I want to know whether with hindsight, this forum believes that Normandy was the best option and why. Personally I think Greece would have been a good option though I won't go as far as to say it would be a better option. The advantage of coming in through Greece is that those eastern european countries can be taken before germany's eastern front collapses and so the eastern bloc will never be created. The problems encountered in the breakout from Normandy will also be avoided. In OTL the hedgerows in Normandy were a huge problem. Southern greece doesnt have hedgerows. Hitler also expects an invasion in the west and Patton's fake army would confirm his suspicions. Landing in Greece would be a big surprise to the Germans.
Was Normandy the best option for D day?
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Saphroneth
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https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=318668
Actually on the first page right now.
Actually on the first page right now.
Landing in Greece while Germany has good air coverage in the region with very little good beaches for the USN and RN to lend air support..
And Germany still has Crete and whatever air units that are there..
Greece is also very Mountainous just like Italy..
The Allied forces invading from any point unto the Greek Beaches will have a rough time just the Allies had in Italy in 43-44 and 45...
Slow and stuck in attrition warfare against determined German resistance all along the mountainous region of Greece, Albania and Yugoslavia
Germany's Army Group South would probably shift units and move to interdict the Allied forces there and likewise any German anti-partisan and garrison units in Yugoslavia will head down south to likewise lend interdiction support against any Allied forces South of Yugoslavia.
And Germany still has Crete and whatever air units that are there..
Greece is also very Mountainous just like Italy..
The Allied forces invading from any point unto the Greek Beaches will have a rough time just the Allies had in Italy in 43-44 and 45...
Slow and stuck in attrition warfare against determined German resistance all along the mountainous region of Greece, Albania and Yugoslavia
Germany's Army Group South would probably shift units and move to interdict the Allied forces there and likewise any German anti-partisan and garrison units in Yugoslavia will head down south to likewise lend interdiction support against any Allied forces South of Yugoslavia.
The hedgerow problem was solved by placing a cutting device on the fronts of the Sherman tanks. In southern Greece you have something much worse than hedgerows: mountains everywhere. That's why the ancient Greeks were divided into small city states.
Making the main invasion through Greece means creating a logistical nightmare. You have to transfer millions of troops and tens of thousands of vehicles not just across the channel but down through the Med and indeed all the way to the easternmost Med. It also vastly decreases the amount of air power that can be deployed. Britain had been turned into one large aircraft carrier that could massively hit strategic targets in Germany as well as in Normandy a few miles across the channel, and D-Day was accomplished only by diverting huge numbers of planes away from the campaign against Germany's industry and oil supplies. Why should thousands of planes have to be moved to the Eastern Med and then quickly moved back to Britain? And where would those planes operate from in the hypothetical Greek campaign? Crete is farther from any plausible mainland Greek landing zone than England is from Normandy, and you would have to invade and take mountainous German-occupied Crete first. Also on Crete you would have to build overnight a huge number of airfields--and why, when you already have the airfields and the infrastructure for building more airfields in England? And where on Crete would you build enough airfields on this mountainous island?
A case could be make for a small-scale supplementary invasion of Greece, but that would only get bogged down in the Balkan mountains, like the small-scale invasion of Italy was bogged down for a year and a half by mountainous terrain.
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An invasion of Greece would have proably achieved great results, had it been done in conjunction with the surrender of Italy, when a good part of Greece (including the Aegean islands) was garrisoned by units willing to change sides. Also willing to change sides, had they been offered the opportunity, would have been the Bulgarians, who occupied the north-eastern portion of mainland greece, including the port of Kavala. The areas biggest port, Salonic, was garrisoned by Germans, but that area in particular is NOT mountainous and could have easily been taken. Once you have troops in Bulgaria in sufficient numbers, Romania will instantly change sides, cutting of Germany's supply of oil one full year earlier (meaning a hell of a lot more of the Heer and its equipment gets left behind in their retreat from Russia).
Germany will be forced to redeploy units to both theaters (Italy & Balkans) leaving France wide open for a landing in, say, autumn '44.
Germany will be forced to redeploy units to both theaters (Italy & Balkans) leaving France wide open for a landing in, say, autumn '44.
I'm no military expert, but it seems to me that by the time we got through all the mountains and sinkholes (limestone in Yugoslavia - I do know a little geology - look up Karst topography) so we could strike at Germany, the Red Army likely would already be at the Atlantic coast.
Normandy is preferable because the plains of western Europe would seem like a highway in comparison to southeastern Europe, allowing us to hit Germany much sooner.
