WI Better Kriegsmarine in WW2

Kenneth P. Hansen thinks Raeder was competent. Why bother using that source again if it disagrees with you?
1. Kenneth Hansen is used to lay out the differences between one idiot, Raeder, and the German Mahanist.
2. I suggest a re-read of Mister Hansen if you think he thinks Raeder was competent.
 
1. Kenneth Hansen is used to lay out the differences between one idiot, Raeder, and the German Mahanist.
2. I suggest a re-read of Mister Hansen if you think he thinks Raeder was competent.
I read the whole thing. Hansen unmistakably is favorable to Raeder:

"With limited resources, Raeder had designed a capable fleet and formulated a flexible naval strategy; given the spirit, intelligence, imagination, will, and knowledge of the officer corps, results out of proportion to the national investment were a real possibility. Better could not have been hoped for without a substantial change in government policy.

The fundamental differences in naval strategy between Admirals Raeder and Wegener corresponded, then, from their different perspectives from which they looked at the problem. Raeder was bound by national strategy, policy, and government economic and budgetary priorities. Wegener's theories were limited by no such realities. Wegener steadfastly held to his notion that Great Britain and its domination over the world's oceans stood in the way of German national greatness. In fact, however, as we have seen, German foreign and defense policy during the Weimar and, at least initially, National Socialist regimes was oriented not against Britain but against the threat of a combined Polish and French invasion. Naval issues were secondary, and Raeder had his minister's instructions: "Base [naval] operational ideas more on political and military [i.e., land] realities." (101) The new and flexible approach to seapower strategy, warship design, and operational concepts that resulted would have been anathema to naval leaders of the Tirpitz era.

While Raeder repeatedly sought and received assurances from Hitler that war against Great Britain was not part of the grand plan, Wegener could see no other outcome. He had declared in his 1929 book, "As long as England acts as an outpost of America, no European world can be established;" (102) unrestrained by practicalities, he continued to press his theories, and in so doing distanced himself from his former crewmate and friend. Ultimately, Wegener's views left him alone and bitter; if his operational doctrines were now unrealistic, he had accurately foreseen the future enemy, and soon he saw his country engaged in the war that he had always maintained was unavoidable.

Raeder's often-quoted fatalistic declaration that the German surface forces were so weak that they could "do no more than show that they know how to die gallantly and thus are willing to create the foundations for later reconstruction" is overused and overplayed. (103) His conception of naval power was born of a philosophical construct other than the typical Anglo-American view, based on the writings of Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett, or even the German, Tirpitzian view of preceding decades. Raeder's innovative uses of seapower were actually early examples of asymmetric warfare. His theory that a broadly based attack on all the elements of maritime trade could be effective conforms to current views on the subject. (104) The use by the Kriegsmarine of operational logistics concepts to solve the Wegenerian problem of the "dead angle" was a "world first," one that has not received adequate recognition. In this sense, Erich Raeder pointed the way for all the middle-power navies that aspire to exercise seapower in distant waters."--Raeder vs Wegener: conflict in German naval strategy by Kenneth P. Hansen
 
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I read the whole thing. Hansen unmistakably is favorable to Raeder:
Is he?

