Who would win in a 1980s air war: NATO or the Warsaw Pact?

Who would win in a 1980s air war?

  • NATO

    Votes: 222 92.1%
  • Warsaw Pact

    Votes: 19 7.9%

  • Total voters
    241
Factually wrong. The casing around a Shipwreck's HE warhead wouldn't even come close to penetrating the main armor belt of the Iowa. Thats over 12" of armor.

Except the main armor belt if the Iowa is irrelevant. It's the deck armor that matters, as the P-700 will be plunging down into it after conducting it's pop-up maneuver. The Iowa's deck armor is around half of that. The Fritz-X, a weapon with only a somewhat thicker armored piercing nose and much less mass and speed then the P-700, tore through thicker deck armor then that like it was paper.

But even if we accept your arguement that it's a contest between the P-700 and the main armor belt... well, a subsonic Mk 84 general purpose bomb can penetrate 15 inches of steel. Are you seriously asking me to believe that a munition six times as heavy moving at least three times as fast will do worse?
 
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SsgtC

Banned
Except the main armor belt if the Iowa is irrelevant. It's the deck armor that matters, as the P-700 will be plunging down into it after conducting it's pop-up maneuver. The Iowa's deck armor is around half of that. The Fritz-X, a weapon with only a somewhat thicker armored piercing nose and much less mass and speed then the P-700, tore through thicker deck armor then that like it was paper.

But even if we accept your arguement that it's a contest between the P-700 and the main armor belt... well, a subsonic Mk 84 general purpose bomb can penetrate 15 inches of steel. Are you seriously asking me to believe that 12 inches will turn away a munition six times as heavy moving at least three times as fast?

Of regular steel. Not armor. And at any rate, the missiles are not programed to hit the deck. To easy to miss, get shot down or skid across the deck. They're programed to hit the hull. Which puts them squarely against the main armor belt. But even if I grant you a deck hit, the missile is not going to kill the ship. The armor on the Iowa wasn't put on in just one area. It's layered. An upper armor deck of 1.5" that will detonate GP weapons and missiles, then the next deck down is the main armor belt that was 6" thick which would absorb the blast. Then, just in case some of the blast managed to leak through, there was a splinter deck the next deck down that was .625" thick.
 
Factually wrong. The casing around a Shipwreck's HE warhead wouldn't even come close to penetrating the main armor belt of the Iowa. Thats over 12" of armor. A 3.5" casing will break apart against that. The armor may be damaged, but it's not penetrating. Look how actual AP shells are made. The steel is MUCH thicker than 3.5" and they still had a hell of a time penetrating. And before you mention the speed, a 16" APC shell from an Iowa moved at Mach 2.21. A Shipwreck doesn't have a prayer in hell of defeating an Iowas armor
Why would the designers of the shipwreck design the missile to target the belt armour vs other portions of the target ?
 

SsgtC

Banned
Why would the designers of the shipwreck design the missile to target the belt armour vs other portions of the target ?

Because they were never meant to kill a battleship. They were meant to target softskinned carriers and merchants. When the P-700 was designed, none of the battleships were in service.
 
I would like to do two things . First get us back on topic and second point out that the Soviet era AS-4 , AS-6 ,SS-n-12 and SS-n-19 missiles all had large hollow charge warheads designed too knock out American Aircraft Carriers . A 1000 lb hollow charge is going to be terrifying to the ship it hits . Now the warhead of a missile with a considerable diameter and plenty of throw weight can be changed at will . For example the Nuclear and Conventional versions . The Iowa Class was more survivable then any other ship at sea in the 80's . It was not however invulnerable . The belt that could stop missiles was mainly below the waterline in a location a sea skimmer is not going to hit . Even a Harpoon will do considerable damage if it does not hit the main citadel . The Soviet missiles however will impact at a 30 to 60 degree angle and punch a hole up to 2 metre diameter at least 8 metres through the decks . If the hit the main turrets it's all over . If they Hit the boiler room the ship is going nowhere . Soviet Anti-Ship missiles are still better in terms of lethality then western missiles . Western missiles are designed with destroyer size targets in mind . Russian and Soviet missiles had 90,000 ton Carriers in mind .
 
Of regular steel. Not armor. And at any rate, the missiles are not programed to hit the deck. To easy to miss, get shot down or skid across the deck.

