WI: Allies Ignore North Africa and Start a Two Front War Instead
- Thread starter redlightning
- Start date
1. It's not going to work in SPring 42. Second, Allied success in the Med was in part dependent upon divide and conquer. Land in France right away, the Germans are not going to be husbanding forces "just in case" Italy or here or there is attacked. They knew France was the main target and always held back because of this.
Blow your wad on France right away in late 1942, kiss goodbye the Kursk offensive, sending reinforcements to Africa, and holding German reserves in Greece (all losing, futile moves made in 43). A significant portion will be sent to France to push the Allies back in to sea. Without the back of the Luftwaffe broken, the logistics will be in place to actually bring the forces to the front and they will have enough manpower to get it done.
I think the Wallies OTL made the right move. If they blew the wad on France early and it didn't work, it keeps Italy and the war and increases the chance (though not by much) of a negotiated peace.
Blow your wad on France right away in late 1942, kiss goodbye the Kursk offensive, sending reinforcements to Africa, and holding German reserves in Greece (all losing, futile moves made in 43). A significant portion will be sent to France to push the Allies back in to sea. Without the back of the Luftwaffe broken, the logistics will be in place to actually bring the forces to the front and they will have enough manpower to get it done.
I think the Wallies OTL made the right move. If they blew the wad on France early and it didn't work, it keeps Italy and the war and increases the chance (though not by much) of a negotiated peace.
TFSmith121
Banned
Spring, 1942 is too early; agreed...
Spring, 1942 is too early; agreed...
Autumn, 1942, after Alamein and in parallel with Stalingrad, is possible - odds are long, but not impossible, and for a limited operation - as SLEDGEHAMMER was envisioned to be - it's in the realm of possible success. Certainly more than a pure sacrifice, which was the expectation if the Soviets were in deep trouble in the summer of 1942.
ROUNDUP is entirely possible, and a ROUNDUP preceeded by an enlarged TORCH (using the assault sealift freed up by cancelling WATCHTOWER in favor of a movement by sea to eastern Algeria, rather than overland) looks very good.
Especially if this 1943 invasion coincided with ZITADELLE, as HUSKY, in fact, did...
Best,
Spring, 1942 is too early; agreed...
Autumn, 1942, after Alamein and in parallel with Stalingrad, is possible - odds are long, but not impossible, and for a limited operation - as SLEDGEHAMMER was envisioned to be - it's in the realm of possible success. Certainly more than a pure sacrifice, which was the expectation if the Soviets were in deep trouble in the summer of 1942.
ROUNDUP is entirely possible, and a ROUNDUP preceeded by an enlarged TORCH (using the assault sealift freed up by cancelling WATCHTOWER in favor of a movement by sea to eastern Algeria, rather than overland) looks very good.
Especially if this 1943 invasion coincided with ZITADELLE, as HUSKY, in fact, did...
Best,
Actually no. After NW Africa was invaded in Nov 1942 the German mobile reserves in France were sent elsewhere. ie: the SS Corps training there embarked for the eastern front. Others were used to disarm the French Army, & then scattered about. Mobile reserves in France in the spring of 1943 were near useless shot up survivors of the eastern front. The other formations were combed out for replacements elsewhere. end result was the defense in March or April 1943 was weaker than October 1942. This repeated drawn on the defense in France kept up through the summer & did not effectively end until the autum.
Elsewhere Hitler insisted on keeping up robust defenses for no logical reason, while drawing down others on capricious whim, & in reaction to Allied Deception Ops.
You are attempting to apply your own good sense & military skill to Hitlers deranged world view. More often than not he made the wrong stratigic. decision. having him abruptly making consistently good decisions croses into ASB territory.
At the scale the Allies are capable of in late 1942 they are not "blowing the wad". they had a fair chance of creating a sustainable lodgement in France. After in 1943 they have a variety of option for both building on that, and striking elsewhere.
Deleted member 1487
Part of the dispersion of reserves in France were the result of the invasion of North Africa in 1942 that caused Operation Anton and the move of 10th Panzer to Africa. That won't happen if there is no landing of Americans and Brits in Morocco and Algeria. Perhaps 10th Panzer goes to Africa to shore up Rommel and check Monty anyway, but Vichy stays neutral and out of the fight and then no dispersion of German forces in France.
