What if the Kamikaze or "divine wind" never came to be?

Wikipedia: "Kamikaze (神風, pronounced [kamiꜜkaze]; "divine wind" or "spirit wind"), officially Shinpū Tokubetsu Kōgekitai (神風特別攻撃隊, "Divine Wind Special Attack Unit"), were a part of the Japanese Special Attack Units of military aviators who flew suicide attacks for the Empire of Japan against Allied naval vessels in the closing stages of the Pacific campaign of World War II, intending to destroy warships more effectively than with conventional air attacks. About 3,800 kamikaze pilots died during the war, and more than 7,000 naval personnel were killed by kamikaze attacks.

Kamikaze aircraft were essentially pilot-guided explosive missiles, purpose-built or converted from conventional aircraft. Pilots would attempt to crash their aircraft into enemy ships in what was called a "body attack" (tai-atari) in aircraft loaded with bombs, torpedoes, and/or other explosives. About 19% of kamikaze attacks were successful. The Japanese considered the goal of damaging or sinking large numbers of Allied ships to be a just reason for suicide attacks; kamikaze was more accurate than conventional attacks, and often caused more damage. Some kamikazes were still able to hit their targets even after their aircraft had been crippled.

The attacks began in October 1944, at a time when the war was looking increasingly bleak for the Japanese. They had lost several important battles, many of their best pilots had been killed, their aircraft were becoming outdated, and they had lost command of the air. Japan was losing pilots faster than it could train their replacements, and the nation's industrial capacity was diminishing relative to that of the Allies. These factors, along with Japan's unwillingness to surrender, led to the use of kamikaze tactics as Allied forces advanced towards the Japanese home islands.

The tradition of death instead of defeat, capture, and shame was deeply entrenched in Japanese military culture; one of the primary values in the samurai life and the Bushido code was loyalty and honor until death. In addition to kamikazes, the Japanese military also used or made plans for non-aerial Japanese Special Attack Units, including those involving Kairyu (submarines), Kaiten (human torpedoes), Shinyo speedboats, and Fukuryu divers."

(Potential PoD): After a Battle of Midway (1942), the Japanese suffered a defeat, but not as severe due to one or two carriers surviving and withdrawing. These experienced pilots are left available with some tasked with training new pilots whilst their comrades engage the US Navy. Resulting from this, by '44 the Kamikaze aren't employed until the threat to the Japanese home Islands grow after the fall of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, leading to the idea of them being brought around in 45'.

How does this effect the war now that the Japanese aren't sending their pilots on one way missions and sacrifice their lives, but instead intend to keep as many of their pilots on for as long as possible. What potential aircraft could be introduced and/or effect this will have on the course of the war in the Pacific in several key engagements nearing its end?
 
(Potential PoD): After a Battle of Midway (1942), the Japanese suffered a defeat, but not as severe due to one or two carriers surviving and withdrawing. These experienced pilots are left available with some tasked with training new pilots whilst their comrades engage the US Navy. Resulting from this, by '44 the Kamikaze aren't employed until the threat to the Japanese home Islands grow after the fall of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, leading to the idea of them being brought around in 45'.
I think your more effective POD is Admiral Yamamoto surviving Operation Vengeance, with Ugaki dying instead. From what we know of the man's character, there is no way in hell he will countenance the usage of suicide tactics. Ugaki on the other hand was a firm proponent of kamikazes and the commander of the Okinawan 'kikusui' operations that sent so many Japanese airmen to their deaths.

 
Interesting premise. Imo i guess the japanese must feel the situation is not bad enough to warrant the kamikaze. Maybe a few small tactical victories here and there later in the war, a few US carriers hit at the Marianas, a bit more success /fewer losses at Leyte? Given the POD, say Akagi and Hiryu survive Midway, being repaired in a few months. Let's also say that this introduces enough butterflies so that Yamamoto never gets killed, so he remains IJN commander until late in the war, perhaps at Marianas and Philippines, but after these two battles he will likely resign. I don't think he will allow kamikazes, and will probably oppose the idea even if he's not IJN chokan anymore. Although as the war gets worse and worse, there will be increasing number of pilots crashing into US ships by their own choice, but not actually official policy.

Yamato's last sortie might not happen , instead it s probably prepared for shore defence.

