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The Kriegsmarine and the Aircraft Carrier: The Design and Operational Purpose of the Graf Zeppelin, 1933–1940
Marcus Faulkner War in History Volume 19, Issue 4, November 2012, Pages 492-516In 1928 the authorization of funds by the Reichstag for the Panzerschiff Deutschland was an important development for the navy and allowed it to begin conceiving a long-term building programme. The new commander-in-chief, Admiral Erich Raeder, made the first reference to a carrier in a memorandum drafted in January 1929 for the defence minister, General Wilhelm Groener, on the ideal composition of the fleet once it was freed from Versailles treaty constraints.23 Raeder argued for at least one carrier along with a sizeable naval air arm, but, owing to political considerations, references to a carrier were omitted from the Schiffbauersatzplan approved by the Reichstag in the spring of 1931. Internally the carrier, referred to as a 10,000 t Flugdeckkreuzer, remained part of future planning, and in 1931 maritime aviation was integrated into fleet manoeuvres.24 By the autumn of 1932 a more ambitious rearmament plan was adopted as a result of a changing international climate and to assist industry during the recession.25 The naval segment of the Umbauplan foresaw the creation of a naval air arm in 1934 and, although details remained vague, the completion of a carrier by 1938.26.....
Maritime aviation offered a solution, and there was extensive collaboration with civilian airlines in the development of long-range flying, oceanic navigation, and radio communications.31 However, land-based aircraft operating from Germany lacked the range to operate beyond the North Sea.32 Only naval aviation could operate over the ocean, but the few seaplanes carried by the Panzerschiffe were limited to operating in good weather. A carrier’s far larger air group could operate in poorer conditions, offering a substantial increase in capability, and the navy was willing to concede cruiser tonnage to build carriers, should it be allowed to join the London Treaty. The shift from a battle line to raiding groups required more smaller carriers rather than one or two large ones. To operate with the Panzerschiffe they needed to have considerable endurance (12,000 nm at 20 kt) and be capable of sustained high speed for air operations. They also needed the equivalent armament and protection to ward off destroyer attacks.33In March 1934 a new Schiffbauersatzplan was drafted that, alongside a core of eight Panzerschiffe, included three 15,000 t carriers, two for active service and one in reserve.34....
The Washington Treaty stipulated that aircraft carriers, vessels of over 10,000 t designed specifically and exclusively for the purpose of carrying aircraft, were permitted to carry 15 cm guns, and made an extra provision allowing the two American battlecruiser conversions to mount four twin 20.3 cm turrets.37 The Germans saw this as an indicator that the Americans believed carriers to be capable of surface action.38 The severe German numerical inferiority meant that the fighting potential of every warship needed to be maximized and prompted Raeder to demand a heavier gun battery for the carriers.
The fact that the British had converted, reconverted, and built carriers of differing displacements was seen as an indication of British uncertainty.52 In 1935 the First Sea lord, Admiral Ernie Chatfield, told Waßner that the British would focus on 15,000 t carriers as this was the best compromise between size and handling abilities.53 In contrast, Dickens was a strong advocate of the hybrid concept.54 Throughout the 1930s German civilian naval officials would travel to Britain to attend the ‘Navy Weeks’ to gather technical information, and in August 1935 Heinrich Ohlerich, Hadeler’s superior and principal designer of the carrier, went to Portsmouth when it became known that Furious would be open to the public.55 On another occasion German observers viewed Courageous when she visited Copenhagen in 1937.56