Invading France 1942 is too high risk
Torch was carried out using a lot of boats without ramps, a number of ferries, and a number of other expedients that would have been very high risk to try on the Atlantic Coast of France.
Now potentially a landing along the Vichy Coast might have succeeded in getting ashore, if the Vichy didn't resist much or actively cooperated. But Pierre Laval had a lot of power, and so did Darlan and frankly this seems a rather huge long shot to me. More so when you realize that even the Americans didn't trust the Vichy much at all.
Granted the Atlantic Wall didn't really exist, although it was strong enough to slaughter the Canadians at Dieppe. So a large landing might have gotten ashore. But I would assume at that point that the same forces that were rushed into Tunis would be available to deal with the landing in France (including 2 Panzer Divisions and elite paratroopers), and certainly there are other reserves.
However, the Germans have far better fighters than the Allies at this point (the FW190 was outclassing the Spitfire for a while, and certainly American fighters at the time are a poor second place to the Spitfire). The Luftwaffe has not suffered the disasters it would in the period November 1942-March 1943 trying to resupply Stalingrad and Tunisia at the same time (including the loss of several hundred bombers and transport aircraft and their aircrews which were often drawn from training units).
To carry out a summer 1942 invasion means no Guadalcanal, as well as no Buna Campaign (both required very large numbers of merchant ships to support). The Battle of the Atlantic is costing the Allies dearly as well.
I think Torch was about the only thing we really could do in 1942.
If the landing is attempted, and either repulsed or forced into evacuation in a Dunkirk style situation (probably the most likely result) I am not entirely sure Churchill can keep power after the disasters against the Japanese.
Torch was carried out using a lot of boats without ramps, a number of ferries, and a number of other expedients that would have been very high risk to try on the Atlantic Coast of France.
Now potentially a landing along the Vichy Coast might have succeeded in getting ashore, if the Vichy didn't resist much or actively cooperated. But Pierre Laval had a lot of power, and so did Darlan and frankly this seems a rather huge long shot to me. More so when you realize that even the Americans didn't trust the Vichy much at all.
Granted the Atlantic Wall didn't really exist, although it was strong enough to slaughter the Canadians at Dieppe. So a large landing might have gotten ashore. But I would assume at that point that the same forces that were rushed into Tunis would be available to deal with the landing in France (including 2 Panzer Divisions and elite paratroopers), and certainly there are other reserves.
However, the Germans have far better fighters than the Allies at this point (the FW190 was outclassing the Spitfire for a while, and certainly American fighters at the time are a poor second place to the Spitfire). The Luftwaffe has not suffered the disasters it would in the period November 1942-March 1943 trying to resupply Stalingrad and Tunisia at the same time (including the loss of several hundred bombers and transport aircraft and their aircrews which were often drawn from training units).
To carry out a summer 1942 invasion means no Guadalcanal, as well as no Buna Campaign (both required very large numbers of merchant ships to support). The Battle of the Atlantic is costing the Allies dearly as well.
I think Torch was about the only thing we really could do in 1942.
If the landing is attempted, and either repulsed or forced into evacuation in a Dunkirk style situation (probably the most likely result) I am not entirely sure Churchill can keep power after the disasters against the Japanese.
Correct as far as it goes. Conversely in late October & up to 4th or 5th November the Germans were reacting to deception ops. ie: When the fleets that comprised the Eastern & Central Task Forces of Op Torch departed the UK ports the Germans air recon & submarines observed it. They then reacted to information from their spies in England that this was a invasion of Brittiany. The mobile reserves were deployed accordingly and were watching the Bereton penninsula as the convoys stood out into the Atlantic.
Unlikely. As Darlan told the US Ambassador Admiral Leahey a few moths earlier: 'if you come with two divisions we will fight you, if you come with twenty we will join you.' When the news of Op Torch reached France a number of French Army commanders prepared to fight the Germans. One actually organized his command for a march on Bourdeux. Petain repeatedly assured the German of nuetrallity & Op Anton was executed anyway. Odds are if a Allied army lands a 'neutral' French army dissolves as anyone with pro Allied tendencies starts shooting Germans. Even if Petain keeps some sort of control over the army for the first few days its difficult for the Germans to ignore potential Allied ports in the south & a potential zone of French resistance.