The japanese of course will try their hardest to attacks the US fleet conventionally when they see an opportunity, but they may not get as many hits as the kamikazes did. So fewer US losses. On the other hand, a portion of the pilots earmarked OTL for kamikazes are given a bit more training and held back for defence against the US invasion, so perhaps a few thousands more survive.

This unfortunately does not remove the tragedies of the firebombings and atomic attacks. The firebombings are probably the latest moment after which the japanese will indeed adopt kamikaze tactics. In terms of aircraft, i guess one change is the resources used OTL for various kamikaze planes and other suicide craft are instead used for something else, though like i said, by mid 1945 at the latest they will adopt the kamikaze tactics so they will have just started on that direction production wise by war's end.
 
Interesting premise. Imo i guess the japanese must feel the situation is not bad enough to warrant the kamikaze. Maybe a few small tactical victories here and there later in the war, a few US carriers hit at the Marianas, a bit more success /fewer losses at Leyte?
I guess the question is whether or not the Marianas and Philippine battles even take place following less severe Japanese losses at Midway. We might very well be looking at a longer Solomons slog, with anything happening after that being totally up in the air (my money is on a series of major Central Pacific naval engagements in the vicinity of Truk). Heck, I think there is even a very small chance that Guadalcanal turns into a Japanese Phyrric victory.
 
Indeed, providing Akagi and/or Hiryu either are undamaged or moderately damaged so they are available for the Guadalcanal battles, where they can turn the tides. How do you see this Guadalcanal phyrric victory, what would it entail in your opinion?
I see them winning Santa Cruz by killing Enterprise and managing to land most of their troops in November due to having at least partial naval supremacy (since there are no US carriers left), and i see them mounting another major reinforcing effort in January instead of evacuating, but would the japanese troops be able to actually capture the airfield?
 
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It will have a local effect but won’t change much on the grand scheme of things.
Yes some ships will survive that didnt and a lot of US sailors will come home that didn’t
And the stress of the situation will not effect even more US sailors and of course some of the Kamikaze pilots will survive (presumably some of them will die in other ways.
For example my uncle was a petty officer innWW2 (exact rank carried as the war went on) and had been in the navy when the war started. His personal log had him commenting several times about how hard the tension of the Kamikaze was on the crews of ships farther out or on detached duty.
So this will have tons of minor changes but the grand scheme will not change much
 
Indeed, providing Akagi and/or Hiryu either are undamaged or moderately damaged so they are available for the Guadalcanal battles, where they can turn the tides. How do you see this Guadalcanal phyrric victory, what would it entail in your opinion?
I see them winning Santa Cruz by killing Enterprise and managing to land most of their troops in November due to having at least partial naval supremacy (since there are no US carriers left), and i see them mounting another major reinforcing effort in January instead of evacuating, but would the japanese troops be able to actually capture the airfield?
My take on a Japanese Phyrric victory at Guadalcanal goes something like this...

1. Enterprise is lost at Eastern Solomons courtesy of Akagi and Hiryu still being in the picture; Ryujo goes down as per OTL.

2. Kawaguchi's assault at Bloody Ridge still fails, but as a result of ongoing Japanese naval superiority, Wasp is lost and the Americans are unable to send Puller's 7th Marines to Guadalcanal; Vandergrift is forced to make do with what he has.

3. The Japanese land Maruyama's 2nd Division; Hornet is heavily damaged trying to stop the Japanese reinforcement convoy and as much as he hates doing so, Halsey is forced to withdraw; the Japanese perhaps lose one carrier (your choice - my money is on one of the light ones like Junyo or Zuiho).

4. The subsequent Battle for Henderson Field results in a stalemate; while Maruyama fails to take the airfield, his men capture and occupy several strategic positions (including Bloody Ridge) that stymie optimum use of Henderson and put severe pressure on the Marines.

5. By this point in time, both Hyakutake and Yamamoto are immensely frustrated and decide that ousting the Americans from Guadalcanal takes precedence over intact recapture of Henderson; they reluctantly agree to cooperate on this.

6. Yamamoto dispatches Hiei and Kirishima to bombard Henderson in conjunction with Hyakutake ordering Maruyama's remaining forces to attack.

