Which non-European nation had the potential to industrialize first?

Ah interesting.
I imagine Japan would need to be less isolationist and start an export market for their guns and industry to spur further advancement.
Otherwise it's just imitation right? And I see no reason they couldn't, but if Japan was starting to be in competition with Europeans for those markets... especially as, IIRC, they also have silver mines, they could industrialise.
But they need to embrace the competition which is the opposite of the Dejima system.
I'd imagine quite a few local states would be delighted to get weapons without having to invite missionaries in. Thinking of Vietnam for example...
The bigger issue to being the cradle of industrialisation is that they don't have fuel. Innovation and trade are one matter, but Japan has consistently had a hard time with acquiring fuel for industrial processes (most of their coal is either low quality and in the far south where rebellious lords rule or hard to access in the far north that wasn't under de facto Japanese rule until the 1800s and lack of oil was a major factor in the 20th century). The UK produced 62.5 million tons of coal per year in 1850 while Japan with its ENTIRE colonial empire produced 55 million tons of coal per year in 1941, despite all the technological advances in mining made in 90 years.

Firearms production might be a useful export, but it won't suffice for creating the conditions needed to start up industrial factories. Even if they could buy the fuel with their silver, they'd need to know what to do with the fuel to start up industrial processes like steam power, which requires having enough of it for long enough for someone to bother experimenting with the possibilities, and have enough it of it that it can replace human labour. Japan also doesn't have nearly enough trees to provide enough energy, let alone survive the subsequent environmental catastrophe that level of deforestation would bring about.
 
Ah interesting.
I imagine Japan would need to be less isolationist and start an export market for their guns and industry to spur further advancement.
Otherwise it's just imitation right? And I see no reason they couldn't, but if Japan was starting to be in competition with Europeans for those markets... especially as, IIRC, they also have silver mines, they could industrialise.
But they need to embrace the competition which is the opposite of the Dejima system.
I'd imagine quite a few local states would be delighted to get weapons without having to invite missionaries in. Thinking of Vietnam for example...
It's possible Japanese arquebuses were already being traded across Southeast Asia before sakoku decisively shut things down. Japanese mercenaries and adventurers were definitely already all over the place, with some having fairly prominent positions in, for example, Siam. And guns (probably culverins, or old-style cannons) were already being imported into the region from Calicut and I believe there was one instance of an Ottoman expert being brought in to make ammunition for a really big cannon. I think Java was also a regional source of cannons. And Dai Viet's conquest of Champa (nowadays known as southern Vietnam) was due to their gunpowder weapons based on Ming models, so what eventually became Vietnam was evidently capable of producing guns. So local states did have a source of gunpowder weapons without missionaries, it's just that foreign ones tended to be better.
Indonesia would be held back due to being a Dutch colony from around 1512. Colonies generally used for extraction of resources and not made into industrial power houses.
To beat the British to industrialization you are going to have to start before 1730ish or so. Before that you are generally getting into the ideas of "why didn't the Roman's industrialize?" realm.
1512 is entirely incorrect, that's when the first Europeans arrived, and it was the Portuguese, not the Dutch, and the Dutch only got the VOC established in Batavia in 1619. But even besides that, calling Indonesia a Dutch colony at that point would be like stating that India before the Raj was a British colony. Like India, parts of what became Indonesia might have been under direct foreign rule, but also like India, there was no single colonizer until quite a fair bit after Europeans first arrived. Also like India, parts of Indonesia stayed independent independent in fact or in name until quite late in history - the infamous Balinese mass ritual suicide of puputan was first done in 1849, for example.
 
So local states did have a source of gunpowder weapons without missionaries, it's just that foreign ones tended to be better
All good points. As I mentioned earlier, I do wonder why they fell behind though. Was it just more efficient European weapon manufacturing making them more competitive?
 
