What If: Ottoman conquest of;malta,vienna,(tahran)persia?

[Snake Featherston]

Actually western army's had one of the biggest revolutions in the 16th century (that is the 1500`s, specifically the period after pavia). Things changed in the west, and the Ottomans did not keep up. We don`t see such a massive shift in how war was fought until the Napoleonic period.

Do the armies of Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and Tokugawa Ieyasu count as "Western"? Because those guys wielded armies larger than the largest Christian European states and were wielding armies armed with the Japanese version of the pike an also with the arquebus.

 

[Arafeel]

Nor does referring anachronistically to various separate states with distinct military traditions like Hanover, Brandenberg, Austria, Bohemia, Saxony, Pomerania, Posen, Venice, Goa, Mantua, Savoy, Naples, and the Papal States as "Germany" and "Italy" mean anything. This is not the 20th Century, and referring to them as such indicates the usual nonsense that 15th Century petty-states were their 20th Century juggernaut successors.

It is a reference to a nation, not a state. Germans and Italians solider, meaning soldier from the german speaking states and from the italian states. In 1573 Alva besieged Haarlem with an army of Spaniards, Italians, Germans, Burgundians and southern Netherlanders, while it was defended by Scots, French, Germans, English and Walloons.
The muster-list of Maurice of Nassau's camp at Juliers in 1610 shows that his army consisted of nineteen French companies, six German, sixteen Walloon, eight Frisian, thirty-five English, and twenty-nine Scottish companies. Among the twenty-five thousand troops on the Catholic side at Moncontour, six thousand were Swiss, some four thousand Italian, three thousand German and there were a few companies of Walloons lent by Alva.
The army with which Sebastian of Portugal invaded North Africa in 1578 consisted of Portuguese, Spaniards (recruited secretly in Castile), Germans, Walloons, and papal troops under the command of an Englishman, Thomas Stukely.

As a result of the mercenary and volunteer systems it was not only in the civil wars of France that fellow nationals fought one another. Germans fought for both sides there; and the Swiss who fought by treaty for the French king fought by private contract for his enemies. From the Swiss Protestants who opposed the Huguenots to renegade Christians who fought for the bey of Algiers, the mercenary soldier continued to maintain the role in which Machiavelli had condemned him, putting profit and personal convenience before country or faith.

It is very true that the mercenary forces caused problems, as an example the Spanish army treated to loot Antwerp after that city had fallen if they were not paid.

It was a big debate among western military reformers if one should try to create a national standing army. Both the English and the HRE tried unsuccessfully, but had to abandon it.
The impatience of Gustavus Vasa with mercenaries did produced by mid-century an actual example of a national standing army in Sweden. It was composed for a short while of volunteers, then of conscripts, and this represents a tendency general in Europe to prefer the conscript to the small numbers and the unreliability of volunteers.
In practice, however, native troops showed to poor advantage when matched against mercenaries, and those countries which attempted to raise large numbers of native troops, as did Sweden and some of the German princes, were forced by administrative difficulties, and by the reluctance of the men to serve, to modify or abandon their
plans.

The style of war evolved after the Italian wars demanded a degree of specialisation; sappers, engineers, artillery gunners, pikemen, musketeers.
The domination of the pike and shoot diminished the impact of cavalry until the new Swedish system apperde. This happened after the pike to shoot ration had change, as when cavalry diminished the need for the solid pike block diminished. deep and heavy pike blokes meant that you were not fully utilising your striking power, and that was mostly the shoot. You see this most clearly in the Dutch army during the 80th years war.

Artillery could theoretically dominated, but due too the size of the guns there were seldom any of the field when the few pitch battles happened. When the cannons did make an appearance (and the French average about 3-5 guns on the field) they dominated. Another example is in the Parliamentary invasion of Cornwall during the English civil war. The apperances of just one gun was enough to halt the advance.

 

[Snake Featherston]

It is a reference to a nation, not a state. Germans and Italians solider, meaning soldier from the german speaking states and from the italian states. In 1573 Alva besieged Haarlem with an army of Spaniards, Italians, Germans, Burgundians and southern Netherlanders, while it was defended by Scots, French, Germans, English and Walloons.