Normandy is preferable because the plains of western Europe would seem like a highway in comparison to southeastern Europe, allowing us to hit Germany much sooner.
The US airforce bombed Ploesti from bases in libya so its not like there are no airfields in the mediterranean theater. I dont see why Crete can't be bypassed just like the channel islands and the keroman base were. I'm not sure about this but I think the allies would suffer fewer casualties coming in through Greece. The Germans in the region are already busy with Tito's partisans and its unlikely they would just abandon the chase for Tito and move wholesale to Greece. Moving through Greece also presents the possibility of trapping Germany's 3 army groups on the eastern front between allied and soviet lines which would end the war sooner. Again with hindsight, Greece also presents the option of saving eastern europe from 45 years of communism. Even without hindsight it should have been clear that Stalin wasn't going to pull out after the war.
Read the thread linked in the first reply. Pay particular attention to Carl Schwamberger and Calbear. They are WWII geniuses - I am not exaggerating.
To invade Greece you would need airfields close by, so you could keep fighters above the beaches to maintain air superiority and gain air supremacy, and so you could have a quick turnaround of bombers to get nonstop air attacks on the defenders. Indeed you would need to seize airfields and sites for airfields months before the invasion so as to expand existing air facilities and to set about knocking out bridges, rails etc. not only in Greece but in the Balkans so the Germans couldn't easily transfer tanks south. Some of the heavy bombing could maybe be done from Italy (Libya was too far away) but not enough for softening up the landing zone and then protecting the beachhead. And you can't use aircraft carriers--they are mostly in the Pacific.
I am assuming of course that in this scenario the Allies are conducting a major D-Day style invasion, not just a diversionary attack.
I won't speak for Carl but thank you for the compliment. I would rather use the term "fairly well versed" since there are folks here who can run circles around me on some subjects.
To the OP -
There are a huge number of logistical reasons that the only logical place to make the major landing to find, fix, and defeat the forces of the Third Reich was the UK, more specifically Eastern England.
1. Transport distance. Vessels moving cargo from English ports had, at most, a 200 mile round trip. The ports were fully developed and the material handling was world class. Most of the shipping used in the landing had an operational speed of 10-14 MPH. As you can see this means that a vessel could complete roughly a round trip a day.
The distance crossing the Channel was also short enough that some LCM/LCT could be dispatched directly from port to the landing beaches after D-Day to provide supply along with LST and LSI.
2. Operational mass. The WAllies put 160,000 men onto the Normandy beaches on D-day. These were followed by an additional 700,000 troops in the next three weeks, along with huge numbers of tanks, trucks, jeeps, ammo, rifles and GI socks. The largest landing fleet ever assembled (the force used to land on Okinawa) was able to carry about 200,000 men to the Island and a modest (by ETO standards) number of tanks and trucks. It was beyond the capacity of even the industrial behemoth that was WW II America to construct enough shipping to move a force sufficient to defeat the Reich and land it in the Agean.
3. Air Cover. While heavy bombers could operate out of Italy (primarily 15th Air Force operating out of airfields near Foggia) Close Air Support (CAS) fighter/bombers had a much more restricted range. The maximum radis of operation for fighter bombers to provide cover during all possible flying hours is ~150-250 miles depending on type. This allows the aircraft to be fully armed, with no take-off weight being dedicated to external fuel tanks (a 108 gallon drop tank weighs over 1,000 pounds) or if tanks were used to greatly increase loiter time over the battle area. The WAllies had ~2,350 fighter/fighter bombers and 700 medium bombers in operation on D-Day (that is 171 squadrons of fighters/fighter-bombers and ~90 squadrons of light medium bombers). These would not have been available if the invasion was anywhere other than Northern France as a large percentage of the fighters tasked to D-Day air cover were part of the escort force of the Combined Bomber Offensive.
The number of single engine aircraft used on D-Day was well over double the number the USN fast carrier force ever had at its disposal on a single day (and even then other operational needs, CAP, ASW patrol, and mechanical failures, would have reduced the figure even more). Even with the addition of the escort carrier force that was commonly utilized to support amphibious landing, the USN would have been hard pressed to gather more than 1,200 aircraft for a single operation.
Northern France was the only place on Earth where the WAllies could hammer an enemy with the sort of airpower required to prevent Heer reinforcement.
