marathag
Banned
Like today, with Germany calling the shots from within the EU, and a weak UK outside
Was Britain Right to Enter WWI?
- Thread starter Amadeus
- Start date
Derek Pullem
Donor
But it was Germany who decided that a general war was better than peace. Justifying that by claiming the French and Russians would have done the same given the chance does not change that.
Yeah, My general impression has also been that Germany expected to fight Britain. Whether that came from an assessment of Britain's Foreign Policy leading them to decide they "might as well" invade Belgium and gain the advantage, or whether they decided that invading Belgium was the way to go, and then prepared for the probable consequence of facing Britain, I don't know. I suspect it was a bit of both.
In a lot of ways the strategic situation vis a vis Belgium had not changed. The idea was that Belgium provided a very strategically significant path into the heartland of either Germany or France. Neither can allow the other to have it as it would be the proverbial “Dagger to the heart” of the other. And Britain doesn’t want any other great power to control the Channel Ports as they are probably the best location from which to launch a naval invasion, bypassing the defenses they had spent centuries building up against France.
On the whole, nothing about this had changed.
Derek Pullem
Donor
Basically yes. If Russia continued to a General Mobilisation then they would be in the same position.
The argument appears to be that Germany couldn't afford to risk waiting or negotiating as it will jeopardise their war plans.
Riain
Banned
IIRC the German position/assumption from 1908 to Dec 1912 was that Britain was a likely or possible (I can't recall the exact wording) enemy combatant and this changed to the assumption that Britain definitely would be an enemy combatant in Dec 1912. You can match these assumptions to German mobilisation/campaign plans, up to 1912/13 Germany had 4 war plans, and I'm guessing the 'will she or won't she' of Britain would have driven the selection of the particular plan but by April 1914 there was only 1 plan for a single knockout blow to the west.
As for Belgium the biggest change between 1839 and 1914 was that the direction was different, Belgium was created to hinder a defeated France from going on the offensive into the rest of Europe. Also the nature of power had changed, in 1839 'Middle Powers' like Britain and France ruled the roost but in 1914 new 'Superpowers' were emerging and in this new order the utility of small buffer states might well be reduced although I can't see the declining middle powers accepting a renegotiation on this basis. This is not to say it's OK to run roughshod over Belgium, merely to point out that a 75 year old Treaty might well have declining usefulness.
Riain
Banned
Fair enough, although it seems to be a very fine point of detail given Russia's partial mobilisation was unlike other country's. IIUC it was considerably more comprehensive and used as a shortcut to speed up the acknowledged notoriously long Russian mobilisation.
Apparently once things like partial mobilisations were announced military officers would take day trips in border regions to check things out, and the Germans from East Prussia saw plenty that was worrying to them in Russian Poland.
Well, for starters, I am pretty sure the Treaty was equal opportunity. The Kingdom of the Netherlands was created to keep the French specifically at bay. By the time that the Belgians broke away both France and Prussia were considered equally possible aggressors as far as I am aware.
I think you are confusing WW1 and WW2. There were no superpowers yet. There were the makings of the ones that came, but they were not there yet. Nor would anyone in 1839 or 1914 describe Britain or France as “middle powers”
I doubt Belgium would say so. The treaty of London gained them recognition as independent. It also guaranteed their territorial integrity. The Oregon Treaty is 177 years old in June, yet I don’t think either Canada or the US is looking to renegotiate it.
I am curious as to how you would see the Treaty of London being renegotiated? And what new terms would need introduced?
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Why, thank you Sir.
I was a bit concerned about this one (1 AM, drifting in and out of sleep and frankly too much beer )... must've been where the line about "closing the Strait" came from...Sometimes I wake up in the AM thinking "O God, what was it I typed last night?"
Agreed on all points, but even with an end to the War in 1916, the devastation and the loss of life would've been horrendous by that point... once the guns fell silent, no one (except maybe a few nutbags in the German GS, and they'd prob be swiftly overruled) would be in a hurry to light 'em off again...
The UK would've definitely lost some face on the world's stage by not entering in 1914, but they could gain some of that back by "holding the line" when peace negotiations start if the Germans and A-H got too "grabby"...
Good point on Ireland... with all that was going on in July and Aug of 1914, it's easy to forget that most British MP's, whether Liberal, Labour or Tory, were more preoccupied by the Home Rule question than they were by what scuffle was breaking out on the Continent....
