What If Yamamoto Resigns from IJN Command, Effects and Aftermath?

So, what if Yamamoto decides to resign instead of staying on like he did? How would that have changed the war if he had resigned in summer of '41 instead of being talked out of it by associates?
 
I'm more looking at what sort of changes for Japan that his choice to step down would mean, and that is a possibility, but at the same time; the PH attack was Yamamoto's idea; and to my understanding, this was only approved in spring/summer/fall of '41. On his threatening to resign no less. This is based on him sticking to his choice and resigning despite advice against such a move.

Is there a PH or a far more likely shift toward the Philippines in terms of force used?

My thinking would be the IJN would focus more on Manilla and using most of the carriers built for the Philippines without Yamamoto. Thats my thinking though, what about you and your thoughts?

Would there be some sort of move toward Hawaii or would it be more focused on Midway/Wake or Philippines?

Considering that Yamamoto was more of a broad scope strategist rather than his colleagues. Without him, the IJN would be focused on their immediate region correct?

And if that's the case, how would things play out if Japan only attacked US possessions in their area of the world?

Philippines will be taken, its in the Japanese front yard. Possibly Wake as well...

Anyway, sorry for rambling.
 
The plan without Pearl Harbor was to outright ignore the American holdings in the region and hit British and Dutch possessions only, reasoning (probably correctly) that Roosevelt would have a difficult time rallying Congressional support for a declaration of war without any attacks on American holdings.

So no Philippines, Wake, or Hawaii.

And if that's the case, how would things play out if Japan only attacked US possessions in their area of the world?
Never going to happen, completely contrary to Japanese strategic objectives.
 
The more interesting question to contemplate is who takes command of the Combined Fleet instead of him. Because from there, we can extrapolate how the subsequent war is probably going to be run. Somebody like, say, Nobutake Kondo will steer things quite differently from, say, Jisaburo Ozawa.
 
The plan without Pearl Harbor was to outright ignore the American holdings in the region and hit British and Dutch possessions only, reasoning (probably correctly) that Roosevelt would have a difficult time rallying Congressional support for a declaration of war without any attacks on American holdings.

So no Philippines, Wake, or Hawaii.


Never going to happen, completely contrary to Japanese strategic objectives.
That makes it more of an army show. IJN gets relegated to a bus service.
 
Ok, you're talking war declaration. I'm looking at trade; there was no plan to fight the US since until the more restrictive trade embargo came about because Japan received much of its oil and such from the US.

What triggered the embargo tightening in 1941? Wasn't it something to do with the IJA closing in on one of the last port cities or something? Burma? Somewhere in there? I'm fairly sure that part of the reasoning behind hostilities with the US was due to the tightening of the embargo, not just Yamamoto's fixation.

And that is true; who would've commanded the Combined Fleet then? Would it still even be called Combined? What sort fleet structure would the IJN have had with I.Y. not involved? Certainly the IJN would not have the clout of otl without Yamamoto around...
 
Ok, you're talking war declaration. I'm looking at trade; there was no plan to fight the US since until the more restrictive trade embargo came about because Japan received much of its oil and such from the US.

What triggered the embargo tightening in 1941? Wasn't it something to do with the IJA closing in on one of the last port cities or something? Burma? Somewhere in there? I'm fairly sure that part of the reasoning behind hostilities with the US was due to the tightening of the embargo, not just Yamamoto's fixation.
There was no plan to strike south until the trade embargo came about; even after there was still a strong faction that thought fighting the US was a fool's errand. The plan I was talking about? It was discussed after the embargo.

It was the Japanese takeover of French Indochina that prompted the embargo.

And that is true; who would've commanded the Combined Fleet then? Would it still even be called Combined? What sort fleet structure would the IJN have had with I.Y. not involved? Certainly the IJN would not have the clout of otl without Yamamoto around...
Soemu Toyoda, two and a half years early. He's pretty much the only four-star admiral Japan has at this time that isn't part of the General Staff or in politics, he's one of the longest-tenured Combined Fleet officers, and just as importantly he's adamantly opposed to war with the United States at this point.

Structurally I don't see much changing. The IJN was structured mostly the same as it was before Yamamoto as after, and Toyoda was a quiet proponent of naval aviation himself, if not to the point of some of Yamamoto's proteges.
 
Would Yamamoto be at risk of assassination from the more volatile junior officers for resigning?
This might influence the choice of successor or push his successor to be more aggressive than they'd otherwise want to be.
 
Hmm, ok..

I can see Japan avoiding the Philippines IF they go North. Interesting Man, Toyoda. That page doesn't really say much about the sort of plan he would've had, just that he was not a fan of going against the US.

What triggered the move on Indochina then? If that can be butterflied by Yamamoto's resignation [not sure since that was likely an Army op?]...

I know Yamamoto was under threat of assassination several times; I'm not sure however whether that was partially due to his planning or the factionalism. It was likely a mix of the two plus his personal stance on a war with the US as to why he was under threat of assassination, and I'm not sure whether or not stepping out of the Navy would've changed the target on his back or not.

TBF, I'm all for Japan going North myself. I'm not entirely sure how that would've played out in the long run, but with Yamamoto out of the picture, I would assume there would be more push for going North...
 
Hmm, ok..

I can see Japan avoiding the Philippines IF they go North. Interesting Man, Toyoda. That page doesn't really say much about the sort of plan he would've had, just that he was not a fan of going against the US.
They’re not going to go North. The Navy was adamantly against fighting the Soviet Union and the Army wasn’t too keen after Khalkin Gol.

