Which German general had the best idea for fighting on the Eastern Front?

[Julian]

i think manstein was the best choice for the war. he definately know how to use germany's strengths to his advantage and win victories even when the situation seemed to be doomed, like at kharkov in 1943. if germany did that for every battle, than they could have made russia decide that it was less costly just to make a ceasefire like in korea right now.

 

[Shimbo]

The problem is that if Germany could send much more latter - when it actually tried - sending close-to-desired at the time it would do any good couldn't have been more of a strain.

That Germany needed every single panzer division it could get on the Eastern front (along with other things) would be more reasonable if it wasn't for the fact that the difference to the situation in the East of supplying Rommel more generously is a relative drop in the bucket.

Two divisions out of an army of what, three million men? And this is going to make a difference to the Eastern armies as significant as how much more Rommel can do with them (assuming sufficient supplies)?

I find that aspect of Hatton's argument the weakest, though interesting to hear figures on the ports in the area (a more convincing issue, since the ports can't be increased).

And similarly, the lack of roads etc. between North Africa and the objective...this applies just as much in reverse (as in, from Egypt to Tunis).

Also, blaming Rommel for overextending things in Africa would carry more weight if Hitler had tried harder to keep Rommel leashed, instead of encouraging him just enough to cause problems without doing anything to address his needs or wants.

Its a problematic situation, but its not an impossibility.

From Cooper: "In November, for instance, only 30,000 tons arrived, compared to 83,000 tons in August. ...The following year, 1942, saw considerable fluctuations in supply. The best month was April, when 150,000 tons came across the Mediterranean; the worst was March, when only 18,000 tons arrived."

So "what is being sent (and what is arriving)" is rather relevant, not just the in-theater issues.

All I'm pointing out to you is what a professional military historian who looked at the issue concluded: the ports are inadequate, the distance from the ports to the front is immense, the transport from the ports to the front is simply not available in the quantities required, and what transport is available is extremely vulnerable to air attack. The logistic situation did not allow the deployment of more German armoured divisions. The only possibility is perhaps the poorly equipped and trained Italian divisions could have been withdrawn and replaced with better equipped and trained German divisions, but that was politically impossible.

As you mention the distance issue cutting both ways, yes that's absolutely right , although in the British case they had much bigger ports in Egypt, a secure (but slow) supply chain around the Cape of Good Hope, far more trucks and air superiority. But even so, that's exactly why the front swayed back and forward so many times - both sides kept outrunning their supplies.

I'll also note that Montgommery is often criticised for the slow pursuit of the Afrika Corps after 2nd Alamein. What this doesn't take into account is that the logistics factor still applied. When Rommel tried to assault his pursuers at the Battle of Medenine, expecting them to be at the end of their supply tether and possibly having to fall back as had happened so many times before, he was easily repulsed, becasue the British had solved the logistics issue at the cost of the methodical pursuit.

Later, the Africa Corps was fighting in Tunisia where these issues don't apply, particularly the immense distances. Tunisia offered two major deepwater ports at Tunis and Bizerte, the sea route from Sicily was much shorter making interdiction harder and the distance from the ports to the front was nowhere near as far.

 

[BlairWitch749]

Just a thought; with both the UK and the US out of the war in Europe, would the Soviets still receive Lend-Lease supplies? IIRC they were quite dependant on some of the items they received from the US, be it because they couldn't produce those themselves, or because receiving them from the US freed manpower and production capacity for other things.



I think BlairWitch wrote a timeline where Manstein is put in charge of planning the Russia campaign, and does pretty much exactly that.

- Kelenas

Manstein changes the world has this as a central element under the parasite program


unlike A LOT of senior german commanders manstein had actually served on the eastern front in ww1

 

[BlairWitch749]

That would be an interesting alternate timeline. Rommel was never going to get sent to the Eastern Front with Hitler in charge though because Adolf knew him well enough that he would not have turned a blind eye to the ethnic cleansing going on which was part of Hitler's grand plan in the East.