All good points. As I mentioned earlier, I do wonder why they fell behind though. Was it just more efficient European weapon manufacturing making them more competitive?
The European advantage did not really lie in Technology itself until well into the 18th century. But they had strong structural advantages as early as 1500. To quote myself from an older thread on the beginning of European dominance as I am to lazy to write this out again:
I´d argue that the course for dominance had been set at least by 1500, if not earlier, although it did not mature fully until about 150 years later. But the relevant developments all had happened before 1500:

Political landscape: By 1500 a number of reasonably stable European states had evolved that were in competition with each other, but none could dominate or conquer the others. They all were large enough and had reasonably developed institution to build up from there and they needed to keep up with each other.
Education and professionalisation: Not only was there a strong drive for better educated populations, with public education spreading, the education system was also reasonably flexible and practice orientated, providing methodic grounding and useful skills/knowledge along with classical/theological knowledge. Moreover many fields were increasingly professionalised at least at certain levels: The core of army command were professional soldiers/mercenaries, major government officials have a legal education or experience in their field, leaders of major banks and merchants provide their sons with both practical and theoretical training according to their means and needs.

Labor efficiency: Not to the same extent as in the industrial revolution, but the Plague fueled a rise of productivity and a partial shift away from subsistence farming in Europe. There also was a wider adoption of simple machinery and in many regions guild restrictions became more flexible. Even hampered by traditions European craftsmen and manufacturies were starting to pull ahead on a per capita base.

International trade and banking: By 1500 were seen as core parts of a nations wealth. Large trade and banking houses were usually active across a multitude of political entities. European traders generally tried to get a foot into the long-distance carrying trade themselves, not just selling and buying. The banks also provided a large number of services beyond money lending and transfer, like insurance and investment. Their business also was no longer based on personal relationships, but on legal agreements.

Economic policies: Moreover European governments were far more supportive of trade and industry than in other parts of the world: They often supported foreign investments within their realm, accepted self organised trade organisation until it openly clashed with their national interests, actively promoted the use of cash crops and did a lot to increase production of strategic or at least profitable goods by private enterprises.

Shipping: European shipping technology was still in its infancy at this point, but they were looking in the right direction: They wanted long-ranged, reasonably fast, reasonably large, reasonably efficient ships, because they wanted the carrying trade to India/reliable transport to the Americas.

Gunpowder weapons: At this point the European firearms were not that advanced, though the innovations in firearms technology now started to spread from Europe instead of into Europe. More important is that Europe now had developed all basic fields of firearms: field artillery, siege artillery, infantry and cavalry weapons. Different nations are developing doctrines best suiting their respective needs and improving the weapons to match that while also trying to get the cost down because they need to keep up with the neighbors.

Now some nations/regions outside Europe still had advantages in some fields and would continue to do so for decades if not centuries, but were grossly hampered by restrictions in others:

The Mughal empire for instance was the industrial power of its age. But it remained funamentally an agrarian state. For example despite a huge ship building industry left long-range trade almost entirely to outsiders. It also never really managed to form a stable, self-sustaining public administration.

The Ming and later Qing had of course a very well developed bureaucracy and strict educational standards for its staffing. Unfortunately the educational requirements were more geared towards classical eduction than to applied administration or flexibility. Furthermore the disdain for trade and merchants in China (and countries under its direct influence) was far more pronounced and entrenched than it was in most other parts of the world. There were at times active efforts to prevent merchants from amassing too much wealth and merchants were systematically excluded from government positions. Coupled with Imperial China´s approach to diplomacy it is unsurprising that they actively fought Chinese participation in international trade. The main reason China was able to keep up as long as it did was their sizeable population growth. Which in turn was fueled by the government surpressing cash crops in favour of food crops.

The Ottoman Empire in military regards remained easily a rival for European powers into the 18th century, but already in the 15th century struggled to keep up with the change to cash-payed armies. They never really found a solution in between religious restrictions on banking, inflation, price control attempts, feudal structures and the shift of trade routes.
This of course could be expanded upon, especially as the pov of this thread is slightly different. But for industrialisation outside Europe try to find a nation that fulfills as many of these structural preconditions for the rise of Europe as possible. And then find a pod how to get the lacking elements.
 
