A lot of interesting and useful points you make.
Your argument makes me more aware of how much the SGW and the Chinese Revolution are actually interwined for the future of the TL. This sadly means for my lazy butt that the latter should happen just before or during the SGW, so I have to plan, and in all likelihood write, both of them in the next update, sigh. This also suggests me that in order to foster what looks like the most likely development path, I have to prefer plausible butterflies that makes the transition of China to modernization not too troublesome, long, or traumatic, as far as conditions would allow.
If the US and the EE stay on good terms until the 21st Century, Africa could be a test case for partnership and development between the world's most powerful blocs, and the best argument for a new, closer global order.
Alternatively, if the US and EE do end up on opposite sides of a 3rd GW, US naval predominance means that subsaharan Africa is all-but lost to the EE, and even North Africa may suffer an "Operation Torch". But I don't get the sense that's where this TL is going.
Good points. The first development path is interesting since it indicates how by the 21st century this world might actually come closer to global political unity than I had originally expected.
In many ways the most interesting question of TTL's 20th Century will be the balance of power in an Asia that features five independent great powers - Russia, Japan, India, China, and Egypt, plus strong presences of both the US and the EE.
The obvious frictions are as follows. India and Russia are too close for comfort and are natural enemies, in a direct continuation of the Great Game. Egypt probably still desires influence in Persia and Central Asia. Japan, as already mentioned, has an anti-Russian tilt. Russia, in addition to seeing her worst nightmate, a powerful Sweden, Poland and Turkey (here, Egypt) back from the grave in the European context, will be desperate to hold on to her Asian empire. As for China, its a question of to what extent they recover. If they seem on the path to power, China's natural ally is Russia and, if EE-US relations fray, the US. If not, China will try to cling to neutrality to the extent possible, but end up deeply penetrated by Japanese, European, American and even Indian influence, while Russia makes a play for influence in the Western and Northern provinces.
A lot of interesting points. After the 2GW, Russia would hence have a strong interest in fostering the recovery of China, then, more so than any other great power.
At *Versailles, the powers will probably seek a strong India, but they may be leery of a strong China. OTOH, they may see Russia as truly beaten and China as a non-factor, and end up pulling out of the Legation cities. If they preserve them, though, they won't be British - most likely, they'll be divided up between Germany, Italy and Japan, with the US complaining but acquiescing in exchange for the guarantee of the rest of China. The great powers, defeated and rising, may not see it yet - but Asia writ large has the potential to be the Balkans writ large of TTL - the powder keg of Earth.
Agreed on the potential for Asia to be Balkans of the global order in TTL 20h century. Honestly, I would snuff out the expectation that TTL USA shall necessarily feel a special drive to pursue a pro-Chinese policy, despite the OTL clichè. TTL has wholly different premises, and things may easily go in a wholly different direction, if the US-EE-Japan axis remains strong.
As it concerns the Western (including Japan for this purpose) foothold in China, it obviously depends on how political events in China unfold, but unless it completely falls into chaos and warlordism, I suppose it might not be too difficult to have the Western powers lose control of their spheres of influence in China during the 2GW. As it concerns the cities themselves, I'm uncertain whether to have the great powers pull out from them as well, or leave them into place to be further irredentist issue of contention.
The one odd country is the UK. The US, more than any other power, is responsible for destroying their empire and naval dominance. OTOH, there is a powerful British fear going back centuries of a united Europe. And the UK has the example of Ireland next door, an enthusiastic US state, and of France languishing on the Continent. Culturally, politically, and of course linguistically, the UK is much closer to the US (especially the formerly Commonwealth bits) than the EE. If push comes to shove, I think the UK joins the US either as a set of states or at least a close ally - ESPECIALLY if the US and the EE come to blows or nearly so, but likely even if relations remain cordial.
Interesting. More of an argument to justify the reasonable expectation that
one way or another the long US-UK drama of TTL shall end with America absorbing Britain.
Increasingly starting to wonder if you shouldn't write two versions of TTL's 20th Century - a world of cooperation with no 3GW, and a more troubled world featuring a 3GW and/or a Cold War.
I would just point out that there is a plausible middle ground between a 3GW or Cold War caused by an estrangement between the USA and the EE, and total cooperation between all of TTL superpowers and great powers. As you point out, the USA, EE, Japan, and India have good reason to cooperate on one side, and Russia and China do as well on the other side. This might be a plausible seed for this world's last global conflict, be it a 3GW or a Cold War.
Yet too early to say whether there is justification to make the twin variant TLs you describe, however. There can't be divergence till the post-2GW period.