There was no "German Nation" in the modern sense at the time. That's the problem.

It is very true that the mercenary forces caused problems, as an example the Spanish army treated to loot Antwerp after that city had fallen if they were not paid.

So the Jannissaries are exceptionally more than this why? It's got to be more than that they were Muslim Turkics.

It was a big debate among western military reformers if one should try to create a national standing army. Both the English and the HRE tried unsuccessfully, but had to abandon it.
The impatience of Gustavus Vasa with mercenaries did produced by mid-century an actual example of a national standing army in Sweden. It was composed for a short while of volunteers, then of conscripts, and this represents a tendency general in Europe to prefer the conscript to the small numbers and the unreliability of volunteers.
In practice, however, native troops showed to poor advantage when matched against mercenaries, and those countries which attempted to raise large numbers of native troops, as did Sweden and some of the German princes, were forced by administrative difficulties, and by the reluctance of the men to serve, to modify or abandon their
plans.

An army that would run into a buzzsaw upon invading Russia......

The style of war evolved after the Italian wars demanded a degree of specialisation; sappers, engineers, artillery gunners, pikemen, musketeers.
The domination of the pike and shoot diminished the impact of cavalry until the new Swedish system apperde. This happened after the pike to shoot ration had change, as when cavalry diminished the need for the solid pike block diminished. deep and heavy pike blokes meant that you were not fully utilising your striking power, and that was mostly the shoot. You see this most clearly in the Dutch army during the 80th years war.

It seems that cavalry's significance as an arm was in decline long before machine guns and tanks replaced it, or at least that arms of the military ebb and flow with the ages. Regardless, it seems to me that the Janissaries' problems were in becoming outmoded and less able to adapt, not in *not* being a professional standing army like their European counterparts.

Artillery could theoretically dominated, but due too the size of the guns there were seldom any of the field when the few pitch battles happened. When the cannons did make an appearance (and the French average about 3-5 guns on the field) they dominated. Another example is in the Parliamentary invasion of Cornwall during the English civil war. The apperances of just one gun was enough to halt the advance.

That was probably because artillery could hit the broad side of a barn.....

 

[Arafeel]

Claiming that armies of German-speaking small kingdoms are German is nationalist bullshit, that's what I'm talking about. Austria, Brandenberg, Saxony, Wurtemburg, Bavaria, Posen, Silesia.....none of those states are equivalent to modern Germany. Claiming they are is ridiculous.

That is a minor issue for the discussion her. Thing is, my sources just us german and italian (who are not napolitans). I am not claiming those states are the equivalent to the modern states nor am i claiming that the western armies were the equivalent of the 20th century national standing armies. Okay?

 

[Arafeel]

There was no "German Nation" in the modern sense at the time. That's the problem.

Nation, not state, but meh, it think it easier that to say german (ish) speaking princely states of the HER


So the Jannissaries are exceptionally more than this why? It's got to be more than that they were Muslim Turkics.

The were professionals, and still good troops. They just did not evolve whit the times. If recall correctly, during malta they did not wear armour and fought whit swords. The knights used flame weapons on them as there clothing tended to catch fire easy. They were superbly morale, no doubt.
And it is important to remember that even whit the problems the mercenary armies caused for the employers, those were outwayed by the cones, at least in contemporary eyes.


An army that would run into a buzzsaw upon invading Russia......

Well they did switch back to mercs


It seems that cavalry's significance as an arm was in decline long before machine guns and tanks replaced it, or at least that arms of the military ebb and flow with the ages. Regardless, it seems to me that the Janissaries' problems were in becoming outmoded and less able to adapt, not in *not* being a professional standing army like their European counterparts.

That was the point we were making, and did make if you going back an reread the the first few pages.


That was probably because artillery could hit the broad side of a barn.....

The reasons why guns could not hit anything are legions, but experienced gunners got to know their guns. It really was an art. They were also heavy as fuck and were not easy to get on the filed.

