When the red army had the 6th army surrounded they started a offensive against Rostov on the Don that failed. But what if they had managed to break through and surround AG south in the Caucacus along with the 6th army? Losing over a million men and thousands of tanks must mean that the Soviets now can roll up the entire German line all the way to Leningrad
What if the Germans lose a entire armygroup in 1942/1943 in Soviet
- Thread starter mattep74
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I'm not sure how hard it is to create and maintain the encirclement - I'll leave ghat to others.
However, Kursk may give an indication of what could happen and how fast after a loss of that size. In that case, rather than being surrounded, a German army essentially threw itself into a grinder, but the subsequent soviet advances went about as far and fast as was possible.
However, advances after Kursk would have been well supported by Lend Lease trucks and there would have been far fewer in 1942, so distance of advance likely similar but in smaller numbers.
However, Kursk may give an indication of what could happen and how fast after a loss of that size. In that case, rather than being surrounded, a German army essentially threw itself into a grinder, but the subsequent soviet advances went about as far and fast as was possible.
However, advances after Kursk would have been well supported by Lend Lease trucks and there would have been far fewer in 1942, so distance of advance likely similar but in smaller numbers.
Pulling off such a encirclement is a stretch, but it's not impossible. It is pretty much the death knell for the Germans in the East. While a large proportion of manpower could be evacced through Crimea, they'd still have to abandon their heavy equipment and whatever chunk gets cut-off in the Kuban between Rostov and Yekatorinador could not hope to escape. What's more, most of the forces for the backhand blow at Kharkov came from the retreat out of the Caucasus, so with them dislocated and denuded of their heavy gear, it can't go off. That causes further spirals as the Soviets consolidating their positions along the central D'niepr lets them sweep down, cut off the Mius line, and pin the Germans there against the Sea of Azov to be destroyed. Basically, the Soviets will end the winter campaign season of '42/'43 at the rough starting positions of the winter campaign season of '43/'44. So an overall acceleration of the War in the East by about six months.
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raharris1973
Gone Fishin'
Just six months?
Why not twelve? Or more?
"starting positions of the winter campaign season of '43/'44." were basically all just 100-200 km within the 1938 Soviet border up and down the front. Not too bad!
Because the Germans still have capacity to regenerate some of it's strength during the Spring of '43. German war material production was still increasing and they still had reserves of manpower they could draft. There may be no prospect of launching an Operation Citadel, but they can still mount the sort of tenacious defensive efforts we saw in the latter part of 1943 and for long periods of 1944.
Good points. Also, such an absurd German failure can perhaps put more serious attempts into preventing Tunisgrad, avoiding Kursk, even withdrawing to the Panter-Wotan line (not that this will do much), but in short it reduces 3-6 months of German aggressiveness and shortterm thinking and replaces it with a sudden turtling mentality when the Germans still had a lot of space to trade.
arrestedcorn
Banned
It'd be hard for the Red Army to create such an encirclement, but it ain't completely off the table. AG South is practically nonexistent by the end of this. Yes, they can evacuate via Crimea, but they can't evacuate everyone & can't take heavy equipment either. The Third Battle of Kharkov was a failure for the Soviets precisely due to the forces retreating from the Caucasus coming and stopping them. But if they're all dead or POW, there aren't enough German or really any Axis forces in Ukraine to stop the Soviets from cutting off Ukraine from the Axis. So the Soviets completely cuts off almost all German/Axis forces in Ukraine, killing whatever was left of AG South. So by the Spring of 1943, Ukraine is Soviet again. It's doubtful if Germany can even do the Battle of Kursk, as they have no ready forces. Also, to compensate for AG South being brutally killed, they would most likely strip forces from AG North, weakening their position and allowing the Soviets to push them out from Leningrad, ending the Siege & potentially encircling portions of AG North. Hell, maybe the USSR can even encircle the Rzhev Salient, because the Germans are taking troops from there to other fronts. After having their troops encircled in the Leningrad-Novgorod Area, the Rzhev & Center Front, Ukraine, AND the Caucasus, the war dramatically shortens, and the Soviets can potentially advance all the way to the Rhine.
The catch-22 about this though is that the more dire things are in the east, the more forces in the west get stripped to fight against the Soviets which means weaker resistance to the Allied advance when it comes either in Italy or in Normandy in '44. And we know that the Germans will always prioritize fighting the Soviets over the Western Allies. This could definitely shorten the war and lead to a farther Soviet advance (more of Germany and Austria? Denmark maybe? Finland may get completely rolled over, etc.), but the Rhine might be a stretch without significantly weakening the Allies on the back end.
On the other hand, Hitler will think that if they defeat the landings in France it might split the western Allies (like he thought the Battle of the Bulge would).
There are two primary components to this, one political and one logistical. The political component was Churchill's fear of the Soviets. The logistical was the resources in all realms (hardware, training, stockpiles etc etc) required for D-day. The funny thing is Churchill was sold totally on the 'soft underbelly of Europe' approach which is, as OTL, a bottle neck the Germans can hold come Central Italy. I still hedge my bets D-day rolls in in Summer 44.
Well yeah, but if he couldn't defeat the Normandy landings IOTL with more resources then what hope does he have in a timeline where the Wehrmacht suffers much graver losses in '42/'43?
I think the biggest boon for the USSR is not the larger push into Germany, of which would probably not be much more than OTL and probably not lead to significant changes, but rather than the USSR would suffer from significantly less damage and deaths, while certain regions would not be as stripped by the Germans. A 1.25 year Siege of Leningrad would be far less devastating than a 2.75 year siege, and the free labor and working manpower supplied by PoWs and liberated civilians would mean that the USSR is helped immensely. Moreso, it would put less strain on the Soviet military, as less men are killed in failed operations in 1943 and 1944 because the USSR now has a huge power imbalance compared to Germany. Germany still has manpower reserves, and they still have an expanding industry, but the immediate loss of troops will prove disastrous to the German war effort. This will dwarf Bagration in the halls of military disasters, as the destruction of more than a million Germans in one encirclement would be one of the largest military defeats in history.
I think at a minimum we can assume there won’t be the OTL 47 (IIRC) divisions under OB West in June 1944. We might see a much more rapid advance across France, though logistics would still be a major barrier. The UK in particular would benefit from much lighter casualties in France in this scenario.