opposition from other post colonial states (Biafria had some of France's vassals support like Ivory Coast and Gabon which it also used to send some discrete aid and support from other more independent African states like Tanzania and support from the white settler colonial states to break up the most populous black state) what exactly will be the relationship between these states and the West under these conditions of both some Western and Unaligned movement support?.

Like the Biafrans described French support as too little to be descisive, if they still manage to win(and if they manage to do so with it's Vassal republic of Edo) would they be really so obligated to support France? Same with Katanga and Belgium/France, tho West Papua's success independence would be more dependant on the Dutch, would they really not just treat it like how say Chad treats it's independence from Chad?.

And what ideological movements would this support, Biafra again as an example saw huge humanitarian support from Churches in form of Joint Church Aid. Would this validate Christian movements like liberation theology to prominence in the decolonized world? Or would the ideology of the Ahiara Declaration, an document that constructed an idea of a Black Africa in opposition to Communist bloc, Muslim world and the West and with intellectuals that created it proposing the earliest forms of communualism be among the main ideas like Mobutu's Authenticalism and that given the influence that Nigerians from the Biafran region have had OTL, possibly a more successful ideology one at that.

And that's just Biafra, what changes in ideology could come out of an independent Katanga and West Papua. Katanga had a White management class. Would under the Belgian influence they not be immediately expelled and allow for a more gradual transition and successful transition like Botswana did or would that class work to keep their position and privileges and work as a Catel to not let such a transition occur. Alternatively, would these state instead be as opposed to Western influence and its heritage and be more like Uganda and expel non-native born experts to have their roles filled in by cronies?.

 

[Joriz Castillo]

If all three separatist movements succeeded, it might have a domino effect across Asia and Europe. Any breakaway movement would look at the success stories and say, "If they pulled it off, why can't we? ".

 

[PecuTheGreat]

For the most part, for the sake of ensuring the Ahiara Declaration manifests like OTL I would like for the war to continue till the 1969 situation then victory with minimal aid from France.

Some sort of Uber successful speedy March/Sail to Lagos might to it.

However, everything you needed for such an Ideology was already developed through the periods of political strife with the North and Western and Commie Bloc opposition to Biafra, so a similar enough ideology and manifesto is likely, even if Bango ends the war with a speedy taking out of Lagos.

 

[PecuTheGreat]

Katanga for sure would multiply the supply of its resources that it gives to Europe.

 

[CHKeeley]

Katangan nationhood was a chimera that was blatantly used to bring the Lumumba government to its knees, maintain the dominance of the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga (read: Belgium) over the copper flow, and trigger a general crisis. This was accomplished with largely Belgian and American resources, and with willing aid from Hammerskjöld’s United Nations. After Mobutu’s “friendly intervention to restore order” with the go ahead from western intelligence, the situation changed. Patrice Lumumba was murdered, and within the year the image of Tshombe’s Katanga as a beleaguered Poland or Austria vanished and the United Nations turned to the task of reintegrating the secessionists. So in order to keep Katanga viable and propped up by the colonial powers (which it almost entirely was), then you need Léopoldville to stay in either Lumumba’s hands or those of another nationalist.

Honestly though if all three states succeed in gaining independence, I’m not sure that really does much internationally. Independence and separatism already pretty much work this way: might makes right regardless of legal claims to this or that. The Republic of China (ROC) may not be universally recognized but we all implicitly recognize it as a sovereign state because it has managed to continue existing. Some more independence projects getting off the ground for this or that reason doesn’t do a whole lot to change the calculus of, say, activists in Catalonia. They still face the same constellation of forces arrayed against them regardless of whether or not Biafra can deploy sufficient violence or threat of violence to secede.

 

[PecuTheGreat]

Katangan nationhood was a chimera that was blatantly used to bring the Lumumba government to its knees, maintain the dominance of the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga (read: Belgium) over the copper flow, and trigger a general crisis. This was accomplished with largely Belgian and American resources, and with willing aid from Hammerskjöld’s United Nations. After Mobutu’s “friendly intervention to restore order” with the go ahead from western intelligence, the situation changed. Patrice Lumumba was murdered, and within the year the image of Tshombe’s Katanga as a beleaguered Poland or Austria vanished and the United Nations turned to the task of reintegrating the secessionists. So in order to keep Katanga viable and propped up by the colonial powers (which it almost entirely was), then you need Léopoldville to stay in either Lumumba’s hands or those of another nationalist.

