Personally I would say it did work.
It put France in a choke hold, and let Germany deal with Russia - the failure was in not getting out of the war when Russia left it.
Then their prewar goals would have been met.
yes, that's a lot to do. In any case almost being outflanked and defeated when you have a dense and good railway sistem and the germans are running away from his means something was wrong and a more conservative approach in deployment and offensive would have stopped the German army earlier.That's a LOT of stuff to do, the French could do it, they went from 5 field Armies to I think 8 in 5 weeks, whereas it took the Germans 6 weeks to go from 8 to 9 field Armies and 3 ArmeeGruppe which were basically big, independent Corps.
Actually, the Germans are far more ambitious. what they really seek is a decisive victory in Belgium where they destroy a French army, cut off the retreat of the rest and throw them back against their own fortress line. They want to Vichy France.This is exactly what the aim was; to knock France down with 7 armies in 6 weeks so they could finish France off with 4 armies and send 3 armies east to deal with Russia.
ts like you're trying to use details to disguise the fact that the Germans got within sight of Paris while the French didn't get near Cologne or even Strasbourg in 1914 by pointing to this or that mistake or detail. The fact of the matter is that the Germans were able to repulse French attacks on the left and centre and advance on the right and centre and take territory that put them in the best position to fight the long war that would ensue of victory wasn't achieved in a single campaign.
But its not a sightseeing trip and the German objective is to avoid a long war they believed that would lose. Launching an attack the end result of which is well we not going to lose as fast as we might have is not strategy, operations or even tactics. All you have managed to do is attack Belgium, extend your front and bring Britain into the war as an enemy. Which brings in the worlds largest merchant marine, so ALL your enemies now have access to world resources.
The assumptions were poor.
- Russia is weak
- Russia is slow
- Belgium wont resist
- GB is occupied with Ireland
- France will surrender in 42 days.
The German General Staff had a strategy that was divorced of the political consequences that military operations were able to realise.I think you're giving the Germans too much credit for having a strategy that was linked to political objectives that military operations were conducted to achieve.
The Russians were fast enough to invade and necessitating a shift in German forces.As for the assumptions, the Russians were slow and while not weak they were relatively beatable on the battlefield.
Then why go to such lengths to secure British neutrality if they didn't have an obvious situation in Ireland and that the British Army had already refused orders.I don't believe the Germans were relying on the British being occupied with Ireland, by December 1912 the German assumption was that Britain would be an enemy combatant in the next war.
Paris falls in 39, France capitulates in 42.Germany didn't think France would surrender in 42 days
I think you're giving the Germans too much credit for having a strategy that was linked to political objectives that military operations were conducted to achieve. It took the experience of WW1 to show that an organisation to do this sort of strategic thinking and planning was required, with the British being the first to put together a group called the Imperial War council. The Germans never put one together during WW1, which is a big reason why they lost.
As for the assumptions, the Russians were slow and while not weak they were relatively beatable on the battlefield. The Belgian field army quickly retreated into the national redoubt in Antwerp, although they did conduct 2 or 3 sorties into the German rear and escaped from the siege, the most effective Belgian resistance was railway sabotage and flooding of coastal areas which weren't big army tasks. I don't believe the Germans were relying on the British being occupied with Ireland, by December 1912 the German assumption was that Britain would be an enemy combatant in the next war. Germany didn't think France would surrender in 42 days, their aim was to have done enough in France in 42 days to start transferring up to 3 field armies to the east, they still expected to have 4 field armies in France after 42 days.
They should have read Clausewitz. What a pity for them he didn't write in German. Oh, wait...The German General Staff had a strategy that was divorced of the political consequences that military operations were able to realise.
Whereas the British staff officers all went back to their regiments at the outbreak of war, determined not to miss a moment of glorious conflict, and died in their droves on the Aisne and at Ypres. No wonder British army staff work was - with some exceptions - pretty poor for the first years of the war - we'd killed all the trained ones off.Not just Germany, all of them, the Royal Navy didn't even have a staff to make plans until 1912, the plan was all in the 1st Sea Lord's head.
Was France's plan 17 a well thought concept of how to win a war against Germany in a way that served France's needs, was Plan 19 the same for Russia?
The problem with plan XVII was Joffre forgot to plan for the worst case. Instead, he just assumed the Germans wouldnt commit their reserves early. Germany had twenty divisions more than e Joffre thought.Not just Germany, all of them, the Royal Navy didn't even have a staff to make plans until 1912, the plan was all in the 1st Sea Lord's head.
Was France's plan 17 a well thought concept of how to win a war against Germany in a way that served France's needs, was Plan 19 the same for Russia?
The problem with plan XVII was Joffre forgot to plan for the worst case. Instead, he just assumed the Germans wouldnt commit their reserves early. Germany had twenty divisions more than e Joffre thought.
The plan was highly controversial in France and many made the correct suggestion to extend the flank.
Plan XIX is a very reasonably one given the need to draw the Germans off the French. The Russians do after all destroy Austria.
Even if unsuccessful plans can be the best available.
The Schlieffen plan is the only one that makes any sense for the Germans. It does well because of Joffre and King Albert's mistakes. Against competent opponents, the Germans would easily lose the war by the end of September
Not just Germany, all of them, the Royal Navy didn't even have a staff to make plans until 1912, the plan was all in the 1st Sea Lord's head.
Was France's plan 17 a well thought concept of how to win a war against Germany in a way that served France's needs, was Plan 19 the same for Russia?
This is completely wrong. The French want to destroy the German army and win the war. The territory comes later.Your assessment of plan 17 is exactly what general staffs did, you're looking at the plans tactical and operational aspects and looking to maximize them. About the only higher level thinking about plan 17 was that France wanted A-L back and had to act simultaneously witht they didn Russia. There was no thought about if A-L was a valid strategic objective and how a successful campaign would Force Germany to surrender or set France up for another campaign and if a follow-up campaign launched from A-L would be beneficial and force Germany to sue for peace. Maybe it was, but I suspect nobody gave such issues serious thought.
Plan 19 is strategically sound. So was Alexeseyev's Southern strategy. While the Russians failed in the execution, its hard to suggest a better idea given the need to draw forces from the French front. Sure, the Russians should have stressed the need to delay on the French but if Rennemkampf punches through the German cavalry screen, the German 8th army is destroyed and the war practically wonThe same with Russia's plan 19, was invading East Prussia the best way to defeat Germany and was Russia looking to getting hold of forward ports on the Baltic because Russia needed them or something? Or was EP invaded because it was operationally possible and allowed Russia to fight while the French fought?
This is pure hindsightium. A long war strategy can only work if the Ottomans join which is highly doubtful in August. It makes no sense to divert forces from the main effort to pursue secondary objectives of dubious value. Dont forget how close the Germans come to defeat at the MarneGermany was the same. A 'war plan' might have looked a lot like Moltkes campaign plan, but added things like making sure the French channel ports were captured and coal and ore fields were secured with minimal damage.
I mean, why should Italy have gone out of their way to help Austria shit on the alliance terms for the eightyfourth time in the past ten years?From the public Italian statements since 1912, it should have been obvious that Italy was not a happy camper in the Alliance, and unlikely to assist in defensive operations, let alone offensive.