Well the aggressive intentions were to violate Belgium's neutrality. Yes they were different from France's intentions. France honored the treaty, and only entered Belgium after the German invaded. That was a defensive reaction. Russia's plans to ethnically "sort" East Prussia would've been an international crime, in violation of the Geneva Conventions. Who are you saying the French planed to relocate by force? They didn't do that after WWI. What plans the Entente had for a post war are a little aside the point of this conversation. There is a major difference between having war plans, and plans for war. The Entente had war plans, the Germans had both. The Germans wanted a war in 1914, the Entente, and the UK didn't.
Abrogating an agreement on neutrality could only be considered by all parties as a destabilizing act. If Germany had done that in say 1905 it would've set everyone on edge. Belgium would know Germany would violate their territory in the event of a Franco/German War. Belgium would increase it's defense spending, enlarge it's forces, and build new defensive works. They might enter into a direct alliance with the French, and allow the prepositioning of French Forces inside Belgium, to help hold the fortress line, and the Ardennes Country. At the least they would enter into talks with France to coordinate strategy. They might also enter into talks with the UK about defensive arrangements. The Germans never did that because they were attempting to deceive everyone, and gain operational surprise.
It's safe to say German diplomacy in 1914 was terrible. German Statecraft had declined badly since the days of Bismarck. Bismarck was duplicitous, but not ham handed, he was usually a step or two ahead of his opponents. He only ran calculated risks, for limited objectives. Bismarck would never have let the military dictate policy to the Chancellor, the formulation of policy was his job, and the military served national goals, not set them. There was no rational reason for Germany to run such insane risks in 1914. It was the ambition, and paranoia of the generals that dragged the world into a disaster, and it was all so unnecessary, in fact it was criminally stupid. Compounding it even more was after losing WWI the generals helped set the stage for WWII with their stupid "Stabbed in the Back Theory".
Riain
Banned
I'm most certainly not confusing WW1 with WW2. If the CP had won and Germany carved out a Greater German Mittel Europe and Mittel Afrika they assuredly would be considered a Superpower, while a defeated Russia would merely (yes, I'm aware of the irony) need to get it's shit together for 15-20 to also become one by default. I subscribe to the theory that WW1 & 2 were a modern day 30 Years War to reorder the world around the new paradigm of Superpower and would there be 2 or 3 of them. As for Britain being a middle power, likely Mackinder would agree, and certainly they lacked the hard power (potential and actual) of the USA, Russia and Germany by 1914.
As for Belgium and the Treaty, my point is that while some treaties last ages others don't and treaties get changed and renegotiated when they don't suit the signatories and regularly are broken. It seem to me that this treaty is given the status of Holy Writ, most likely because people believe the British explanation that they went to war for Poor Little Belgium while forgetting the previous decade of diplomacy and political maneuvering.
marathag
Banned
by many of the same ignoring that Russia had no real Casus Belli against A-H in 1914.
Germans tore up one treaty, while the Russian had no treaty at all with Serbia that justified Russia mobilizing at all
The purpose of treaties is to establish regularity, and predictability in international relations. A treaty guaranteeing the neutrality, or territorial integrity of a third country helps promote international peace, and stability. Abrogating, or violating such a treaty has the opposite effect. Nations need to be circumspect about doing ether. Abrogating any treaty, without good cause can make your country seem an unreliable interlocutor, and violating them makes you look untrustworthy. Just as when an individual consistently lies, cheats, and breaks their word, in 1914 Germany showed itself to be untrustworthy. The German position was that power is the only law, and the rights of others carried little weight.
The neutrality of Belgium was in the interests of British Security for the same reasons in 1914, as it had been in 1839. Violating the treaty showed Britain that Germany had little respect for British interests, or it's own treaty obligations. In retrospect committing gross human rights violations in Belgium only reinforced the point that the Germans couldn't be trusted to act in an honorable, or responsible manor. Talking about the hypocrisy of the way White Powers acted in Africa isn't relevant, because in 1914 they were operating by a double standard, so can only be judged by their own standards of what they thought was wrong in the treatment of fellow White Christians. Being the aggressors in 1914 made any claim that invading Belgium was in anyway a defensive move a very bad joke.
Russia didn't need a treaty with Serbia, to justify a partial mobilization. Many nations have acted to defend other nations they had no formal treaty of alliance with. The world knew Russia was a supporter of Serbia. Russia had interests in the Balkans, that would be damaged if the Serbian State was destroyed. The German Generals pushed AH into war with Serbia precisely because they knew Russia would mobilize against AH. The GGS intended to use Russia's action to stampede the Kaiser, and Chancellor into a general war, they didn't want. Can you tell us what was the German interest in destroying the Serbian State in 1914? It can't be the Austrian Alliance, because it was a defensive pact, with no obligation to join in an offensive war.
