what if Germany captured Leningrad?

[DrakonFin]

If Leningrad falls the Finns and Germans will cut the Murmansk Railway in early 1942, pretty much shutting down the Northern route for Lend Lease until late 1943 when the capacity upgrades for Arkhangelsk are completed. Large formations of Germans are freed up for duty elsewhere, which probably will prove decisive for Case Blau.

I don't think the Finns and Germans cutting the Murmansk railway or, especially, capturing Murmansk in early 1942 is likely. Time and resources will be needed to put the captured Leningrad area into order, for one thing. While the city and its port may become a boon for German logistics later in 1942, in the first months after its capture there will be a lot of damage to the infrastructure from the fighting, and from likely Soviet sabotage. It is likely that the Soviets have also sunk some of the bigger ships to block various strategic points in the seaways around the city, etc. The eastern Gulf of Finland will need minesweeping to be used safely. The Baltic Sea will be iced up from January to late April, and no ship traffic north of Gotland will be possible without icebreaker assistance - the winter of 41-42 was pretty dire, all in all.

The Finnish Army will be tired and spent after the 1941 attack. The whole country is short of food and supplies as it is, and bringing in more will be difficult due to the winter conditions, even with German assistance (the Germans have precious few icebreakers: IOTL if was the Finnish icebreakers that had to help the Germans even in the southern Baltic during that winter). Even on land, the logistics north of the Ladoga would be godawful, especially in the winter, and then immediately after it in the spring. The German troops up north have just recently (during Operation Silver Fox) proven themselves inept at fighting in the northern wilderness conditions, especially in the winter.

All in all, I'd say that the earliest the Finns and Germans can realistically mount a successful attack against the Murmansk railway would be in the summer of 1942. Waiting 5-6 months and building up the logistics, troops and supplies for a new attack in summer conditions would make success up north much more likely.

 

[thaddeus]

I don't think the Finns and Germans cutting the Murmansk railway in early 1942 is likely. Time and resources will be needed to put the captured Leningrad area into order, for one thing. While the city and its port may become a boon for German logistics later in 1942, in the first months after its capture there will be a lot of damage to the infrastructure from the fighting, and from likely Soviet sabotage. It is likely that the Soviets have also sunk some of the bigger ships to block various strategic points in the seaways around the city, etc. The eastern Gulf of Finland will need minesweeping to be used safely. The Baltic Sea will be iced up from January to late April, and no ship traffic north of Gotland will be possible without icebreaker assistance - the winter of 41-42 was pretty dire, all in all.

The Finnish Army will be tired and spent after the 1941 attack. The whole country is short of food and supplies as it is, and bringing in more will be difficult due to the winter conditions, even with German assistance (the Germans have precious few icebreakers: IOTL if was the Finnish icebreakers that had to help the Germans even in the southern Baltic during that winter). Even on land, the logistics north of the Ladoga would be godawful, especially in the winter, and then immediately after it in the spring. The German troops up north have just recently (during Operation Silver Fox) proven themselves inept at fighting in the northern wilderness conditions, especially in the winter.

All in all, I'd say that the earliest the Finns and Germans can realistically mount a successful attack against the Murmansk railway would be in the summer of 1942. Waiting 5-6 months and building up the logistics, troops and supplies for a new attack in summer conditions would make success up north much more likely.

what is the impediment to shelling Murmansk from ships? have been told that is an inappropriate venture (without citation) but my only knowledge of the port is that German ocean liner SS Bremen used it as safe harbor in the early stages of the war, so my assumption it is a deep water port that large ships can approach?

 

[DrakonFin]

what is the impediment to shelling Murmansk from ships? have been told that is an inappropriate venture (without citation) but my only knowledge of the port is that German ocean liner SS Bremen used it as safe harbor in the early stages of the war, so my assumption it is a deep water port that large ships can approach?

It would not be a walk in the park. There was the Soviet Northern Fleet protecting Murmansk and its surroundings, and it also had coastal artillery batteries in the area. Given that very little German naval force was used during the OTL Operation Silver Fox, AFAIK, I don't think the Kriegsmarine had the sort of assets available that they thought could be used advantageously against Murmansk.

 

[Kippari]

I think it was, oddly enough, the Americans that prevented the Finns from cutting the Murmansk railroad at Sorokka by threatening to declare war if Finland pushed onward. Plans had been been drawn already for the operation. I think the chief of general staff of Finnish Defence Forces during the war mentioned that in an interview.