 

[Arafeel]

Do the armies of Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and Tokugawa Ieyasu count as "Western"? Because those guys wielded armies larger than the largest Christian European states and were wielding armies armed with the Japanese version of the pike an also with the arquebus.

I really dont know, i know jack about that period of Japanese history.

 

[Badshah]

Do the armies of Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and Tokugawa Ieyasu count as "Western"? Because those guys wielded armies larger than the largest Christian European states and were wielding armies armed with the Japanese version of the pike an also with the arquebus.

True, plus the Mughal Empire was arguably the most powerful country in the world during the 16th and 17th Centuries! ASIA FTW!!!

 

[Laurentia]

Thats the most rediculas thing i have ever heard. The crusades were incredibly passé by this tşme and forming such an alliance given the era is difficult at best. There is this presistant notion that if the ottoman took one more inch of territory other then the otl then all hell would brake lose every christin in the world would unite against the ottomans.




If they can nock out vienna from becoming a threat then venice could be reached and perferably sacked if not acpture altogether after malta falls.And again they dont have to hold on to vienna just take out there base of operations to consolidate there hold on the balkans. As for persia they defeated them on sevral battles, persian azerbeijan and azerbeijan was a constant toug of war. To the ottomans persia was a second theater of war. And its nto nessecary to conquore persia just sack tahran and nock the persians out of the game so there hold on both azerbaijans are secure and they dont have to leave such a large eastern force and so then can focus on europe. Persia is just too big and harsh to conquore.

You have the problem of overextending into Europe. That's far too many displeased Christian's to rule.

 

[DrakeRlugia]

You have the problem of overextending into Europe. That's far too many displeased Christian's to rule.

Over extending isn't going to provoke a crusade. Especially not in the midst of the Reformation. Like it's already said in this thread, many of the German Princes, especially the Protestant ones were more fearful of Charles V and the Turk. François I certainly had no problem allying with the Ottomans either and would've been glad to see Vienna sacked. Likewise, a century later Louis XIV totally ignored when Vienna was besieged a second time, and actually used to the occasion to increase his influence along the Rhine.

The Ottomans had no problems ruling Hungary directly either, really. So I don't see how pieces of Austria would tip things. It was Hungary that seriously overextended them in Europe anyways, they would've been better off supporting and propping up Zapolya in Hungary as their vassal. They could similarly set up someone as a vassal in Austria.

 

[Elfwine]

Some of these posts are really hard to read. For instance.

The were professionals, and still good troops. They just did not evolve whit the times. If recall correctly, during malta they did not wear armour and fought whit swords. The knights used flame weapons on them as there clothing tended to catch fire easy. They were superbly morale, no doubt.
And it is important to remember that even whit the problems the mercenary armies caused for the employers, those were outwayed by the cones, at least in contemporary eyes.

Below is what I think it is supposed to mean, corrections in bold:

They were professionals and still good troops. They just did not evolve with the times. If I recall correctly, during (the battle of) Malta they did not wear armour and fought with swords. The knights used flame weapons on them as their clothing tended to catch on fire. They had superb morale, no doubt.
And it is important to remember that even with the problems the mercenary armies caused for the employers, those were outweighed by the pros(?) , at least in contemporary eyes.

 

[mailinutile2]

Claiming that armies of German-speaking small kingdoms are German is nationalist bullshit, that's what I'm talking about. Austria, Brandenberg, Saxony, Wurtemburg, Bavaria, Posen, Silesia.....none of those states are equivalent to modern Germany. Claiming they are is ridiculous.

That'st the third time you are writing that.
As I already told you (twice), I referred to them as "german" simply because they were qulified a s such in the payrollbooks (the document we have).
The term had no "national" meaning, but rather was used as a quite derogative term (expecially by the venetians) to indicate that those were landlubbers coming from the tirol.
differently from the spanish tercios, those companies had not a "proper" name, and are referred in all the documents as the "german" ones.
This does not implies thinking them as prussian soldiers, for the Caliph's Zeppelins!

1) I suppose that makes it a military superpower relative to the Ming and Qing dynasties, no?