On this view, Raeder genuinely regarded the entire German navy as one "naval family," a sense that he expended considerable personal effort to nurture. However, there were limits to the grandfatherly schoolmaster's familial inclusiveness and intellectual latitude. It has been claimed that because of Raeder's philosophy of strict professional excellence (Ressortdenke), "intellectual challenges [were] ... carefully omitted from the Naval Academy's (Marineschule) curriculum and [from] later training." (18) It has even been argued that all German naval training encouraged mental and behavioral conformity, presumably with the views and conduct of the service chief, who "supported the [Nazi] regime unflinchingly and proved merciless against malingerers, deserters, and those who questioned the authority of the Fuhrer." If that is true, Raeder's strictness and intolerance of independent thought might have been strong enough to break the bonds of early friendship with Wegener and their common "crew" membership. However, that Raeder was a "man of principles" makes jealousy unlikely as the main motivation behind the feud.
I tend to read everything before I come to a judgement and not cherry-pick.
"With limited resources, Raeder had designed a capable fleet and formulated a flexible naval strategy; given the spirit, intelligence, imagination, will, and knowledge of the officer corps, results out of proportion to the national investment were a real possibility. Better could not have been hoped for without a substantial change in government policy."
Yet, Raeder did not build to:
." Wegener asserted that geographic position was just as vital as the possession of a fleet of ships and that such position should relate directly to the willingness of one's forces to engage the enemy: "The tactical will to battle is a correlate of geography."
If the fool had; he would have insisted on dual use German commercial ship-building. Such as a deep blue water fishing fleet and roll-on, roll-off freighters and refuel at sea fast oil tankers. Furthermore:
In the late 1920s the German navy was being publicly accused of having provoked, prolonged, and, eventually, lost the war. The naval officer corps itself was divided by a storm of controversy over Tirpitz's memoirs, which had been published in 1919, and over Wegener's writings, now in book form. Raeder responded by suppressing all critical publications--not out of envy over Wegener's growing reputation as a strategic thinker or to defend the image of Tirpitz but to reestablish the German navy as a unified, viable, and reliable arm of the government. In view of the ruthless interservice rivalry between the army and navy (and later the air force), Raeder felt it was essential that the navy preserve and enhance its professional standing if it was to have a practical naval role in foreign and domestic policy.
For an apolitical man, as Hansen wrote Raeder was, that (^^^) is very political behavior, although very parochial and narrow minded is the Castexian sense. Also, I find it strange that Hansen misunderstands Hipper's intent as a mentor and influence on Raeder. Just because an admiral wants to perform anti-commerce warfare and practice sea denial in conjunction with the U-boat campaign does not mean he is unaware or rejects naval geography or denies Mahan. Hipper wanted range and geography to make the battlecruisers work. Hansen gets that wrong.

Now we come to the crux of the Hansen so-called defense of a naval incompetent. (Well, actually two incompetents.)
Raeder, had "had to conceive a naval strategy by which a land power might deal with British naval superiority." (60) The key was to find a middle-ground strategy, between the fleet-action theory of Mahan and the Jeune Ecole theory of Theophile Aube, which employed operational maneuver to create favorable tactical situations. (61) Castex believed that it was not necessary to seek a Mahanian fleet action, rather that a limited tactical victory in a critical situation could "upset the balance" and win opportunities for maneuver. The benefits of winning even secondary objectives in secondary theaters "may exceed expectations and bring a success having major repercussions upon the principal theater, where all remains in doubt, even though the plan of maneuver has foreseen exactly the opposite." (62) On this basis Raeder envisioned a useful role for the navy that the German government might be persuaded to accept. German defensive requirements for seapower had to be balanced against the undeniable need to go on the offensive against Great Britain. To resolve this seeming conundrum, as will be seen, Raeder would resort to an innovation not seen before in naval history.
Insofar as Raeder figured things out and read Hipper and Castex, he concocted Plan Zed from Outer Space based on rather simple-minded notions.
During the interwar period, before underway refueling was perfected, the limiting factor of onboard fuel capacity caused naval influence to be regarded as regionally isolated, centered upon major bases with fuel bunkers: "While machine propulsion gave a new vigor and celerity to maneuver, the necessity of keeping the fleet supplied with fuel acted as a tether upon it." (64) It was accepted as a general principle that "a battle fleet lost efficiency in direct proportion to its distance from its base." (65) Moreover, for any nation considering cruiser warfare against Great Britain, the lack of a supporting network of bases was a crippling deficiency. (66) In the First World War, Germany's overseas possession had been insecure and could not be counted upon as naval bases. In response, the endurance of German warships was now substantially increased by the use of efficient diesel and high-pressure steam propulsion systems.
Couple of problems.
1. Destroyers, despite Hasten's claims did not see such range, endurance increases for use in the North Atlantic incorporated at all, much less global deployments as Hasten claims Raeder envisioned. We know from the fool, Raeder, that he specifically wrote the Plan Zed battlegroups were intended for North Atlantic raiding alone.
2. U-boats, the type VIIs were also not designed to that theater, though I put the blame on Doenitz who was also gadget oriented.
The fundamental differences in naval strategy between Admirals Raeder and Wegener corresponded, then, from their different perspectives from which they looked at the problem. Raeder was bound by national strategy, policy, and government economic and budgetary priorities. Wegener's theories were limited by no such realities. Wegener steadfastly held to his notion that Great Britain and its domination over the world's oceans stood in the way of German national greatness. In fact, however, as we have seen, German foreign and defense policy during the Weimar and, at least initially, National Socialist regimes was oriented not against Britain but against the threat of a combined Polish and French invasion. Naval issues were secondary, and Raeder had his minister's instructions: "Base [naval] operational ideas more on political and military [i.e., land] realities." (101) The new and flexible approach to seapower strategy, warship design, and operational concepts that resulted would have been anathema to naval leaders of the Tirpitz era.
"Weimar policies" here means JULIAN CORBETT. We know what Mr. Hasten's schooling is, now, don't we? "The navy exists to carry out national policy." to quote Julian directly. Wegener came at it from the central strategic problem that confronts an admiral of a Mackinder power. How does one beat Mahan?

