Back on track- I think the result would be...
...no divided Korea, a larger Japan, and a China that is taken over by the Communists anyway. Longer term, there are fewer impediments to Soviet-Japanese trade and diplomacy.
This is partly in response to Sift Green's plea to keep the thread on track:
Your quibble is noted, but their is enough evidence for both sides of that argument that brining it up again will simply derail the thread from its intended topic. You believe the evidence shows that the Soviet Invasion was more important. I and many others believe that the evidence shows the atomic bombings were more important. You have probably seen all the evidence for both sides, and you opinion will probably not change if that debate is rehashed here.
On primary attribution of surrender to the Bomb, I've heard the argument from Frank's downfall and Sadao Asada.
So lets not bring it up again and focus on what the Opening Post asked us about: If Japan surrenders before the U.S.S.R. has a chance to get in on the action, how does that change post war East Asia and the world?
Okay- getting back to it, undivided, noncommunist Korea is most likely (though there's a tiny chance for an communist movement to take power in the whole country through guerrilla warfare and uprisings).
But the changes in Manchuria will still only be likely to delay final communist success in China a bit, not prevent it.
Chiang Kaishek/Jiang Jieshi had to reoccupy an enormous amount of territory, and would have been unlikely to be be able to fix and destroy Chinese Communist pockets even if his Nationalists got control of more Manchurian cities and railways and factories in 1945. Chiang's forces, legitimacy and capabilities were just stretched too thin after the war, and a failure to permanently reduce communist pockets in north and central China, and new ones in the Manchurian countryside, will be followed by the ChiComs eventually gaining the strength and initiative to defeat his armies while the economy is ravaged by inflation.
It was easier to find Tom Billings' rationale for a similar outcome in China than what I've written in the past
"Tom Billings
3/14/00
In article <Pine.GSO.4.21.0003140035270.28618-100000@gemini>, Mike Ralls
<mra...@willamette.edu> wrote:
> POD: The US A-bomb program does a little better than in OTL, but only a
> little. The bomb is ready by the middle of May and is dropped on June
> 1st. The Japanese don't surrender, and another one is dropped. This
> finally makes them surrender, and WWII ends in June.
> Now, because this surrender comes so quickly after the fall of Germany,
> the USSR has not had time to ship it's troops across Siberia and prepare
> to invade Manchuria. What are the results of this?
> Well, the biggest change is going to be a united Korea under American
> influence. How does the Cold War go without Korea? How does Korea
> develop without the threat to the North and the devestation of the war?
There may still be some sort of coalition government
including the Kim factions, but that would collapse
pretty quickly. After about 1947, I'd expect Kim Il Sung
to be leading a small guerilla war from the manchurian
side of the border, where the countryside belongs to a
weaker CCP. If the financial collapse of the ROC still takes
place, then there will be a CCP in power in Manchuria
within 1-2 years of OTL's 1949. That would be the signal
for an expansion of the guerilla war, through easing Kim's
logistical problems. The best that could be hoped for would
be a 3-6 year flare-up and suppresion of this activity.
That would _still_ leave Korea far less battered, more prosperous
and more populous than in OTL. It would also leave it strongly
anti-communist. The PRC would have to keep a stronger
force on the Korean border from the late 1950s onwards. This
external concern would inhibit Mao from engaging in particularly
gross escapades that weaken the PRC as a whole, in favor of his
position in CCP politics. It is probable that we'd see fewer of the
campaigns that swept so many technical people into the LaoGai
after the 'Hundred Flowers' period, much less the inanity of
the Great Leap Forwards.
> Also, when the Soviets invaded Manchuria, they gave lots of goodies to the
> Communists. Without this, and with the Nationalists instead firmly in
> control of Manchuria, with all of that extra industry, how will the
> Chinese Civil War go?
A delay of at most 1-2 years in a CCP/PLA vicytory,
if the Nationalists still sink into insolvency as IOTL
> Also, Japan will likely have had less damage than in OTL, having been
> spared months of fire-bombing. Effects?
Firebombing started in March of 1945, so substantial damage
has been done by June, though some of the minor industrial
areas may be spared that were burned in July IOTL. Major effect
of a lack of a "Korea Boom" in 1950-53 would change the Japanese
economy in the short run. There will be fewer large industrial
steel and heavy industry concerns that were revived by the
Korean War logistical purchases, and more small companies. In
general an economy that will be healthier in the long run, if a bit
less glamorous during the 1970s and 1980s.
There will be less of the willing cooperation between the US and
older japanese politicians who were complicit in pre-war and
wartime japanese policies. That works for their socialist party,
which _may_ mean an economy less market-oriented than IOTL,
with worse econmic results.
One long term major change would be the faster growth and
development of the Korean economy, as a major competitor
to japanese firms in exports. This will begin to become evident
about 20 years after competent pro-market policies start being
followed, after any coalition with the communists breaks down.
1965-70?
Outside northeast Asia, there would be the Vietnam conflict,
without LBJ's paranoia about PLA intervention. Thus, we might
see the lifeline of shipping into N. Vietnam's ports snipped as early
as 1964. Bui Tinh, Giap's logistician, has stated, since he moved to
Paris, that this would have been decisive. Indeed, the casualty rates
in S. Vietnam dropped 10 to 1 in the 6 months after mines and a
general shipping interdiction were imposed in May of 1972 IOTL.
With this result in1961-4, instead of 1972, I doubt we would see
major US ground combat units in S. Vietnam. The needed logistical
support for the PAVN simply wouldn't let the North operate even
regimantal-sized assaults, as happened IOTL from September
of 1964 onwards. Indeed, since 95 percent of the NLF suppies
for their guerila forces came from the North, those operations
would be deeply restricted. The ARVN's 1964 strategy was
sufficient to such a weakened foe.
In US politics, we _might_ get Truman re-elected in 1952. The ability
to keep a democratic majority in Congress might also be available
to him. That would mean no amendment limiting the number of
terms a President could have. While this might be good for stability
during the Cold War, the longer term consequences could be damaging
to democracy. What might 16 years (1957-73) of LBJ have done to us?
Regards,
Tom Billings"