The OP,
So its already done....
I think with 10 tubes its quite realistic to kill 2 CVs if they get lucky.
USS Tautog ambushes Pearl Strike Force
- Thread starter ThreeDee3
- Start date
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- Tags
- pearl harbor wwii
I think with 10 tubes its quite realistic to kill 2 CVs if they get lucky.
The old chap taking us around HMS Alliance a few years back suggested up to an hour per tube (Bow or Stern) with a lot of sweat and kind words as the torpedo room had to be partially dismantled (it was a living area) and then the torpedo's each in turn hoisted up and man handled into each tube and armed/rigged to launch etc
Something just occurred to me. If spotted early Nagumo had orders to abandon the attack. This close to Pearl is a toss-up, does he turn around or go for it?
Based on his actions at Midway and Leyte Gulf my guess is he'd obey orders and turn around, despite massive criticism from his staff and the pilots...
Based on his actions at Midway and Leyte Gulf my guess is he'd obey orders and turn around, despite massive criticism from his staff and the pilots...
Yes a lot of the IJN Admirals seem to bottle it - sometimes snatching a defeat from the Jaws of victory while doing so
For this scenario to work, the Tautog would have to be very lucky. It would also depend on if contact was made in the daytime or at night.
If it is the daytime, operational doctrine at the time called for her to be submerged. This means that sighting the task force would be difficult because the periscope would only be about 3 feet above the water. This greatly reduces visual range. It must also be remembered that once the boat submerges it becomes largely immobile. Its maximum submerged speed is only about 9 knots (under optimal conditions), but at this speed the battery will be drained in about an hour. Therefore she would be running at a much slower speed, likely around 4 knots. Most people can walk faster than that. Because of this she would have to find herself almost dead on the track of the task force when she detects it in order to be able to be in a position to conduct an attack. The task force will be steaming at 18 knots or more, probably closer to 25 knots. Unless the Tautog finds herself dead on track ahead of them they will easily outdistance her. This also gives the crew precious little time to set up the attack, leading to rushing the set up and fudging the results.
Assuming that she gets lucky in this regard, tactics of the day dictate that she submerge to 100 feet and make her attack approach based on sound bearings alone. This was meant to prevent her periscope from being sighted and to give her some level of protection from counter-attack. However, the sonar systems of the day were unable to provide bearings accurate enough to precisely aim torpedoes, and when combined with the gross unreliability of the Mk 14 torpedo the likelihood of getting a hit is very very low.
If it is at night, she might be able to get closer prior to submerging, but even then she will be saddled with the same crappy tactics and torpedoes. Plus the ships will be running dark, and if you have ever been at sea at night you will know how difficult it is to see and track a darkened ship. She might actually blunder right into the middle of the task force, but this puts her into extreme danger from the destroyers.
Pre-war training and doctrine really tied the hands of our submarine crews. The tactics were based on unrealistic expectations and assumptions and were heavily infused with caution. Many sub commanders chafed under these silly tactics, but they were dictated to them by the "Gun Club" admirals who didn't like or respect submarines. Throw in an over confident and arrogant Bureau of Ordnance and a stunted R&D program for the Mk 14 torpedo and you have the makings of a lackluster performance record for our boats, and that is exactly what we got for the first six months of the war.
The Tautog's Commanding Officer was Joe Willingham, who was a competent and capable skipper, but he was no Mush Morton or Dick O'Kane and I doubt he would have dumped the rule book on the first day of the war. Most likely he would have conducted an approach based on the tactics I described and his results would have been zero.
As always, you can never count out Lady Luck, so it is at least possible that she might give them a bloody nose.
To answer some of the other questions:
The Tautog was capable of carrying the Mk 10 torpedo, but at this time she was not. The fleet submarines only carried this older and less capable weapon if there was a shortage of MK 14's, and at this time we had plenty of them. It is quite ironic due to the fact that the Mk 10 was actually a pretty reliable torpedo, even with a shorter range and smaller warhead.
A good crew could reload a torpedo tube in 15 minutes, a really good crew in less than 10. Sixteen weapons were carried in the forward room, 6 loaded in the tubes, with 2 reloads for the upper four tubes and 1 reload for the lower two tubes. Eight weapons were carried in the aft room, with four loaded in the tubes and one reload per tube. The reloads were carried on skids that were aligned with the tubes, so very little up and down movement was required. Even still, a reload operation was a carefully orchestrated ballet that required a lot of hard work and attention to detail.