I despise Corbett and Corbettists.
While Raeder repeatedly sought and received assurances from Hitler that war against Great Britain was not part of the grand plan, Wegener could see no other outcome. He had declared in his 1929 book, "As long as England acts as an outpost of America, no European world can be established;" (102) unrestrained by practicalities, he continued to press his theories, and in so doing distanced himself from his former crewmate and friend. Ultimately, Wegener's views left him alone and bitter; if his operational doctrines were now unrealistic, he had accurately foreseen the future enemy, and soon he saw his country engaged in the war that he had always maintained was unavoidable.
Unsinkable aircraft carrier Number 1; is what we Americans call her. Geography, as Mahan defined its use, applies to AIRPOWER, too.
Raeder's often-quoted fatalistic declaration that the German surface forces were so weak that they could "do no more than show that they know how to die gallantly and thus are willing to create the foundations for later reconstruction" is overused and overplayed. (103) His conception of naval power was born of a philosophical construct other than the typical Anglo-American view, based on the writings of Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett, or even the German, Tirpitzian view of preceding decades. Raeder's innovative uses of seapower were actually early examples of asymmetric warfare. His theory that a broadly based attack on all the elements of maritime trade could be effective conforms to current views on the subject. (104) The use by the Kriegsmarine of operational logistics concepts to solve the Wegenerian problem of the "dead angle" was a "world first," one that has not received adequate recognition. In this sense, Erich Raeder pointed the way for all the middle-power navies that aspire to exercise seapower in distant waters."--Raeder vs Wegener: conflict in German naval strategy by Kenneth P. Hansen
He said it and he meant it. While a fool, he still understood at the time, that his gamble failed. And in the end, what script did he follow? His or Wegener's? Let me add this little bit.

German naval operations, then, were not to focus solely on either the offensive or defensive. Prewar British naval intelligence "credited German naval strategists with sufficient imagination to envisage an alternative to Tirpitz's defunct programme of a symmetrical armaments competition." (68) Royal Navy studies concluded that the greatest threat from the German surface fleet would be employment as single ships in a merchant-raider role to complement the efforts of the U-boats. (69) That no such concerted effort in fact developed early in the war was only because the resources of the Kriegsmarine were overburdened by that time.