Most missiles are very much programmed to hit the deck, American ones included. That's half the reason why they have that pop-up maneuver in the final approach, the other half being to throw off attempts at point defense. Skidding isn't any more of an issue then it was with AP bombs and missiles are much less likely to miss due to actually having guidance.

The armor on the Iowa wasn't put on in just one area. It's layered. An upper armor deck of 1.5" that will detonate GP weapons and missiles, then the next deck down is the main armor belt that was 6" thick which would absorb the blast. Then, just in case some of the blast managed to leak through, there was a splinter deck the next deck down that was .625" thick.

It doesn't matter if the armor is spaced if there isn't actually enough armor to stop the thing. If 6 inches fails, then 1-2 inches definitely won't work out. The fuse is on a delay designed to bring it well inside a target ship before exploding. Unless the armor physically stops the warhead then it's not very useful. Plus, alot of the jet fuel is gonna follow the warhead through the big 'ol hole it made and be ignited by the explosion. So in addition to all the internal damage caused by the explosion of 750 kgs of RDX, your gonna have multiple jet fuel fires raging above and below deck.

Russian and Soviet missiles had 90,000 ton Carriers in mind .

And the resulting designs weren't that different from what would be capable of busting a battleship. A Nimitz-class may have lighter armor then an Iowa, but it has a whole lot more internal space, mass, and superior damage control schemes which basically makes it just as tough a target.

As much as it may pain the battleship enthusiasts to hear, the Iowa was obsolete by the 1980s as far as ship-ship combat. Even in it's intended role as a shore-bombardment vessel, a bunch of destroyers or cruisers with their 6-8 inch guns were probably more cost effective in the context of the 1980s. Ultimately, the reasons for their reactivation was out of political demand and not any sort of military necessity.
 
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Factually wrong. The casing around a Shipwreck's HE warhead wouldn't even come close to penetrating the main armor belt of the Iowa. Thats over 12" of armor. A 3.5" casing will break apart against that. The armor may be damaged, but it's not penetrating. Look how actual AP shells are made. The steel is MUCH thicker than 3.5" and they still had a hell of a time penetrating. And before you mention the speed, a 16" APC shell from an Iowa moved at Mach 2.21. A Shipwreck doesn't have a prayer in hell of defeating an Iowas armor

Not to mention the fact that single ships rarely fight each other in 20th Century warfare is concerned. A task group fights another task group. A US Surface Action Group (SAG) will most certainly have at least one Aegis cruiser with it in this time period, and will have air support. The Soviet SAG will have their best AAW and ASW warships on hand as well.

If it comes down to a gunnery duel, it is because one side has achieved a dominant position in terms of power over the other and that other SAG cannot get away.

There is also the other issue that the Soviets do not have an unlimited supply of Backfires, Bears, and ASM able to deal with US Carrier and Surface battle groups, and no NATO or US Admiral is going to take his capital ships into waters without air support, particularly fighter cover. So the relative merits of the Soviet ASM (and James Dunnigan in "How to Make War" in 3 editions going back to the Cold War didn't think the Iowa was particularly vulnerable to conventional warheads) it really only matters if the Soviet Bombers are able to get off a successful attack.

Maybe, or maybe not is the answer to that question.

For fiction I recommend highly "The War that Never Was" for a great look at the war at sea in a NATO/Pact hot war in the 1980s
 
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It should probably be noted that the USN has not lost a ship heavier than a destroyer to Kamikaze attack or missile attack or catastrophic deck fire (Forrestal incident for example) since 1944 (the USS Princeton being the last one). Indeed you could make the case that the USN is incredibly good at damage control and fire fighting.

We have historical examples of catastrophic fires aboard US super carriers which should be very instructive.

Mission kills however from several ASM hits seem very likely however against a CV/CVN. But the thing is those ships are full of ammunition and aviation fuel, which are far better protected aboard the Iowa class. So best probably result for a Soviet attack on an Iowa class is a mission kill.
 
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Not to mention the fact that single ships rarely fight each other in 20th Century warfare is concerned. A task group fights another task group. A US Surface Action Group (SAG) will most certainly have at least one Aegis cruiser with it in this time period, and will have air support. The Soviet SAG will have their best AAW and ASW warships on hand as well.

Well, duh. And no SAG, American or Soviet, will be operating in a vacuum by itself. This only reduces the role of the Iowa, however, it doesn't enhance it. She'll be playing second fiddle to the missile cruisers who make up the main striking force of an American SAG as well as any air support they can call in.