Actually Ashigaru fusiliers were a significantly lesser fraction, and, mostlimportant thing, they weren't trained to use thier musquets to produce a fire concentration.
But with the proper training, they could (and indeed, they did)

2) That would be light armor by Medieval standards.

yes and now.
it would be light compared to what heavy cavalry wore, but not compared to what infantry wore.
Most important thing, that was a reasonable compromise granting some degree of mobility to the troops and at the same time granting them protection from missiles.
And my point is, rudimental defence as it was, the ottomans did not have it

3) The Ottomans invented musketry tactics, so I daresay that the only difference is including pikemen.

We're coming back to this argument again and again.
We obviously have very different views on this matter.
Let's try for a moment to adopt your view: how come that ALL our sources, western and eastern alike, agree on the fact that they had few hand guns, of inferior quality, and used them quite poorly? That the Topkapi registers report that the empire tried to buy guns in the west in any occasion, but we have no news of any western power trying to do the reverse? That the same registers report that elite units tended to use european equipment? That both eastern and western fonts reports a preponderance of bows in the turkish army?
In the nut of the thing, how come that ottoman gunfire caused no decisive advantage in any battle of the time, while or documents report firepower provided the decisive advantage to western armies, expecialy against the ottomans?

 

[Laurentia]

Over extending isn't going to provoke a crusade. Especially not in the midst of the Reformation. Like it's already said in this thread, many of the German Princes, especially the Protestant ones were more fearful of Charles V and the Turk. François I certainly had no problem allying with the Ottomans either and would've been glad to see Vienna sacked. Likewise, a century later Louis XIV totally ignored when Vienna was besieged a second time, and actually used to the occasion to increase his influence along the Rhine.

The Ottomans had no problems ruling Hungary directly either, really. So I don't see how pieces of Austria would tip things. It was Hungary that seriously overextended them in Europe anyways, they would've been better off supporting and propping up Zapolya in Hungary as their vassal. They could similarly set up someone as a vassal in Austria.

I didn't say it would cause a Crusader. Merely that the empire would begin to overextend itself severely.

 

[Awilla the Hun]

What I was arguing was not that the Europeans had large professional armies (although the Spanish were getting close with... their army of Flanders, I think it was), but that AHP is overestimating some of the Ottoman advantages over the Europeans: for example, morale, and weaponry, were more closely matched than he seems to think. However, the Ottomans had more resources, superb engineering, and better logistics, as well as their crack Janissaries (although some of their opponents also had good morale and weapons), which enabled them to defeat their enemies.

Now I'm getting out of this one. And I can't help but think that "He knows things" is going to be the death of me some day, in some debate in the future...

 

[Snake Featherston]

I really dont know, i know jack about that period of Japanese history.

\

Well, the Spanish Army of that time totaled 30,000. That was the size of *individual armies* by *both sides* of the Japanese Unification War. Armies wielding muskets and pikes. The gap between Japan and the petty-states of the Early Modern period is quite profound.

!
Actually Ashigaru fusiliers were a significantly lesser fraction, and, mostlimportant thing, they weren't trained to use thier musquets to produce a fire concentration.
But with the proper training, they could (and indeed, they did)

And the armies of those wars could individually match the entirety of the largest European army. So again, Japan of that time must be a military superpower.

We're coming back to this argument again and again.
We obviously have very different views on this matter.
Let's try for a moment to adopt your view: how come that ALL our sources, western and eastern alike, agree on the fact that they had few hand guns, of inferior quality, and used them quite poorly? That the Topkapi registers report that the empire tried to buy guns in the west in any occasion, but we have no news of any western power trying to do the reverse? That the same registers report that elite units tended to use european equipment? That both eastern and western fonts reports a preponderance of bows in the turkish army?
In the nut of the thing, how come that ottoman gunfire caused no decisive advantage in any battle of the time, while or documents report firepower provided the decisive advantage to western armies, expecialy against the ottomans?