The requirement for operational flexibility gave rise to what became known as the German "double-pole" strategy and also to the "Z Plan," a shipbuilding program approved in the mid-1930s for the period 1939-48. The Z Plan envisioned an eventual force of thirteen battleships and battle cruisers, four aircraft carriers, fifteen panzerschiffe, twenty-three cruisers, and twenty-two large destroyers. (70) Under the double-pole approach, single high-endurance warships would engage in distant operations against British commerce while two small but powerful battle groups, each formed around battleships plus a single aircraft carrier and screened by diesel-powered light cruisers and destroyers, maintained local sea control in the North and Norwegian seas. (71) These proposed battle groups represented a major departure from conventional naval organization and operational concepts.
Considering that Hasten got the insertion of "battle groups" as Raeder himself wrote "into the North Atlantic", wrong, why should I regard his alleged defense of Raeder as anything but a Corbettist argument?
The operational concept behind the Z Plan and double-pole strategy was not to seek set-piece engagements but to create secondary opportunities through maneuver that would help rebalance the odds of the primary naval conflict, being fought in the Atlantic. Until the impressive combat power they envisioned could be in service, the trap of the "dead angle" remained--that is, to engage the enemy in an area of strategic consequence, the Germans had to find a way to reach the Atlantic (see map 2). Mahan would have said that more bases were the solution. Wegener's position that bases had to be secured by conquest was well known; he had advocated military expansion into Denmark and Norway. (77) Raeder set about trying to obtain the bases by diplomacy.
Hasten contradicts himself; a situation which he accuses of Wegener.

"Underway replenishment."

Here is where Hasten's scholarship is outright wrong.
Through the German naval attache in Moscow, Raeder requested from the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, in return for technology to support its own ambitious fleet expansion plans, permission to establish a German naval base in the Motovskiy Gulf, on the Barents Sea nearly adjacent to the Norwegian border. On 17 October 1939, the Soviets offered the use of Zapadnaya Bay, which empties into the Motovskiy Gulf: "In this bay, Germany may do whatever she wishes: she may carry out whatever projects she could consider necessary. Any type of vessel may be permitted to call there (heavy cruisers, submarines, supply ships)." (78) German ships could enter in any season and, as the bay was wholly surrounded by Soviet territory and dosed to shipping, in complete secrecy. In this way Raeder devised a partial solution to the problem of geostrategic isolation that Wegener did not envision.
Why ask for an anchorage if one is not conceding Wegener?
Understanding fully that the security of the leased Russian base, in a remote and undeveloped area, was tenuous at best, the Germans planned to sustain it by "afloat logistical support." Several merchant ships were taken up from trade and made suitable for repair, supply, accommodation, and command support tasks. Ultimately, three vessels were modified and assigned to the new base, which was given the code name BASIS NORD. (79)
These ships, (The Aktmarks) were not capable of doing what the USN was capable of doing with its Jupiter class colliers and later the Lexingtons, underway replenishment at sea. They needed an anchorage.
Clearly, in this a Mahanian battle-fleet action was not the object of Kriegsmarine planning; something more sophisticated and deadly was being contemplated. The concept of afloat logistics support was exploited to provide a freedom of action on a scale unprecedented in German naval history. It soon produced a revolutionary design for a fleet support ship that was decades in advance of every other navy in the world.
Yeah. Well that did not happen.
The trials used a system of towing alongside, reminiscent of the American Dinger-Nimitz system developed during the First World War, passing fuel oil, diesel fuel, and water hoses with booms and cranes. Although it was a demanding seamanship evolution, with practice the Germans found they were able to begin pumping about twenty minutes after the ship wishing to refuel began its approach alongside. During the Spanish Civil War, German ships frequently replenished at sea from auxiliary support ships, achieving fuel transfer rates of 120 tons per hour under operational conditions. (80)
Secure anchorages again. Nationalist ones.
The most remarkable example of the effectiveness of German operational logistics was the sortie by the battle cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, supported by six supply ships, for Operation BERLIN, which took place between 25 January and 22 March 1941. The patrol lasted sixty days and covered over 17,800 miles. The raiders were resupplied on six occasions, receiving 30,355 tons of fuel. (88) In that cruise the German battle cruisers used radar to good advantage, managing to evade in heavy weather British ships that were not similarly equipped, but they also used two Dithmarschen-class trosschiffe, Ermland and Uckermark (formerly Altmark), to widen their search front. In fact, Uckermark made the majority of sightings on 15 March that led to the capture or destruction of sixteen merchant ships, mostly tankers, totaling eighty-two thousand tons. (89) In total, twenty-two Allied cargo ships, amounting to 115,622 tons, were lost, and transatlantic shipping cycles were disrupted--Allied losses that exceeded those from any of the great wolf-pack convoy battles or cruises by single U-boats. (90) Admiral Raeder had achieved the aim of dispersing enemy escort forces, creating opportunities for other raider sorties, and disrupting the British war economy--at least this once. Without doubt, Operation BERLIN was the crowning moment of German surface naval operations. (91)
Single ship raiders, hunh? Reads like a surface action group. Only thing missing is the Plan Zed aircraft carrier. Refueling was furtive and at anchorage.

