During the discussions regarding the Five Power Treaty between 12 November 1921 and 6 February 1922, it became clear that the IJN were determined to retain Mutsu and that the British ships were, on average, the oldest. By 30 November 1921 the parties were in deadlock. To thrash out a compromise, the three main parties held a series of semi-clandestine meetings. Proceedings were recorded by Maurice Hankey, who was the only outsider present. On 14 December 1921 Charles Hughes (US), Arthur Balfour (UK) and Kato Tomosaburo (Jp) met in Hughes' home to debate the actual ships that would make up their agreed 5/5/3 ratio. One of their first agreements was to classify capital ships as pre-Jutland or post-Jutland, given that battle's effect on the appreciation of naval commanders to the threat of plunging shells fired at longer ranges.
Hughes proposed finishing USS Colorado and USS Washington. Balfour protested; the Royal Navy had nothing comparable and, even with all the changes during construction, HMS Hood wasn't the ship that would have been built to a purely post-Jutland design. If the US had their two new ships, he wanted two of the new battlecruisers that had just been laid down and a gradual replacement programme of older ships rather than a 10 year moratorium. Even Balfour wasn't aware that the 8" armour which had been openly ordered wasn't the ships' thick belt armour, but the deck plating. The belt was a massive 14" and the turret fronts 17½". The ships were armoured against 18" armour piercing shells, which were being developed by all three nations until the 16" calibre limit was agreed. These were not the battlecruisers they were being sold as. They were the very first modern fast battleships, as revolutionary as HMS Dreadnought had been 15 years previously but with the improvements well hidden below the skin.
Kato was impassive. He stated that he had received no specific instructions on that point but was personally in favour of adopting Balfour's counter-proposal.
Around 4pm Hughes insisted that the two new ships would disrupt his harmonious 'parity calculations' under the 5/5/3 agreement. Britain would have to scrap HMS Tiger, as well as those ships already agreed, or build to the 35,000 ton limit. Not knowing the true nature of the new design, Balfour considered the loss of HMS Tiger too great a sacrifice and reluctantly conceded.
PoD
Balfour states that he is unable to do as Kato did and make that choice without consultation. The meeting adjourns. He receives a reply to the proposal from Beatty at the Admiralty.
"Sacrifice Tiger. Try to get incremental construction. No moratorium."
Next
1) The further discussions around the "battleship holiday".
2) How the contracts with the shipbuilders changed after the PoD and what that meant for the costs of the G3 programme.
David.
Hughes proposed finishing USS Colorado and USS Washington. Balfour protested; the Royal Navy had nothing comparable and, even with all the changes during construction, HMS Hood wasn't the ship that would have been built to a purely post-Jutland design. If the US had their two new ships, he wanted two of the new battlecruisers that had just been laid down and a gradual replacement programme of older ships rather than a 10 year moratorium. Even Balfour wasn't aware that the 8" armour which had been openly ordered wasn't the ships' thick belt armour, but the deck plating. The belt was a massive 14" and the turret fronts 17½". The ships were armoured against 18" armour piercing shells, which were being developed by all three nations until the 16" calibre limit was agreed. These were not the battlecruisers they were being sold as. They were the very first modern fast battleships, as revolutionary as HMS Dreadnought had been 15 years previously but with the improvements well hidden below the skin.
Kato was impassive. He stated that he had received no specific instructions on that point but was personally in favour of adopting Balfour's counter-proposal.
Around 4pm Hughes insisted that the two new ships would disrupt his harmonious 'parity calculations' under the 5/5/3 agreement. Britain would have to scrap HMS Tiger, as well as those ships already agreed, or build to the 35,000 ton limit. Not knowing the true nature of the new design, Balfour considered the loss of HMS Tiger too great a sacrifice and reluctantly conceded.
PoD
Balfour states that he is unable to do as Kato did and make that choice without consultation. The meeting adjourns. He receives a reply to the proposal from Beatty at the Admiralty.
"Sacrifice Tiger. Try to get incremental construction. No moratorium."
Next
1) The further discussions around the "battleship holiday".
2) How the contracts with the shipbuilders changed after the PoD and what that meant for the costs of the G3 programme.
David.