One of the problems the German leaders never solved was a accurate estimate of Allied amphib capability. They did not understand how it worked and routinely under or over estimated capability. The Allied deception leaders understood this & based multiple deception operations on this weakness. It was no accident that in the summer of 1943 German forces were spread across the entire Mediterranean littoral of Europe. Rommel spent as much time planning for a suposed Allied invasion of the Balkans as for his defense of northern Italy during July, August, & September. When the Eastern & Central TF of Op Torch pass the Gibralter strait Hitler & Co judged the more likely targets as Sardinia, Marsailles, Sicilly, or even the Italian mainland. French Africa was dismissed as least likely.
The senior German leaders, not just Hitler, so consistenly scattered their ground and air forces about western Europe & the Med & misdirected reserves that it is almost ASB that they would do otherwise were the Allied strategy to change. Kesselring was one of the very few who managed to anticipate Allied capabilities correctly, tho he was sometimes forced into the wrong decsion anyway. ie: the Morning Air operation in Feb/March 1943.
Which were just barely entering service. The overwhelming majority of US fighter wings used in North Africa (which were pulled from Britain as well as the US) were equipped with P39s (hopelessly outclassed by the Me109E and FW190), the P40E, and early model P38, with a wing equipped with Spitfire V also. For that matter the US was still using B25C and B26A mediums, A20s, and B17Es, with some B24s available as well. All good bombers for the day, but in dire need of escorts.
The 1942 Luftwaffe was better equipped than the RAF, USAAF and Red Air Force, and sufficient reserves to make air superiority doubtful and air supremacy just wasn't going to happen in France in 1942. This doesn't even account for the fact that the German fighters were mostly manned by very high quality pilots at this point, as the murderous attrition that began at Stalingrad and Tunisia had not yet begun.
None of which prevented the Allies from running the Axis air forces out of Tunisia in March/April 1943 & cutting off supply to the ground forces. Why or how the Allied air forces with their 'inferior' equipment and aircrew were able to win that battle is a question often ignored.
The Allied air forces did it again in the summer of 1943 over Sicilly. The Axis winning tactical victories, but losing the air war over Sicilly & southern Italy at every operational & stratigic turn. Earlier in the spring & summer of 1942 the RAF suposedly lost the Rodeo & Circus operations over western France. Yet by autum the Gemans had given up contesting the incursions and withdrawn their remaining operational units to eastern France.
The Germans were trying to provide fighter cover to air transports flying 300 miles one way from Sicily to Tunisia, which is outside of effective Me109 range and a big stretch for the Fw190. They had to deal with interception from Malta and from Allied bases in Tunisia as well. In Tunisia itself the Luftwaffe and Italians only had a handful of bases, plus some dirt fighter strips. Not to mention fuel and parts issues which had to be flown in by those same highly vulnerable air transports. None of these operational issues are a problem in France and Belgium however.
The Luftwaffe rarely bothered to keep more than two fighter wings in France 1941-1942. But put an Allied Army ashore, and suddenly all those fighter wings that historically went to defend the Fatherland from strategic bombing are going to be readily available for France in 1942. The Luftwaffe chose not to intercept most of the RAF attacks in France because they recognized rightly they were no threat, and economy of force called for better uses of fighter wings elsewhere.
The Allied Air Forces in Tunisia won because they had better bases (once completed), better logistics by far, practically unlimited replacements (especially the Americans), and all those Ju52s and Gigants were weakly escorted because there were not enough Axis fighters in Tunisia to provide adequate escort, and they were too far away from Axis bases in Sicily for escorts to be provided.
Plus Allied losses were pretty high but this was an attrition campaign were all the advantages were on the Allied side. None of this is true in France in 1942.