Honestly though if all three states succeed in gaining independence, I’m not sure that really does much internationally. Independence and separatism already pretty much work this way: might makes right regardless of legal claims to this or that. The Republic of China (ROC) may not be universally recognized but we all implicitly recognize it as a sovereign state because it has managed to continue existing. Some more independence projects getting off the ground for this or that reason doesn’t do a whole lot to change the calculus of, say, activists in Catalonia. They still face the same constellation of forces arrayed against them regardless of whether or not Biafra can deploy sufficient violence or threat of violence to secede.

What of West Papua. One interesting thing about that is that an argument was and is still being made that Indonesia's rule over it should be seen as colonial, just colonial Austronesians colonizing over Melanesians.

The Idea of non-European colonizers in the period of the Scramble for Africa and After could be made with more grounds and not only made but be grounds for secession.

Like Ethiopian rule over Oromo and Somali could now be argued against on grounds of colonization, so could integration of the middle belt region of Nigeria into Nigeria proper on grounds that the Hausa-Fulani were basically used as sub-colonizers by the British to conquer and hold the middle belt.

Anyways, what do you think about the calculus of the spread of Ideology, the Ahiara Declaration seems like something with similarities to later ideologies coming out of the 3rd world to reject capitalism and Communism for their own geo-political movement like Mobutu's Authenticalism and Hinduvata(this because of its opposition to the Islamic world as well). Except it was more universalist, specifically to Black Africa and less particularist(compared to Authenticalism). To what extent could it actually be a wide spread ideology for the 3rd world, and would the alliance with Christianity in the Ideology that would certainly be further bolstered by the humanitarian efforts of Joint Church aid be more of a hindrance than support?.

 

[Aisha Clan-Clan]

Quebec would probably be an independent NAFTA member in 2022 in ttl.

 

[PecuTheGreat]

Anyways, what do you think about the calculus of the spread of Ideology, the Ahiara Declaration seems like something with similarities to later ideologies coming out of the 3rd world to reject capitalism and Communism for their own geo-political movement like Mobutu's Authenticalism and Hinduvata(this because of its opposition to the Islamic world as well). Except it was more universalist, specifically to Black Africa and less particularist(compared to Authenticalism). To what extent could it actually be a wide spread ideology for the 3rd world, and would the alliance with Christianity in the Ideology that would certainly be further bolstered by the humanitarian efforts of Joint Church aid be more of a hindrance than support?.

All this write up makes it look like some Ahiara descendant ideology becomes pretty popular in West Papua as it fits all of that and would be taken into the Black identity by the game of American culture.

Aside from all that, West Papua would so certainly recieve alot of Dutch-Indonesian migration, maybe enough that this group takes over from the native Melanesians. At the very least, West Papua would be much more populous than today.

This link might be telling.

https://www.reddit.com/r/imaginarymaps/comments/s3dj7q

 

[PecuTheGreat]

Something I got off askhistorians that elaborated on the Indonesian Acquisition of West Papua, which was opposed by the actual West Papuan council.

At independence, the Republic of Indonesia claimed to be the legal successor to the *entire* Dutch East Indies, including West Papua. This was despite the Netherlands retaining West Papua as the Netherlands New Guinea. The Netherlands did agonisingly slowly start to move the colony to a semblance of independence with efforts such as creating a flag, anthem and a constituent assembly. But it’s also important to note that the territory was really dispersely settled and it was estimated in 1962 that a third of the inhabitants lived totally outside the control of the colonial government.

