What changes could the German leadership have made during and after operation Barbarossa to improve its chance of victory in eastern front

[Remington 2.0]

What changes could the German leadership had made during operation barbarossa and post operation barbarossa in the eastern front to improve its chances of defeating the Soviet Union in ww2?

Example:focus more on destroying the tank and aircraft factories that were not prioritise in OTL and allowed to move further east to support the Soviet war effort latter on in ww2

Evacuation in the Soviet Union - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

 

[The Tai-Pan]

It is such a giant conflict with such deep trends, most choices are just ripples against a tidal wave. Once the Soviets are engaged and determined to hold out, Germany is going to be hard-pressed to win, doubly so with a hostile UK at their backs.

 

[lionhead]

What changes could the German leadership had made during operation barbarossa and post operation barbarossa in the eastern front to improve its chances of defeating the Soviet Union in ww2?

Example:focus more on destroying the tank and aircraft factories that were not prioritise in OTL and allowed to move further east to support the Soviet war effort latter on in ww2

Evacuation in the Soviet Union - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

Barbarossa failed to achieve its goals. Mostly because of the huge underestimation of the Soviets ability to mobilize. Plus the territory they had to cross, plus the weather. Nothing to do with planning really.

Well thye could have been more realistic and planned to fight in the winter, not expect to be behind Moscow before it. But they still have to actually capture it. And then have the steam left to go beyond.

 

[Aghasverov]

Short of shooting Der Fuehrer and aborting the whole fiasco before it began, I'm a little stumped...

 

[Worffan101]

It'd be really, really hard to do better than OTL. The Soviets simply have an immense manpower advantage and have so much land to retreat into (while the Nazis are fighting the weather the whole way) that there's very little to actually be done. Plus, Nazi ideology meant that the occupation was so brutal that they were fighting partisans the whole way in, it was a mess by any standard.

 

[tomo pauk]

It would've required Nazis to become Notzis - IOW, to change it's mindset and handling of the occupied areas. They've managed in OTL to galvanize the peoples in Slavic parts of the SU against themselves, instead against Stalin. That was not shotting themselves in the foot, that was equivalent of sawing off one half of the feet.
Even if they bacame Notzis, unless Germany has some kind of peace with the UK, they are bound to loose.

 

[Monk78]

It would've required Nazis to become Notzis - IOW, to change it's mindset and handling of the occupied areas. They've managed in OTL to galvanize the peoples in Slavic parts of the SU against themselves, instead against Stalin. That was not shotting themselves in the foot, that was equivalent of sawing off one half of the feet.
Even if they bacame Notzis, unless Germany has some kind of peace with the UK, they are bound to loose.

that and maybe realistic goals geographically speaking

 

[Onkel Willie]

What changes could the German leadership had made during operation barbarossa and post operation barbarossa in the eastern front to improve its chances of defeating the Soviet Union in ww2?

Example:focus more on destroying the tank and aircraft factories that were not prioritise in OTL and allowed to move further east to support the Soviet war effort latter on in ww2

Evacuation in the Soviet Union - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

Barbarossa was spectacularly successful, but failed because its goals were unachievable. There was no way the Germans would ever get east of Moscow, never mind reaching the Urals. The best thing to do would've been to establish realistic goals, but that's not happening with Hitler in charge. The best thing for the Germans would've been for Hitler to be assassinated a few months into Barbarossa and Goering settling for Brest-Litovsk 2.0 in the autumn of 1941. That would've left the Germans with a sizeable Eastern European empire and a buffer zone between itself and the surviving USSR. That would only leave the British to deal with if Goering is smart enough to denounce the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

 

[ivanotter]

It is a near impossible thread. But let us try to see if there could be some 'easy' fixes':

- believe the intelligence coming back: Not underestimating tank production is the first one. The next is to not under-rate Soviet tanks. The appearance of T-34 was a nasty surprise - and it should not have been.
- Logistics! Plan for rapid conversion of railways to European width. Build railways! This single point sounds 'tame' but the German railway people actually had the knowledge and bandwidth to make inroads (I found that somewhere - not sure where)
- aim at infra-structure. This is a horrible thing really. Germany did identify the three areas of rapid conquest:
Leningrad = industry
Moscow = transport hub
Stalingrad = oil (Caucasus)
The problem was of course that it was near impossible to do all of it. The aim of capturing and destroying Soviet divisions (and armies) as close to the border as possible was not a bad idea. It worked up to a point as the Soviet forces never managed to stabilise a front. That went out of the window when Germany simply had to take a break.
- Develop the 'Ural Bomber' and bomb the far-away plants.

