Cleanup.
Hence why the boomers are always relevant in peoples thinking
a. The Boomers (actually strategic rocket forces) are there as side-rails to keep potential central conflict deterred and geopolitics scrambles contained within limits. The deterrent will not stop some kinds of madmen and regimes, unless the numb-chucks who serve the reckless have some semblance of sanity within them. One dose of Stalin was enough for the Central Committee, so when Khrushchev firewalled the conflict, he was doomed. Hence that lesson learned. There are conspiracy nuts out there, (I am not one of them.) who think Stalin was "helped" along when it looked like the Korean War was headed that way.
Well yes that is the case but it is something that can be done situationally
b. (Geo) Politics being what it ism, one has to develop technical means independent of host country basing in peacetime when practicing Mahan, or one winds up at the vagaries of "what is in it for me" and having to accept disagreeable associations with some regimes that one in a better or more just world would "quarantine" (Franco's Spain is a WWII era example, Stalin's Russia is another, In Stalin's case, the Americans were prepared to fight an air campaign from Russian territory, same as they did from the UK, but how did that basing scheme work out? NTG.)
So situationally is "unacceptable". One has to have options that one owns.
Latakia occurred at the same time as a major air battle was ongoing sucking up the attention and when the Syrian Air Force had no anti shipping capability worthy of the name, them not getting any AshM until what 2007? Your FAC has room for a MANPAD equivalent, not effective at intercepting inbounds or keeping aircraft out of their engagement envelopes. Basing close runs into the same issue as land basing aircraft you bring up and 1,000-1500 men aboard a tender is little more expendable than 5000 on a carrier
c. The air forces neutralized each other at Latakia. Similar situation is likely in the Western Pacific.
d. If the competitor was sure of his RIKKOS, he would not spend resources on sea denial rocket artillery. I take him as given. His airpower over water is NTG.
d. Down at that rung, ECCM and electronic warfare probably counts for more than any SAM, but even at that, the nature of the target brings the competitor's launch platforms down into MANPAD range and NEZs.
e.
If you put 1000 men into a tender to support a FAC-ron, then you are doing it wrong. More like 250-300
Everyone was still expecting a carrier fight to end in a SAG fight - even as late as Midway after getting slapped about and losing 3 flattops the IJN charged off 'all Leroy Jenkins' to try and get their 2 BCs into range and 'do their best'
f. Lesson learned from Coral Sea? USS Yorktown. Flattops run away like scalded children who touch hot stoves when dedecked and the battleships will run with them. (Yamamoto ran at Midway.). Nagumo had not lesson learned it. Fletcher and Spruance by osmosis had. First time at bat, Somerville would have to be prescient, so I will concede he might have done the "stupid", but a better admiral would have run for it.
g. Had Nagumo "done his best" post burndown, well then that would have been an interesting death.
And had the USN had BBs at Midway I suspect they would have been expecting it to end in a SAG fight as well
h. No. Nimitz was not that stupid. He had six Standards in his lineup, ready; but chose speed and planes over guns and glory.
In fact didn't the last great sea battle end in a very one sided SAG fight mainly fought with USN battleships every bit as old as the Rs?
i. The last gunfight was a
position defense across a strait fought by gunships that had been second class citizened to Monitor status. They turned in a good shoot-ex, while Coward's destroyermen sank the IJN interlopers with torpedoes. Meanwhile to their north, baby flattops screened by tin-cans turned in the critical fight against the other IJN gun club and sent them packing, What a surprise that was. It turns out that flattops and their bodyguards "could" fight fast battleships and win. It just depends on the "Samurai spirit" inside the Woolworth Carrier crew man and in the tin-can sailor. It also shows just how DEADLY destroyers could be when their effectors worked.
And they had thought about the water problem - it had been known about long before April 42 (probably known about long before the first R was even laid down)
k. I'm sure it had been, but it was not in this case.
The force had been rushed into place and the ship in question had yet to arrive.
l. Why not?
Sending a fleet with a deficiency like that into the tropics is a Benny the Moose and Marshal Graziani Italian X Army, no-fresh- water-for-you kind of move. Do not make me remark about the British Pacific Fleet and its similar woes in 1944-1945.
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Back to Streetfighter.
Streetfighter was arguably the original concept, but once the USN got down to nailing what they actually needed to have in a small vessel, rather than just naval college theorizing, they did not need or want a missile boat FAC. If the USN needed a missile boat, don't you think they would have piled on a missile boat module to the LCS when they piled on everything else?
j. They tried, but the US Army FUCKED IT UP. It was called (Get this one.) Non Line of Sight Missile.
(XM501 Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System)
If the USN needed a missile boat the Sa'ar would be a good choice, but to replace the LCS you don't want that. A missile boat does not replace the OHPs in ASW escort, does not perform MCM, and can't cheaply do OPV duties so that we don't have CG's chasing pirates in speedboats or DDGs performing fisheries patrol. You probably need at least two hulls for this, but the Navy shoved everything in one because they wanted Congress to fund it
k. Is this the third or fourth time?
Figure out the mission and build to it. If you want OPVs and frigates, build them. If you want a swarm of missile boats to fight in the brown water, build those. Just don't promise Congress that one hull fits all missions and can be adapted to purpose. Sea-power tools do not function that way.
Why are the basing weird? Are they not just the less good RN ships being used in the less important (to GB) areas? (and the lack of docks for larger KVGs in Med)
k. Oil first. Lack of infrastructure second. Condensers third. One cannot use ships in areas where one has not built the support facilities or adapted the ships to the weather conditions. (See my previous comment about the British Pacific Fleet disaster, when the RN tried to push its "modern ships" into an area of operations for which the Royal Navy was not technologically prepared.)
Good in the North Sea is not good globally.
Is this not all due to a simple decision that IO was the 4th most important sea area for GB? After the Atlantic, North Sea/Channel & Med? RN was never going to be able to match IJN if they sent the main force and RN had to fight two European powers at the same time.....
l. That is that Corbett doing the RN's thinking. How about a little MAHAN?
Was there a viable alternate supply route to Australia .
See those red circles? THAT is what is navally imperative to Great Britain, after the North Atlantic.
Why not simply use very long range aircraft rather than any street fighter? P8 or large drones could operate from a long way (even Alaska/Australia) away especially with air force KCs to help it?
j. You can. Can you afford the cost of operating for weeks and months of a B-52 or a B-1? Missile boats float.
Planes have to "fly" to stay on station and blockade.
Definitely. That was basically assumed. Though I think the RN would have matched the IJN pretty well if they could use their full force.
Regardless, the RN was never going to get enough ships to challenge the KB while fighting the war they did IOTL. The Treasury would have to be on some good stuff to allow that. But they also were not likely going to authorize fuel dumps that they would not believe would be needed for the movement of the fleet to Singapore. Granted, they could probably have gotten more if they had accepted a smaller home reserve. But if they are doing that, I would argue that a tanker and oiler fleet would be a better deal.
k. The Singapore Bastion Defense makes no sense without those fuel dumps. Yet one more reason to dump on Backhouse, Pound and Phillips; I suppose. And here I thought "Betty" Stark was the major walking naval bolo on the allied side in WW II.
Alfred Thayer Mahan may be the most successful mimetic strategic weapon the U.S. Navy has ever unleashed on the world.
His book managed to thoroughly screw up German and Japanese naval strategy for decades.
m. He was, because nobody in those clown clubs bothered to dig deep and figure what he wrote out. Except those who did and do. Like the competitor I have used in my examples. They are not stupid. They have Sun Tzu.