Despite these moves by the Dutch, Indonesia didn’t drop it’s claim. And the the Netherlands retention of West Papua was increasingly problematic from a view of decolonisation. Indonesia had been rallying support for its position from newly independent African nations, while the Dutch supporters in Australia, South Africa and New Zealand became wary of the situation potentially escalating to violence, which the Indonesians were increasingly threatening. By the end of the 1950s the Dutch were essentially ready to leave. But they didn’t want to turn over to the Indonesian. Partly, no doubt, this was motivated by spite over the Indonesian’s own hostile relations towards the Dutch, but there were genuine arguments made about the Melanesian heritage of West Papua and the right of self determination of the West Papuans themselves.

At the same time, the Indonesians began ramping up their threats and rhetoric. In 1958, Indonesian riots attacked Dutch businesses, and Diplomatic relations were cut off in 1960. In December 1961, the Indonesians organised *Operation Trikora* to invade the territory. An undeclared war had begun that the Dutch were ill equipped to fight long term, and which its allies would not get involved in. The United States became concerned that renewed Indonesian-Dutch hostilities could lead the Indonesians to align with the Soviet Bloc and so pushed for a ceasefire. Thus a treaty was drawn up - *The New York Agreement* - between the Dutch, Americans, and Indonesians under the auspices of the UN. It’s useful to note that no West Papuans were involved in these negotiations, it was an agreement between Indonesia and the Dutch. The West Papuan council did protests this fact to the Dutch but by then it was fait accompli.

So in 1962 the Dutch agreed to turnover control of West Papua to the United Nations, and the *UN Temporary Executive Agreement* (UNTEA) took control. The end point of this temporary arrangement was to be an **Act of Free Choice** by the West Papuans themselves in 1969.

UNTEA was a mess made from compromise. Perhaps it was the best that could be done, but from the start it was weak on legitimacy, with an unclear role and incapacitated powers. Nevertheless, with a UN plan in place, many countries essentially stopped paying attention. Not Indonesia though, who remained committed to acquiring the territory. To pursue this, Indonesia had pressured the UN to agree to transition custodianship of the territory to them for 1963 until the vote 1969. The UN was pretty okay with this, as the UN has a general aversion to running territories for any period of time. To mitigate other countries re-involving themselves, the Indonesians remained committed (with a hiccup in 1965) to the 1969 vote.

But it was to be a vote on their terms. Indonesia invoked a form of community consensus voting that was traditional to parts of Indonesia to be used in West Papua. This situation led to a situation where out of a population of roughly 1 million, only 1026 votes were cast. And those voter hand-picked by Indonesia delivered a **unanimous** result to join West Papua permanently to Indonesia.

This was not technically illegitimate. The Indonesian consensus method was still a form of democracy and an expression - if a hollow one - of the West Papuan’s view. The UN Representative overseeing the vote on behalf of the Secretary General - Fernando Ortiz-Sanz - delivered a report affirming the legitimacy of the vote. This was also re-confirmed years later in passing by the International Court of Justice which noted (and i’m paraphrasing) that *the lack of UN statements in opposition to ongoing Indonesian administration since the Act of Free Choice suggests that the UN views the matter of West Papuan self-determination resolved*. However, the legitimacy of Indonesian control of West Papua is a legitimacy born from the letter of the law, not the spirit of the law.

Of course, the West Papuans haven’t all been entirely satisfied and the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM) emerged in the years after the vote to challenge Indonesia rule. On 1 July 1971, the West Papuan Republic was proclaimed, but has failed to attract the recognition the international recognition it would need to become properly independent.

As for the potential allies for West Papua. The question split the solidarity post-colonial countries. Some such as India favoured Indonesia as a large post-colonial country itself, while others like Ghana favoured West Papua as a people under an enduring forign rule. Both the Communist and Capitalist blocs saw Indonesia as a more important player, and one they didn’t want to alienate by supporting a separatist movement. The Americans and Europeans particularly saw the question as having been resolved. Although this has changed since the end of the Cold War and the end of the Indonesian dictatorship in the 1990s/2000s, which has given some new sympathy to the West Papuan independence movement.