What about a Central Asian/Russian steppe industrialization? I'm not sure how feasible it is, but I feel confident in saying there would be access to coal and other fuel sources, as well as an incentive to innovate, given constant conflict?
 
All good points. As I mentioned earlier, I do wonder why they fell behind though. Was it just more efficient European weapon manufacturing making them more comp
Southeast Asia historically had low population density until the modern era, which couldn't have helped. The area is full of jungles and mountains and small islands, after all. Although it's possible that by the time of European entry its population was still recovering from a drop after being firmly enmeshed into the disease pool of India and China 200-400 years earlier.

But personally I think the main reason for the so-called Great Divergence was colonial extraction. The Renaissance was essentially living standards in Europe reaching a rough parity with that in the Middle East, India, and China, but then the stolen resources of two continents fueled a wave of technological and social innovation and demographic increase which gave European countries a leg up with their Middle Eastern rivals and with the civilizations of Africa and the rest of Eurasia. Even the countries which didn't directly profit from American resources still got indirect benefits - for example, war can drive innovation, but where was the money for the massive Habsburg wars coming from if not from the Americas?

I'm not saying that colonialism is absolutely the only way for industrialization to happen, but I am saying that it's probably behind the single historical example that we have. And it's not impossible for some other Old World region to take advantage of the Americas, but no other place had the incentive to send ships into the unknown, since for 2000 years Europeans had been spending ungodly amounts of money just for luxuries from the east like silk and spices.
 
Southeast Asia historically had low population density until the modern era, which couldn't have helped. The area is full of jungles and mountains and small islands, after all. Although it's possible that by the time of European entry its population was still recovering from a drop after being firmly enmeshed into the disease pool of India and China 200-400 years earlier.

But personally I think the main reason for the so-called Great Divergence was colonial extraction. The Renaissance was essentially living standards in Europe reaching a rough parity with that in the Middle East, India, and China, but then the stolen resources of two continents fueled a wave of technological and social innovation and demographic increase which gave European countries a leg up with their Middle Eastern rivals and with the civilizations of Africa and the rest of Eurasia. Even the countries which didn't directly profit from American resources still got indirect benefits - for example, war can drive innovation, but where was the money for the massive Habsburg wars coming from if not from the Americas?

I'm not saying that colonialism is absolutely the only way for industrialization to happen, but I am saying that it's probably behind the single historical example that we have. And it's not impossible for some other Old World region to take advantage of the Americas, but no other place had the incentive to send ships into the unknown, since for 2000 years Europeans had been spending ungodly amounts of money just for luxuries from the east like silk and spices.
There's also the introduction of New World crops (without the fungi and diseases that would limit their yields in their native environments) like potatoes (which also could be grown on lands that weren't viable for other forms of farming, like mountains). Those arrived in Europe much earlier than they did elsewhere and helped support rapid population growth across the board. A certain level of rapid population growth (after technologies are developed to cope with lack of labour) and lack of opportunity in the countryside seems to be needed to push people to urban centers where the population is concentrated enough to work in factories.

There's also the fact that the looting of the Americas ended the Great Bullion Famine; the famine continuing would've greatly reduced trade with India and China and crippled European economic institutions. Colonialism was certainly necessary for Europe to industrialise, in that sense.
 
Southeast Asia historically had low population density until the modern era, which couldn't have helped. The area is full of jungles and mountains and small islands, after all. Although it's possible that by the time of European entry its population was still recovering from a drop after being firmly enmeshed into the disease pool of India and China 200-400 years earlier.

But personally I think the main reason for the so-called Great Divergence was colonial extraction. The Renaissance was essentially living standards in Europe reaching a rough parity with that in the Middle East, India, and China, but then the stolen resources of two continents fueled a wave of technological and social innovation and demographic increase which gave European countries a leg up with their Middle Eastern rivals and with the civilizations of Africa and the rest of Eurasia. Even the countries which didn't directly profit from American resources still got indirect benefits - for example, war can drive innovation, but where was the money for the massive Habsburg wars coming from if not from the Americas?