The key thing is really: which of the three main aims to go for if it is not possible to do all of it?

Was Moscow really the one? Or should we have seen Case Blue in August 1941?

My opinion: go for the oil and Caucasus. It would mean a flank that is exposed, but ...

 

[Oda]

It might be easier if the Germany’s didn’t slaughter and commit war crimes on Ukrainians Russians and the Baltic people but then again it require the nazis to not be nazis
Get USA to be more isolationistic and not give lend lense to ussr will be helpful

 

[HexWargamer]

Make peace with Britain before USA really comes into the war .. and with no blockade import oil from USA. That avoids the Caucasus / Stalingrad fiasco and lets everything to be put into the drive for Moscow. Moscow is the rail hub === if it can be captured fast enough there is no massive relocation of indursty to the east because there is no rail link. What's more, Moscow is where Stalin can be cornered and forced to sign a peace deal ..
Before invading the Soviets, dump the millstone and let Mussillini sort himelf out in the Med (i.e. don't waste time and effort in Africa / Greece etc.) == start Barbarossa just a few weeks early and there would be just enough time to encircle Moscow before the winter.
DO NOT, under any circumstances, get into a war with the Americans (otherwise, sooner or later, it's going to be mushroom clouds over Germany)

 

[Johnrankins]

It is a near impossible thread. But let us try to see if there could be some 'easy' fixes':

- believe the intelligence coming back: Not underestimating tank production is the first one. The next is to not under-rate Soviet tanks. The appearance of T-34 was a nasty surprise - and it should not have been.
- Logistics! Plan for rapid conversion of railways to European width. Build railways! This single point sounds 'tame' but the German railway people actually had the knowledge and bandwidth to make inroads (I found that somewhere - not sure where)
- aim at infra-structure. This is a horrible thing really. Germany did identify the three areas of rapid conquest:
Leningrad = industry
Moscow = transport hub
Stalingrad = oil (Caucasus)
The problem was of course that it was near impossible to do all of it. The aim of capturing and destroying Soviet divisions (and armies) as close to the border as possible was not a bad idea. It worked up to a point as the Soviet forces never managed to stabilise a front. That went out of the window when Germany simply had to take a break.
- Develop the 'Ural Bomber' and bomb the far-away plants.

The key thing is really: which of the three main aims to go for if it is not possible to do all of it?

Was Moscow really the one? Or should we have seen Case Blue in August 1941?

My opinion: go for the oil and Caucasus. It would mean a flank that is exposed, but ...

One of the problems with the railroads is that the Nazis skimped on German railroad maintenance before the war to speed up arms production. The same steel couldn't be be used to both build a panzer and a railroad engine at the same time after all. So it didn't have a lot of spare production to make replacement track for out east, which is why they sucked at it. The Union Army did a much better job at railroad repair than the German Army did 80 years later.

 

[BlackDragon98]

It is a near impossible thread. But let us try to see if there could be some 'easy' fixes':

- believe the intelligence coming back: Not underestimating tank production is the first one. The next is to not under-rate Soviet tanks. The appearance of T-34 was a nasty surprise - and it should not have been.
- Logistics! Plan for rapid conversion of railways to European width. Build railways! This single point sounds 'tame' but the German railway people actually had the knowledge and bandwidth to make inroads (I found that somewhere - not sure where)
- aim at infra-structure. This is a horrible thing really. Germany did identify the three areas of rapid conquest:
Leningrad = industry
Moscow = transport hub
Stalingrad = oil (Caucasus)
The problem was of course that it was near impossible to do all of it. The aim of capturing and destroying Soviet divisions (and armies) as close to the border as possible was not a bad idea. It worked up to a point as the Soviet forces never managed to stabilise a front. That went out of the window when Germany simply had to take a break.
- Develop the 'Ural Bomber' and bomb the far-away plants.

The key thing is really: which of the three main aims to go for if it is not possible to do all of it?

Was Moscow really the one? Or should we have seen Case Blue in August 1941?

My opinion: go for the oil and Caucasus. It would mean a flank that is exposed, but ...

You forget Ukraine, the breadbasket.
IMO they should have went for Caucasus and oil through Ukraine. Take the bread and the oil first (addressing their shortages) and then attack Moscow from the south, bypassing a number of rivers.
Also, once the Black Sea is secured, the Germans can ship supplies to the Romanian ports via barges on the Danube and then repack supplies on cargo ships for shipment to the Caucasus.