There is also the other issue that the Soviets do not have an unlimited supply of Backfires, Bears, and ASM able to deal with US Carrier and Surface battle groups, and no NATO or US Admiral is going to take his capital ships into waters without air support, particularly fighter cover.

Nobody has unlimited supplies of anything and a Soviet SAG is never going to be operating outside of air cover either, so I'm not sure what point your trying to make here.

So the relative merits of the Soviet ASM (and James Dunnigan in "How to Make War" in 3 editions going back to the Cold War didn't think the Iowa was particularly vulnerable to conventional warheads) it really only matters if the Soviet Bombers are able to get off a successful attack.

James Dunnigam doesn't have very much merit, his "How to Make War" included. He's a good intro level, but a lot of his stuff doesn't withstand closer scrutiny.

It should probably be noted that the USN has not lost a ship heavier than a destroyer to Kamikaze attack or missile attack or catastrophic deck fire (Forrest incident for example) since 1944 (the USS Princeton being the last one).

The US lost ships heavier then a destroyer in 1945. Beyond that, this doesn't really mean much as there has never been a major organized attack against a USN SAG or CBG since 1945 either.

We have historical examples of catastrophic fires aboard US super carriers which should be very instructive.

Not really, non of those fires really match the profile of a carrier which has taken multiple missile hits by whatever heavy AShM you care to mention.

So best probably result for a Soviet attack on an Iowa class is a mission kill.

That depends on how many hits the Soviets get in on the vessel with what sort of missiles, which in turn depends on a host of other variables... very little of which has to do with the design of the Iowa.
 
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Well, duh. And no SAG, American or Soviet, will be operating in a vacuum by itself. This only reduces the role of the Iowa, however, it doesn't enhance it. She'll be playing second fiddle to the missile cruisers who make up the main striking force of an American SAG as well as any air support they can call in.



Nobody has unlimited supplies of anything and a Soviet SAG is never going to be operating outside of air cover either, so I'm not sure what point your trying to make here.



James Dunnigam doesn't have very much merit, his "How to Make War" included. He's a good intro level, but a lot of his stuff doesn't withstand closer scrutiny. .

According to whom? Any specific criticism? He and Frank Chadwick, and the various designers of war games covering this area of history put out immense amount of work and all provided extensive and thorough sources.

Indeed the commercial war games covering the period in question don't agree with you at all. Since we don't have an ACTUAL NAVAL BATTLE to look at, they are as likely or more so in terms of accuracy than anything else.

As to the point... the comparison of a Iowa vs Kirov etc (which came up a lot during and after this period) is a invalid as the Iowa vs Yamato comparisons that always turned up (and still do). If it comes down to gunnery ranges, somebody has already been defeated anyway. The war at sea was going to be about task groups and strike packages.
 
The US lost ships heavier then a destroyer in 1945. Beyond that, this doesn't really mean much as there has never been a major organized attack against a USN SAG or CBG since 1945 either.



Not really, non of those fires really match the profile of a carrier which has taken multiple missile hits by whatever heavy AShM you care to mention. .

to air attack? Actually no. The CA Indianapolis, an obsolescent cruiser, was lost to submarine, not air attack. No cruiser or larger ship warship in the USN was lost to air attack in 1945, or indeed after the CVL Princeton. While some significant sized transport and auxiliary ships were lost in 1945, they were not combat ships.

The Forrestal suffered numerous detonations from exploding ammunition storage. Indeed it matches closely to the catastrophic damage suffered by the CV Franklin and the IJN Carriers at Midway.

For those unfamiliar...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1967_USS_Forrestal_fire
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Oriskany_(CV-34)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Enterprise_fire

But yes I agree, it really comes down to how well protected the US SAG is in terms of air support. It also depends on where the fight takes place (Mid Atlantic, a major offensive into the Barents Sea, which called for 4 CVBG and 1 SAG), in the Aegean etc.
 
According to whom? Any specific criticism? He and Frank Chadwick, and the various designers of war games covering this area of history put out immense amount of work and all provided extensive and thorough sources.

He states stuff that is pretty untrue, like talking about how tanks can't fight in mass (which is particularly rediculous given how a armored attack is most effective when massed), how when they support infantry they provide more moral than material support, and how they're frequently equipped with flame throwers as their main gun...

Indeed the commercial war games covering the period in question don't agree with you at all.

