Reaching For The Skies – The Space Task Group
Looking back, Thomas O. Paine's Space Task Group was doomed to failure by one simple factor; his leadership. Despite the signals coming from the Nixon Administration that they would not, could not, support an increased budget for space exploration, he still attempted to push for wild ideas such as the landing on Mars, thirty years ahead of its time, and huge space stations the like of which we have yet to realise today. The result was inevitable; Nixon rejected the entire package, station, shuttle, Mars landing, moon bases and all, and essentially told Paine to 'try again, and think small'.
Paine refused, attempting to grandstand with the success of Apollo. Nixon's demand for his resignation was yet another inevitability, as, fortunately, was the choice of George Low as his immediate successor...
What Do You Do After You Have Walked On the Moon? NASA 1969-2009, John Clayton Fischer, University of Ohio Press, 2012
The first act of George Low was, naturally, to attempt to 'mend fences' with President Nixon, not an easy task given both the actions of his predecessor and the legacy of 'Kennedy's ghost' over the whole Apollo Program. He had initially to protect the lunar program; after being tipped off that 'the President likes heroes', he strongly played to this aspect, selling the lunar landings to the Administration as objects of national pride that, furthermore, were already mostly paid for. This tactic worked, albeit only by the skin of its teeth, and funding was guaranteed for the remaining Apollo landing series through to Apollo 20. The follow-on program...
Post-Apollo Mission Planning, MA Thesis, Francis Falk, Rice University, 1989
...that the plans for the MORL had been mothballed for four years, and that we had envisaged a much longer lead time, much longer. If I remember correctly, we were projecting something along the lines of seven years from the initial start date of 1965...and Administrator Low was calling for proposals for something that could be lofted into the air in just four years, in 1973. Fortunately, we were able to leverage a lot of the expertise developed by the Skylab people, though...
...only think that they must have been looking back over a load of old plans. There were no Saturn V launchers left that weren't allocated to the lunar program, you see, but there were a surplus of Saturn IB that hadn't been needed. I guess someone had always figured they could be used for Apollo Applications. We could sell the science part, as well, all Earth resources stuff. The astronomy boys weren't happy, of course, but they were going to get a dedicated mission, even fly one of them aboard...
Oral Testimony, William N. Gardner, MORL Studies Office Director, 1997
The success of the Apollo 11 landing galvanised the nation like nothing before it. Everywhere there was a drive for more progress; and that Nixon was able to announce another nine missions to the Moon, followed by a space station, was certainly a factor in his popularity bounce at about that time. Selling a slightly enhanced NASA budget to Congress was surprisingly straightforward, given the projections of the Bureau of the Budget for a reduced NASA budget in FY 1970-73, despite a series of ambitious projects.
Apollo 11: Forty Years Later, Simon B. Morrison, Space Review, July 20, 2009
NASA Administrators (Apollo Era)
1961-68 James E. Webb
1968-69 Thomas O. Paine
1969-75 George Low
1975-78 Samuel A. Phillips
NASA Deputy Administrators (Apollo Era)
1965-68 Robert C. Seamans
1968 Thomas O. Paine
1968-69 George Low
1969-72 Robert Gilruth
1972-75 John B. Medaris
1975-81 Charles A. Townes
I'll be watching with interest. I still remember your first shot at this.