What mistakes did the Reich make in their defense of Italy between 1943 and 1945?
What should they have done to improve their performance against the WAllies?
What should they have done to improve their performance against the WAllies?
What mistakes did the Reich make in their defense of Italy?
- Thread starter Captain Homicide
- Start date
Deleted member 1487
For starters they shouldn't have made a stand in Tunisia and pulled out before the Allies came to dominate the seas and air and grind the Axis air forces to death in the region. Then don't defend the islands off the coast of Tunisia (Pantelleria) and lose more men and air power. The enormous amounts of critical equipment and veteran manpower of both the Italians and Germans would have been invaluable in Italy. Beyond that they shouldn't have ignored Agent Cicero's intelligence.
Post-Torch the Axis should have cut their losses in N. Africa and pulled out. The two hundred thousand or so captured German/Italian troops in N. Africa would be better served defending Italy instead.
Had those losses in Africa been preserved & used in Sicily they could have defended it.
Deleted member 1487
I have to strongly disagree with that. As air and naval bases Sicily and Sardinia were FAR too important to lose and allow the Allies to base in without a massive fight. Losing Sicily was the reason the Italian government ultimately defected and it was Sicily as a base that opened up the Italian mainland to inevitable invasion. Yes there were significant logistical challenges, but it was far enough away from the Allied based in Africa that it was possible to defend due to the restrictions it left on Allied fighter coverage. With all the AAA that was lost in North Africa plus what was pushed in to Sicily IOTL after the loss of Tunisia, not to mention all the fighter aircraft and pilots lost fighting from November 1942-June 1943, would have provided enough defensive air coverage to hold the island.
Furthermore without Sicily and Sardinia being such an inviting target IOTL they might not have been invaded at all due to being too risky due to Axis fighting power, which forces the Allies to invade elsewhere in 1943, which leaves them without the important experience gained in both Africa and Italy and forces them to attack before Axis fighting power was nearly as worn down as it was IOTL 1942-43 in the Mediterranean. Without Italy defecting the Germans have many fewer divisions locked down in the Mediterranean/Aegean/Balkans and can be used elsewhere, not to mention the ability to use the forces lost IOTL in Tunisia to garrison the Italy against attack and freeing up forces used later IOTL to defend Italy elsewhere.
I think the best and most economical strategy would've been to rip up the bases and other infrastructure in Sicily and southern Italy and establish a defense farther north. In view of the Allied material edge, in seapower and airpower, it seems unwise to commit so much at the southern end of Italy, and on an island. It might seem a daunting challenge at first but there were other examples of the WAllies overcoming that, notably at D-Day.
Deleted member 1487
Prior to their defection they fought as well as could be expected given their material deficits. The story of Italian incompetence after 1940 is highly exaggerated as they tried very hard to correct their problems organizationally and in training, but were unable to overcome their losses in equipment and the quality of said equipment. Not losing heaps of it in Tunisia, plus all that trained and experienced manpower would have made them perform much better from 1943 on.
Given all the Allied material wealth they'd be able to replace all the ripped up basing very quickly, mooting efforts at sabotage. There is also politics to consider, the Italians would refuse to abandon half their core territory to the Allies. Plus if you abandon Sicily you've given the Allies much close bases to bomb the mainland with; from Sicily and Sardinia you at least have a strategic buffer distance of several hundred miles from Allied bases in North Africa and they only have small air fields in nearby Malta.
Without the huge losses of equipment in Tunisia/North Africa, not to mention the trained and experienced manpower, they'd have more than enough to defense Sicily. IOTL despite the invasion being a relatively near run thing initially (in large part due to the screw ups of the Allies and their general inexperience, which would be worse without the combat experience in Tunisia) the Allies were able to bulldoze the Axis forces due to their being extremely weak in equipment (the Italians even more than the Germans) and quality manpower. Even some of the German divisions were still not full formed or trained as a result of the losses in North Africa. Having the long range AAA that were lost in Tunisia in Sicily would have really made Allied bombing efforts much more dangerous, but IOTL they were absent due to lack of replacements, as what remained was retained in Germany. Remember the Germans lost two FLAK divisions in Tunisia in 1943, which were very powerful formations. Having that available in Sicily on top of what was there IOTL would have made it perhaps too tough of a nuts to try cracking for the Allied air forces, especially backed up by the more than 2000 aircraft the Axis lost in Tunisia+what was there IOTL.
https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=133825
On top of that was the OTL FLAK that was there:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allied_invasion_of_Sicily#Axis_evacuation
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My view: The Nazi should have occupied their pre prepared defensive lines much earlier than they did. Also not reinforcing failure in North Africa would give extra equipment and man power to hold these lines.
Surely if Sicily was more heavily garrisoned it would simply have been bypassed and quarantined. Why bother wasting resource taking an island you can isolate and starve out. In fact in that case surely you want the enemy to flood Sicily with men and materials. Much easier then to land on the mainland and strangle the supply lines meaning all of those resources are wasted.