Nevertheless, Murmansk is a different beast altogether. There was simply not enough transport capacity in the arctic for supporting multiple divisions, not to mention a head-on offensive(which the foolhardy Germans had to learn the hard way) and essentially no meaningful beaches on which to land. On the other hand, the city and the rest of the peninsula could be kept supplied easily via the sea. The Murmansk fjord is also quite long and narrow, and also had coastal artillery to defend it from seaborne assault. It just wasn’t feasible.

As for Leningrad, Hitler wanted to raze the metropolis and divide it with Finland, but he also wanted and said many things he could never have followed through. It would have been a gargantuan task anyway, especially during wartime, and undoubtedly it would’ve met resistance within Germany and abroad. I mean, everybody understood the cultural and artistic significance of the city, nazi or not.

 

[DrakonFin]

I think it was, oddly enough, the Americans that prevented the Finns from cutting the Murmansk railroad at Sorokka by threatening to declare war if Finland pushed onward. Plans had been been drawn already for the operation. I think the chief of general staff of Finnish Defence Forces during the war mentioned that in an interview.

To look at the conclusions in this Master's Thesis about the "Sorokka plan" (ie. the plan about a Finnish attack at Belomorsk in the spring of 1942), the writer's assessment is that by concentrating enough troops into the attack, the Finnish forces could have taken their objective. Holding Belomorsk in the long term would have probably been more difficult and required significant German support. The reason the attack was not realized was apparently, in the final accounting, political: Mannerheim not wanting to undermine Finland's position in the eyes of the Allies.

I think it is a good question to ask what the Germans capturing Leningrad would do in terms of Mannerheim's thinking, and that in terms of Ryti's and the rest of the political leadership. One one hand, it might make them believe that Germany can win the war in the east, and thus make them support deeper Finnish involvement in the war against the USSR. On the other hand, the situation might also spook them into thinking that the Allies now see Finns as complicit in what would have been a brutal occupation of the USSR's second city, and thus think that Finland should try to distance itself from Germany and otherwise tread as carefully as possible to deflect as much of the guilt-by-association as it can. I believe the latter view would not be supported by as many current observers as the former, but it would fit the OTL attempt to hold on to the "separate war" thesis as a central point of the Finnish diplomatic efforts towards the Allies, especially the US.

 

[merlin]

As a propaganda tool, Hitler will invite FDR to send US ships to come and collect Russian civilians, to return to the US.

 

[Johnrankins]

As a propaganda tool, Hitler will invite FDR to send US ships to come and collect Russian civilians, to return to the US.

When the Hell did Hitler do anything like that?

 

[thaddeus]

what is the impediment to shelling Murmansk from ships? have been told that is an inappropriate venture (without citation) but my only knowledge of the port is that German ocean liner SS Bremen used it as safe harbor in the early stages of the war, so my assumption it is a deep water port that large ships can approach?

It would not be a walk in the park. There was the Soviet Northern Fleet protecting Murmansk and its surroundings, and it also had coastal artillery batteries in the area. Given that very little German naval force was used during the OTL Operation Silver Fox, AFAIK, I don't think the Kriegsmarine had the sort of assets available that they thought could be used advantageously against Murmansk.

lack of carriers for the KM came back to hurt them? although the RN had little success in the area https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_EF_(1941) with that type of operation (initially)

of course the weapon they eventually used, and equipped the Finns with, was the lightweight Panzerfaust.

 

[thaddeus]

I think it is a good question to ask what the Germans capturing Leningrad would do in terms of Mannerheim's thinking, and that in terms of Ryti's and the rest of the political leadership. One one hand, it might make them believe that Germany can win the war in the east, and thus make them support deeper Finnish involvement in the war against the USSR. On the other hand, the situation might also spook them into thinking that the Allies now see Finns as complicit in what would have been a brutal occupation of the USSR's second city, and thus think that Finland should try to distance itself from Germany and otherwise tread as carefully as possible to deflect as much of the guilt-by-association as it can. I believe the latter view would not be supported by as many current observers as the former, but it would fit the OTL attempt to hold on to the "separate war" thesis as a central point of the Finnish diplomatic efforts towards the Allies, especially the US.

thanks for your thoughtful replies!

I've always thought Mannerheim, considering the hand he was dealt, played about as skillfully as any other leader in WWII. I do think at some point the rush to grab territory for Finland, in an apparent victory scenario would eclipse his cautious approach?

my scenario to eliminate the Soviet Baltic fleet, which they struggled with mixed results to do, along with capture of Leningrad would, in addition to obvious military benefits, intend to increase their influence over Scandinavia.

