What was maximum possible Fat Man production for the United States?

In this scenario I am proposing, Nazi Germany has defeated the Soviet Union, and has little to worry until US nukes come in in late 1945. Now considering that Hitler had a greater access to natural resources and would not be beat down as hard as Imperial Japan, it would take well over two nukes to defeat Germany.

The question is, how many Fat Man nukes could produced each month in the coming years of 1945/46 and maybe even as late as 1947? I have read upon other forums, that production would either be a couple nukes each month, with the most optimistic being 5-6 each month.

Is this an accurate assessment of many nukes America could crank out each month?
 
Fat Man and Little Boy combined they were talking 3 per month from existing summer 1945 facilities

OTL the US built 120 fat men 1947-49, average of 5 per month, without any new reactors. Admittedly some modifications were done to existing reactors, but don't know when and exactly what.

Depends on how much money the US is willing to spend, B Reactor took 13 months to build. So 5 per month is a good 1946 estimate, could easily double or triple that for 1947, and this is only Plutonium Bombs
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
The OTL production is not an unreasonable gauge. As noted it would be possible to increase it incrementally, but it is extremely unlikely to do more than double. One factor to consider is that, even at the time it was in production, the Mark III was seen as a starting point an a less than ideal design. It was, for a variety of reasons, not suited for "assembly line" production. The Mark III was replaced in early 1949 by the Mark 4 (the U.S. went from Roman numerals to Arabic numbering with the Mark 4, probably because the realization struck that there would eventually be too many Marks to make Roman numerals practical). The Mark 4 itself was rapidly replaced by the much improved Mark 5 in the production line by late 1951. The fissile materials from both the Mark III and Mark 4 were recycled for use in later weapons.

In the scenario presented it is likely that the introduction of the Mark 4 is accelerated by some months reducing the actual production of the "Fat Man" Mark III devise.
 

Riain

Banned
The Wigner effect happened with the Handford reactors in 1946 that limited Fat Man production so a bunch of Little Boys were prepared as an interim measure, I assume this would still occur?
 
Rhoades in his The Making of the Atomic Bomb' stated there was a ready core enroute to Tinian in August 1945. 3-4 more core were in incremental stages of assembly & additional mtl for a core forth coming from Hanford in Oct-Nov. So, up to five more bombs available in 1945.

For 1946 it's more ambigous. The shut down for improving the reactors leaves only theoretical evidence. There is the post restart production given above. Rhoades estimates that with continued production 18 cores would have been the minimum practical. He suggests the 36 projected for 1946 when the reactors were designed was not practical, without improvements in the reactors.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
The Wigner effect happened with the Handford reactors in 1946 that limited Fat Man production so a bunch of Little Boys were prepared as an interim measure, I assume this would still occur?
I wouldn't all it a "bunch". A total of five Mark I were produced, including the one expended in combat (at Hiroshima).
 
How long would it take for the WAllies to achieve air superiority to even be able to successfully use nuclear weapons against the Reich after it's defeated the USSR?
 
Last edited:

Riain

Banned
I wouldn't all it a "bunch". A total of five Mark I were produced, including the one expended in combat (at Hiroshima).

Not of grapes but maybe of bananas.

As I understand it the Little Boy drawing etc were destroyed and once the Wigner effect became known there was a scrabble to make some Little Boys without all the designs and the like. They made or gathered about 30 cases, had 12 cores but only 6 initiators.

However the point is that if the war eent on the US could keep producing Little Boys or produce initiators for the 12 cores or whatever.
 
How long would it take for the WAllies to achieve air superiority to even be able to successfully use nuclear weapons against the Reich after it's defeated the USSR?

Air superiority for? The Allies flew thousands of reconissance missions over Some were sucessfully intercepted, most werent. If the air forces run a series of photo recon missions with the same profile as possible atomic missions then odds are the Germans will ignore most them the same as the Japanese did. Three radar blips at high altitude on a routine flight pattern are a low priority.

OTL The Allies gained air superiority east of the Rhine almost as soon as enough P51 groups were available. It was a matter of range & the P52 with drop tanks allowed the 9th AF to defeat the main German interceptor force over Germany. In October 1943 the ball bearing raids that were unescourted into Germany took severe losses. Three months later in the Big Week of January 1944 it was the German defense that took the severe losses. Changes in escort tactics, improved bomber mission profiles, improving veteran bomber crews all helped, but once the number of escorts hit critical mass it was game over.

A mass transfer of aircraft from the east is not going to help. Part is because there was no 'mass' to transfer, and part because this would accellerate the German aircraft losses. From 1942 thru to late 1944 the German air force was able to maintain a average of a little over five thousand operational aircraft on all fronts combined. 'Brute Force' by John Ellis has biannual charts showing the numbers. At some points the number hit highs above 5,500 combat worthy aircraft. Other times it fell momentarily towards 4,500. At late 1942 approx 60% of this operating force was on the eastern front. As the 1943 campaigns developed those in the east were reduced & in the west increased. The most significant change in raw numbers was when the eastern front was stripped of interceptors to defend Germany. Well over half the flyable interceptors were shifted west. By mid 1944 the proportion of operational aircraft in the east had fallen below 40% of the total & the proportion of interceptors there were far less.

The other half of this is the west Allies were far better or more efficient at destroying German aircraft. For the 12 months of 1943 two thirds of German aircraft losses were in the west. This despite that for most of the year the west had roughly half the total aircraft. The bottom line is that when the interceptor groups were transfered from the east to defend Germany the pilots died faster than vs the Red Air Force. Maybe I can post some of the relevant numbers for this soon.
 
The charts pasted below are a sample of the data for German air force losses. The first set are from the Hyperwar web site. http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/AAF-Luftwaffe/AAF-Luftwaffe-5.html They more or less fit the thesis of higher losses in the west.

German aircraft losses by Theatre.png
German Fighter Losses 1943.png


The second pair of charts are from Andrew Arthys who has done some research on the subject.

Arthys Chart I.jpg
Arthys Chart II.jpg
 

Riain

Banned
Carl, that data is all good but it refers to regular combat operations. A nuclear strike is very special given that we wouldn't want to lose one of these weapons, so what do you think would be the likelihood of a nuke strike being thwarted, particularly later strikes? 10%, 5%, 15%?

I think it would be necessary to lay on big conventional air operations to suppress and divert defenses to give the nuke bomber the best chance of getting through.
 
Top