How would history be different and what would it take for France to win Franco-Prussian war? Would it been enough to have Belgium and Luxembourg part of France and thus increase the number of French soldiers? What if Britain,Italy, Austria-Hungary or a post-1815 independent Poland intervened on the side of France? How would a French victory change history both short term and long term?
What if France wins Franco-Prussian war?
- Thread starter Alexander George
- Start date
First, which kind of victory? Napoleon III pulling a Bismarck in Germany seems relatively hard, giving the relatively lesser (while not crushingly inferior) situation of french army logistics and operational capacities. We might end up with a French victory which would be not that much distinct from a de facto stalemate, which would probably make negociations managed trough international (reading British and Austrian, in all likeness) intervention.
Britain would pull a veto on any french troops west of the Rhine, not mentionijg any kind of french client-state, before someone could even end to say "natural bor...."
Anything more than return to 1814 borders and MAYBE Luxembourg and/or an limited extended border in southern Palatinate is definitely out of question for what matters London, which wasn't yet seeing Prussia as a potential threat for themselves. And that would be a maximalist annexation, probably much more reduced ITTL.
Belgium is definitely out of question, safe maybe for a compensation to France not annexing Luxembourg with a return to 1814 borders.
It's worth noting that French état-major or diplomatical corps didn't saw Prussia as an existential threat for France, but would have been fairly content with discrediting it as an international actor, rather than destroying it for shit and giggles.
Black : French border in 1866
Dark blue : French borders in 1814 (First treaty of Paris)
Blue : Luxembourg
Light blue : Regions french état-major and/or diplomatic corps presented interest controlling or annexing
I could see, however, London accepting partial dismembrement of the confederation on the North-West at the benefit of some princes defeated in 1866, but nothing too much benefiting for France.
As for the immediate changes, you'd may see something for German politics and maybe a structural and institutional liberalization of the German Confederation, no (at least in short term) unification with southern German states. But economically and geopolitically, Germany is still going to be a major player in the late XIXth.
In the same time, you'd probably not see the Second Empire falling anytime soon, while the liberalisation tendence it underwent began to weaken it a bit already, Republicanism remaining a popular radical alternative in most urban and industrial centers.
The absence of the leagues and communalist movement in France would have an interesting macro-historical consequences, as no socialist (or rather, semi-socialist) experience of power which would mark international revolutionary movement (anarchist or socialist).
Internationally, you might end up with a less polarized situation : as mentioned above, you didn't have at this point a real French antagonism against Prussia/Germany and while I don't see them being best buddies after the war, you would quickly end up with normalized relations earlier than IOTL (historically the normalisation of relations happened in the late 1890's)
Britain would pull a veto on any french troops west of the Rhine, not mentionijg any kind of french client-state, before someone could even end to say "natural bor...."
Anything more than return to 1814 borders and MAYBE Luxembourg and/or an limited extended border in southern Palatinate is definitely out of question for what matters London, which wasn't yet seeing Prussia as a potential threat for themselves. And that would be a maximalist annexation, probably much more reduced ITTL.
Belgium is definitely out of question, safe maybe for a compensation to France not annexing Luxembourg with a return to 1814 borders.
It's worth noting that French état-major or diplomatical corps didn't saw Prussia as an existential threat for France, but would have been fairly content with discrediting it as an international actor, rather than destroying it for shit and giggles.
Black : French border in 1866
Dark blue : French borders in 1814 (First treaty of Paris)
Blue : Luxembourg
Light blue : Regions french état-major and/or diplomatic corps presented interest controlling or annexing
I could see, however, London accepting partial dismembrement of the confederation on the North-West at the benefit of some princes defeated in 1866, but nothing too much benefiting for France.
As for the immediate changes, you'd may see something for German politics and maybe a structural and institutional liberalization of the German Confederation, no (at least in short term) unification with southern German states. But economically and geopolitically, Germany is still going to be a major player in the late XIXth.
In the same time, you'd probably not see the Second Empire falling anytime soon, while the liberalisation tendence it underwent began to weaken it a bit already, Republicanism remaining a popular radical alternative in most urban and industrial centers.
The absence of the leagues and communalist movement in France would have an interesting macro-historical consequences, as no socialist (or rather, semi-socialist) experience of power which would mark international revolutionary movement (anarchist or socialist).
Internationally, you might end up with a less polarized situation : as mentioned above, you didn't have at this point a real French antagonism against Prussia/Germany and while I don't see them being best buddies after the war, you would quickly end up with normalized relations earlier than IOTL (historically the normalisation of relations happened in the late 1890's)
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I don't know about German unification, but I think France is not allowed to annex anything by other powers.
The French had belatedly woken up to the fact that Prussia would soon finish uniting Germany, after which France would no longer be top dog in Europe. Having missed their best chance to forestall it in 1866, they now went to war when it was too late.
Would have been talking of a stalemate between France and Prussia (which I find, actually, more plausible to happen), I would have agreed.
There, tough, you proposed a French victory over the German alliance, which is significantly different, as French armies can enforce some changes. I wholeheartedly agree that Britain or other powers wouldn't accept any significant annexation, tough.