4. Supply movement - France is agreeably flat, at least in Normandy, although there are a distressing number of waterways that require bridging of some level. Despite the water obstacles, it was possible to readily supply forces as much as 200 miles from the landing beaches with all the food, fuel (usually) and ammunition needed to maintain an offensive. The average WAllied armored division used over 800 TONS of supply daily, with the figure increasing in bad weather. Moving this sort of supply through the mountains of Greece and the Balkans would be nearly impossible today, with good roads, modern semi-trailers, and no one shooting at the trucks. In WW II it was frankly impossible.
There are any number of operational considerations beyond the basic logistical issues of supply, transport, and aircraft availability that an advance through the Balkans would have been lunacy burnished to a high sheen, but these few items will hopefully demonstrate the relative difficulty of any approach outside of Northern France.
I won't speak for Carl but thank you for the compliment. I would rather use the term "fairly well versed" since there are folks here who can run circles around me on some subjects.
To the OP -
There are a huge number of logistical reasons that the only logical place to make the major landing to find, fix, and defeat the forces of the Third Reich was the UK, more specifically Eastern England.
1. Transport distance. Vessels moving cargo from English ports had, at most, a 200 mile round trip. The ports were fully developed and the material handling was world class. Most of the shipping used in the landing had an operational speed of 10-14 MPH. As you can see this means that a vessel could complete roughly a round trip a day.
The distance crossing the Channel was also short enough that some LCM/LCT could be dispatched directly from port to the landing beaches after D-Day to provide supply along with LST and LSI.
2. Operational mass. The WAllies put 160,000 men onto the Normandy beaches on D-day. These were followed by an additional 700,000 troops in the next three weeks, along with huge numbers of tanks, trucks, jeeps, ammo, rifles and GI socks. The largest landing fleet ever assembled (the force used to land on Okinawa) was able to carry about 200,000 men to the Island and a modest (by ETO standards) number of tanks and trucks. It was beyond the capacity of even the industrial behemoth that was WW II America to construct enough shipping to move a force sufficient to defeat the Reich and land it in the Agean.
3. Air Cover. While heavy bombers could operate out of Italy (primarily 15th Air Force operating out of airfields near Foggia) Close Air Support (CAS) fighter/bombers had a much more restricted range. The maximum radis of operation for fighter bombers to provide cover during all possible flying hours is ~150-250 miles depending on type. This allows the aircraft to be fully armed, with no take-off weight being dedicated to external fuel tanks (a 108 gallon drop tank weighs over 1,000 pounds) or if tanks were used to greatly increase loiter time over the battle area. The WAllies had ~2,350 fighter/fighter bombers and 700 medium bombers in operation on D-Day (that is 171 squadrons of fighters/fighter-bombers and ~90 squadrons of light medium bombers). These would not have been available if the invasion was anywhere other than Northern France as a large percentage of the fighters tasked to D-Day air cover were part of the escort force of the Combined Bomber Offensive.
The number of single engine aircraft used on D-Day was well over double the number the USN fast carrier force ever had at its disposal on a single day (and even then other operational needs, CAP, ASW patrol, and mechanical failures, would have reduced the figure even more). Even with the addition of the escort carrier force that was commonly utilized to support amphibious landing, the USN would have been hard pressed to gather more than 1,200 aircraft for a single operation.
Northern France was the only place on Earth where the WAllies could hammer an enemy with the sort of airpower required to prevent Heer reinforcement.
4. Supply movement - France is agreeably flat, at least in Normandy, although there are a distressing number of waterways that require bridging of some level. Despite the water obstacles, it was possible to readily supply forces as much as 200 miles from the landing beaches with all the food, fuel (usually) and ammunition needed to maintain an offensive. The average WAllied armored division used over 800 TONS of supply daily, with the figure increasing in bad weather. Moving this sort of supply through the mountains of Greece and the Balkans would be nearly impossible today, with good roads, modern semi-trailers, and no one shooting at the trucks. In WW II it was frankly impossible.
There are any number of operational considerations beyond the basic logistical issues of supply, transport, and aircraft availability that an advance through the Balkans would have been lunacy burnished to a high sheen, but these few items will hopefully demonstrate the relative difficulty of any approach outside of Northern France.
THat does not leave much to add.
The MAIN thurust is to come through Northern France.
The Brits would have preferred a more pheriperical approach - first striking at the "weak" exposed parts of the reich and then the main thrust through France
There was also an option to strike instead of Southern France (Dragoon) to open a (secondary) front in Greece, but in hindsight that would have been probably the wrong strategy.
