What if Germany went for a negotiated peace in late 1916?

[Pericles]

It seems that in late 1916, Germany realised it could not win the war militarily-rememerbing that events like the Russian Revolution were not yet foreseeable-and so it faced a choice between either a negotiated peace or taking extreme measures to win the war and achieve its war aims. The problem with unrestricted subrmarine warfare is even at the time, this would foreseeably bring about US entry into the war and that could easily lead Britain to fight on until Germany faced overwhelming force and resources, let alone that it was not effective as thought. Bethmann-Hollweg was a leading advocate against this policy and argued for a negotiated peace.

What if the German goverment feared losing the war more than they wanted to win it outright? Wilson at this point was offering a negotiated peace and the Allies were not in a great position either, but it is unclear if German demands would have been moderate enough to bring about a peace. Bethmann-Hollweg envisioned an independent Poland (from only the Russian parts of it), German controlled-Lithuania (but still Russian losses are nowhere near Brest-Litovsk), restoration of the German colonies with the addition of the Belgian Congo, Austria-Hungary controlling the Balkans, though France and Belgium would not lose any territory or independence. It would not have involved reparations and war guilt, and many of Germany's Septemberprogramm goals would not have been implemted.

If so, would this have been a pause to the conflict or could peace have lasted reasonably long? Everybody presumably would be unhappy from failing to achieve their goals and want revenge for the huge losses they already suffered, but also would have been exhausted by war and fear another pointless repeat of it. While losing isn't essential to produce extremism and revanchism, not experiencing humiliation would have also reduced the risk of countries trying to reverse the results with another war. Depending on the timetable, how would this have affected events in Russia? More broadly, what do you think the implications of this would have been?

I will admit that plenty of other posters will have a more detailed knowledge of WWI than I do and hopefully you'll give your thoughts.

 

[lukedalton]

The problem is always the same: why the Entente will accept this? It make Germany and the rest of the CP get out of the conflict with a nice booty and his enemies very bloodied and with part of their territory razed (Belgium, Russia and North France)

 

[ArtosStark]

Morale in the Entente Armies was high in late 1916. And support at home was generally pretty high for “finishing the job”. I doubt a compromise is possible.

 

[Aphrodite]

Morale in the Entente Armies was high in late 1916. And support at home was generally pretty high for “finishing the job”. I doubt a compromise is possible.

Of course it was. The Entente knew that with supplies rolling in from America and the blockade bringing the German economy to ruins, it was only a matter of time before the Central Powers collapsed

The Germans are so desperate that they roll the dice with USW hoping to win before the Americans arrived.

Only the Russian Revolution spared Germany from collapse in 1917

 

[Fehérvári]

The only peace the Entente would perhaps be willing to accept at this point would be peace according to status quo ante bellum. That would be a pill very hard to swallow for the Germans.

 

[Erzherzog_Karl]

The Entente rejected in OTL every attempt at a peace negotiation, which were made by the Central Powers, chief among them Germany, more than once. As Fehervari stated, only an open declaration of status quo ante bellum being the basis of the peace negotiations would have even the chance of getting the warmongering Entente to the table, and even that is unlikely. Their war goals can only be achieved by a victory, from the massive land grabs by Italy to the ill-defined destruction of Prussian militarism.

 

[Disraeli's Ghost]

warmongering Entente

???? Stupid Entente, how dare they not trade away Belgian independence and Northern France for the sake of peace.

It seems that in late 1916, Germany realised it could not win the war militarily

Unfortunately, the Germans would have needed to make the logical step from this realisation (i.e. they were not in a position to be demanding anything) for a compromise peace to have been possible.
The Entente had the advantage in a long war. A compromise peace in Germany's favour in late 1916, as you allude to, requires Wilson cutting off the Entente's access to credit. But even then, as has been discussed many times on this board, the Entente had numerous other (if very painful) options.

but also would have been exhausted by war and fear another pointless repeat of it

Even in 1917 German leaders were openly talking about a peace that set them up for the 'next war'. I'm not sure a compromise on their terms satiates them. Granted Germany isn't a military dictatorship yet, and Bethmann would have probably held this 'never again' view. But there would still be a serious militarist party in the Reich.

 

[RedSword12]

Even in 1917 German leaders were openly talking about a peace that set them up for the 'next war'.

That is how everyone thought in those days. War was the norm, not an aberration like we think of it today. A peace bargain that leaves you vulnerable in the event of war would be considered a bad deal.

