Update One- Warsaw Falls
The Red Army had done it. Despite initial set-backs, communications problems and the context of a still very unstable nation, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic had not only driven the invading Polish armies out of Ukraine and the border regions, but driven deep into the Polish heartland. By August 1920, after nearly a year and a half of fighting, the Russian soldiers stood on the banks of the Vistula and began attacking Warsaw itself. The Polish army, battered and desperate, moved to defend the city, even as hope dwindled. Peace talks were already being held, but the Russian leaders suddenly smelled blood in the water, and pushed their armies hard. Perhaps more than a simple ceasefire could be won here, in the heart of Poland. Propaganda ran hot on the idea of Bolshevik banners waving over the Polish capital, an obvious precursor to European wide revolution. A victory here could do much to support uprisings in Germany and even farther afield.
And a victory is what they got. The Russian armies completely encircled and crushed Józef Piłsudski’s forces around the city. It had been a desperate battle full of bold plans, wild gambles and miscommunications but a last minute Russian reinforcement (ordered there away from Stalin’s Crimea front at his reluctant consent) turned the tide. The Polish armies, already worn by months of campaigning, broke completely, many of them surrounded. The Soviet commander, Mikhail Tukhachevsky managed to bag nearly the entire Polish 5th Army and badly mauled the 1st, with Polish losses ranging upwards of 20,000 killed or missing and over twice that captured. Piłsudski himself managed to slip the net, retreating westward with the tattered remains of his forces, but everyone knew the war was over.
Polish troops surrounding after Warsaw falls in August 1920
The reaction in the rest of Europe was immediate and intense. It seemed clear to all observers that the seemingly unstoppable tide of Bolshevism was sweeping westward. This was greeted with jubilation by some on the left. French Section of the Workers' International stated in their official paper- “Not a man, not a sou, not a shell for the reactionary and capitalist Poland. Long live the Russian Revolution! Long live the Workers' International!”. The British labor Party printed leaflets supporting Russia and stating that no member of Labor would help Poland, either in war or commercially. Strikes and sitdowns in sympathy with the Soviet victory swept across Europe, especially in Germany and Czechoslovakia where anti-Polish sentiment had run high among the working class. Among the elites, of course, the reaction was very different.
Many of the more historical minded drew comparison to the sweeping victories of Revolutionary France in the late 18th century, when their armies had been fired by zeal and went from victory to victory. Indeed Tukhachevsky’s latest moniker was the Red Napoleon, clearly showing how the Soviets had inherited the mantle of French terror. Winston Churchill was more blunt and compared the Russian invasion to a literal plague stating, “ An infected Russia, a plague-bearing Russia; a Russia of armed hordes not only smiting with bayonet and with cannon, but accompanied and preceded by swarms of typhus-bearing vermin which slew the bodies of men, and political doctrines which destroyed the health and even the souls of nations.” While somewhat overwrought, Churchill would have found many who agreed with his sentiments. The mood was dark in European capitals as they contemplated the possibility of Russian bayonets thrust straight into the heart of Central Europe.
Like so many concerns, much of it revolved around Germany, the still riven battle-scarred country right in the center of Europe. Germany was obviously a very troubled state, still reeling from the immediate aftermath of the First World War. The Weimar Republic was still only a few years old and struggling with civil unrest and political instability. Indeed, only a few months before, it had weathered the right-wing Kapp Putsch which had only been defeated by a general strike. This had been followed by left-wing socialist violence, echoing the still fresh Spartacus Uprisings of 1919. It seemed apparent to all, and especially to the Russians, that Germany was ripe for a socialist revolution, a nation on the edge.
Right-Wing Freikorps mobilized during the failed Kapp Putsch, a sign of Germany's instability
In Germany itself, the reaction to the Polish-Soviet War had been mixed. Many Germans, at least those not in the far left, feared Bolshevik armies sitting on their borders. It seemed clear that Russia intended to spread their socialist worldview at the point of a sword, and indeed perhaps preferred to. Worse, such a Red victory might inspire the flickering embers of German socialism to new heights and many feared for the survival of the central government. On other hand, any weakening of Poland enhanced the chance of Germany reclaiming the expansive eastern territories stripped away by Versailles . While the Weimar Republic had approved of the settlement on paper, desire to regain those lands ran high even among those dedicated to democracy. In some ways, Russia and Germany were natural allies, both now isolated powers hated and feared by the former Entente. This was reflected on by Lenin who stated quite baldly that the Entente had ‘crucified and suppressed Germany.” Before and during the Polish war, both sides had met and discussed possible economic treaties as both nations sought to rebuild after years of devastating violence and upheaval.