Derek Pullem
Donor
Russia isn't blameless here - the logical extension of her mobilisation would be a war which involved A-H. Whether that could be classified as a defensive war for A-H is an interesting discussion but ultimately pointless as Germany unilaterally decided that it would be.
My point is that Germany could have pulled back which would have given Russia an opportunity to pull back. Claiming Russia would have attacked Germany would place Germany's opinion of international affairs above all other nations - which basically gives them carte blanche in the future if they are victorious to decide what other nations intents are irrespective of treaty obligations. It's this situation which swung the British behind the French.
If Germany were able to mobilise against the perceived threat (Russian forces supporting Serbia and indirectly attacking A-H) then a widening of the war would be an Entente responsibility. Hindsight tells us that the War of the Frontiers in Alsace was a disaster for the French and absent a German attack through Belgium there is not a smoking gun to justify British intervention. Indeed if the battles are fought mostly on German Alsace in the West then to the public it seems that the Germans are not the aggressors.
Meanwhile in the East, A-H and Germany would easily defeat any Russian intervention in Serbia. Italy and Ottomans stay out as its not their fight and in Italy's case don't want to risk relations with the UK. The war probably fizzles out in six-twelve months, Germany and A-H are strengthened, everyone realises the futility of attacking prepared defences.
Now the one thing stopping this less awful scenario from happening is that the Germans did not plan for it! The next war had to be fought as planned or not at all. This is where Germany does carry more of the guilt and why UK was right to stop a nation with such a monomaniacal policy to prosper.
I don’t feel like enough consideration is given to the straitjacket of mobilisation in this era.
The main lesson most countries took from the Franco-German War of 1870-1871 was that you needed a mass army and efficient mobilisation.
Prussia had defeated two major powers by having a larger army due to its mass conscription and by mobilising faster than her enemies, thereby snatching the initiative.
Austria, being a multi-national entity, couldn’t afford to use mass conscription because large segments of its multi-ethnic population were deemed insufficiently loyal. And mobilisation was inefficient, partly due to incompetence, partly because Austria was huge.
France under Napoleon III had the same problem. It didn’t dare arm its entire military population, only those deemed reliable. And its mobilisation system was inefficient too.
So by 1914, countries had established rigid mobilisation programmes, aimed at producing the most soldiers in the shortest time as that would provide a significant, perhaps even war-winning advantage in any war.
I don’t think Europe’s generals and statesmen sat in their HQ’s in the summer of 1914 twirling their moustaches like pantomime villains while they schemed. They faced the dilemma of not mobilising or mobilising late and thus losing a possible war in weeks or mobilising and giving their countries the best chance of survival.
And once mobilisations started, the powder keg was bound to explode.
The main lesson most countries took from the Franco-German War of 1870-1871 was that you needed a mass army and efficient mobilisation.
Prussia had defeated two major powers by having a larger army due to its mass conscription and by mobilising faster than her enemies, thereby snatching the initiative.
Austria, being a multi-national entity, couldn’t afford to use mass conscription because large segments of its multi-ethnic population were deemed insufficiently loyal. And mobilisation was inefficient, partly due to incompetence, partly because Austria was huge.
France under Napoleon III had the same problem. It didn’t dare arm its entire military population, only those deemed reliable. And its mobilisation system was inefficient too.
So by 1914, countries had established rigid mobilisation programmes, aimed at producing the most soldiers in the shortest time as that would provide a significant, perhaps even war-winning advantage in any war.
I don’t think Europe’s generals and statesmen sat in their HQ’s in the summer of 1914 twirling their moustaches like pantomime villains while they schemed. They faced the dilemma of not mobilising or mobilising late and thus losing a possible war in weeks or mobilising and giving their countries the best chance of survival.
And once mobilisations started, the powder keg was bound to explode.
Derek Pullem
Donor
But when Austria mobilised after the 1st Balkan War in 1912 it didn't.
Russia made it explicitly clear to its military districts in response to this on 21 November 1912 that Russian mobilisation does not equal a Declaration of War. This was in response to an Austrian mobilisation of three corps along the border with Russia and a partial mobilisation of three corps along the border with Serbia which begun on November 21. A-H even gave out a medal to the soldiers involved
Russia did partially mobilise in response, mobilising in three military districts on November 23 (Kiev, Odessa, Warsaw)
But nothing came of it because France, Germany and Britain were desperately trying to restart the Conference of London which met on 16 December 1912.