Notwithstanding this claim;
The result was an employment of German naval surface forces that ran counter to "traditional ideas on the subject" one that "may well appear as a splitting up of forces--perhaps even 'squandering' of them?' But even after the war, German naval leaders were to be practically unanimous in the opinion that, given the circumstances, the approach was correct and reasonably successful--even, in specific cases, "very good."

Indeed it was the only way of disposing these forces which could
have had any chance at all of any successful and damaging attacks
on the enemy. By this means they lent support to the U-boat
warfare on enemy communications, forced the enemy to split up his
forces, hampered or prevented him from concentrating his forces
for major naval engagements, forced the enemy to confine his
merchant shipping lines within very rigid limits, thereby causing
frequent delays and difficulties in the transport of supplies, and
in the case of U-boats tracking down convoys presented them with
valuable and easy targets. (100)
Except that the surface raider operations Raeder undertook, the U-boat campaign Doenitz mounted and the long range maritime aircraft interdiction the Luftwaffe contributed were...

fought from Norway and Western France.

So, how did Hasten do by United States Naval War College standards?

He gets an "unacceptable".

As I wrote:

1. Kenneth Hansen is used to lay out the differences between one idiot, Raeder, and the German Mahanist.
2. I suggest a re-read of Mister Hansen if you think he thinks Raeder was competent.
What I think is that Hasten laid out an argument that was not proven.
 
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Garrison

Donor
Raeder's often-quoted fatalistic declaration that the German surface forces were so weak that they could "do no more than show that they know how to die gallantly and thus are willing to create the foundations for later reconstruction" is overused and overplayed.
It may be a melodramatic statement but it is a faily accurate assessment of how screwed the surface fleet was. Raeder was working to the assumption the fleet would have until the mid 1940's to build up a surface fleet and then that goes out the window in 1939. Graf Spee is cornered and scuttled, most of the modern ships the fleet has are sunk or damaged in Norway. Bismarck gets lucky against Hood, and then very unlucky against some torpedo bombers. and Tirpitz spends most of the war providing target practice for the RAF. One is bound to wonder what any Admiral would have done when his political masters so continuously ignored reality?
 
It may be a melodramatic statement but it is a faily accurate assessment of how screwed the surface fleet was. Raeder was working to the assumption the fleet would have until the mid 1940's to build up a surface fleet and then that goes out the window in 1939. Graf Spee is cornered and scuttled, most of the modern ships the fleet has are sunk or damaged in Norway. Bismarck gets lucky against Hood, and then very unlucky against some torpedo bombers. and Tirpitz spends most of the war providing target practice for the RAF. One is bound to wonder what any Admiral would have done when his political masters so continuously ignored reality?
Resigned and retired to Switzerland, but Raeder drank the NAZI kool-aid in addition to being incompetent.
 