So it was with a certain amount of optimism that German diplomats received Soviet counterparts in the summer of 1920. The Russian proposed a deal, a deal with wide-ranging implications and possibilities. On the surface it was a simple enough proposal. If Germany would agree to not assist Poland, Russia would not only respect German borders, it would return the eastern lands taken in 1918. In addition, they advanced plans for extensive trade between the two nations with Russia providing food for a still hungry Germany and Germany supplying industrial goods and machines for a devastated Russia. For their part, the German received these offers with, perhaps surprising, wary acceptance. While most German leaders did not assume the RSFSR was a trustworthy ally, geopolitical conditions did press them together. The Bolshevik diplomats were correct when they judged Germany felt shunned and oppressed, with an industry in tatters and locked out of international trade. An economic pipeline to the fabled agricultural riches of Russia could do much to stabilize the nation. Even better, the prospect of reclaiming the lost eastern territories would be a great boon. Not only did they view it as a moral good, and one that would defend the rights of the German peoples in those areas, but it would also bolster the Weimar Republic’s support among the population. Among the right, ironically, came the loudest calls for acceptance of the deal. For, they argued, if Russia was not to be trusted, then surely taking the territories now would help in any future war? At least the frontline would be farther east.
The talks had been kept secret of course, for such a deal would outrage the western powers. Germany had convinced Russia that it could not openly invade Poland, even if the nation was defeated. So instead a bit of subterfuge was required. If it seemed that Russia would win the war, the Red Army would allow the old German territories to revolt and throw off the Polish shackles. Then, with these places in apparent confusion and disorder, German troops would move in to restore order. It was gambled that London and Paris would rather see these areas in even German hands then Bolshevik ones. It was a bold diplomatic stroke that had seemed unlikely to happen. Only half a year ago the Poles had been driving into the Ukraine, and it was the RFSR that had been desperate for aid.
Polish troops during their opening drives on Ukraine. Red victory had seemed academic.
Now, the situation could not be more different. Russian armies were chasing the last fragments of Polish troops, clearly winning the war. Liviv fell a few weeks after Warsaw, the last southern Polish bastion, and Soviet troops were charging ever further. They began entering the former German territories and all the diplomatic back and forth became frighteningly relevant. Soviet leaders pressed Berlin for a firm answer. Would they accept their old territories for a promise of peace and economic aid, as well as firmly backing the RSFSR in whatever peace settlement was decided with Poland?
The offer came at a particular tense time of German and Allied relations in the fall of 1920. Only a few months before at the Spa Conference, the Allies had still treated Germany as a defeated, subjected nation by demanding coal supplies, extensive monetary reparations and widespread disarmament. German negotiators had been humiliated when the Allies had simply ignored their own proposals and declared their intentions for economic sanctions or even military force if Germany did not simply concede. It was with this recent disgrace in mind that German elites considered the tantalizing Russian offer. Their final thoughts could be be summed up by the Chief of Army Command, Hans Von Seeckt ‘Never can Prussia-Germany concede that Bromberg, Graudenz, Thorn, (Marienburg), Posen should remain in Polish hands, and now there appears on the horizon, like a divine miracle, help for us in our deep distress. At this moment nobody should ask Germany to lift as much as a finger when disaster engulf Poland.’ The only downside was the risk of Allied Intervention if the Germans made their move. Would France and Britain consider such reclamation a breach of the Versailles Treaty, a break worthy of military action? What of the Rhineland and other border territories? On the other hand, would the war weary Allies truly risk general war over eastern lands filled with German people? The Weimar Republic thought not and sent messages to Moscow, indicating that they would take the offered deal.
Hans Von Seeckt, German Chief of Army Command and backer of the Soviet deal
Even as the German agreement was sent, Poland was disintegrating at last. By November 1920 the last Polish troops faced a daunting choice. They could either surrender to be captured by the hated Bolshievks or attempt to flee the country. Piłsudski chose the former, fleeing by ship out of Gdansk and eventually arriving in Paris, where he hoped to set up a Polish government in exile. Thousands of others followed him, either by ship or more commonly by simply crossing the border into Germany. The rest were caught in the net of Red Army units which exhausted followed behind. Weary and battered, one thing drove them on. They had won. Poland had been defeated and a vista of new options opened for the Bolshevik leadership in Moscow.