What triggered the move on Indochina then? If that can be butterflied by Yamamoto's resignation [not sure since that was likely an Army op?]...
It’s not going to be butterflied by Yamamoto’s resignation. It was done to provide a springboard for invasion of the Dutch East Indies, something the whole Navy was on board with.

A reminder: Yamamoto’s resignation was a threat used to bully the Navy into going along with his plans to attack the US as part of the plans to seize Southeast Asia. The “seize Southeast Asia“ part everyone in the Navy was on board with.

TBF, I'm all for Japan going North myself. I'm not entirely sure how that would've played out in the long run, but with Yamamoto out of the picture, I would assume there would be more push for going North...
Again, no. Army show, Khalkin Gol, etc.
 
Yes, and if he had actually resigned is the question...

I dont get what you're saying Hornet; first you say that Japan didn't want to touch the US stuff if they could help it. But as it stands, they will have to regardless of what plan they use in the end. No matter how you look at it, the Philippines is too close for Japan to ignore at their own peril. You say that it wasn't part of their plan to touch US territories and yet regardless of whether Yamamoto is there or not, the end result will still get them in a war with the US.

All I'm trying to say is that the Japanese are making a big mistake by leaving a potential enemy with a park bench seat in their front yard. I just cannot see the US leaving them alone per their own wishes. Gonna make up a thread for this sidenote...

I've read in the past that in some aspects, the Embargo that happened was viewed by at least some of the Japanese as an act of war of itself. So the Embargo happens regardless.... Anyway, new thread time, again. To avoid too much derailment here.
 
Yes, and if he had actually resigned is the question...

I dont get what you're saying Hornet; first you say that Japan didn't want to touch the US stuff if they could help it. But as it stands, they will have to regardless of what plan they use in the end. No matter how you look at it, the Philippines is too close for Japan to ignore at their own peril. You say that it wasn't part of their plan to touch US territories and yet regardless of whether Yamamoto is there or not, the end result will still get them in a war with the US.

All I'm trying to say is that the Japanese are making a big mistake by leaving a potential enemy with a park bench seat in their front yard. I just cannot see the US leaving them alone per their own wishes. Gonna make up a thread for this sidenote...

I've read in the past that in some aspects, the Embargo that happened was viewed by at least some of the Japanese as an act of war of itself. So the Embargo happens regardless.... Anyway, new thread time, again. To avoid too much derailment here.
I didn't say Japan didn't want to touch US stuff if they could help it.

Yamamoto's resignation threat didn't come out of the blue. It's tied inextricably to an ongoing strategic dispute between Yamamoto and the Combined Fleet on the one side, and the Navy General Staff and joint staff command. Yamamoto, speaking for the active fleet in the matter, wanted to take the American possessions and hit Pearl Harbor, for all the reasons you've outlined. The General Staff, on the other hand, believed that if they left US possessions alone there would be no stomach for fighting Japan in the first place, which both takes impressive intestinal fortitude on their part and was IMO broadly correct.

Yes, there would be a war with the US at some point. Again, we had a serious disagreement between Yamamoto and IGHQ on when that war was desireable. IGHQ clearly believed that fighting the US would go better with more time to build ships, secure their SLOCs, and let the US get hip-deep in Europe - they were not blind to developments in that part of the world. Yamamoto, knowing of the 2-Ocean Navy Act was coming, believed that it was better to fight immediately and roll the dice on being able to destroy the US fleet.

This is why I say if Yamamoto actually resigns, the Japanese will do their best to ignore American holdings. I'm of the opinion that Yamamoto actually resigning means IGHQ winning this strategic dispute, and regardless of his popularity I expect most of the Combined Fleet's officers would fall in line with the IGHQ should that happen.
 
Alright. Good point. Granted, I don't see that happening. But they can try.

If anything, I think the US isolation stance is a lie. After all, they started lend lease, and embargoes.. so how can that truly be isolationist?

Yeah... that's probably warranting a new thread there...
 
Alright. Good point. Granted, I don't see that happening. But they can try.

If anything, I think the US isolation stance is a lie. After all, they started lend lease, and embargoes.. so how can that truly be isolationist?

Yeah... that's probably warranting a new thread there...
Uh, duh?
 
What are the chances of foregoing the Pearl Harbor attack and using those resources to ensure a quick success elsewhere, particularly Guam and the Philippines in the hope of luring the Pacific Fleet into the all out super engagement the IJN always hoped for closer to Japanese supply lines?
 
If the Japanese hit the Dutch and British only, the US fortifies the hell out of Guam, the PI, Wake, etc. And the kicker is the Japanese still wouldn’t have the logistics to get much if any closer to India and Australia. Darwin would still be the world’s largest self sustaining POW camp, and Ceylon might as well be the far side of the Moon.

The US Navy already started it’s massive buildup and the prospect of fighting the IJN alone will be enough impetus to continue the build up. Not being at war with Germany means the Army will get less resources, but those resources will certainly be passed on to the British and Australians.

Japan will still end up at war with the US, just a US with a larger fleet and massively more heavily defended possessions in the Western Pacific, to the point where the USN may actually have the time and fleet train to relieve the PI (I understand that wasn’t WP Orange-5, but things change according to capabilities).

Just my take, happy for a true expert to tell me I’m wrong :)
 
Yeah, you arent wrong, since I envision pretty much the same thing happening to Japan sometime in due course of their excursion... Just because of where the Philippines are Geographically....
 
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