Garrison

Donor
Resigned and retired to Switzerland, but Raeder drank the NAZI kool-aid in addition to being incompetent.
You know when you apparently think everyone who didn't have the stars and stripes on their uniform is incompetent (and some of them as well) it rather devalues the term.
 
Is he?


I tend to read everything before I come to a judgement and not cherry-pick.

Yet, Raeder did not build to:

If the fool had; he would have insisted on dual use German commercial ship-building. Such as a deep blue water fishing fleet and roll-on, roll-off freighters and refuel at sea fast oil tankers. Furthermore:

For an apolitical man, as Hansen wrote Raeder was, that (^^^) is very political behavior, although very parochial and narrow minded is the Castexian sense. Also, I find it strange that Hansen misunderstands Hipper's intent as a mentor and influence on Raeder. Just because an admiral wants to perform anti-commerce warfare and practice sea denial in conjunction with the U-boat campaign does not mean he is unaware or rejects naval geography or denies Mahan. Hipper wanted range and geography to make the battlecruisers work. Hansen gets that wrong.

Now we come to the crux of the Hansen so-called defense of a naval incompetent. (Well, actually two incompetents.)

Insofar as Raeder figured things out and read Hipper and Castex, he concocted Plan Zed from Outer Space based on rather simple-minded notions.

Couple of problems.
1. Destroyers, despite Hasten's claims did not see such range, endurance increases for use in the North Atlantic incorporated at all, much less global deployments as Hasten claims Raeder envisioned. We know from the fool, Raeder, that he specifically wrote the Plan Zed battlegroups were intended for North Atlantic raiding alone.
2. U-boats, the type VIIs were also not designed to that theater, though I put the blame on Doenitz who was also gadget oriented.

"Weimar policies" here means JULIAN CORBETT. We know what Mr. Hasten's schooling is, now, don't we? "The navy exists to carry out national policy." to quote Julian directly. Wegener came at it from the central strategic problem that confronts an admiral of a Mackinder power. How does one beat Mahan?

I despise Corbett and Corbettists.

Unsinkable aircraft carrier Number 1; is what we Americans call her. Geography, as Mahan defined its use, applies to AIRPOWER, too.

He said it and he meant it. While a fool, he still understood at the time, that his gamble failed. And in the end, what script did he follow? His or Wegener's? Let me add this little bit.


Considering that Hasten got the insertion of "battle groups" as Raeder himself wrote "into the North Atlantic", wrong, why should I regard his alleged defense of Raeder as anything but a Corbettist argument?

Hasten contradicts himself; a situation which he accuses of Wegener.

"Underway replenishment."

Here is where Hasten's scholarship is outright wrong.

Why ask for an anchorage if one is not conceding Wegener?

These ships, (The Aktmarks) were not capable of doing what the USN was capable of doing with its Jupiter class colliers and later the Lexingtons, underway replenishment at sea. They needed an anchorage.


Yeah. Well that did not happen.

Secure anchorages again. Nationalist ones.

Single ship raiders, hunh? Reads like a surface action group. Only thing missing is the Plan Zed aircraft carrier. Refueling was furtive and at anchorage.

Notwithstanding this claim;

Except that the surface raider operations Raeder undertook, the U-boat campaign Doenitz mounted and the long range maritime aircraft interdiction the Luftwaffe contributed were...

fought from Norway and Western France.

So, how did Hasten do by United States Naval War College standards?

He gets an "unacceptable".

As I wrote:


What I think is that Hasten laid out an argument that was not proven.
Your interpretation of Hansen's view of Raeder flies in the very face of reality and common sense. You know as well as I do that a paper's conclusion sums up the points made by the author. Hansen OBVIOUSLY is arguing that Raeder was both competent and innovative in his naval strategy. I read the whole paper and what I quoted was not some cherry-picked segment that miraculously contradicts the whole rest of the paper, but the conclusion, FOUR PARAGRAPHS of it.
 
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Your conclusions and mine are based on different criteria. Of course you disagree as is your right. However, your case is not proven as is Hansen's and for much the quoted reasons I gave from HIS paper, which you read.
 