The fate of Europe seemed to hang in the balance, ready to be remade in the image of socialism and communism.
And a victory is what they got. The Russian armies completely encircled and crushed Józef Piłsudski’s forces around the city. It had been a desperate battle full of bold plans, wild gambles and miscommunications but a last minute Russian reinforcement (ordered there away from Stalin’s Crimea front at his reluctant consent) turned the tide. The Polish armies, already worn by months of campaigning, broke completely, many of them surrounded. The Soviet commander, Mikhail Tukhachevsky managed to bag nearly the entire Polish 5th Army and badly mauled the 1st, with Polish losses ranging upwards of 20,000 killed or missing and over twice that captured. Piłsudski himself managed to slip the net, retreating westward with the tattered remains of his forces, but everyone knew the war was over.
Polish troops surrounding after Warsaw falls in August 1920
The reaction in the rest of Europe was immediate and intense. It seemed clear to all observers that the seemingly unstoppable tide of Bolshevism was sweeping westward. This was greeted with jubilation by some on the left. French Section of the Workers' International stated in their official paper- “Not a man, not a sou, not a shell for the reactionary and capitalist Poland. Long live the Russian Revolution! Long live the Workers' International!”. The British labor Party printed leaflets supporting Russia and stating that no member of Labor would help Poland, either in war or commercially. Strikes and sitdowns in sympathy with the Soviet victory swept across Europe, especially in Germany and Czechoslovakia where anti-Polish sentiment had run high among the working class. Among the elites, of course, the reaction was very different.
Many of the more historical minded drew comparison to the sweeping victories of Revolutionary France in the late 18th century, when their armies had been fired by zeal and went from victory to victory. Indeed Tukhachevsky’s latest moniker was the Red Napoleon, clearly showing how the Soviets had inherited the mantle of French terror. Winston Churchill was more blunt and compared the Russian invasion to a literal plague stating, “ An infected Russia, a plague-bearing Russia; a Russia of armed hordes not only smiting with bayonet and with cannon, but accompanied and preceded by swarms of typhus-bearing vermin which slew the bodies of men, and political doctrines which destroyed the health and even the souls of nations.” While somewhat overwrought, Churchill would have found many who agreed with his sentiments. The mood was dark in European capitals as they contemplated the possibility of Russian bayonets thrust straight into the heart of Central Europe.
Like so many concerns, much of it revolved around Germany, the still riven battle-scarred country right in the center of Europe. Germany was obviously a very troubled state, still reeling from the immediate aftermath of the First World War. The Weimar Republic was still only a few years old and struggling with civil unrest and political instability. Indeed, only a few months before, it had weathered the right-wing Kapp Putsch which had only been defeated by a general strike. This had been followed by left-wing socialist violence, echoing the still fresh Spartacus Uprisings of 1919. It seemed apparent to all, and especially to the Russians, that Germany was ripe for a socialist revolution, a nation on the edge.
Right-Wing Freikorps mobilized during the failed Kapp Putsch, a sign of Germany's instability
In Germany itself, the reaction to the Polish-Soviet War had been mixed. Many Germans, at least those not in the far left, feared Bolshevik armies sitting on their borders. It seemed clear that Russia intended to spread their socialist worldview at the point of a sword, and indeed perhaps preferred to. Worse, such a Red victory might inspire the flickering embers of German socialism to new heights and many feared for the survival of the central government. On other hand, any weakening of Poland enhanced the chance of Germany reclaiming the expansive eastern territories stripped away by Versailles . While the Weimar Republic had approved of the settlement on paper, desire to regain those lands ran high even among those dedicated to democracy. In some ways, Russia and Germany were natural allies, both now isolated powers hated and feared by the former Entente. This was reflected on by Lenin who stated quite baldly that the Entente had ‘crucified and suppressed Germany.” Before and during the Polish war, both sides had met and discussed possible economic treaties as both nations sought to rebuild after years of devastating violence and upheaval.