The status of West Papua since WWII is thus a story of the law producing a result that is unsatisfactory to many but which other countries have accepted because it was, according to the framework of international law, a legitimate and legal outcome. However, it’s also a story of keeping your eye on the prize. West Papua lacked a clear and consistent advocate for it’s own interests after 1962 (and even before this the Dutch were a largely absent colonial master), whereas the Indonesians ran a focused and consistent if at times a little ethically dubious campaign over 20 years to acquire West Papua by any means.

https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/vnbh99

 

[PecuTheGreat]

Something I got off askhistorians that elaborated on the Indonesian Acquisition of West Papua, which was opposed by the actual West Papuan council.

https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/vnbh99

This does provide a possible timeline of Papuan independence without Dutch Indonesians.

Like Godamn it, the UN just had to be competent for 10 years, tho Indonesia would probably still invade like they did to East Timor and the USA and USSR would probably not support West Papua, tho China might given they supported Biafra due to Sino-Soviet split issues.

Being so much closer and the USA being conflicted, such an attack could be the alt-Chinese invasion of Vietnam, tho with no land border that's still more unlikely than not.

 

[comrade cat]

Something I got off askhistorians that elaborated on the Indonesian Acquisition of West Papua, which was opposed by the actual West Papuan council.

https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/vnbh99

I think there are few possible ways that West Papua could be independent:

1. The Dutch gave them full independence somewhere in the 1950s, instead of planning to release them in the 1960s. So West Papua already sovereign before the US decided to pressure Netherlands to give West Papua to Indonesia.

2. Have the US view Soekarno regime as a lost cause earlier. OTL, they only view Soekarno as a lost cause in 1964. In 1962, the US still think that they can appease Soekarno by giving Indonesia West Papua. Yes Soeharto toppled Soekarno after 1965 and Indonesia became solidly pro-West after that. But in 1962, this is still far from foregone conclusion. If the US in 1962 thought Indonesia will become a communist state soon, they, will be more willing to support the Dutch in granting West Papua independence.

3. 1998 turmoil in Indonesia becomes much more severe. Indonesia lose several more outlying territories, either by (kinda) peaceful referendum,or by any other ways.

OTL the interim president Habibie grant East Timor independence referendum, but only East Timor,and try other methods like carrot and stick in other places like Aceh and West Papua. It went successfully in Aceh (eventually, but not before reescalation of military conflict under Megawati and a massive tsunami there), but went to s**t in West Papua.

 

[PecuTheGreat]

It went successfully in Aceh (eventually, but not before reescalation of military conflict under Megawati and a massive tsunami there), but went to s**t in West Papua.

Elaborate well n what happened in West Papua.

Yes Soeharto toppled Soeharto after 1965 and

You made a mistake here.

 

[comrade cat]

Elaborate well n what happened in West Papua.

Aceh managed to struck a peace deal with the central government in 2005 and is largely at peace today (sharia law peace, but still no armed conflict anymore) . Meanwhile, West Papua still sees armed conflict even to this day.

Part of it could be explained because of the fragmented nature of West Papuan movement (contrasted to the relative unity of the Acehnese one).

But one of the largest missed opportunity is during Gus Dur (Abdurrahman Wahid) presidency. The West Papuan conflict almost had a peaceful resolution when Gus Dur made plenty of concessions to them, he even allowed them to raise the "morning star" Flag in public.

But when Gus Dur was overthown in Jakarta (due to unrelated political crisis), his successor, Megawati, instead decided to to the hardline path (she also did the same in Aceh) and re-escalate military conflict there. This sudden about face from the central government part made the West Papuan to lose faith in them.

And until today, the central government still seems to favor the hardline approach, so I don't think it will be resolved anytime soon.

You made a mistake here.

Lmao, yeah edited

 

[jsb]

I think there are few possible ways that West Papua could be independent:

I think Australia deciding to get more involved in breaking up the potential united future northern enemy who could eventually outnumber them if it developed and making sure they are divided between the islands post independence?

If Australia simply decided to ensure that both all of Timor, Yamdena, Kobroor & Wokam and Papua gained separate independence after 1945 when they had defacto control of the area, who would really be able to stop them?

Australia simply asks the Dutch, Portugal, etc if they want to come fight the RAN on the other side of the world....and Indonesia to think if they even have any real warships?