For reference purposes, I am Qualified in Submarines, earning my Silver Dolphins on the USS Darter (SS-576) in 1984. The Darter was a diesel boat very similar to the WWII fleet submarines.
If it is the daytime, operational doctrine at the time called for her to be submerged. This means that sighting the task force would be difficult because the periscope would only be about 3 feet above the water. This greatly reduces visual range. It must also be remembered that once the boat submerges it becomes largely immobile. Its maximum submerged speed is only about 9 knots (under optimal conditions), but at this speed the battery will be drained in about an hour. Therefore she would be running at a much slower speed, likely around 4 knots. Most people can walk faster than that. Because of this she would have to find herself almost dead on the track of the task force when she detects it in order to be able to be in a position to conduct an attack. The task force will be steaming at 18 knots or more, probably closer to 25 knots. Unless the Tautog finds herself dead on track ahead of them they will easily outdistance her. This also gives the crew precious little time to set up the attack, leading to rushing the set up and fudging the results.
Assuming that she gets lucky in this regard, tactics of the day dictate that she submerge to 100 feet and make her attack approach based on sound bearings alone. This was meant to prevent her periscope from being sighted and to give her some level of protection from counter-attack. However, the sonar systems of the day were unable to provide bearings accurate enough to precisely aim torpedoes, and when combined with the gross unreliability of the Mk 14 torpedo the likelihood of getting a hit is very very low.
If it is at night, she might be able to get closer prior to submerging, but even then she will be saddled with the same crappy tactics and torpedoes. Plus the ships will be running dark, and if you have ever been at sea at night you will know how difficult it is to see and track a darkened ship. She might actually blunder right into the middle of the task force, but this puts her into extreme danger from the destroyers.
Pre-war training and doctrine really tied the hands of our submarine crews. The tactics were based on unrealistic expectations and assumptions and were heavily infused with caution. Many sub commanders chafed under these silly tactics, but they were dictated to them by the "Gun Club" admirals who didn't like or respect submarines. Throw in an over confident and arrogant Bureau of Ordnance and a stunted R&D program for the Mk 14 torpedo and you have the makings of a lackluster performance record for our boats, and that is exactly what we got for the first six months of the war.
The Tautog's Commanding Officer was Joe Willingham, who was a competent and capable skipper, but he was no Mush Morton or Dick O'Kane and I doubt he would have dumped the rule book on the first day of the war. Most likely he would have conducted an approach based on the tactics I described and his results would have been zero.
As always, you can never count out Lady Luck, so it is at least possible that she might give them a bloody nose.
To answer some of the other questions:
The Tautog was capable of carrying the Mk 10 torpedo, but at this time she was not. The fleet submarines only carried this older and less capable weapon if there was a shortage of MK 14's, and at this time we had plenty of them. It is quite ironic due to the fact that the Mk 10 was actually a pretty reliable torpedo, even with a shorter range and smaller warhead.
A good crew could reload a torpedo tube in 15 minutes, a really good crew in less than 10. Sixteen weapons were carried in the forward room, 6 loaded in the tubes, with 2 reloads for the upper four tubes and 1 reload for the lower two tubes. Eight weapons were carried in the aft room, with four loaded in the tubes and one reload per tube. The reloads were carried on skids that were aligned with the tubes, so very little up and down movement was required. Even still, a reload operation was a carefully orchestrated ballet that required a lot of hard work and attention to detail.
For reference purposes, I am Qualified in Submarines, earning my Silver Dolphins on the USS Darter (SS-576) in 1984. The Darter was a diesel boat very similar to the WWII fleet submarines.
I can't recall the Go-no Go point for the strike force being spotted. Maybe 48 hrs out? Glenn would have it. The plan favored continuing the attack after the Go - No Go point. The thought was if spotted that late there would still be operational surprise even if tactical surprise was lost.
