The Brusilov Offensive is an interesting potential turning point for the Russian Empire and the Allies to do better in WWI. The Offensive, while producing impressive results against the Austro-Hungarians, did not matter much for the Russians in the long-term. I'd be interested to see what other historians have to say, this is what Orlando Figes gives as the reason for its strategic failure-
In the long-term, could this have enabled the Allies to win the war earlier and with Russia as one of the victors? That obviously has huge implications for Russian politics, though I suspect an eventual revolution against the Tsar was inevitable by 1916 anyway. Looking even further ahead, what might the post-war world order have looked like in such a scenario?
If Evert and Kuropatkin had followed up Brusilov's advance with their own promised attacks on the Western and North-Western Fronts, the enemy might have been pushed back and the course of the war changed entirely. Hindenburg later confessed that with a second offensive, "We (would have been) faced with the menace of a complete collapse." According to the original war plan, Brusilov's Front was cnsidered secondary to both Evert's and Kuropatkin's. Yet neither of them were prepared to attack. To be fair, their task would have been much harder than Brusilov's. For they would have had to fight the German troops, which were much stronger than the Austro-Hungarian forces whom Brusilov had overcome on the South-Western Front. But their vanity was also a factor: the increased risk of defeat made them all the more afraid of losing their precious reputations. Perhaps the real blame lay with Stavka. Alexeev had served under Kuropatkin and Evert during the Japanese War and was still too frightened of them to force them to attack. The Tsar also indulged the cowardly generals-they were favourites of his court-and ignored Brusilov's daily requests to order an offensive.
How differently could it have gone? Would an attack against the Germans have been able to achieve a breakthrough or at least divert enough of their strength to boost Brusilov against the Austro-Hungarians? The Germans were a more formidable opponent after all and the Russian army had deep weaknesses. At the same time, 1916 looked like a great opportunity for the Allies, with the Central Powers facing intense pressure on their different fronts. What could the Russians have achieved with a better coordinated offensive?Such military stupidity was largely to blame for the slowdown of Brusilov's offensive. Instead of starting a second offensive Stavka transferred troops from the north to Brusilov's front. They were not enough to maintain the momentum of his offensive, however, since the Germans, with their position eased by the inactivity of Evert and Kuropatkin, were also able to transfer reinforcements to the south.
In the long-term, could this have enabled the Allies to win the war earlier and with Russia as one of the victors? That obviously has huge implications for Russian politics, though I suspect an eventual revolution against the Tsar was inevitable by 1916 anyway. Looking even further ahead, what might the post-war world order have looked like in such a scenario?