 

[thaddeus]

IMO they should have went for Caucasus and oil through Ukraine. Take the bread and the oil first (addressing their shortages) and then attack Moscow from the south, bypassing a number of rivers.
Also, once the Black Sea is secured, the Germans can ship supplies to the Romanian ports via barges on the Danube and then repack supplies on cargo ships for shipment to the Caucasus.

think they needed to capture Leningrad and Murmansk prior to end of 1941, closing off the Arctic Convoys route (a route that was expected), this prevents or delays L-L supplies for quite a while.

this also clears the Baltic Sea for their own transport, beyond the huge political victory (more purges anyone?)

from my own viewpoint, this might take the place of OTL Operation Typhoon? with seizing Leningrad and any Soviet counterattack(s)?

then proceed with the historical Case Blue, only kept to original objective in 1942?

 

[ChairAgainstWall]

The problem with the "take Caucuses and oil" strategy is that Stalin was expecting them to do exactly that. The cream of the Red Army was in the south. Hitler, in fact, ordered that the main thrust be in the south, but OKH Chief of Staff Franz Halder went and reoriented the operation against Moscow, then lied and said the main thrust would be in the Ukraine. The Reds were unprepared for Germans in the center, and you got the series of major encirclements that capture the imagination (and lots of Russians). Then, in August, Hitler notices that things in the Ukraine aren't going well, and orders Guderian to head south, which he very reluctantly does, and captures half a million prisoners and he whole Ukraine.

It's not a planning change, but a better idea than what actually happened would be to then ignore Moscow and send Gunderian towards Stalingrad. But just about all the German generals thought that they just needed to take Moscow and Soviet resistance would collapse, and Hitler went along with their advice. That (and other such affairs) was why he later doesn't trust generals, like in the famous Downfall scene (not that Hitler wasn't responsible for a host of strategic blunders on his own). Of course, after the war, the US Army let Halder write the official history of the war in the east, and he shifts all the blame to Hitler, and lies about the Heer's complicity in genocide. Jerk.

Basically, Barbarossa went about as well as could be expected. Better planning for winter clothes and such could have helped, but there would still be logistics issues getting it to the front—really, the whole shebang was running on a shoestring.

 

[Fulton 44]

I start with the proposition that there is no way Germany can defeat a unified and determined USSR in a long war. The problem is made worse with the US in the war and victory becomes impossible. Therefore:
1.. Clear the Mediterranean by early 41 thereby avoiding the Balkans campaign.
2. Start Barbarossa earlier.
3. Roll the dice and focus all out on Moscow and take it by September. Don't shift resources to the flanks.
4. Wage a psychological war. Establish governments in exile. Spread propaganda among the Soviet people. Establish national governments for the Ukraine, etc. and enlist these people as allies. Spread disinformation. Announce that the war is over after Moscow falls. Spread rumors about Stalin and the Communist leadership. Treat prisoners reasonably well.
5. Avoid war with the USA at all costs.
6. Develop long range bombers in the 1930's with substantial pay load capacities and use then to hit Baku and other strategic targets.

Even with all of this a great deal of good luck would be required.

 

[ChairAgainstWall]

Roll the dice and focus all out on Moscow and take it by September.

I suppose the diesel will just teleport itself into the panzers' tanks? Another reason why Guderian was order south was because it kept him roughly at the same distance from Germany, easing the dire logistical bottlenecks. The flanks of the central thrust were exposed, the Red Arm was massing front of them in short, the modern consensus among historians is that this would be impossible.

As for trying hearts-and-minds tactics, I think you are confusing the Nazi Party with something else. The reason why the SU was invaded was to slaughter the "subhumans" and establish "Aryan" farming communities. Treating the locals decently is such a departure that it would move this discussion into ASB territory.

 

[McPherson]

Commit suicide.

All kidding aside, Barbarossa was just about the stupidest operation laid on imaginable. I do not see what could have been done that would do anything but prolong the agony about a year.

 

[RedSword12]

As for trying hearts-and-minds tactics, I think you are confusing the Nazi Party with something else. The reason why the SU was invaded was to slaughter the "subhumans" and establish "Aryan" farming communities. Treating the locals decently is such a departure that it would move this discussion into ASB territory.

Not to mention the difficulty of feeding both the home populace and the conquered. A big reason the Ukraine was so important to the Germans was because it had all that food that could be used to alleviate shortages at home—at the cost of the Ukrainians themselves.

 

[thaddeus]

the oil of Caucasus is a mirage in my view, they themselves discovered Allied plans for Operation Pike to destroy the largest oilfields at Baku, and after Barbarossa commenced the Allied plans are Plan B, after any Soviet sabotage?

to me the consolation prize of Donets is more realistic, after all the Nazi regime had developed a huge synthetic oil infrastructure that requires the feedstock of coal?