 

[Disraeli's Ghost]

War was the norm, not an aberration like we think of it today. A peace bargain that leaves you vulnerable in the event of war would be considered a bad deal.

A general European war was still an aberration. There's a difference between wanting to end the war decisively on your terms, and wanting to end it on the basis that it left you in a better position to restart it at a future date. Germany leaving Belgium did not leave them vulnerable, it just left them unable to threaten Paris or Dover.

 

[CaptainCalvert]

I can't see restoration of the colonies ever being a starter. Even if the Entente had been less willing to fight they would (quite reasonably) view them as part of the compensation for war damages or the first part of punishment for starting the war.
Also, the USA is about the only neutral power with enough authority to oversee a negotiated peace, so their idea of fairness and acceptability needs to be factored in.

 

[RedSword12]

A general European war was still an aberration. There's a difference between wanting to end the war decisively on your terms, and wanting to end it on the basis that it left you in a better position to restart it at a future date.

Ending a war on a basis that leaves you in a better position to fight it again in the future is the kind of bargain every side would want in a hypothetical peace.

Germany leaving Belgium did not leave them vulnerable, it just left them unable to threaten Paris or Dover.

That inability to threaten Paris or Dover, heck even Moscow is exactly the kind of strategic vulnerability that Germany was dealing with. They would most likely lose in a protracted war. By comparison, Britain would most likely lose if it lost its naval supremacy, and France would most likely lose without the buffer of Belgium to protect its northern flank. Not being able to win a war quickly was to Germany what losing naval supremacy would be to Britain or a pro-Germany Belgium would be to France: a good setup for defeat. Now, I get the argument that Germany should just not have gotten itself into wars it could not win, and I agree with it, but the general view of the day held that war was likely, and that as such countries should set themselves up as best as possible to win when not if another broke out. Getting a deal that would be produce favorable circumstances even if war broke out again was not warmongering. It was what everyone wanted, and for good reason.

 

[Disraeli's Ghost]

That inability to threaten Paris or Dover, heck even Moscow is exactly the kind of strategic vulnerability that Germany was dealing with. They would most likely lose in a protracted war. By comparison, Britain would most likely lose if it lost its naval supremacy, and France would most likely lose without the buffer of Belgium to protect its northern flank. Not being able to win a war quickly was to Germany what losing naval supremacy would be to Britain or a pro-Germany Belgium would be to France: a good setup for defeat. Now, I get the argument that Germany should just not have gotten itself into wars it could not win, and I agree with it, but the general view of the day held that war was likely, and that as such countries should set themselves up as best as possible to win when not if another broke out. Getting a deal that would be produce favorable circumstances even if war broke out again was not warmongering. It was what everyone wanted, and for good reason.

I agree with much of what you say. My quibble is that there is a difference between the German militarist clique of Ludendorff & co, that thought any 'compromise' peace had to set them up to restart the war at the time of their choosing, and the Entente. Whilst the Entente undoubtedly wanted major territorial gains, I have never read of any serious Entente statesman believing peace was just about positioning themselves for the next inevitable struggle for supremacy. Even staunch war advocates like Clemenceau wanted to win decisively not to set them up for the next war, but to deter Germany from starting another one.

I'll admit my view here is heavily skewed by my view that the Entente were in the right during the conflict, and that there was no justification for Germany to demand an occupation of Belgium, other than illegal military conquest.

 

[Pericles]

Could any compromise have been reached? The demands I mentioned could have been an opening bid rather than all being bottom lines, though Germany would most want to make gains in the East. Specific peace offers coming out could hurt Allied morale but also might lead to too much of a backlash with the German public and troops.

 

[RedSword12]

Whilst the Entente undoubtedly wanted major territorial gains, I have never read of any serious Entente statesman believing peace was just about positioning themselves for the next inevitable struggle for supremacy. Even staunch war advocates like Clemenceau wanted to win decisively not to set them up for the next war, but to deter Germany from starting another one.

Well, take the provision in the Treaty of Versailles which barred Germany from conscription. That part was designed to ensure Germany would not have a trained manpower reserve to fall back on in the next war, which the French assumed would be prolonged. In the event, they were correct; Germany's reserve of fully trained soldiers ran dry in late 1941, and the Wehrmacht never regained the edge it had that June. All they had left was the survivors of the previous campaigns, and replacements whose training was rushed. As to the view of Entente leaders, Ferdinand Foch's famous quote, "This is a truce for twenty years," comes to mind. It was not considered unthinkable that there would be another war in the future.