As Dave makes clear the Tautog would have to find itself very near the carriers course & ahead of them. Perhaps 5,000 meters or less from the course, and maybe ten minutes ahead of them, probablly more. The Nautalus found itself close to the carriers at Midway, but was driven off by aggressive destroyer action
Thank you Dave for replying and for your service. You seem to know your stuff, so I hope you don't mind me asking a few more questions.
What depth could the Tautog send and receive radio signals?
If the Tautog did manage to find and sneak up on the fleet, what do you think it's chances were of sinking a carrier, and what would be the "best case" environment for the Tautog? I believe it rained heavily the night of the 7th and there was fog on the morning of the 8th.
Also, the Tautog would be able to radio their location to the US Fleet and bases, which are searching for them. Would American aircraft and ships be able to harass them throughout their retreat? Would the invasion of Wake Island have to be called off?
Good post
How about Hydrophone effect? Surely they would hear the fleet a long time before they saw it or any smoke etc
An example would be the attack on HMS Barham by U331 in Nov 41 - the crew heard the approaching 3 battleships and escorts some hours before actually sighting them and was fortunate enough that the fleet basically steamrolled over the Sub offering the vessel a point blank (literally several hundred meters) shot on the Battleship with 3 tubes. In fact so close that the captain of the u-boat did not actually fire a spread but fired all 3 fish on the same bearing
If the same thing happened here with Tautog and having been given mana from the gods and finding itself in the path of the carrier force in the same way that Barhams luck runs out several weeks earlier, then she is in with a 'shot' (I did a pun)
In fact this as you mentioned earlier is probably the only way that Tautog could conduct an attack on a fast moving ship such as a fleet carrier
Further notes and observations after reading the last several posts:
ThreeDee, why did you pick Tautog for this scenario? On 07 December, Tautog was in port at Pearl undergoing refit. In the OTL she did not get underway until the day after Christmas. Unless you chose Tautog for a specific reason, it may make more sense to have one of the boats that was already at sea to intercept the retreating Japanese. Sister boat Trout and the big old Argonaut were off Midway, with Tambor and Triton patrolling north of Wake. One of these boats would probably be more likely to intercept Kido Butai than the Tautog, which probably wouldn't have been able to get underway for several days at best.
Radio reception for low frequency (LF) was possible at periscope depth using a loop antenna. No part of the boat needed to be above the water, indeed the loop antenna itself was usually 10-15 feet under the water at PD. Transmission or HF comms was a bit trickier, requiring a whip style antenna to be above the water. There were a few different types of these antennas with one type attached to the periscope. The height of the antenna above the water determined the range of transmission, with very long range requiring the boat to be surfaced. Assuming your boat is relatively near Hawaii, a contact report could be sent with the boat broached (i.e. only partially surfaced).
As to the chances of sinking a carrier, refer to my post above. There are a lot of variables to consider and the idea is at least possible. They would have to be in a favorable position close to the enemy track and ahead of them, and they would have to get through the destroyer screen without being detected (probability low to medium). At this point approved tactics dictated that they dive to at least 100 feet (they are most likely already there) and track the target on sonar alone. Optimum position for firing would be (obviously) ahead of the target and between 1000-2000 yards off the target track (projected course). Once satisfied with the firing solution they would set the running depth of the torpedoes to approximately 30 feet so that they will run under the keel (the optimum spot for the Mk 6 magnetic influence exploder to detonate the warhead) and fire off a full spread of six torpedoes. They would then go deep (250 feet), rig for silent running, and wait to hear the detonation of the weapons, all the while expecting a depth charge attack from the escorts. But given the conditions that existed within the submarine force at that time, I believe the likelihood of this type of attack being successful to be quite low. During the war, this type of approach was used 31 times with no known successes. Sonar bearings were just not accurate enough and range was nothing but an educated guess. Both of these elements are EXTREMELY important to accurately aiming torpedoes. Sonar was very useful in the initial detection of the target and detection ranges out to 15,000 yards were possible under good conditions. But the very fine and accurate tracking necessary to aim torpedoes was just beyond the capability of the relatively primitive systems of the day.