But giving the geopolitical and geomilitary situation, I also think that they would need to throw France a bone with a (partial?) return to 1814 borders which are a fairly limited expansion : the Luxembourg case is a bit harder since French état-major will likely claim it in the event of a clear French victory but I could see, as advanced above, that giving it to Belgium at the expense of some highlighted above borders cities could be seen as a fair compromise.
The goal of Austria and Britain would be likely to prevent France pulling a munchkin in Germany (not that I think it was possible or even planned IOTL), but as well not to isolate France too much, making it a possible destabilizing element in western Europe : basically, being firm but ready to give some tokens.
In fact, I'd expect the more problematic issue ITTL would be the matter of monetary and financial compensation owed by Prussia.
Well, for Germany, it was about making it the departure point to unify the NGF with the remaining southern German states by taking on France, seen by Bismark and conservative German elites as the main cause and threat for a united Germany.
For France, as @Mikestone8 pointed, it was about realizing that NGF was able and wanted to play an international role. That said, I disagree with him when they say it was an active worry : even at this point, Germany wasn't really seen as an existential threat internationally, and you had a significant reluctance from French état major to go at war for a shady diplomatical issue.
I said nothing about "existential".
The French did not see themselves as in danger - their readiness to attack shows that. What they feared was a loss of status. Up to now they had been the premier military power, having got the better of it against Russia in 1854-6 and against Austria in 1859. But a Germany united under Prussia would be at least their equal if not somewhat ahead. Napoleon III's wishes would no longer be decisive about what happened on the European scene. The cheeky gesture of seeking to put a Hohenzollern on the Spanish throne only served to rub their noses in it. This was what they were trying to reverse - though events would show their opportunity to do so had already passed - probably five years ago.
@Mikestone8
My bad then, it seems I misunderstood your point while we mostly agree there.
My bad then, it seems I misunderstood your point while we mostly agree there.
Saphroneth
Banned
Fortunately the "how" side of things is relatively achievable - first off you need the French to focus on counter-battery fire at long range with their artillery, and second off they need to be a bit better about maintaining a cohesive front. The French doctrine of the day worked incredibly well if it got enough in the way of supplies and didn't get heavily shelled (it basically consisted of good entrenchments and shooting the f*ck out of enemies at several hundred yards with Chassepot fire) and there was a definite tendency in the Prussian Army to duly attack heavily defended positions.
"positions magnifiques" is pretty functional as doctrine goes for the time. It might just have needed better depth to the trenches to work fully.
"positions magnifiques" is pretty functional as doctrine goes for the time. It might just have needed better depth to the trenches to work fully.
Indeed a military stalemate and British diplomatic involvement to bring a compromise peace, based on status quo ante-bellum was more likely to happen than a clear French victory. Gladstone even wanted to do that, but his cabinet was against it. How do you get a stalemate and a peace of the kind I mentioned and what happens with German unification?
What would it take for the war to turn into a stalemate and end in a negociated peace, with no changes in borders? And would there still be a united Germany in 1871 or later?
Have better french manoeuvers prior to the Battle of Sedan, allowing Napoleon III to escape to Paris rather than surrendering. From there, have him command a defensive strategy for grinding down the prussian armies until they are exhausted or until the south german states decide to backstab the prussians.
Speaking of which... what happens to the german states after a french defensive victory? Will the states in the North German Confederation rebel against Prussia?
I think the best thing would have been for Britain to intervene diplomatically and get the two sides to agree to a negociated peace.
Would a bigger France that includes Belgium and Luxembourg, with more soldiers available, be able to win?
France was the aggressor in the Franco-Prussian War, if a stalemate is scored it is a "Prussian victory", not a French one.
Saphroneth
Banned
The "backstab" approach would work to produce something you could call a victory, though.
That might help a bit, but manpower was not really France's problem. The issues were more that the military hadn't kept up with some of the latest reforms and its battle plan was also poor.
(In any event, European history in general is going to be very different if France controls Belgium/Luxembourg, and this conflict might be butterflied away.)
Why they'd "backstab" Prussia when it was just proven that they could quite defend themselvs together. I also fail to see how it could be considered a victory as the french army got defeated in the field, the prussians are entrenched in french territory and the emperor returned to Paris. It isn't going to be as shocking as OTL but it's still going to be highly embarassing.
Saphroneth
Banned
Well, because fighting both France and Austria is quite a different prospect to fighting one.
If they wanted to, that is.
Well, it depends - the French Army hadn't fully mobilized yet during the OTL battles, and they put together some quite large armies post-Gravelotte but were unable to properly train and/or equip them.
Being able to have the new armies work in concert with the old ones would help out a lot, as the Prussians didn't really have a strategic reserve during the period of the Sedan siege and for a while afterwards - and with more French prewar regulars around, they'd be having a harder time prosecuting the siege.
Nowhere it was stated that Austria would join the war, especially a war where the french blundered themselves in and scared the **** out of the south german states. In fact, french tone and poor judgement is exactly what prevented Austria from taking advantage of Prussia in 1870.
It's still a long way from a victory. More like a stalemate that is going to be seen as a huge failure of Napoleon's foreign policy.
France, in 1870, was seen as the clear superior to Prussia. The only way the french could've called that war a success is if they were to decisively beat the prussian army in the field in order to enforce that notion.