So they assume Arab-levels of (in)competency for the Soviets in the 1980s. I don't think I need to elaborate how bad an assumption that could prove to be. I imagine according to those same games, Allied Force should have seen the Serbs butchered in immense numbers. They weren't modified. They were abandoned altogether as the Arab forces found their forces totally incapable of even beginning to perform the tasks Soviet doctrine demanded of them.
Like accepting unholy levels of casualties fighting enemies who could suffer them better than you could (Iraq fighting Iran). But when the US gave its satellite intel to Iraq, it neutralized Iran's "human wave" attacks, forcing Khomenei to accept peace. "Worse than taking the vilest of poisons", he said. True. He died within days...
<snip>They did not conduct the charge of the light brigade against Allied anti tank guns (mistakes that the Allies, and the Israelis in the early part of the 73 War made).<snip>
It must be admitted that the Egyptian Armed Forces of 1973 were better than it had ever been before.
Both NATO and the Pact had massed armor in the Central Front. In fact there is considerable discussion both then and now that the concentration of machines to space by the early 1980s made the situation more akin to World War I, Kursk or Normandy than dashing about Poland or France in 1940. That applies to the war in the air too. The alarmist predictions that the Soviets would reach the Rhine in two weeks we saw in the late 1970s always were overblown and had a lot more akin to invasion fiction than to sober assessment of likely Soviet capabilities.
IDK. NATO was in pretty sorry shape in the Late 70s...
What real life operations? In the last 60 years, the number of wars involving mechanized forces on a large scale are few. We have two between India and Pakistan, the PAVN invasions of South Vietnam 1972 and 1975, the Arab Israeli conflicts 1967, 73, plus Lebanon in 82, the Iran Iraq War, and the 1st and 2nd Gulf War involving the US et al against Iraq (and Iraq invading Kuwait with basically a combined arms corps to start the ball). That is it. Yugoslavia was mostly an infantry affair in rugged and urban terrain with mechanized forces limited to the few roads, while the various wars in Africa have been infantry affairs with occasional motorized forces making a difference when terrain allowed. The one mechanized invasion (Libya vs Chad) was a disaster for the mechanized force.
TBH, IMVHO I'd only count the Iran-Iraq War, and for the purposes of your example only up until the Iranians had run through most of their old US equipment.
During the Cold War, the most worrisome and most unlikely was the so called BOOB attack (bolt out of the blue), where you had a Klingon "it is a good day to die" moment and the war started. In reality the ability of the Soviets to start a war some random day was almost zero. There were too many indicators that would be noticed, now NATO/US could refuse to believe these were really a threat and fail to heighten readiness, but that is almost ASB. There would be differences between troop, materiel, and supply movements for even a major exercise and a real attack. The previous is for a conventional attack just looking at land forces - there are separate and pretty glaring indicators for air and naval preparation as well, and trust me those were watched very carefully.
I had always understood that at least as late as the 1970s the Soviets had the means of Strategic Surprise IF they were willing to roll the dice regarding: A) Having their logistic tail be non-existent (basically, the tanks running on little more than the petrol they've been fueled with), and B) Praying to Lenin that NATO doesn't launch tactical nukes.
For nuclear attacks, since the Soviets had air base problem, in that their major full service bases were not close enough to the USA for bomber attacks without a lot of tankage and they were always short on tankers. This meant they had to forward stage nuclear forces, and they also did not have the sort of airborne alert SAC had. Also, the chain of custody for nuclear weapons was more complex so bombs were rarely if ever pre-loaded on even "alert" aircraft so getting off the ground would take longer.
The part of Red Storm Rising that is quite accurate, IMHO, is how the various indicators of the Soviets ramping up their readiness add up.
Agreed. One reason SAC was always so hair-triggered and the US had (IIRC) 61% of its nuclear arsenals based in undetectable SSBNs was the ongoing constant fear of a sneak attack. It may have been many decades ago, but Pearl Harbor was something the nuclear military never forgot.
Allowing for the fact that American intelligence capabilities improved quite a bit in the 1970's, it's worth noting that the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 caught NATO by surprise. Second, strategic surprise is not the same as absolute surprise. What matters is where NATO is in the REFORGER effort. Are those reinforcements on the ground in Germany at their POMCUS sites getting equipped. Or are they staging in Texas/Georgia etc? Are the Marines on the ground in Denmark, Iceland and Norway or are they still en route?
If they are still in the US, then they have attained something akin to Tactical Surprise. It would be Strategic Surprise if the troops are still in their home bases, or still moving towards their ports or airbases. If they are still in complete peacetime status, its a bolt-from-the-blue.
If they are fully mobilized, at their wartime defenses positions, REFORGER is complete, NATO's reserves have been activated and sent to the front, and even the US Selective Service has been activated and the first lots have been drawn with the conscripts being sent to basic training...my guess is Moscow is going to pull the plug on whatever craziness they've been doing. OTOH, the Warsaw Pact will be fully mobilized and ready to attack on multiple axis of assaults, with reserves coming in all the way back to Moscow, and beyond. But the later you go from the 70s into the 80s, the more anemic the Soviet's war machine will be. Scarier still, I don't think that there was anyone around in Moscow to tell the Kremlin the truth about how weak the Soviet military was becoming. A good example (as I've said) was their reaction to the downing of Flight KAL 007.
As I've said earlier, this represents the "Middle Case" Scenario, or the "Extended Buildup". Neither the least nor the most likely.
The one thing belief I absolutely share with ObsessedNuker is that Soviet Maskirova efforts would be effective here. We can debate their F-117 defense capabilities all day. But I do believe the Soviets would have had reasonably effective countermeasures to deal with American intelligence gathering efforts, particularly since their espionage efforts were so effective at gathering intel on our capabilities. See James Hall as one example.
I would like to argue with you, but i just can't. I knew a guy back during the downing of Flight KAL 007. A local politician who was a staunch Reaganite Republican. And he bought the Soviet "Korean Spy Plane" Story hook-line-and-sinker, rod-reel-and-pole.
The troop and other movements needed for the Czech invasion were much smaller than for an invasion west, and the air force and navy really had no need to do anything to get ready. In a build up to war if the Soviet Navy does not send an abnormal number of submarines out from the bases in the Kola area and in the Pacific, they won't be in position to attack major REFORGER convoys in time and will have to transit under wartime conditions subject to attack. I can guarantee you 100% this will be observed. VVS air units will need to be forward deployed, train traffic from the USSR to Germany will be up. Some of this can be hidden via maskirova, others you try to hide by timing movement to avoid satellites if you can, although that imposes penalties in terms of how long it takes to get everything in place.
If things work well for the Soviets and combination of maskirova and a diplomatic two-step to slow the NATO mobilization down (including sponsored political demonstrations in NATO countries) NATO won't be ready even if they realize what is coming. One thing that matters is what time of year this happens, and whether or not this was long planned or a crisis that is escalating and the Soviets decide to go for it.
One of the WWIII novels had the principle character telling his fellow generals that they should launch not a prepared invasion in the spring or summer but an immediate attack in the dead of winter. IMO he was right.
Regarding Israeli logistics... to be fair the Soviets brought in a lot of ammunition and spares to the Syrians and Egyptians too in 1973. It seems that relatively poor nations cannot afford massive ammunition stockpiles.
To be fair to the Israelis they were hit by a better prepared Arab assault force than they ever faced before or ever would again.
Now that I think on it, that may be one reason why the author DIDN'T follow the winter offensive idea. It also conjures up the image of Barbarossa 2.0