I thought your sources said they had *few artillery pieces* of inferior quality, not muskets. And as to why these sources do not exist, I can offer a simple example of how that might be. The Axis-Soviet War, a decisive victory for the Soviet Union, written by the losers was turned into Germans overwhelmed by a faceless horde without too many details of what the Soviets did. Asking why people would never attribute anything superior to the enemy in wartime propaganda is a strange question, particularly in the 1400s and 1500s.

 

[mailinutile2]

\
I thought your sources said they had *few artillery pieces* of inferior quality, not muskets.

Artillery pieces were few and had scarce range, while, in origin, arquebuses were just few and poorly handled, but they become progressively worse (in the sense of "not of the same level of the ones produced in the west") during the 16th century (see later).

A cannon is a big, hard thing, and often it survives a battle pretty unscathed (if does not crack). Good cannon captured were usually re-used, but bad ones (and according to letters, most of captured ottoman ones were so) and were usually melted when captured, to recuperate the metal. But after a battle, captured arquebused they were usually in pretty bad conditions (in the hurly-burly of combat there are many unhortodox ways a long piece of wood and metal could be used), and since there was no sense in melting them down (there's no much metal to recuperate), they were usually thrown away.

The problem for artillery was meanly in the weapons itself, while hand gunnery problems relied more in the scarce training of the handlers to produce a fire concentration.
But in the eye of the Vizier reading the bad report, it is not so easy to make the distintion between the quality of the weapon and the handling of it. The net results is that, seeing how much more effective was european musketry, most ottomans thought "this franks [westerns] must have exceptional arquibuses, since they are able to cause such an effect".
Thus, anybody rich or important enough pushed to be equipped with items coming from the west. As you could imagine, this did not help to increase the quality of home-made hand guns.
With the time, things worsened, since metallurgy improved faster in the west than in the empire, and hand guns become also worse per se respect to the european ones (less reliable, less range, slower to recharge).

The empire attempte to patch thing buying foreign weapon, but the solution was not effective, since trade was not enough to equip more than a few privileged units.
A second reason (most probably, the root problem) for than not being effective is the fact proper training (i.e. training aimed at maximizing fire concentration, speed up reloading, coordinate with pikemen or their equivalents) was not implemented

In definitive, the ottoman army was lacking both artillery and in small arms but the small-arm problem was perceived as the most problematic.
As I told, the point of a battle for most of the fighters was taking spoils, and for this reason even naval battles (which today we summarize as "sink the other ship", thus "use the big gun") were actually decided by musketry of the boarding/boarded troops, thus the importance of not having good handguns/not being able to handle them properly (the distinction was probably difficult to make in the head of the soldiers themselves) was considered more crucial than the artillery problem.

\And as to why these sources do not exist, I can offer a simple example of how that might be. The Axis-Soviet War, a decisive victory for the Soviet Union, written by the losers was turned into Germans overwhelmed by a faceless horde without too many details of what the Soviets did. Asking why people would never attribute anything superior to the enemy in wartime propaganda is a strange question, particularly in the 1400s and 1500s.

If you think that Pasha and Viziers (of which we have letters deploring the scarce quality of both cannons and hand guns), had in fact been suborned by enemies to spread propaganda, then I must conclude that the western spies were much more active then I have thought.
Especially since the same spies must also have altered the Topkapi registers which show the costant buying of european weapons by the empire, and the difference in equipment between elite units (few, overpaid, partly equipped with european weapons) and second-rate units (many, cheaper, equipped with items from the empire).
I do not exclude that some of those complaints could have other reasons as well (an attempt to sink a rival in the Divan, a pasha unable to accept the fact that the battle was lost because he was a poor general, even simply the writer being in a bad mood), but there is no doubt that the problem existed.

 

[Snake Featherston]

Artillery pieces were few and had scarce range, while, in origin, arquebuses were just few and poorly handled, but they become progressively worse (in the sense of "not of the same level of the ones produced in the west") during the 16th century (see later).