 

[Clandango]

When the Hell did Hitler do anything like that?

I presume you mean why and not when? Because if it is purely a propoganda tool, sure, why not? It depends on if Hitler has declared war on the US at this point. Of course it would bring into question what reason everyone would think of him sending them to the US. Maybe to make Americans either refuse to take them, and make them look bad to Eastern Europeans, or to make there be Nativist and America First movements against possible Bolshevik agents. That line being propoganda, not what I think. But yah, Hitler can suggest such a thing, but I imagine it would be done in an almost mocking manner. And of course there would first be a purge of members of Communist organizations (which were mandatory for all) and an elimination of any remaining intellectuals. Things sould have to be done carefully to not make Southern Europeans wary of the anti-Communist credentials of the Nazis.

 

[L4a1]

I presume you mean why and not when? Because if it is purely a propoganda tool, sure, why not? It depends on if Hitler has declared war on the US at this point. Of course it would bring into question what reason everyone would think of him sending them to the US. Maybe to make Americans either refuse to take them, and make them look bad to Eastern Europeans, or to make there be Nativist and America First movements against possible Bolshevik agents. That line being propoganda, not what I think. But yah, Hitler can suggest such a thing, but I imagine it would be done in an almost mocking manner. And of course there would first be a purge of members of Communist organizations (which were mandatory for all) and an elimination of any remaining intellectuals. Things sould have to be done carefully to not make Southern Europeans wary of the anti-Communist credentials of the Nazis.

I think he means when. As in when did Hitler do something like this that makes you think he would behave in the manner you have described above.

 

[Karelian]

I've always thought Mannerheim, considering the hand he was dealt, played about as skillfully as any other leader in WWII. I do think at some point the rush to grab territory for Finland, in an apparent victory scenario would eclipse his cautious approach?

I'd say that even then Belomorsk is as far east as he would be willing to extend the Finnish lines. The Finnish mobilization of 1941 (over 600 000 personnel) was absolutely massive considering the 4-million strong total population, and the oldest age classes had to be demobilized as soon as possible in any case.

 

[Clandango]

I think he means when. As in when did Hitler do something like this that makes you think he would behave in the manner you have described above.

He was speaking about someone else's post, so I am not sure if my own relates the most. Anyways, we can look at Paris, which upon capture he decided would be mostly left ictact incase of victory, so that German cities could dwarf them.

 

[knightdepaix]

I've always thought Mannerheim, considering the hand he was dealt, played about as skillfully as any other leader in WWII. I do think at some point the rush to grab territory for Finland, in an apparent victory scenario would eclipse his cautious approach?
my scenario to eliminate the Soviet Baltic fleet, which they struggled with mixed results to do, along with capture of Leningrad would, in addition to obvious military benefits, intend to increase their influence over Scandinavia.

I'd say that even then Belomorsk is as far east as he would be willing to extend the Finnish lines. The Finnish mobilization of 1941 (over 600 000 personnel) was absolutely massive considering the 4-million strong total population, and the oldest age classes had to be demobilized as soon as possible in any case.

Would Mannerheim take advantage of the situation that Germany took Leningrad? When Germany attacked Leningrad, Finland must have been pushing towards the White Sea. The Soviet Union could attempt a separate ceasefire with Finland to put thorns on the German backside in Leningrad. Mannerheim leadership could just make the Soviet Union yielded the Finnish captured lands and thus cut the lines of communication on lands from Murmansk. The Lend-Lense transport would take temporary dip.

German troops would still be push out of the Soviet Union regardless but could Finland secure the captured land by Mannerheim leadership after the war?

 

[thaddeus]

I've always thought Mannerheim, considering the hand he was dealt, played about as skillfully as any other leader in WWII. I do think at some point the rush to grab territory for Finland, in an apparent victory scenario would eclipse his cautious approach?

I'd say that even then Belomorsk is as far east as he would be willing to extend the Finnish lines. The Finnish mobilization of 1941 (over 600 000 personnel) was absolutely massive considering the 4-million strong total population, and the oldest age classes had to be demobilized as soon as possible in any case.

was thinking about two things, not actually involving direct Finnish action.

how much territory Finland might occupy if it had already been cleared of Soviet troops (i.e. more than they would have drawn on the map pre-war)

also Mannerheim was not complete dictator, other foces could come into play?