If Joe Willingham made the unlikely decision to toss out the rule book and make a daylight periscope approach, the likelihood of success goes up considerably, from less than 5% to about 10-30%. Uncertainty and hesitation were quite prevalent and caution was the mantra of operations in the first few months of the war. It would have taken a truly gutsy skipper to go against everything he had been taught was right and to toss out all the experience he had (even as flawed as it later turned out to be) at this stage. Indeed most of the reports of the first submarine actions amply demonstrate this unfortunate mindset. It took time to build up the experience and confidence necessary to take greater chances.
The Mk 14 was actually a very well made, precision-crafted piece of machinery. But the damn thing was full of bugs and faults due to a stunted R&D phase and the overconfident intransigence of the managing engineers at the Bureau of Ordnance. It ran too deep due to the problems I outlined above and this prevented the Mk 6 magnetic exploder from firing when it should. When this fault was discovered, the crews simply set it to run shallower, but then discovered that the MK 6 exploder was so sensitive it set off the warhead prematurely, before it even reached the target! So then they just deactivated the magnetic feature and set the weapon to impact the side of the target using the regular contact exploder. But due to a fault with the firing pin, the damn thing wouldn't go off and it bounced off the side of the ship! The BuOrd managers steadfastly refused to admit that anything was mechanically wrong with the torpedo, blaming all the troubles on the boat crews. Only after field tests and trouble shooting in theater revealed and corrected the problems, and only after being ordered by higher authority to pull their collective heads out of their arses did BuOrd finally get onboard and fix the issues at the factory. When combined with unrealistic pre-war training and poorly thought out tactics the torpedo problems reduced the submarine force to frustrating near impotency.
These issues are why I believe that the chances of getting in a successful attack on one of the Kido Butai carriers at this time to be very low.
As for how this scenario would effect other battles, I just couldn't say for sure. Lots of butterflies there.
ThreeDee, why did you pick Tautog for this scenario? On 07 December, Tautog was in port at Pearl undergoing refit. In the OTL she did not get underway until the day after Christmas. Unless you chose Tautog for a specific reason, it may make more sense to have one of the boats that was already at sea to intercept the retreating Japanese. Sister boat Trout and the big old Argonaut were off Midway, with Tambor and Triton patrolling north of Wake. One of these boats would probably be more likely to intercept Kido Butai than the Tautog, which probably wouldn't have been able to get underway for several days at best.
Radio reception for low frequency (LF) was possible at periscope depth using a loop antenna. No part of the boat needed to be above the water, indeed the loop antenna itself was usually 10-15 feet under the water at PD. Transmission or HF comms was a bit trickier, requiring a whip style antenna to be above the water. There were a few different types of these antennas with one type attached to the periscope. The height of the antenna above the water determined the range of transmission, with very long range requiring the boat to be surfaced. Assuming your boat is relatively near Hawaii, a contact report could be sent with the boat broached (i.e. only partially surfaced).
As to the chances of sinking a carrier, refer to my post above. There are a lot of variables to consider and the idea is at least possible. They would have to be in a favorable position close to the enemy track and ahead of them, and they would have to get through the destroyer screen without being detected (probability low to medium). At this point approved tactics dictated that they dive to at least 100 feet (they are most likely already there) and track the target on sonar alone. Optimum position for firing would be (obviously) ahead of the target and between 1000-2000 yards off the target track (projected course). Once satisfied with the firing solution they would set the running depth of the torpedoes to approximately 30 feet so that they will run under the keel (the optimum spot for the Mk 6 magnetic influence exploder to detonate the warhead) and fire off a full spread of six torpedoes. They would then go deep (250 feet), rig for silent running, and wait to hear the detonation of the weapons, all the while expecting a depth charge attack from the escorts. But given the conditions that existed within the submarine force at that time, I believe the likelihood of this type of attack being successful to be quite low. During the war, this type of approach was used 31 times with no known successes. Sonar bearings were just not accurate enough and range was nothing but an educated guess. Both of these elements are EXTREMELY important to accurately aiming torpedoes. Sonar was very useful in the initial detection of the target and detection ranges out to 15,000 yards were possible under good conditions. But the very fine and accurate tracking necessary to aim torpedoes was just beyond the capability of the relatively primitive systems of the day.