A cannon is a big, hard thing, and often it survives a battle pretty unscathed (if does not crack). Good cannon captured were usually re-used, but bad ones (and according to letters, most of captured ottoman ones were so) and were usually melted when captured, to recuperate the metal. But after a battle, captured arquebused they were usually in pretty bad conditions (in the hurly-burly of combat there are many unhortodox ways a long piece of wood and metal could be used), and since there was no sense in melting them down (there's no much metal to recuperate), they were usually thrown away.

The problem for artillery was meanly in the weapons itself, while hand gunnery problems relied more in the scarce training of the handlers to produce a fire concentration.
But in the eye of the Vizier reading the bad report, it is not so easy to make the distintion between the quality of the weapon and the handling of it. The net results is that, seeing how much more effective was european musketry, most ottomans thought "this franks [westerns] must have exceptional arquibuses, since they are able to cause such an effect".
Thus, anybody rich or important enough pushed to be equipped with items coming from the west. As you could imagine, this did not help to increase the quality of home-made hand guns.
With the time, things worsened, since metallurgy improved faster in the west than in the empire, and hand guns become also worse per se respect to the european ones (less reliable, less range, slower to recharge).

The empire attempte to patch thing buying foreign weapon, but the solution was not effective, since trade was not enough to equip more than a few privileged units.
A second reason (most probably, the root problem) for than not being effective is the fact proper training (i.e. training aimed at maximizing fire concentration, speed up reloading, coordinate with pikemen or their equivalents) was not implemented

In definitive, the ottoman army was lacking both artillery and in small arms but the small-arm problem was perceived as the most problematic.
As I told, the point of a battle for most of the fighters was taking spoils, and for this reason even naval battles (which today we summarize as "sink the other ship", thus "use the big gun") were actually decided by musketry of the boarding/boarded troops, thus the importance of not having good handguns/not being able to handle them properly (the distinction was probably difficult to make in the head of the soldiers themselves) was considered more crucial than the artillery problem.

And Japan, able to wield individual armies of arqebus and naginata-users larger than the largest European army by this standard must have been the world's most powerful nation in the Wars of Unification.

If you think that Pasha and Viziers (of which we have letters deploring the scarce quality of both cannons and hand guns), had in fact been suborned by enemies to spread propaganda, then I must conclude that the western spies were much more active then I have thought.
Especially since the same spies must also have altered the Topkapi registers which show the costant buying of european weapons by the empire, and the difference in equipment between elite units (few, overpaid, partly equipped with european weapons) and second-rate units (many, cheaper, equipped with items from the empire).
I do not exclude that some of those complaints could have other reasons as well (an attempt to sink a rival in the Divan, a pasha unable to accept the fact that the battle was lost because he was a poor general, even simply the writer being in a bad mood), but there is no doubt that the problem existed.

And if equipment was everything, Imperial Japan in 1942 would have been stopped in Malaya and the Philippines.

 

[mailinutile2]

Of course equipment is not all.
Your example is very cogent since what the Ashigaru fusiliers of contemporary (i.e. 1500-ish) japan lacked was proper training to achieve firepower concentration.
Which is something ottoman troops lacked, too: in fact this one of he most problematic issues of their infantry

 

[Burton K Wheeler]

So nothing then. Thanks thats all I needed to know.

If somebody takes the time and effort to actually respond to your question, it's better to either respond in kind or ignore them rather than to be obnoxious.

It's always amusing when people act obnoxious when the people they're arguing with are most likely asleep or not online.

You can stop being obnoxious too.

 

[Burton K Wheeler]

And Japan, able to wield individual armies of arqebus and naginata-users larger than the largest European army by this standard must have been the world's most powerful nation in the Wars of Unification.




And if equipment was everything, Imperial Japan in 1942 would have been stopped in Malaya and the Philippines.

This has nothing to do with the topic of Ottoman conquests and your giant line-by-line nitpicky posts add absolutely nothing to the topic. You need to stop treating threads like a contest that must be won at all costs.

 

[HeavyWeaponsGuy]

This has nothing to do with the topic of Ottoman conquests and your giant line-by-line nitpicky posts add absolutely nothing to the topic. You need to stop treating threads like a contest that must be won at all costs.

Well someone had to say it, too bad it took a damn moderator to do it.