 

[Ukrainian Victory]

The only peace the Entente would perhaps be willing to accept at this point would be peace according to status quo ante bellum. That would be a pill very hard to swallow for the Germans.

To be honest, I doubt that this would be enough. The Entente wanted to rearrange the map of Europe along national/ethnic lines, and a status quo ante bellum would not allow that. Plus, what would the huge sacrifices of World War I all going to be for if the war is just going to end with a status quo ante bellum peace in 2.5 years?

 

[Ukrainian Victory]

The Entente rejected in OTL every attempt at a peace negotiation, which were made by the Central Powers, chief among them Germany, more than once. As Fehervari stated, only an open declaration of status quo ante bellum being the basis of the peace negotiations would have even the chance of getting the warmongering Entente to the table, and even that is unlikely. Their war goals can only be achieved by a victory, from the massive land grabs by Italy to the ill-defined destruction of Prussian militarism.

Worth pointing out that the Entente believed that the Central Powers were sitting on a lot of territory that did not rightfully belong to them:

 

[Garrison]

Could any compromise have been reached? The demands I mentioned could have been an opening bid rather than all being bottom lines, though Germany would most want to make gains in the East. Specific peace offers coming out could hurt Allied morale but also might lead to too much of a backlash with the German public and troops.

Such compromise peace ideas always fail for the same reason, each side only wants to negotiate when they have the upper hand or are sufficiently desperate to be willing to make concessions. In the first case the party thinks they can win so why compromise? In the latter the other side thinks they are going to win so why compromise?

To be honest, I doubt that this would be enough. The Entente wanted to rearrange the map of Europe along national/ethnic lines, and a status quo ante bellum would not allow that. Plus, what would the huge sacrifices of World War I all going to be for if the war is just going to end with a status quo ante bellum peace in 2.5 years?

That was purely post war, during the war itself they just wanted to you know have the country that conquered neutral Belgium and ravaged large parts of France defeated and made to pay. I realize many seem to find the idea that Germany be held to account for its actions unacceptable, but any peace that leaves them retaining their gains and weakening their neighbours is a bad peace.

 

[ArtosStark]

Of course it was. The Entente knew that with supplies rolling in from America and the blockade bringing the German economy to ruins, it was only a matter of time before the Central Powers collapsed

The Germans are so desperate that they roll the dice with USW hoping to win before the Americans arrived.

Only the Russian Revolution spared Germany from collapse in 1917

Well, yes, but those tended to come more to the fore in 1917. In 1916 there were actually serious questions as to the tightness of the blockade and the US was trying to influence a peace by tightening up the flow of capital. It was actually the situation on the ground that had people confident.

In 1916 the French felt they had won a hard fought victory at Verdun. They had taken the worst the German Army could throw at them and not only held out, but bled the Germans white. It was a little over optimistic but not totally untrue.

Meanwhile, the British, who had been a tiny part of the military picture in 1914, and of dubious utility in 1915, had shown themselves to be a peer opponent to the Germans. They had dealt severe body blows to the Germans while showcasing ability on par with the German and French armies. Again, over optimistic but not totally wrong.

 

[Ukrainian Victory]

That was purely post war, during the war itself they just wanted to you know have the country that conquered neutral Belgium and ravaged large parts of France defeated and made to pay. I realize many seem to find the idea that Germany be held to account for its actions unacceptable, but any peace that leaves them retaining their gains and weakening their neighbours is a bad peace.

They had already made various promises to the Italians, to the Serbs, to the Romanians, to the Arabs.

 

[Erzherzog_Karl]

???? Stupid Entente, how dare they not trade away Belgian independence and Northern France for the sake of peace.

Ah, the double standard...it is fine for the Entente to hold Central Power territory before peace negotiations but not for the other side...thanks for revealing your absolute bias. If one side is willing to start peace negotiations and the other is not, the unwilling side has to face charges of being warmongers.

Worth pointing out that the Entente believed that the Central Powers were sitting on a lot of territory that did not rightfully belong to them:

...are you really trying to play the nationality card from the side of the three biggest empires at the time? Like seriously? 0o

The British Empire, the French Republic and the Russian Empire all hold more "land that did not rightfully belong to them" than all of the central powers combined by the standard your map establishes, regardless how worthless I consider this standard to be.

Ignoring how I find this argument absolutely worthless, how do you assess that land does not rightfully belong to them? Multi-ethnic states exist and are not inherently wrong.