I could offer a trenchant defence of Palmerston’s conduct towards China, but why bother? It’s got nothing to do with what we’re talking about. The fact is that, excluding the period between 24th September 1862 (“It seems to Russell and me that the Time is fast approaching where some joint offer of Mediation… might be made with some Prospect of Success”, Palmerston to Gladstone) and 22nd October 1862 (“I am however inclined to agree with Lewis that at present we would take no steps nor make any communication of a distinct proposition with any advantage”, Palmerston to Russell) Palmerston holds a consistent course of non-intervention towards the American Civil War. That was not only the right course, but it was the popular one- and the public weren’t backward in making this known. Two extracts from a report of Palmerston’s speech to a group of working-men (make of that definition what you will) at Glasgow:
“There are some who wish success to the North, there are others who desire to see the separation of the South from the North. It is not fitting or becoming that the British nation as a nation should take part in that contest (loud cheers)”
“We should be most happy if it had been in the power of this country, by amicable interposition, to reconcile these conflicting parties; but we felt, and we know that any attempt of that kind, in the existing state of things, would have an effect the very reverse of that which was intended (hear, hear)” (Caledonian Mercury, April 1st 1863)
Perhaps you are right, though, in that I shouldn’t portray Palmerston as the voice of reason. After all, it’s hardly the act of a rational man to unilaterally declare that Portuguese captains carrying slaves will be hung as pirates, to tell the Portuguese that they can declare war if they choose, and then quietly extend the rule to include Brazil several months later. It doesn’t make sense to station a fleet at great expense off the West African coast when any ship can hoist an American flag and avoid being searched, and it isn’t particularly rational to station a fleet off the coast of Cuba and almost provoke a war by searching slave ships bearing the American flag. It’s even less rational, when a Royal Navy captain lands a small force at Gallinas to liberate 841 slaves and destroy four Spanish slave barracoons in probable violation of international law, to write to the Admiralty accepting full responsibility and recommending that the captain be promoted. Perhaps what Palmerston should have looked at the situation, said “I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the states where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so”, and left it at that.