Deleted member 1487
German supply to Tunisia was horrible and interdicted, which would not be the case in 1942-43 France. Williamson Murray makes the case that the LW was killed on the periphery in 1942-43 because of supply issues and general unfavorable circumstances, which would not have been the issue over France or elsewhere were in 1942-the first half of 1943 the LW was scoring majorly favorable kill ratios. That changed after August with P-47s and drop tanks to a degree, but a Summer 1943 campaign in France would have been tough to support from the air the way it needed to be. Plus if there was a significant fear of Wallied invasion they would have called off Kursk and left the SS in France. In fact that probably would have been a better option for the Germans in the East anyway in 1943.
marathag
Banned
Low level, the P-39s did fine with Russian pilots on the East Front against those two, including 4 of their 6 top aces got most of their kills in that LL model.
It just wasn't a good escort.
That was the job of the P-47 and P-38
TinyTartar
Banned
The Allies had massive manpower problems in 1944 keeping up an advance against a German Army that had seen multiple army groups and millions of their best men dead or captured already, along with massive commitments to the Eastern front. In 1942, the Eastern Front commitments exist, but the manpower was not nearly as tapped, nor was the Luftwaffe nearly as beaten, nor were the reserves half as depleted, nor was the Battle of the Atlantic basically won, nor was the Mussolini Regime toppled, allowing the Germans to not have to defend that front and they'd possibly have the ability to use Italian troops in France.
In 1942, the best they could do would be to hold a coastal enclave where they would be hemmed in. And I do not think that this would be sustainable.
This is not even getting nearly to the fact that the US Army was not ready to take on the brunt of the fighting, as there were not enough divisions in Britain combat ready or not, and the experience of the African and Italian campaigns had not improved doctrine substantially enough.
Basically, this is not going to work. Even if German defenses in France were poor at this point, the counterattack is not something that I think airpower is going to be able to stave off.
In 1942, the best they could do would be to hold a coastal enclave where they would be hemmed in. And I do not think that this would be sustainable.
This is not even getting nearly to the fact that the US Army was not ready to take on the brunt of the fighting, as there were not enough divisions in Britain combat ready or not, and the experience of the African and Italian campaigns had not improved doctrine substantially enough.
Basically, this is not going to work. Even if German defenses in France were poor at this point, the counterattack is not something that I think airpower is going to be able to stave off.
The Axis were covering the air transport route from both ends from airfields on Sicilly as well as Tunisia. A look at the combat radiuses from those shows favorable coverage, wheras the Allied fighters & bombers had to fly further to reach the air route. So why could the Axis air forces not protect the air route, or the sea route. The German air lift was a emergency measure as the sea delivery was failing. Why was the sea transport failing & a inadaquate air lift attempted?
The Axis had all weather airfields in Tunisia from november 1942, the Allies had none until March & April & had to deliver supply over a 500+ kilometer land route. The Axis tried to interdict the Allied overland supply & failed, they tried to, suppress the construction of the Allied airfields in Tunisia & failed, they failed to suppress the airfields on Malta. Why were the Axis unable to interdict the difficult Allied supply routes, but the Allies were able to interdict theirs?
If the German AF was superior why did it have resort to economy of force?
What German fighter groups were based in German in late 1942? How many aircraft & what daylight bombers were they defending against? Are specialized night fighters to be sent against the Allied Spitfires over Normandy? Just how many operational German aircraft were there in west & mediterranean in late 1942? How many Allied aircraft were there in the UK at that moment. How many combat worthy aircraft did the Germans send to the battle fronts between October 1941 & March 1943. How many did the Allies send to the UK and Africa in those months? I already posted rough numbers for that. Perhaps you have some supportable numbers?
Yes the Allies won after they built better bases, of course to cover Normandy they already have better bases nearer in the UK from day one, and better supply than in Tunisia.
What? The Allies invading France have poorer logistics worse airfields, less adaquate ports, longer supply line to the factories in the UK or US, fewer AA weapons, and start with fewer aircraft than with the Tunisian air campaign??? & a air battle over Normandy or France wont have elements of attrition???
Even the short legged Spitfire models of late 1942 could cover Normandy from UK airfields & rehabilitating captured air fields in France would only take a few weeks even with the pioneer units capability of late 1942.
Then the SS dies in France...
Murray makes a point as far as it goes, but this still misses how the Allies with a more difficult position managed to not have their supply route interdicted & were able to build up in the face of the Axis air forces.