 

[thaddeus]

a fairly detailed account of Soviet fleet evacuating to Leningrad https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/daily/wwii/the-soviet-dunkirk-the-tallinn-offensive/

to put it mildly it was a "shoestring operation" by German KM. in addition to 15,000 troops that arrived in Leningrad from this operation, an additional 23,000 evacuated from Hanko.

were the troops and naval guns they were able to concentrate in the Leningrad area decisive?

 

[DrakonFin]

I've always thought Mannerheim, considering the hand he was dealt, played about as skillfully as any other leader in WWII. I do think at some point the rush to grab territory for Finland, in an apparent victory scenario would eclipse his cautious approach?

There really was no desire or need for more land. Conquering more land would require more manpower and resources than it would be worth. Finland would have its work cut out for itself to even absorb the OTL gains in the long term. Taking any additional land from the USSR would just add costs and complexity, and it would bring along an even bigger Russian minority the Finns would have to deal with.

Any offensive military operations the Finns commit after the "attack phase" of 1941 would have to be justified not by irredentism, but by political and military strategy: what military action makes the Finnish position stronger vis-a-vis the USSR and Germany, on one hand, and which does not make the Finnish position towards the Western Allies significantly worse?

I'd say that even then Belomorsk is as far east as he would be willing to extend the Finnish lines. The Finnish mobilization of 1941 (over 600 000 personnel) was absolutely massive considering the 4-million strong total population, and the oldest age classes had to be demobilized as soon as possible in any case.

Quite so. Finland in the fall of 1941 was operating at the limits of its societal capacity. Practically, this level of mobilization could not be kept up for long. And then Finland was in material terms dependent on Germany, for food, for fuels, for fertilizer, for armaments. The more Finland is committed on the front, the more there are troops in arms, the more there are women and even children mobilized in military-style or support roles, the more Finland is also politically beholden to Hitler. Naturally, the Finnish government wanted to keep as much of its ability to make independent decisions as was realistic. It wanted to keep itself at arm's length from Berlin to be able to even decline German suggestions/demands on occasion. What the Finnish leadership would not want to do is join themselves to the Nazis at the hip. It would go directly against the Finnish national interests as Mannerheim, Ryti, et al, saw them.

Would Mannerheim take advantage of the situation that Germany took Leningrad? When Germany attacked Leningrad, Finland must have been pushing towards the White Sea. The Soviet Union could attempt a separate ceasefire with Finland to put thorns on the German backside in Leningrad. Mannerheim leadership could just make the Soviet Union yielded the Finnish captured lands and thus cut the lines of communication on lands from Murmansk. The Lend-Lense transport would take temporary dip.

German troops would still be push out of the Soviet Union regardless but could Finland secure the captured land by Mannerheim leadership after the war?

Finland couldn't realistically make a peace with the USSR in 1942. The Germans had a lot of troops in Finland, and they could control Finnish trade. After making a peace with Stalin, Finland would become a battleground itself. Germany would now blockade Finland, and thus the Finns would be dependent on the USSR for food and other necessary goods. After the experience of the Winter War, and the USSR's treatment of Finland after it, there was very little trust towards Stalin in Finland. On balance, less than there was trust towards Hitler.

In practice, especially if the Germans could take Leningrad, this decision to abandon Germany and join hands with the USSR in 1942 would be like escaping a slowly heating up frying pan by jumping into fire.

Even if Finland somehow survived the war, if the USSR in the end pushes the Germans out, in the long term Stalin would most likely not suffer Finland to keep any of the land conquered in league with the Nazis.

 

[ivanotter]

Interesting to see that even this thread has got the usual 'get-out-of-jail' card:

Germany gets nuked - preferable in 1943. Game over - let us all go home.

There is a little problem with this: A bomb will need to be transported - across occupied France and into Germany.

… and a lot of other considerations.

Just a comment

 

[stevej713]

Depending on when the city fell, and how long it took to get the port back in operation this would also improve German logistics. Supply trains, trucks etc starting that much further east would have to help, but WHEN would seem rather important. A major improvement in front line unit supply situations in late '41 would potentially be more important than when the big effort had shifted to Stalingrad and points South anyway...

Another important factor would be how many tanks Army Group North lost to take it. IOTL, Panzer Group 4 was decimated in von Leeb's last-ditch efforts to take the city before they were withdrawn. If the city is taken with fewer losses to PG 4, that would have huge effects on Typhoon.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Another important factor would be how many tanks Army Group North lost to take it. IOTL, Panzer Group 4 was decimated in von Leeb's last-ditch efforts to take the city before they were withdrawn. If the city is taken with fewer losses to PG 4, that would have huge effects on Typhoon.

What were their casualties?