What's the difference in 1914 - A-H has declared war on Serbia not just mobilised. Germany has declined to resolve the dispute by a Conference.
Whilst the hair trigger mobilisation plans were present on both sides, the immediate initiator of the conflict was down to the Central Powers. That their miscalculations led to a catastrophic war is impacted by mistakes made by the Entente powers as well but the Central Powers could have chosen to resolve the crisis differently as they had in 1912 but they chose not to.
TDM
Kicked
Only that assumes that a country can only justifiably mobilise if it had a pre existing treaty saying it would, and that isn't the case.
Germany deliberately broke a treaty because it's actions went against what it had committed to abide by. On the other hand Russian support of Serbia didn't break any treaty when it mobilised, but neither did it need a treaty to allow it.
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Yes, strategically Britain's geopolitical priority has always been to ensure no single actor dominated the continent. Thus when Germany was formed and immediately became arguably the strongest economic and military power on the continent, this presented a new threat that Britain was forced to confront after France lost the Franco-Prussian war. To not confront Germany would have presented the chance that Germany might economically dominate the continent - or even threaten Britain at sea as they had begun to do in the Naval Arms Race, which would be a massive threat to Britain's power as its ability to sell on the continent would be compromised if Germany chose to limit it. Additionally, Britain had made defence commitments with Belgium, which are a serious thing in 19th-20th century European politics. If they had chosen not to ride to Belgium's defence, they'd have undermined every commitment they had ever made in Europe, and worldwide. Why should a country rely on Britain when they didn't even defend their cross-sea neighbour etc?
I think the main point people forget is that this war was not intended to become a massive global conflict that cost each side millions of men. Entering was right for Britain as it had to defend the status quo in Europe; as Superpowers always have to do in order to maintain their power. In hindsight, things could have been done better or the war might have seemed better to avoid to avoid the loss of millions of men, but then Britain would have been conceding it's influence and global position, and threatening it's economic influence in Europe - and that in the moment was far too big a price to pay.
So yes, Britain should have joined, even if ultimately it came at a huge cost. Hindsight is easy, but in the moment, Britain couldn't afford to do nothing.
I think the main point people forget is that this war was not intended to become a massive global conflict that cost each side millions of men. Entering was right for Britain as it had to defend the status quo in Europe; as Superpowers always have to do in order to maintain their power. In hindsight, things could have been done better or the war might have seemed better to avoid to avoid the loss of millions of men, but then Britain would have been conceding it's influence and global position, and threatening it's economic influence in Europe - and that in the moment was far too big a price to pay.
So yes, Britain should have joined, even if ultimately it came at a huge cost. Hindsight is easy, but in the moment, Britain couldn't afford to do nothing.
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The Thirty Years war itself replaced Spain with France as the predominant European power. Is it then fair to say that France was the predominant European power in 1618?
Similarly, Germany in 1914 had not carved out a Mittle Europe and Mittle Afrika. And unlike the later Superpowers, they did not have the production or resource capability within their own borders to challenge all their rivals bar 1. Their economy had become the largest in Europe but was still underperforming compared to the British, French, most assuredly the US. On a per capita Basis, only in Industrial output did Germany exceed Britain. In All other sectors it lagged behind, including in general economic contribution per capita. It far lagged behind the US in every category including industry.
In other words, Germany was a power. One with potential. But whether it had the possibility of being a superpower in the future or not, it was not one in 1914. The US wasn’t even one in 1914 and that future possibility was much more clear in their case.
Mackinder would have put the US in the same position. By Mackinder’s Thesis no force on Earth should have been able to stop the USSR. Geographic determinism ignores a lot of nuance.
And if Hard Power were the only metric, Germany may well have won WW1.
That is true. But most Signatories seemed to prefer to keep the Treaty of London intact. Certainly Belgium seemed to appreciate its existence. To the best of my knowledge no effort was made by any party to attempt to reopen negotiations. Even by Germany. 1914 is also the first instance I am aware of of it being broken. So there does not seem to be much reason to renegotiate it.
I am not sure that the two are mutually exclusive. If the Soviet Union were to have attacked a NATO nation during the Cold War, and Article 5 were activated, All NATO nations would be obliged, by treaty, to defend them. Yet this simple explanation does not cover the political, military and economic relationships and distinctives between the different member states or the decades of political maneuvering between them, and between them and their opponent. It also does not cover the ulterior motive that most of them would have of fighting the USSR in someone else's territory. However, all this does not change the fact that they would be responding to an treaty obligation.