Your conclusions and mine are based on different criteria. Of course you disagree as is your right. However, your case is not proven as is Hansen's and for much the quoted reasons I gave from HIS paper, which you read.
You absurdly claimed that Hansen (whom you constantly misspelled, by the way) wasn't defending Raeder, and that I was "cherry picking" when I picked four paragraphs from his conclusion. That claim is blatant nonsense. Hansen was OBVIOUSLY defending Raeder, and your claim that he wasn't flies in the very face of common sense. Academic papers are meant to be understood. If Hansen meant to say Raeder was incompetent and Wegener was right all along, he might have thought to say so in his conclusion, hmm?
 
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Garrison

Donor
Your conclusions and mine are based on different criteria. Of course you disagree as is your right. However, your case is not proven as is Hansen's and for much the quoted reasons I gave from HIS paper, which you read.
Well no, if the conclusion of the paper is as Redsword12 has presented it then you are just plain wrong in trying to use it support your claim and the cherry picking isn't on Redsword12's part.
 
You absurdly claimed that Hansen (whom you constantly misspelled, by the way) wasn't defending Raeder, and that I was "cherry picking" when I picked four paragraphs from his conclusion. That claim is blatant nonsense. Hansen was OBVIOUSLY defending Raeder, and your claim that he wasn't flies in the very face of common sense. Academic papers are meant to be understood. If Hansen meant to say Raeder was incompetent and Wegener was right all along, he might have thought to say so in his conclusion, hmm?
You are correct I misspelled "Hansen".

Picking a conclusion and not including the contradictions to that conclusion within the body is not logical.
You know when you apparently think everyone who didn't have the stars and stripes on their uniform is incompetent (and some of them as well) it rather devalues the term.
I have no use for Stark, Leahy, MacArthur, Bradley, Pownall, Carpendar, Fife, Kimmel, Short, Wainwright, Bradley, Buckner, Tower, Halsey, Fredendall, Wright, Leary, English, Adolphus Andrews (exceptionally incompetent), John Wilkes (Should have been court martialled.), and that incredible bonehead; Thomas Withers. I'll leave you to pick out which ones of them are "English" or "German". I also leave you to see where I have not proved their incompetence.
Well no, if the conclusion of the paper is as Redsword12 has presented it then you are just plain wrong in trying to use it support your claim and the cherry picking isn't on Redsword12's part.
Uhm. See where I quoted and why I quoted in rebuttal?
 
You are correct I misspelled "Hansen".

Picking a conclusion and not including the contradictions to that conclusion within the body is not logical.
I read the whole article. All of it. In no way at all does Hansen state that Raeder was incompetent and Wegener was the genius. Your claim that the body of the article in question concludes that Raeder was incompetent is in no way true. The question isn't whether Hansen is right, but whether he was defending Raeder or not (he was). Read your own sources.

To anyone who is reading this, here is the article in question. It is only a 10-15 minute read. Go ahead and read it, and give your own two cents on what Hansen says: https://www.thefreelibrary.com/Raeder+versus+Wegener:+conflict+in+German+naval+strategy.-a0138056199

As happens often with you, McPherson, you're riding straight in the face of your own sources, facts, or common sense. In the past, I recall you using a source on Petain's ambassadorship to Spain, to claim that he was a conspirator in the French Army's anticommunist conspiracy, except that when I actually read that source, I found that it stated Petain merely remained silent about it, rather than actually participating in it. Immoral, but not shoot-worthy as you claimed.