The french southern ports handled roughly a third of all allied supplies until Antwerp harbor was open again. So long distance supply is still possible, but takes up more resources (cargo space and fuel)
Balkans territory is not better than Greek territory, but experiences with Italy show that a determined force could hold up a superior force even in the 20th century if terrain favors the defender.
About a main thrust I agree with CalBear. A minor(secondary) landing in Greece would probably have suceeded on th tactical level, but be it instead or in addition to Dragoon, it would held up the overall Wally conduct of the war.
For the time after the war a western force on the Balkans would have (likely, but not 100%) spared Greece a civil war and depending on where the thrust was aimed could have prevented Bulgaria falling into the Soviet Sphere - but maybe for the price that the Soviets had tried to hang on to more territory in Germany and Austria than OTL.
An interesting option would have been an Turkish entry into the war summer 1943 on the allied side. Combined with a thrust through Bulgaria in late 43/early 44. It would require a build up for some months and prevent the need of an amphibious landing (though Varna and or Constanta might have been tempting targets. But I fear that the Turks would have a "price" for being a staging area...
Greece doesn't have hedgerows.
But it does have mountains.
It's also a rather roundabout route towards beating Germany.
Or, we could launch an attack on say, Normandy. And thereby catch the entire German army between the Allied and Soviet lines!
But it does have mountains.
It's also a rather roundabout route towards beating Germany.
Or, we could launch an attack on say, Normandy. And thereby catch the entire German army between the Allied and Soviet lines!
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I still wonder about doing Operation Dragoon, South of France, with more support a year earlier ignoring Italy (whilst giving the impression that an attack on Pas de Calais will be the main action) might have had good results
The allies tried invading though the port of Thessaloniki in wwI.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Macedonian_front
It was not a success.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Macedonian_front
It was not a success.
Three primary reasons.
1. Keep the critical learning cycle for U.S. troops and further develop the skills and experience that would be needed to successfully invade France.
More cynically: Got this huge army, may as well keep it busy until we have the bits and pieces we need to invade France. Plus, maybe it will get Stalin off our backs.
2. Secure the Foggia airfield complex and the surrounding region.
3. The political element. Take advantage of Italy's willingness to surrender and place pressure on the Reich. Satisfy Churchill's strategic vision (i.e. get him to shut the Hell up about the soft underbelly of Europe) without getting caught up in a full on Balkans quagmire.
Number one, for all the cold blooded aspect of it, was vital. The American Army was mainly a crew of amateurs top to bottom. NCOs with no combat experience led by Company grade officers who had been studying English Lit a few month earlier, field grade officers with zero experience in commanding large mechanized formations, staff officers who had zero experience in juggling the sort of logistical flow that was rapidly becoming the American Way of war, and General officers with little experience in command at the level of responsibility now entrusted to them.
The only way to learn the Art of War is you engage in it. Far better to learn it in a less critical theater than on the beaches of France.
Number two was a critical addition to the Combined Bomber Offensive and also ensured that the supply lines between the Raj and Europe were secure from air or naval attacks launched from the Italian Peninsula. The Foggia complex of air bases allowed the WAllies access to vital targets that were almost impossible to engage from the UK.
A very good argument can be made that once the Foggia region was secure, including gaining enough strategic depth to ensure that it was safe from any sort of Heer counter offensive, the WAllies should have stopped aggressively pushing the offensive up the Peninsula, certainly have stopped once the Gustav Line was encountered. This argument is of course based on pure military consideration and ignores both the political aspects and the humanitarian perspective.
Number three was the inevitable result of Coalition warfare. Compromise is always needed. Taking advantage of the Italian government's willingness to surrender and change sides was a blindingly obvious choice, one that also satisfied the insistent demands of the leader of the UK/Commonwealth. Of the three elements outlined this was by far the most important for the future conduct of the war, even though it turned into a strategic stalemate.
Only by trying the Southern Strategy could the U.S. get full buy in from the British leadership, both Civilian and military, for the invasion of France. The British, for entirely understandable reasons, were far less enamored at the prospect of fighting in France that the Americans. The compromise that included Italy also included a firm commitment to enter Northern France in the Spring of 1944.
One of the reasons why the Bay of Biscay was ruled out was that it was outside effective Allied tactical air range. After Normandy, the Allies rapidly built up a huge forward airbase network. I wonder if instead of southern France, a second invasion on the line Lorient - St. Nazaire was ever looked at for, say, July 1944, exploiting the fact of Allied tactical airpower established in strength in Normandy?