I have no idea what you're talking about. The Ottomans were not fighting in the style of 1300 during Suleyman's reign. The Ottoman command system was totally superior to the West's at this time, and the Ottomans were the most heavily gunpowder-armed army in Europe. They had an artillery arm that was well-trained and produced fine quality weapons - the monster cannon tended to be melted down if captured because they were too big to transport and supply without the central Ottoman administrative system and logistical train.
I'm not sure why you keep returning to Lepanto, a sea battle. The Ottomans were hobbled by a political decision, to have the two wings of the fleet commanded by rival admirals that hated each other and refused to cooperate, plus the presence of the Venetian floating fortresses. It has nothing to do with artillery or proficiency in field battles. And that's one single loss among a very long string of naval victories.
What is your theory as to why there was not one single significant field battle between a Western Army and the Ottomans between Mohacs and Second Vienna - a period of 157 years? Because nobody would engage them in battle because they knew they would be destroyed.
I am returning to Lepanto because it was the only battle between infantry forces between the Ottomans and the West powers, and even if it was fought on boat decks, it was a land battle, not a naval one as we intend the term.
The fact that there was no other significant battle works two way: it also mean sthat the Ottomans did not like the risk of it because they were aware of their infantry and artillery problems, and preferred cavalry raids (wisely, since they had an edge on light cavalry).
I'm sorry to say that we have multiple sources, expecially among Venetian and Genoan letters complaninig about the low quality of the captured ottoman artillery, and wailing on the expense for melting them down (they were merchant at heart, after all); on the other hand we hake the Topkapi documents that show how eager Ottomans were to buy guns from the west and how the most important units (kapudan pasha galleys, 1st jannisseries corp, palace guards) tried to be equipped with them, while the other had to settle for 2nd-rate armaments from the empire (let me notice that we do not have a single case of a european state willing to buy guns from the empire).
The same applies for the command chain, which was quite well infiltrated by Venice services and the
Nunziature reports often it was quite a mess.
Again, all our sources (relations, letters, even miniatures) agree on the Ottoman being extremely poor in the handgun deparment (I'm sorry to say again "Lepanto", but that's the reason for its outcome), a significant fraction of them (vitrually all the timarites, and a significat fraction of the jannissaries) preferring bows even in late 16th century (when virtually there were none in the western armies), and having a body protection at most consisting in leather jacket (while most of western soldiers had studded or mail ones), which would be ok to protect against a bow, but not against an arquebuse.
The same fonts describe their way of fighting, and they were not using neither a pike square nor the pike-and-arqubuse formation, whith the result that they were neither able to hold defensively the ground against a larger attacking force, nor to produce fire concentration able to shake an unshaken unit (and also made them vulnerable to volleys).
No one is questioning their individual bravery, but they were fighting with methods which had been surpassed by 200 years.
If they had improved, instead of sticking to them, things would surely have been different
PS: on the no-alcol-consumption thing: please notice that virtually all the jannissaries were bektashi (and quite famed for going roaring drunk, too), 3/5 of the fleet was christian orthodox and 1/3 of the timarites was ortodox or catholic.