So it was with a certain amount of optimism that German diplomats received Soviet counterparts in the summer of 1920. The Russian proposed a deal, a deal with wide-ranging implications and possibilities. On the surface it was a simple enough proposal. If Germany would agree to not assist Poland, Russia would not only respect German borders, it would return the eastern lands taken in 1918. In addition, they advanced plans for extensive trade between the two nations with Russia providing food for a still hungry Germany and Germany supplying industrial goods and machines for a devastated Russia. For their part, the German received these offers with, perhaps surprising, wary acceptance. While most German leaders did not assume the RSFSR was a trustworthy ally, geopolitical conditions did press them together. The Bolshevik diplomats were correct when they judged Germany felt shunned and oppressed, with an industry in tatters and locked out of international trade. An economic pipeline to the fabled agricultural riches of Russia could do much to stabilize the nation. Even better, the prospect of reclaiming the lost eastern territories would be a great boon. Not only did they view it as a moral good, and one that would defend the rights of the German peoples in those areas, but it would also bolster the Weimar Republic’s support among the population. Among the right, ironically, came the loudest calls for acceptance of the deal. For, they argued, if Russia was not to be trusted, then surely taking the territories now would help in any future war? At least the frontline would be farther east.
The talks had been kept secret of course, for such a deal would outrage the western powers. Germany had convinced Russia that it could not openly invade Poland, even if the nation was defeated. So instead a bit of subterfuge was required. If it seemed that Russia would win the war, the Red Army would allow the old German territories to revolt and throw off the Polish shackles. Then, with these places in apparent confusion and disorder, German troops would move in to restore order. It was gambled that London and Paris would rather see these areas in even German hands then Bolshevik ones. It was a bold diplomatic stroke that had seemed unlikely to happen. Only half a year ago the Poles had been driving into the Ukraine, and it was the RFSR that had been desperate for aid.
Polish troops during their opening drives on Ukraine. Red victory had seemed academic.
Now, the situation could not be more different. Russian armies were chasing the last fragments of Polish troops, clearly winning the war. Liviv fell a few weeks after Warsaw, the last southern Polish bastion, and Soviet troops were charging ever further. They began entering the former German territories and all the diplomatic back and forth became frighteningly relevant. Soviet leaders pressed Berlin for a firm answer. Would they accept their old territories for a promise of peace and economic aid, as well as firmly backing the RSFSR in whatever peace settlement was decided with Poland?
The offer came at a particular tense time of German and Allied relations in the fall of 1920. Only a few months before at the Spa Conference, the Allies had still treated Germany as a defeated, subjected nation by demanding coal supplies, extensive monetary reparations and widespread disarmament. German negotiators had been humiliated when the Allies had simply ignored their own proposals and declared their intentions for economic sanctions or even military force if Germany did not simply concede. It was with this recent disgrace in mind that German elites considered the tantalizing Russian offer. Their final thoughts could be be summed up by the Chief of Army Command, Hans Von Seeckt ‘Never can Prussia-Germany concede that Bromberg, Graudenz, Thorn, (Marienburg), Posen should remain in Polish hands, and now there appears on the horizon, like a divine miracle, help for us in our deep distress. At this moment nobody should ask Germany to lift as much as a finger when disaster engulf Poland.’ The only downside was the risk of Allied Intervention if the Germans made their move. Would France and Britain consider such reclamation a breach of the Versailles Treaty, a break worthy of military action? What of the Rhineland and other border territories? On the other hand, would the war weary Allies truly risk general war over eastern lands filled with German people? The Weimar Republic thought not and sent messages to Moscow, indicating that they would take the offered deal.
Hans Von Seeckt, German Chief of Army Command and backer of the Soviet deal
Even as the German agreement was sent, Poland was disintegrating at last. By November 1920 the last Polish troops faced a daunting choice. They could either surrender to be captured by the hated Bolshievks or attempt to flee the country. Piłsudski chose the former, fleeing by ship out of Gdansk and eventually arriving in Paris, where he hoped to set up a Polish government in exile. Thousands of others followed him, either by ship or more commonly by simply crossing the border into Germany. The rest were caught in the net of Red Army units which exhausted followed behind. Weary and battered, one thing drove them on. They had won. Poland had been defeated and a vista of new options opened for the Bolshevik leadership in Moscow.
The fate of Europe seemed to hang in the balance, ready to be remade in the image of socialism and communism.
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