I'm not saying that colonialism is absolutely the only way for industrialization to happen, but I am saying that it's probably behind the single historical example that we have. And it's not impossible for some other Old World region to take advantage of the Americas, but no other place had the incentive to send ships into the unknown, since for 2000 years Europeans had been spending ungodly amounts of money just for luxuries from the east like silk and spices.

If resource extraction of far off province was the thing which caused the Great Divergence, China, the Caliphate, or one of the several gunpowder empires would also have had its own Great Divergence. The empires followed a European nation coming ahead, Spain had one of the most powerful armies in Europe before conquering 50% of the Americas. Portugal had developed the best navy in the world before their empire arose. The Dutch was the most urbanized region in Europe and made great military reform before going abroad to conquer, the British navy arose befor the British Empire.
 
If resource extraction of far off province was the thing which caused the Great Divergence, China, the Caliphate, or one of the several gunpowder empires would also have had its own Great Divergence. The empires followed a European nation coming ahead, Spain had one of the most powerful armies in Europe before conquering 50% of the Americas. Portugal had developed the best navy in the world before their empire arose. The Dutch was the most urbanized region in Europe and made great military reform before going abroad to conquer, the British navy arose befor the British Empire.
The difference is that the economies of the European core and their colonies were separated by vast oceans in the middle. If an old-style empire conquered its immediate geographical neighbours, more of the resources being sent to the capital would make its way back to the frontier or even just stay there in the first place as compared to the modern European empires. There's only so much a conquered population can stand before revolting, after all. But the European empires conquered distant lands not even in the same hemisphere with such an overwhelming advantage that a bare fraction of the resources that their colonies produced were actually used for the betterment of those colonies, and when those colonies did revolt they were crushed easily.

For instance, wages in Indian states actually went down compared to precolonial times after around 1800, while extreme poverty shot up alarmingly. By contrast, wages in London shot up also around 1800. You can look at the longitudinal data yourself, I'm getting this from "Capitalism and extreme poverty: A global analysis of real wages, human height, and mortality since the long 16th century" by Jason Hickel and Dylan Sullivan, the whole thing is publicly available.

I'll quote the highlights and the abstract:

•The common notion that extreme poverty is the “natural” condition of humanity and only declined with the rise of capitalism rests on income data that do not adequately capture access to essential goods.
•Data on real wages suggests that, historically, extreme poverty was uncommon and arose primarily during periods of severe social and economic dislocation, particularly under colonialism.
•The rise of capitalism from the long 16th century onward is associated with a decline in wages to below subsistence, a deterioration in human stature, and an upturn in premature mortality.
•In parts of South Asia, sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, wages and/or height have still not recovered.
•Where progress has occurred, significant improvements in human welfare began only around the 20th century. These gains coincide with the rise of anti-colonial and socialist political movements.
This paper assesses claims that, prior to the 19th century, around 90% of the human population lived in extreme poverty (defined as the inability to access essential goods), and that global human welfare only began to improve with the rise of capitalism. These claims rely on national accounts and PPP exchange rates that do not adequately capture changes in people’s access to essential goods. We assess this narrative against extant data on three empirical indicators of human welfare: real wages (with respect to a subsistence basket), human height, and mortality. We ask whether these indicators improved or deteriorated with the rise of capitalism in five world regions - Europe, Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and China – using the chronology put forward by world-systems theorists. The evidence we review here points to three conclusions. (1) It is unlikely that 90% of the human population lived in extreme poverty prior to the 19th century. Historically, unskilled urban labourers in all regions tended to have wages high enough to support a family of four above the poverty line by working 250 days or 12 months a year, except during periods of severe social dislocation, such as famines, wars, and institutionalized dispossession – particularly under colonialism. (2) The rise of capitalism caused a dramatic deterioration of human welfare. In all regions studied here, incorporation into the capitalist world-system was associated with a decline in wages to below subsistence, a deterioration in human stature, and an upturn in premature mortality. In parts of South Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America, key welfare metrics have still not recovered. (3) Where progress has occurred, significant improvements in human welfare began several centuries after the rise of capitalism. In the core regions of Northwest Europe, progress began in the 1880s, while in the periphery and semi-periphery it began in the mid-20th century, a period characterized by the rise of anti-colonial and socialist political movements that redistributed incomes and established public provisioning systems.
The paper points to capitalism and not imperialism as the culprit, but considering modern imperialism and the rise of capitalism are so enmeshed I think it generally supports my assertion.
 