If Joe Willingham made the unlikely decision to toss out the rule book and make a daylight periscope approach, the likelihood of success goes up considerably, from less than 5% to about 10-30%. Uncertainty and hesitation were quite prevalent and caution was the mantra of operations in the first few months of the war. It would have taken a truly gutsy skipper to go against everything he had been taught was right and to toss out all the experience he had (even as flawed as it later turned out to be) at this stage. Indeed most of the reports of the first submarine actions amply demonstrate this unfortunate mindset. It took time to build up the experience and confidence necessary to take greater chances.
The Mk 14 was actually a very well made, precision-crafted piece of machinery. But the damn thing was full of bugs and faults due to a stunted R&D phase and the overconfident intransigence of the managing engineers at the Bureau of Ordnance. It ran too deep due to the problems I outlined above and this prevented the Mk 6 magnetic exploder from firing when it should. When this fault was discovered, the crews simply set it to run shallower, but then discovered that the MK 6 exploder was so sensitive it set off the warhead prematurely, before it even reached the target! So then they just deactivated the magnetic feature and set the weapon to impact the side of the target using the regular contact exploder. But due to a fault with the firing pin, the damn thing wouldn't go off and it bounced off the side of the ship! The BuOrd managers steadfastly refused to admit that anything was mechanically wrong with the torpedo, blaming all the troubles on the boat crews. Only after field tests and trouble shooting in theater revealed and corrected the problems, and only after being ordered by higher authority to pull their collective heads out of their arses did BuOrd finally get onboard and fix the issues at the factory. When combined with unrealistic pre-war training and poorly thought out tactics the torpedo problems reduced the submarine force to frustrating near impotency.
These issues are why I believe that the chances of getting in a successful attack on one of the Kido Butai carriers at this time to be very low.
As for how this scenario would effect other battles, I just couldn't say for sure. Lots of butterflies there.
So... the above post describes what would have most likely happened. Here is what they should have done, with a realistic result:
It is late in the day and the boat is patrolling submerged. It is breezy topside, with a medium chop and whitecaps. The sonar operator picks up heavy, fast moving screws off the port side, estimated range 12,000 yards. The captain raises the periscope, swings it to the indicated bearing, and beholds a sight that takes his breath away. By some sort of divine influence they have blundered onto the track of the Japanese task force! He counts numerous ships, including several carriers. He immediately orders battle stations and has the fire control tracking party begin a track on the nearest carrier and the two closest escorts. He uses the periscope very cautiously, exposing it for only a few seconds at a time.
Several minutes later the observations reveal that one escort will pass them on the bow at approximately 2500 yards, the 2nd escort will pass astern at about 2800 yards, close but manageable. The carrier, which is identified as a Soryu class (geez it is coming on fast!), is on a track to pass ahead at 2400 yards, too far away for a good shot. Damn! Once the escorts pass they will have to take a chance and ring up full speed to try to close the track, ideally to 1000 yards or less. The escorts may hear them at that point, but to hell with it. You don't get a chance like this very often!
They continue to move forward at 5 knots. The captain orders the outer doors to the torpedo tubes opened and depth set for the forward fish at 30 feet, and at 15 feet for the aft fish. Those wonderful Mk 6 exploders should make quick work of this carrier! If one of the escorts gets to nosey they will let them have a shot from the aft tubes. Everyone is now very tense as the destroyers are at the closest point of approach. Sonar is tracking them, as you don't dare expose the scope at this point, even with the chop topside. Sonar indicates the destroyers are now moving away with no change in bearing. Good, but what about the carrier? They raise the scope and there she is, big, fat, and coming on like a freight train. Damn it all! She is coming on faster than we thought! Down scope! All ahead flank! Throwing caution to the wind they stay at a flank bell during the next two observations, which reveal that they will only be able to close to 1500 yards before they have to fire.
Okay, this is it. Up scope for a look around. Destroyers missed them completely (Thank god!) and are still moving away. Damn there are ships all around, including five more carriers! Back on the target, the bearing and range check. It won't get any better and if they wait any longer she will move away. A full spread of six is fired, with one aimed to miss ahead and one aimed to miss astern. This will compensate for any error in the estimation of target speed. Down scope! Everything is looking good and sonar reports that the fish are running hot, straight, and normal.