Surely if Sicily was more heavily garrisoned it would simply have been bypassed and quarantined. Why bother wasting resource taking an island you can isolate and starve out. In fact in that case surely you want the enemy to flood Sicily with men and materials. Much easier then to land on the mainland and strangle the supply lines meaning all of those resources are wasted.
thaddeus
Donor
the idea of holding Tunisia for an extended period seems valid, but they were starting with such a deficit of troops and equipment?
my thought was if they had "relocated" to Halfaya Pass instead of engaging in Second Battle of El Alamein, but with the leaders involved an impossible POD?
my thought was if they had "relocated" to Halfaya Pass instead of engaging in Second Battle of El Alamein, but with the leaders involved an impossible POD?
Deleted member 1487
There is a theory that they were effectively stuck at El Alamein due to logistics and a retreat would mean having to abandon a lot of equipment and perhaps men in place, especially if the Brits attacked during the process. Halfaya was a better position, but given how the only solution to the problems of the theater was to breakthrough to the ports in Egypt before the Americans could weigh in somewhere/how then withdrawal effectively admits total defeat in the theater and waiting for the inevitable. Alamein was their last chance to win and they knew it, so given that pressure it would be impossible to get a withdrawal.
Once defeated at Alamein and the Americans had invaded French North Africa the theater was lost and it was folly to try and continue to hold at all, as a delay in defeat really gained them nothing and defeat was inevitable given the logistics at that point.
Not defending Tunisia means it is cleared at least 4 months earlier, allowing an earlier invasion of Sardinia/Sicily/Crete, and so also an earlier invasion (and defection of Italy).
In particular in February 1942 the Germans have to balance deploying to defend Italy and its islands, with stopping the Soviet advance post Stalingrad.
Deleted member 1487
It does, as well as allows Allied shipping through sooner and saving them 2-3 million of tons of shipping per year as they don't have to transit around Africa anymore. That is the trade off with sparing the men, equipment, and supplies that were lost in Tunisia IOTL.
That said the Allies don't gain some pretty important combat experience they did during the Tunisian campaign, which means they will learn some hard lessons if/when they try to invade Sicily or Sardinia...or defer and invade France instead if they deem the Mediterranean mission satisfied and Italy too hard a nut to crack.
Also I think you mean February 1943, not '42. By that point they had sufficient forces to stop Operations Star/Gallop and had back in November made their decisions about committing to defend the Mediterranean. So if they are opting to cut bait in Africa in November they'd have deployed to defend Sicily/Sardinia instead of reinforcing Tunisia and had whatever excess forces available for use in the East, assuming there was any (probably some air units), as the Allies would be occupied for months building up in Tunisia for any further operations in the Mediterranean. Actually without defending Tunisia the Axis forces deployed to Tunisia IOTL would have time to finish forming (Hermann Goering division in particular) while there would be quite a few other units, mostly air, to deploy East for a time. By February/March 1943 the Allies would be set up to invade Italy if they so chose or be gearing up for the invasion of France in summer 1943 and by then the Axis would be prepared, having had 4-5 months.
Honestly though if the Mediterranean route looked too tough I think the Americans would insist on France in 1943, as that was their plan IOTL; they got sucked in to Italy due to the defense vacuum created due to the destruction of Axis armies in Tunisia. It was simply too inviting a target due to the weak defenses to pass up. If the situation were different, in that Axis forces weren't worn down/destroyed in the fighting in Tunisia, then Italy isn't nearly as inviting, not a soft underbelly rather a tough old gut, which gives American planners a lot more negotiating power to resist British desires to try and invade. If both France and Italy look tough, why not go for the closer, more valuable target (France)?
thaddeus
Donor
understand their fuel position was dire, but Rommel requested to retreat to Fuka, so at some points they must not have been immobile?
my speculation is that they died on the wrong hill, British move very quickly thru what should have been formidable natural barrier(s) at Halfaya and Sollum?
Deleted member 1487
IIRC the retreat to Fuka would have involved the abandonment of a fair bit of equipment and left only a fraction of his forces capable of waging a mobile defense. IMHO that was the sound decision, but again it is waiting on the inevitable defeat and larger retreat at that point.
IOTL the British rapid advance post Alamein was a function of the immobility of Axis forces, who were pretty much mostly captured close by their positions at Alamein, leaving very few forces to defend with at the natural barriers.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Battle_of_El_Alamein#Aftermath
No. The US OTL simply did not have the forces in the UK in 1943 to make Roundup feasible. Bolero was scaled back in autumn 1942 without telling the British (details in Ruppenthal) and so they could not build-up to the needed Army Group size in time. A 1943 invasion of France needs a decision in Q4 1942 at the latest to scale back on reinforcements to the Pacific, and to focus on the UK.
Deleted member 1487
Without invading Italy they would have forces available by Summer, especially with Tunisia being captured by the end of 1942.