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Seeing as coal is a rather important resource for industrialization and Japan itself doesn't have much coal and what coal they do have is of poor quality, I'd doubt Japan would be a good candidate for starting an industrial revolution (unless they conquered some regions with enough coal lying around, at which point the issue becomes whether the Japanese end up adopting coal as a major energy source despite the transportation costs and not having prioritized it as a fuel previously and if they can hold onto the coal producing regions without revolts or external invasions threatening their hold).

Meanwhile Korea wasn't nearly as urbanized as Japan or England and the caste system and Confucian ideology there prevented widespread literacy and mercantilism, so capital isn't too readily available.

Basically Japan lacked the resources (and it's doubtful just conquering those resources would work prior to actually knowing how those resources can be leveraged for industrialization or just having a long tradition of using those resources like the English did with the coal just lying on the ground) and Korea lacked the institutional support, at least compared to England and Belgium in the 1700-1800s.
Japan can buy coal from Korea if necessary. I also don't think ideology is that much of a barrier to money-making. People tend to like getting rich and ideology won't stand in their way. I also think Japan's Shogunate setup has a decent chance of leading to a constitutionally limited government, which is a necessity for being the first to industrialize.

The other option is Bengal, which had lots of proto-industry and faced a competitive state system.

I am highly skeptical over China - the central state is too powerful and would extract excessive profiteering.
 
The difference is that the economies of the European core and their colonies were separated by vast oceans in the middle. If an old-style empire conquered its immediate geographical neighbours, more of the resources being sent to the capital would make its way back to the frontier or even just stay there in the first place as compared to the modern European empires. There's only so much a conquered population can stand before revolting, after all. But the European empires conquered distant lands not even in the same hemisphere with such an overwhelming advantage that a bare fraction of the resources that their colonies produced were actually used for the betterment of those colonies, and when those colonies did revolt they were crushed easily.

For instance, wages in Indian states actually went down compared to precolonial times after around 1800, while extreme poverty shot up alarmingly. By contrast, wages in London shot up also around 1800. You can look at the longitudinal data yourself, I'm getting this from "Capitalism and extreme poverty: A global analysis of real wages, human height, and mortality since the long 16th century" by Jason Hickel and Dylan Sullivan, the whole thing is publicly available.

I'll quote the highlights and the abstract:



The paper points to capitalism and not imperialism as the culprit, but considering modern imperialism and the rise of capitalism are so enmeshed I think it generally supports my assertion.
You're making a hell of a leap with your final claim. Imperialism definitely impoverished/held back most (but not all) colonies, but it wasn't behind the tremendous economic growth seen at the metropole. That is a falsehood driven by people's false understanding that there is only so much wealth to go round, so one person's increase must be driven by someone else's decline.

The reality is that imperialism was just economically destructive. It hurt the colonies without boosting the metropole. Economic growth is overwhelmingly something that is domestically driven, which is why non-colonial countries from Ireland to Finland to Korea moved to first world status very quickly once they get their policy rate. Even for Britain, the money that was expatriated to the homeland was very small compared to the overall size of the economy, and negligible once you consider the spending that had to be spent back on pacifying the colonies or bailing out colonial ventures. The vast, vast majority of funds that fuelled the industrial revolution came from the agricultural revolution that happened previously.
 