His style of leading from the front, meeting with the troops, meeting with the people and on occasion meet with enemy troops might have failed big time in the East. Its hard to know exactly how things would have turned out if he was put in charge of an Army Group in Russia.

my bw senses are tingling... Manstein in Africa has the desert fox in command of panzer group 2

 

[Elfwine]

All I'm pointing out to you is what a professional military historian who looked at the issue concluded: the ports are inadequate, the distance from the ports to the front is immense, the transport from the ports to the front is simply not available in the quantities required, and what transport is available is extremely vulnerable to air attack. The logistic situation did not allow the deployment of more German armoured divisions. The only possibility is perhaps the poorly equipped and trained Italian divisions could have been withdrawn and replaced with better equipped and trained German divisions, but that was politically impossible.

Which is why the Germans were able to deploy more armored divisions in North Africa after Torch?

The idea that it was possible to spare (at whatever cost) as much or more aid than was asked for when Germany had a chance at the time when Germany is in a worse position strains my confidence in his research.

As you mention the distance issue cutting both ways, yes that's absolutely right , although in the British case they had much bigger ports in Egypt, a secure (but slow) supply chain around the Cape of Good Hope, far more trucks and air superiority. But even so, that's exactly why the front swayed back and forward so many times - both sides kept outrunning their supplies.

More trucks are part of the supplies not being sent. Air superiority can be combated.

I'll also note that Montgommery is often criticised for the slow pursuit of the Afrika Corps after 2nd Alamein. What this doesn't take into account is that the logistics factor still applied. When Rommel tried to assault his pursuers at the Battle of Medenine, expecting them to be at the end of their supply tether and possibly having to fall back as had happened so many times before, he was easily repulsed, becasue the British had solved the logistics issue at the cost of the methodical pursuit.

Later, the Africa Corps was fighting in Tunisia where these issues don't apply, particularly the immense distances. Tunisia offered two major deepwater ports at Tunis and Bizerte, the sea route from Sicily was much shorter making interdiction harder and the distance from the ports to the front was nowhere near as far.

So send the supplies there so that Rommel can rely on that as a quasi-established base and then lunge out.

I'm not saying this would be easy, but there's a difference between "would be immensely difficult" and "would be outright impossible'.

And the amount of German effort put into this favors the explanation that trying to balance the issues rather than just treat North Africa as not worth it was not the approach used.

As a note, the main reason I'm arguing this is a matter of "is this feasible at all" - that is, can Germany do this as part of a more successful strategy than OTL, not if it can be done without interfering with OTL's decisions.

So an eastern plan that integrates this with Barbarossa and its needs is probably required to begin with.

 

[Shimbo]

Which is why the Germans were able to deploy more armored divisions in North Africa after Torch?
(snip)

I just explained why they could send more supplies after Torch: because that was Tunisia. Tunisia offered two major deepwater ports at Tunis and Bizerte, the sea route from Sicily was much shorter making interdiction harder and the distance from the ports to the front was nowhere near as far.

If you want more a detailed examination I can only suggest you read Van Crevald's book, I'm going to go with his in depth research over your opinion.

 

[Elfwine]

I just explained why they could send more supplies after Torch: because that was Tunisia. Tunisia offered two major deepwater ports at Tunis and Bizerte, the sea route from Sicily was much shorter making interdiction harder and the distance from the ports to the front was nowhere near as far.

Which does not address why they can't send the same stuff to Tunisia and from there to Rommel in time for it to do Rommel some good.

Yes it is difficult. So why isn't Germany putting forth the effort to solve it instead of treating North Africa as a tertiary theater?

If you want more a detailed examination I can only suggest you read Van Crevald's book, I'm going to go with his in depth research over your opinion.

So, you did or did not see that it the source is Cooper's book on the German Army?

This isn't my personal opinion pulled out of thin air and confidence.