So what? Most commercial wargames tend to not reflect real world situations in any case in a number of ways. They tend to provide way more information then a commander would actually have, cut out entire layers in the chain of command, and a whole host of other stuff. Not to say wargaming doesn't have it's uses, and I plenty enjoy them myself, but it also has it's limitations.

As to the point... the comparison of a Iowa vs Kirov etc (which came up a lot during and after this period) is a invalid as the Iowa vs Yamato comparisons that always turned up (and still do). If it comes down to gunnery ranges, somebody has already been defeated anyway. The war at sea was going to be about task groups and strike packages.

Agreed.

to air attack? Actually no. The CA Indianapolis, an obsolescent cruiser, was lost to submarine, not air attack. No cruiser or larger ship warship in the USN was lost to air attack in 1945, or indeed after the CVL Princeton.

The Bismarck Sea and Ommaney Bay, both escort aircraft carriers of size and displacement similar to heavy cruisers, were sunk by kamikaze aircraft in February and January 1945 respectively.
 
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He states stuff that is pretty untrue, like talking about how tanks can't fight in mass (which is particularly rediculous given how a armored attack is most effective when massed), how when they support infantry they provide more moral than material support, and how they're frequently equipped with flame throwers as their main gun...



So what? Most commercial wargames tend to not reflect real world situations in any case in a number of ways. They tend to provide way more information then a commander would actually have, cut out entire layers in the chain of command, and a whole host of other stuff. Not to say wargaming doesn't have it's uses, and I plenty enjoy them myself, but it also has it's limitations..

Which games, considering we are talking about tactical and operational level wargames going back to the late 1960s. Indeed his usual point is that combined arms tactics are what win battles, a point support by numerous professional and civilian sources. Combined arms being anything from an aviation strike package to a naval task force to a combined arms brigade.

The historical record of massed armored attacks, particularly when insufficient artillery and infantry support is present, is very bad. Indeed aside from the Six Day War and the early years of the German Blitzkrieg massed tank attacks have failed universally unless well supported by the other elements (engineers, infantry, artillery, air support).

I have read or played dozens of his books, articles and games. Nowhere does he state what you are stating that I have seen. Have a quote?

His tactical games as well as articles and books discuss specifically the firepower and weapons systems of the various AFVs of any particular situation. Indeed "How to Make War" actually tells you armor value, weapons, speed, reliability (in terms of how often they break down) etc of all of the Soviet and US AFVs of the period in question into the present.

So really curious where you are getting your information here.

As to the value of commercial war games. Some are indeed crap, and they fade away quickly. Some are more interested in being a game than accuracy. But the most successful commercial war games are the ones that combine accuracy and playability and accuracy is measured by whether you can get the historical results by making the historical decisions and using the historical tactics or strategy. Most of the games by the old SPI (Dunnigans company) as well as Avalon Hill and GDW (Frank Chadwicks company) allowed you to do that.

They rarely support your optimistic assessment of Soviet capabilities.
 
Which games, considering we are talking about tactical and operational level wargames going back to the late 1960s. Indeed his usual point is that combined arms tactics are what win battles, a point support by numerous professional and civilian sources. Combined arms being anything from an aviation strike package to a naval task force to a combined arms brigade.

Which does not at all change the fact that in order to be used effectively, armor has to be massed.

The historical record of massed armored attacks, particularly when insufficient artillery and infantry support is present, is very bad. Indeed aside from the Six Day War and the early years of the German Blitzkrieg massed tank attacks have failed universally unless well supported by the other elements (engineers, infantry, artillery, air support).

Which is a nice red herring to my actual point that massed armor is superior to unmassed armor. The failure of massed armor lacking adequate support was a result of them lacking adequate support, not anything to do with the fact they were massed.

I have read or played dozens of his books, articles and games. Nowhere does he state what you are stating that I have seen. Have a quote?

His tactical games as well as articles and books discuss specifically the firepower and weapons systems of the various AFVs of any particular situation. Indeed "How to Make War" actually tells you armor value, weapons, speed, reliability (in terms of how often they break down) etc of all of the Soviet and US AFVs of the period in question into the present.

So really curious where you are getting your information here.

I own one of the versions of "How to Make War" he published around 2002. Suffice to say, I'm pulling stuff straight from there. Another instance is where he claimed that the Iraqis used the same doctrine as the Soviets... when in reality their doctrine was much more akin to that as the Anglo-French in misled-WW1.