The difference is that the economies of the European core and their colonies were separated by vast oceans in the middle. If an old-style empire conquered its immediate geographical neighbours, more of the resources being sent to the capital would make its way back to the frontier or even just stay there in the first place as compared to the modern European empires. There's only so much a conquered population can stand before revolting, after all. But the European empires conquered distant lands not even in the same hemisphere with such an overwhelming advantage that a bare fraction of the resources that their colonies produced were actually used for the betterment of those colonies, and when those colonies did revolt they were crushed easily.

Except that’s not true, Indians living under European rule was no worse off than Indians living under Mughal rule. Black slaves in the swamps of Iraq was as bad off as the slaves in the Caribbean.

For instance, wages in Indian states actually went down compared to precolonial times after around 1800, while extreme poverty shot up alarmingly. By contrast, wages in London shot up also around 1800. You can look at the longitudinal data yourself, I'm getting this from "Capitalism and extreme poverty: A global analysis of real wages, human height, and mortality since the long 16th century" by Jason Hickel and Dylan Sullivan, the whole thing is publicly available.

This is several centuries after the Great Divergence, it’s like explaining the death of the Roman Republic with the rise of Christianity.
The paper points to capitalism and not imperialism as the culprit, but considering modern imperialism and the rise of capitalism are so enmeshed I think it generally supports my assertion.

I will be kind and not comment on this. Let’s just agree to disagree.
 
I don't know about resources (at least there should be iron and coal for industrialisation). But it seems that sub-Saharan societies were pretty underdeveloped compared to Europe that they could launch early industrialisation. These tribal kingdoms should are more centralised and them should have capital and suitable business class before they can go that far.

The problem with SSA is that the continent was very lowly populated in the aftermath of the slave trade. That meant they didn't have the population density to form strong central states on the regular. Those that did form often didn't border any other ones. And as people don't generally like being ruled and taxed by a powerful king you've never met, you can just migrate over the border and escape that rule. That wasn't possible in Europe because states butted up against each other.
 
The problem with SSA is that the continent was very lowly populated in the aftermath of the slave trade. That meant they didn't have the population density to form strong central states on the regular. Those that did form often didn't border any other ones. And as people don't generally like being ruled and taxed by a powerful king you've never met, you can just migrate over the border and escape that rule. That wasn't possible in Europe because states butted up against each other.

There’s also the aspect that Africans even without the local slave trade had larger death rates and the geographic being merciless to trade.
 
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Or...and hear me out, a slower colonisation of the new world (Columbus fails meaning colonisation is focussed around Brazil and Newfoundland) means at least one of the stronger native polities survives. They're underpopulated, have access to coal and a great incentive to advance technologically.
I think the underpopulation of the Native American societies plays against them when making an argument for industrialization in any form. What I perceive as the entire point of industrialization is to make more things for a growing population which creates an exponential growth loop like you see occurring in population charts once industrialization happens in our timeline (graph below for illustration). The Native Americans just didn't have any real incentive to industrialize because there weren't enough of them to reap the benefits. There's a whole train of thought there too about political and economic philosophy that the Amerindians just hadn't developed yet that were also crucial to driving Europe's industrialization. I don't want to get too deep into that here because it could be a separate discussion altogether.

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Plus, all of the peoples who eventually became the various flavors of Native American just had such a late start to what we would consider civilization. This being not only because they didn't arrive on the land much later, but they also did not have access to the good starter agricultural crops and draft animals that Eurasia did. Jared Diamond explains that concept really well in Gun's, Germs, and Steel.

I do love the idea of reversing the traditional Old World versus New World roles, but you have to do so much revising that you really lose the spirit of the original idea and just end up creating a whole new world, rather than an alternative to ours where all of the same technology and ideas we know exist.
 
Japan can buy coal from Korea if necessary. I also don't think ideology is that much of a barrier to money-making. People tend to like getting rich and ideology won't stand in their way. I also think Japan's Shogunate setup has a decent chance of leading to a constitutionally limited government, which is a necessity for being the first to industrialize.