Your reaction was of course to say that Petain's knowledge but silence on the matter constituted participation, that the source entirely agreed with you, and that Petain actually did conspire against France during his ambassadorship in Spain (which was in direct contradiction to the conclusion of your previous source which said: "Yet, the fact remains that Petain, while in Spain, did act in the best interests of France regardless of his personal feelings for the regime. And it was the regime that called him back to France to continue in the service of the Republic. He saw as his mission to regain for France the friendship of Spain and in order to do this he had first to gain the acceptance of the government and the population. His efforts in Spain were directed to this end"). So to support your claim that Petain actually did conspire against France as the ambassador, you unveiled a newspaper article that didn't even say what you claimed it said (it said Petain disliked democracy and admired right-wing authoritarians like Franco and Beck, not that he engaged in conspiracy against the French government whilst in Spain).
 
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Except it wasn't a rebuttal, unless you are saying Redsword12 misquoted the conclusion. If the quote of the conclusion was correct it was simply you cherrypicking to support your biases.
When the body of the argument and the conclusion do not even match each other, what else can it be, but "unacceptable"? Never mind the historical inaccuracies and contradictions I quoted from inside the text of the article.
 
Your reaction was of course to say that Petain's knowledge but silence on the matter constituted participation, that the source entirely agreed with you, and that Petain actually did conspire against France during his ambassadorship in Spain (which was in direct contradiction to the conclusion of your previous source which said: "Yet, the fact remains that Petain, while in Spain, did act in the best interests of France regardless of his personal feelings for the regime. And it was the regime that called him back to France to continue in the service of the Republic. He saw as his mission to regain for France the friendship of Spain and in order to do this he had first to gain the acceptance of the government and the population. His efforts in Spain were directed to this end"). So to support your claim that Petain actually did act against the best interests of France as the ambassador, you unveiled a newspaper article that didn't even say what you claimed it said (it said Petain disliked democracy and admired right-wing authoritarians like Franco and Beck, not that he engaged in conspiracy against the French government whilst in Spain).
I never mentioned Petain or the Vichy state, in this context, so from where did that extraneous nonsense come? Is this your conclusion as to what you "thought" I wrote here? Or is it something you invented to claim that you found a hole in my presentation? Either way, that is a misrepresentation and I demand you retract it at once.
 
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CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
Folks, this is getting a mite testy.

I would imply point out that none of you have any warnings left in the drawer.

Up to y'all, but graceful exit might be a real plan.
 
I never mentioned Petain or the Vichy state, in this context, so from where did that extraneous nonsense come? Is this your conclusion as to what you "thought" I wrote here? Or is it something you invented to claim that you found a hole in my presentation? Either way, that is a misrepresentation and I demand you retract it at once.
I was referring to a discussion we had in a different thread following this post and citation: https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...er-tank-of-france.502529/page-2#post-21446445
Folks, this is getting a mite testy.

I would imply point out that none of you have any warnings left in the drawer.

Up to y'all, but graceful exit might be a real plan.
Fair enough.
 
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First, they need at least 10 fleet carriers.
Then, they need more U-boats.
Plus, 2 Larger Bismarcks.
50 Destroyers.
More Pocket battleships.
More classes of battleships.

That might beat the Royal Navy. Maybe also the USN. If not, then get MORE fleet carriers.
 
First, they need at least 10 fleet carriers.
Then, they need more U-boats.
Plus, 2 Larger Bismarcks.
50 Destroyers.
More Pocket battleships.
More classes of battleships.

That might beat the Royal Navy. Maybe also the USN. If not, then get MORE fleet carriers.
One carrier alone is a problem with Goering claiming everything that flies. And Graf Zeppelin needs a long workup to show how the design needs improvement (and it needs a LOT of improvement).

U-Boats need crews, and you just can't shove anyone into a sub.

Six H-class BB's were planned after Bismarck but only two were laid down and none were completed.

Agree that more DD's (plus TB's and other small ships) were needed.

More PBB's would be useful as raiders but only if ready before war, otherwise they'll get trapped in port.

Of course the RN and USN won't be standing idly by watching this happen and do nothing.

And just where is Germany to get the fuel and manpower needed for this huge fleet? Plus this construction means other things don't get built: tanks, aircraft, artillery, trucks, etc. Germany just doesn't have the factory space or resources to do everything.
 
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