Counting the minutes for the torpedo run, the captain gets word from sonar that the target seems to have sped up and may be changing course. Crap! Up scope for a look. They saw the torpedo wakes and turned toward them to comb the tracks! He holds his breath as he watches three of the wakes pass directly under the target. What? Nothing! No explosion! Damn it all! How did I miss? Looking around the task force seems to be alert now, ships are maneuvering and the destroyers have kicked up their speed and are coming about. Active sonar pinging can clearly be heard. Deciding that discretion is the better part of valor he takes the boat deep and rigs for silent running. They can hear the all the ships overhead. Depth charges are dropped but none close and eventually all seem to be moving away. Deflated and dispirited, the captain runs the whole scenario through his head again, trying to figure out how he botched the set up of the century, a submariner's dream. Waiting a judicious amount of time they surface and send off a contact report and continue on patrol.
It is late in the day and the boat is patrolling submerged. It is breezy topside, with a medium chop and whitecaps. The sonar operator picks up heavy, fast moving screws off the port side, estimated range 12,000 yards. The captain raises the periscope, swings it to the indicated bearing, and beholds a sight that takes his breath away. By some sort of divine influence they have blundered onto the track of the Japanese task force! He counts numerous ships, including several carriers. He immediately orders battle stations and has the fire control tracking party begin a track on the nearest carrier and the two closest escorts. He uses the periscope very cautiously, exposing it for only a few seconds at a time.
Several minutes later the observations reveal that one escort will pass them on the bow at approximately 2500 yards, the 2nd escort will pass astern at about 2800 yards, close but manageable. The carrier, which is identified as a Soryu class (geez it is coming on fast!), is on a track to pass ahead at 2400 yards, too far away for a good shot. Damn! Once the escorts pass they will have to take a chance and ring up full speed to try to close the track, ideally to 1000 yards or less. The escorts may hear them at that point, but to hell with it. You don't get a chance like this very often!
They continue to move forward at 5 knots. The captain orders the outer doors to the torpedo tubes opened and depth set for the forward fish at 30 feet, and at 15 feet for the aft fish. Those wonderful Mk 6 exploders should make quick work of this carrier! If one of the escorts gets to nosey they will let them have a shot from the aft tubes. Everyone is now very tense as the destroyers are at the closest point of approach. Sonar is tracking them, as you don't dare expose the scope at this point, even with the chop topside. Sonar indicates the destroyers are now moving away with no change in bearing. Good, but what about the carrier? They raise the scope and there she is, big, fat, and coming on like a freight train. Damn it all! She is coming on faster than we thought! Down scope! All ahead flank! Throwing caution to the wind they stay at a flank bell during the next two observations, which reveal that they will only be able to close to 1500 yards before they have to fire.
Okay, this is it. Up scope for a look around. Destroyers missed them completely (Thank god!) and are still moving away. Damn there are ships all around, including five more carriers! Back on the target, the bearing and range check. It won't get any better and if they wait any longer she will move away. A full spread of six is fired, with one aimed to miss ahead and one aimed to miss astern. This will compensate for any error in the estimation of target speed. Down scope! Everything is looking good and sonar reports that the fish are running hot, straight, and normal.
Counting the minutes for the torpedo run, the captain gets word from sonar that the target seems to have sped up and may be changing course. Crap! Up scope for a look. They saw the torpedo wakes and turned toward them to comb the tracks! He holds his breath as he watches three of the wakes pass directly under the target. What? Nothing! No explosion! Damn it all! How did I miss? Looking around the task force seems to be alert now, ships are maneuvering and the destroyers have kicked up their speed and are coming about. Active sonar pinging can clearly be heard. Deciding that discretion is the better part of valor he takes the boat deep and rigs for silent running. They can hear the all the ships overhead. Depth charges are dropped but none close and eventually all seem to be moving away. Deflated and dispirited, the captain runs the whole scenario through his head again, trying to figure out how he botched the set up of the century, a submariner's dream. Waiting a judicious amount of time they surface and send off a contact report and continue on patrol.
that's how I pictured it in my timeline except I used an S boat and Mk 10s with 3 hits and 2 actually working as designed
Does anybody know about the cruising of the KB, Like speed and formation?
Would the CVs actually be spread out or just in a single (or twin) lines to make a small box reducing the number of escorts needed?
Would they also not be going quite slowly due to the fuel available?
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