The other option is Bengal, which had lots of proto-industry and faced a competitive state system.

I am highly skeptical over China - the central state is too powerful and would extract excessive profiteering.
But why would Japan buy coal in sufficient quantities (also, I'm not aware of the Korean peninsula having enough coal production to trigger and sustain an early domestic industrial revolution, let alone one for a region with far more land and population like the Japanese Isles. Korea doesn't have a long history of coal mining and usage like England did, after all) in the first place? There has to be a driving force for Japan to actually feel the need to have the coal on hand before they have an industrial revolution, since the discussion revolves around them being the first to industrialise and hence having no one else to model themselves after. Japan historically didn't buy or produce much coal because they never felt the need or had that much use for it until the 1800s. For them to be the cradle of industrialisation, they have to have coal on hand. But without industrialisation, they wouldn't have the coal, either mined or purchased, to begin with.
 
None. They can't. Even if God came from above and gave them everything necessary to industrialise, they would not. I am an Indian and i can honestly say, even though i hurts me deeply, that they will not.
Can you explain why you think this? I'm genuinely curious. The same thought has occurred to me that maybe different peoples are just capable/incapable of different things because of their natural dispositions, but I realize how racist of a thing that can be to say out loud (especially in the sphere of identity politics that dominates my generation in large American urban areas). I feel like this might be the place to talk about that without injecting any accusing or derogative rhetoric into the discussion.

I also think this might ad a more human aspect to this discussion which up to now has largely been about political forces, resource abundance, and geographic positioning.
 
Can you explain why you think this? I'm genuinely curious. The same thought has occurred to me that maybe different peoples are just capable/incapable of different things because of their natural dispositions, but I realize how racist of a thing that can be to say out loud (especially in the sphere of identity politics that dominates my generation in large American urban areas). I feel like this might be the place to talk about that without injecting any accusing or derogative rhetoric into the discussion.

I also think this might ad a more human aspect to this discussion which up to now has largely been about political forces, resource abundance, and geographic positioning.
I would say he's not trying to be racist but simply supplanting the idea of modern day India to that of the India of the Mughal times. Of course a human aspect is necessary during industrialisation as they're are the ones inventing, working and designing things. Bengal was a proto-industrial society throughout the 1600-1757 era because successive governors (before the position became hereditary) managed to increase their and the regions wealth because of a huge amount of exports to Europe and China.

For example, an Indian version of the cotton gin was invented by someone during the tail end of the Delhi sultanate and was used throughout the Mughal period and this was used quite extensively to clear cotton in Bengal. Extremely rich bankers and merchants like the Jagathseths and Omichand prospered in Bengal and even financed the Nawabs when they had to pay tribute to Delhi.

Another thing to note is the use of coal. Without the use of massive amounts of coal, industrialisation is of no use. Bengal didn't use coal but instead used wood because the Mughal empire at that time were clearing the Sundarbans for cultivation which netted them a huge amount of wood. Of course, this is all the wood that was not used for shipbuilding (which was a huge industry by the way, some say the output was around 223,250 tons annually and the flushed deck of Bengali rice ships was later copied and used by the British EIC). Coal can be easily be dug up and transported from Jharkhand and Bihar (where majority of present day India's coal is along with Chattisgarh) to Bengal using the Ganges or overland if the Bengalis wanted.

I have more to say but I think it will be more alternatehistory than real life :coldsweat:.
 
There’s also the aspect that Africans even without the local slave trade had larger death rates and the geographic being merciless to trade.

Geography of Africa is indeed pretty challenging. And Africa is really notorious with its several diseases like sleep disease and malaria. Yes, Europeans too suffered diseases but with my understandment not in such scales as Africans. And probably Africans should change their thinking more scientist view which would allow them think more advanced technology instead focusing on beöoef pf wichcraft and spirits. Even nowadays superstitious is pretty strong on many places of SSA.
 
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