Yet the German army of 1944 was larger than 1942, more men in uniform and more formations. The numbers globally dont add up they way you are suggesting.
The Allies were hemmed in other coastal lodgements for months & sustained them. Why not this one?
This is some of the worst nonsense from television & the pop history books. Op Overlord was executed with just four US Army divisions with any combat experience. Of those only the 1st Inf Div had more than a few weeks combat. The other 30+ Divisions sent into combat in France that year included two more with combat experience, the others were all as green as grass & had no cadres of combat veterans or quiet time on a secondary front beforehand. Those arriving in June & July 1944 went straight into some of the worst combat of the war & managed to win their battle.
Basically, this is not going to work. Even if German defenses in France were poor at this point, the counterattack is not something that I think airpower is going to be able to stave off.[/QUOTE]
for the reasons I stated. The Allies had complete control of the Med, and could bring in transport ships as far east as Bone. The Axis could only bring in (after the initial first couple of months) supplies by air.
The US Army was the best equipped and most formidable corps of engineers in World War II (and since for that matter) and could and did build new airfields or upgraded old ones within a couple of months of Torch. The US and British committed 2 US Air Forces (1 tactical with fighters, light and medium bombers, 1 strategic with heavy bombers), the Desert Air Force (which was significantly larger than the US commitment), and had essentially unlimited access to spares, fuel, replacement aircraft and aircrew.
Meanwhile, the Axis had to flew nearly everything across 300 miles of sea. Over 600 Axis aircraft were captured at the end of the campaign that were sitting on the ground as they lacked spares and fuel and had been cannabilized to keep other aircraft operational.
Logistics was decisive in this fight. So was the fact that Allied fighters shot down around 500 air transports over the course of the campaign, as the Axis lacked sufficient fighter strength in the area to properly escort their vulnerable transports (read about the Palm Sunday Massacre as an example).
Even so, Allied losses were around 850 aircraft vs 2250 Axis (that includes the 600 captured aircraft and 500 transports downed). Only 40% of the Axis air strength was German. The Axis high command could not have picked a worse place to fight an extended campaign.
But in France and Belgium the Germans have essentially unlimited airfields, easy rail access to Germany, plenty of local labor (another issue in Africa), excellent facilities (which they lacked in Africa), and even a local aircraft industry (French aviation industry was put to German use during the war).
While of course having better fighters in 1942
The Allied Air Forces also had some serious issues with doctrine (read An Army at Dawn which discusses this, as do several other works), and weather was terrible November - January in Tunisia.
Economy of Force is a standard military technique. You can't be strong everywhere, as there are always more missions than resources. Not even the Soviets could be strong everywhere. So you conserve assets in less critical theaters like France in 1942 to have more resources available to attack the Soviets. Everyone uses economy of force.
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Under this scenerio, even if the allies got stuck in France (Nov 42), it still would have a huge impact on Eastern Front, Nov 19th the Soviet execute envelopment of Stalingrad. Didn't the 6th Panzer get sent from France? In this case, it would stay there. Without the 6th Panzer, can the Germany even counter attack and buy time for withdrawl from the Caucus?
it all depends on the timing. No responsible naval commander is going to recommend a landing on the French Atlantic coast in November or for that matter anytime before later spring or after mid autumn (October) because of sea conditions, frequent storms, and the fact that the water is going to be damned cold, which matters a lot when you are an soldier in a pitching landing craft and generally wet already (and then have to get into the water to wade ashore).
Southern France? Maybe, not as stormy in general, the water is warmer, and other advantages. However, Southern France is a long way from any Allied airfield, and there are simply nowhere near enough carriers available to provide sufficient air cover if the Axis react in force with every plane they can scrape up (and their bases are reasonably close by in northern Italy, central France and for that matter Corsica and Sardinia)
So I would expect ground, air and naval commanders would balk at this without guaranteed assurances from the Vichy that the landing would be administrative instead of assault.
We are talking about the same Vichy who fought for almost two days during Torch.
Certainly the Allies were in no position in the summer of 1942 to try a landing. So that means its November or wait until next Spring.
Really this is a non starter of an idea for a whole host of reasons and that isn't even including what the Germans will do in reaction.
So I don't see it affecting the Eastern Front any more than the real Torch operation did