7. Naval Battle of Guadalcanal takes place with both sides suffering heavy losses as per OTL; the only difference is that Kondo is in command instead of Abe, and he presses on with the mission despite his casualties and renders Henderson inoperable with a deluge of shipboard gunfire.

8. Amidst the heavy naval bombardment, Maruyama's forces gain ground but can advance no further than the auxiliary airstrip (Fighter One) due to being severely mauled.

9. Rather than have the Marines fight and die for a now-useless objective, Nimitz calls for their withdrawal and King reluctantly concedes.

10. When Turner shows up to evacuate Vandergrift, the Japanese, exhausted, make no effort to interdict; the evacuation goes practically without a hitch.

11. Maruyama's bedraggled troops plant the flag on the smoking moonscape that was once Henderson and deliver a broken, tired cheer of "banzai".

12. Both sides abandon Guadalcanal and Tulagi thereafter, never to return.
 
I think one should understand that the idea of suicide attacks was first raised by some Japanese pilots. By mid-1944, they already faced almost certain death in action against US forces, and the suicide-bombing tactic offered a chance of actually damaging the enemy.

Later on, of course, kamikaze pilots were conscripted into that duty. If one refused, he could be executed for cowardice, and once and having taken off in a "flying bomb", he had no way to survive. (No parachutes were issued, there was nowhere safe to land, and if the pilot managed to ditch in the ocean without setting off the bomb, he had no life jacket or raft.)
 
I think one should understand that the idea of suicide attacks was first raised by some Japanese pilots. By mid-1944, they already faced almost certain death in action against US forces, and the suicide-bombing tactic offered a chance of actually damaging the enemy.

Later on, of course, kamikaze pilots were conscripted into that duty. If one refused, he could be executed for cowardice, and once and having taken off in a "flying bomb", he had no way to survive. (No parachutes were issued, there was nowhere safe to land, and if the pilot managed to ditch in the ocean without setting off the bomb, he had no life jacket or raft.)
The pilots themselves were not the ones who raised the idea of an official, organised system of suicide attacks, although prior to 1944 it certainly was an unspoken rule amongst them that in the event of fatal damage in battle, they would crash their stricken mounts against enemy targets wherever possible.

The first proposal came from the JAAF, specifically staff officer Colonel Koji Tanaka, following his 1944 fact finding mission to New Guinea in which he discovered the numerous operational, training and serviceability problems his fliers faced in the field, and their resorting to ramming attacks against Allied heavy bombers out of desperation. After reviewing the latter, he recommended to IGHQ that such attacks be formally adopted as official tactics.

The JNAF's Admiral Onishi followed suit shortly thereafter, instructing the 201st Kokutai to form suicide squads for use against American shipping in the Philippine battles. He told the pilot cadre that since they were going to die in combat in any case, their deaths should not be futile: they formulated tactics and selected personnel for the task very rapidly.

The kamikazes were never conscripted. They were all volunteers, although there certainly was a degree of subtle coercion in the form of social pressure and expectations to conform ("voluntold" so to speak). As for refusal and being executed for cowardice, there are no known instances of men being ordered to fly suicide missions against their will. It would make no sense, really - someone forced to fly a suicide mission cannot be expected to carry out his duty competently, if at all.
 
The mini-sub crews also discussed the use of "body attack" (tai-atari) with their subs in 1940-42 when developing tactics for Fleet actions and then attacking Fleet anchorages. It's difficult to imagine the IJN and IJA aircrews being on more equal standing with US crews by 1944 where the low survival rate of conventional attacks meant that the idea of suicide missions was seen as an option. Attacks on ships are very much similar to ground attack aircraft, you'd need to give the IJN the A-10 to go 'lets continue with conventional attacks'.
 
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Something like a radio or wire-guided Ohka? They would need radar equiped planes to use it mostly at night, as during the day the USN CAP would be murderous.
 
Something like a radio or wire-guided Ohka? They would need radar equiped planes to use it mostly at night, as during the day the USN CAP would be murderous.
Absolutely. Rennell Island, just with missiles instead of torpedoes. The USN were caught off guard by that particular nighttime strike and their losses could have been far heavier. Interestingly, the Japanese never tried such a move again until much later, and then only using a different attack modality (dusk kamikaze strikes).
 
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