As to the value of commercial war games. Some are indeed crap, and they fade away quickly. Some are more interested in being a game than accuracy. But the most successful commercial war games are the ones that combine accuracy and playability and accuracy is measured by whether you can get the historical results by making the historical decisions and using the historical tactics or strategy. Most of the games by the old SPI (Dunnigans company) as well as Avalon Hill and GDW (Frank Chadwicks company) allowed you to do that.

They rarely support your optimistic assessment of Soviet capabilities

How can you make the claim their historical results for historical decisions for a war that never happened, which by definition is not historical. I also don't see how what difference they make in supporting my assessments of Soviet capabilities (which, by the way, tend to be made with some assumptions I freely acknowledge may not have actually been the case had it come down to a shooting war so you can toss out that strawman for the moment) seeing as we don't have an actual NATO vs Warsaw Pact war with which to compare them against.

Plus, a lot of what I use for supporting my assessment does come from real life operations and I'm pretty sure that real life > any commercial wargame.
 
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Which does not at all change the fact that in order to be used effectively, armor has to be massed.



Which is a nice red herring to my actual point that massed armor is superior to unmassed armor. The failure of massed armor lacking adequate support was a result of them lacking adequate support, not anything to do with the fact they were massed.



I own one of the versions of "How to Make War" he published around 2002. Suffice to say, I'm pulling stuff straight from there. Another instance is where he claimed that the Iraqis used the same doctrine as the Soviets... when in reality their doctrine was much more akin to that as the Anglo-French in misled-WW1.



How can you make the claim their historical results for historical decisions for a war that never happened, which by definition is not historical. I also don't see how what difference they make in supporting my assessments of Soviet capabilities (which, by the way, tend to be made with some assumptions I freely acknowledge may not have actually been the case had it come down to a shooting war so you can toss out that strawman for the moment) seeing as we don't have an actual NATO vs Warsaw Pact war with which to compare them against.

Plus, a lot of what I use for supporting my assessment does come from real life operations and I'm pretty sure that real life > any commercial wargame.

First, beginning mid 1990s a massed tank assault in the face of these systems is suicide

https://warontherocks.com/2014/11/t...ker-and-the-beginning-of-the-rsta-revolution/

Regarding historical results.... these commercial games accurately simulated the various Arab Israeli Wars, as well as the Gulf War, so yes you can indeed apply historical results to test their accuracy. As the systems were close enough as to not matter (just add in better Soviet and NATO systems in terms of modernity) and there you go.

You can model almost exactly the Gulf War using the mid 1980s game "Third World War" (Chadwick, GDW), a few years before it took place.

As to doctrine, the initial Iraqi doctrine in their war with Iran was indeed Soviet, as was Syrian doctrine in 1973. Both nations modified their doctrine after that to take into account local conditions. The Egyptians did as well, although notably before the October War which is likely why they did better than the Syrians did.
 
I am now really tempted to buy CMANO.

It would be a good day to simulate Warsaw and NATO aircraft at the single digit to low double digit fights.

Also would simulate what happens when an Iowa goes against a Kirov.

It's a really nice piece of software, buy I'd suggest waiting till a sale when it drops in price to ease your wallet. Quite fun to muck around in.

Might try giving it a test later of a Kirov v. Iowa.

What is CMANO?

Command: Modern Air/Naval Operations. A spiritual successor to Harpoon, and a versatile thing for testing all kinds of things involving air, sea, sub, and land (although not as good as the rest) kind of warfare. Very very nifty and fun.
 
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What is CMANO?

Command: Modern Air/Naval Operations, a game that simulates modern warfare on a strategic scale, similar to Harpoon. I have CMANO (though not the latest Chains of War DLC that adds some features like cargo and aircraft damage) and I'd recommend it highly, especially to anyone who enjoyed Harpoon. It's available on Steam or through Matrix Games. It's not cheap, but it's fully worth it. Despite the "modern" in the title it is designed to simulate anything from 1950 to the 2020s.

There is (or was -- I can't find it in the latest scenario pack) a scenario called Duelists that was basically a remix of that Harpoon scenario pitting an Iowa SAG against a Kirov SAG. "Battle of the First Salvo, Eastern Med (The War that Never Was)" has a CVBG and an Iowa SAG against three Russian SAGs based around a Slava, a Kirov and a Minsk. As the title suggests, it's based on "The War that Never Was" which was just recommended, though unfortunately I haven't found a copy.
 
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