 

[PecuTheGreat]

I think Australia deciding to get more involved in breaking up the potential united future northern enemy who could eventually outnumber them if it developed and making sure they are divided between the islands post independence?

If Australia simply decided to ensure that both all of Timor, Yamdena, Kobroor & Wokam and Papua gained separate independence after 1945 when they had defacto control of the area, who would really be able to stop them?

Australia simply asks the Dutch, Portugal, etc if they want to come fight the RAN on the other side of the world....?

What if they intervene later post the war, like in the 50s when Indonesia was posturing to conquer Papua, could they still do it?.

 

[jsb]

What if they intervene later post the war, like in the 50s when Indonesia was posturing to conquer Papua, could they still do it?.

Yes, RAN still has a CV albeit an old weak one no Indonesian force is going to be able to really stay and fight at sea, and they know that they will end up facing RN and RAF from Singapore almost certainly as well if it becomes a general war with Australia.... in the 1950s thats not going to be easy for a new county to face without external support so unless US/UK forces Australia to back down It's hard to win?

 

[Quintuplicate]

Was the RAN powerful?

 

[PecuTheGreat]

What of West Papua. One interesting thing about that is that an argument was and is still being made that Indonesia's rule over it should be seen as colonial, just colonial Austronesians colonizing over Melanesians.

The Idea of non-European colonizers in the period of the Scramble for Africa and After could be made with more grounds and not only made but be grounds for secession.

Like Ethiopian rule over Oromo and Somali could now be argued against on grounds of colonization, so could integration of the middle belt region of Nigeria into Nigeria proper on grounds that the Hausa-Fulani were basically used as sub-colonizers by the British to conquer and hold the middle belt.

Anyways, what do you think about the calculus of the spread of Ideology, the Ahiara Declaration seems like something with similarities to later ideologies coming out of the 3rd world to reject capitalism and Communism for their own geo-political movement like Mobutu's Authenticalism and Hinduvata(this because of its opposition to the Islamic world as well). Except it was more universalist, specifically to Black Africa and less particularist(compared to Authenticalism). To what extent could it actually be a wide spread ideology for the 3rd world, and would the alliance with Christianity in the Ideology that would certainly be further bolstered by the humanitarian efforts of Joint Church aid be more of a hindrance than support?.

There's this book, Colonialism by Proxy by Moses E Ochonu that makes the argument that Hausa were used as sub-colonizers in the middle belt region of Nigeria. I haven't completely gone through it but he casually references that other places experienced the same, so an ideology early on that says non-Europeans can be colonizers to bordering regions, which would be legitimized by the independence of West Papua would also mean that such regions like Middle-Belt Nigeria would see their own runs at Separatism.

This would obviously leak into native African state's Conquests being seen as colonial by some like Ghana, largely built around the Asante Empire may now become unstable, Ethiopia is certainly there and Morocco's whole thing in the Western Sahara can be cast as colonial resulting in stronger intervention by the West.

This could straight up be a new faction among the 3rd world/unaligned states which itself would have to align, most likely to the West. Tho USA would see the obvious implications of the larger 3rd world/unaligned community then swinging to the Soviets and leave them to sink.

 

[jsb]

Was the RAN powerful?

How do you rate powerful?

By USN standards or even RN...... NO, but It's still a real if small navy (with training links shared with RN/USN and a core of WWII experience) with a few real first world 1st rate warships including a light CV and large modern DDs in 50s that way above most nations "navies" in the world?

 

[Monk78]

I think Australia deciding to get more involved in breaking up the potential united future northern enemy who could eventually outnumber them if it developed and making sure they are divided between the islands post independence?

If Australia simply decided to ensure that both all of Timor, Yamdena, Kobroor & Wokam and Papua gained separate independence after 1945 when they had defacto control of the area, who would really be able to stop them?

Australia simply asks the Dutch, Portugal, etc if they want to come fight the RAN on the other side of the world....and Indonesia to think if they even have any real warships?

can the Soviets fix that ? Half a dozen skoryy destroyers and similar number of frigate Riga’s plus a few whiskey class submarines