Chapter III: Finding His Footing (1911-1912)
President: Leonard Wood (R-NH)
Vice President: Myron T. Herrick (R-OH)
Secretary of State: Robert Bacon (R-MA)
Secretary of the Treasury: George B. Cortelyou (R-NY)
(res. 1911); John W. Weeks (R-MA)
Secretary of War: Henry L. Stimson (R-NY)
Attorney General: Charles Nagel (R-MO)
Postmaster General: Charles J. Bonaparte (R-MD)
Secretary of the Navy: George von Lengerke Meyer (R-MA)
Secretary of the Interior: James Rudolph Garfield (R-OH)
(res. 1911); Gifford Pinchot (R-PA)
Secretary of Agriculture: James Wilson (R-IA)
Secretary of Commerce & Labor: John W. Weeks (R-MA)
(abolished 1911)
Secretary of Commerce: (est. 1911) John W. Weeks (R-MA)
(res. 1911); Nathan W. Hale (R-CA)
Secretary of Labor: (est. 1911) James Rudolph Garfield (R-OH)
Early in 1911, the Department of Commerce and Labor was divided into a Department of Commerce and a Department of Labor. This was a decision eagerly supported by progressives, which President Wood capitalized on to garner back some of their trust. However, there were many still upset by the Attorney General's unwillingness to busts the big trusts in the country and President Wood's unwillingness to fire Nagel for fear of the outrage from conservative Republicans that would surely follow. Thus, while the executive branch of government slowly carried out progressive reform throughout most of its ranks, the President was still left to focus on foreign policy issues more than anything.
As the Mexican Revolution wrought ever more turmoil south of the border, President Wood was quick to mobilize troops to protect the border and ensure none of the violence or chaos spilt over into the United States. While there were a few attempted raids by revolutionaries, they were easily rebuffed by the U.S. Army and the message quickly got through that they would not be treated well if they came north. While he never used his predecessors famed expression, newspapers of the era were quick to note the President speaking softly and carrying a big stick.
Early in 1911, a rebellion broke out in Morocco that led to the Second Moroccan Crisis. The French dispatched a flying column at the end of April, claiming to be protecting European citizens and interests. On July 1st, a German gunboat arrived in the Moroccan port of Agadir, followed shortly by other German ships, to protect German trading interest in the country. This action was met swiftly by the British, French, and Americans. The British and Americans, though not acting together, each sent a small naval force to the region. They were both worried that Germany was attempting to establish a naval base on the Atlantic in Morocco. The French, too, began patrolling the Moroccan coast.
In response, the Kaiser petitioned for negotiations to take place to settle the dispute. The British urged the French to agree, hoping to avoid war, and the Germans were eager to involve the Americans in the process. Considering President Wood's previous efforts to involve the Germans in an international arms limitation agreement, the Kaiser wrongly believed that the United States would support the Germans in the negotiation process and that this would help to split the British and French. However, President Wood, like President Roosevelt in the First Moroccan Crisis, did not want to allow the Germans to gain a naval base in Morocco where they might be able to project power deep into the Atlantic. Senators Lodge, Beveridge, Root, and Secretaries Bacon, Stimson, and von Lengerke Meyer were with the President on this matter.
The negotiations took place, on President Wood’s suggestion, in his home town of Winchester, New Hampshire. It was here that the Germans found the Americans unwilling to support their plan of an international security force in Morocco to be divided into regions that would be secured by separate countries. Nor would the Americans support the second plan of the Germans of establishing a multinational security force for the whole of Morocco. However, the French, too, were mistaken about American intentions when, after observing the United States rebuff German designs twice, they believed that the Americans would support their plan of establishing a protectorate over Morocco in exchange for colonial concessions to the German Empire elsewhere in Africa.
Unexpected to both the French and the Germans, the British and the Americans had formed a loose coalition in the negotiations, with the intent of getting each nation to stand down, recognition of Moroccan sovereignty (pushed for most strongly by the Americans), and the agreement of each nation to provide international funding to help Morocco provide security for the interests and citizens of other nations (pushed for most strongly by the British). While there were some that were worried in the British and American delegations that both sides would simply refuse the plan and escalate the crisis further, the British were lobbying hard for the French to come around to the idea. Furthermore, a financial crisis in Berlin forced the Kaiser to come around to the idea, which prompted the French to immediately agree to it. Some of the specifics took a few more days to hammer out, but soon enough the Second Moroccan Crisis had been diffused, staving off war in Europe.
The Treaty of Winchester was hailed in America as President Wood’s own equivalent to President Roosevelt’s Treaty of Portsmouth, and there were those that called for the Nobel Peace Prize to be awarded to President Wood. While this did not occur, it was considered a major success for the Wood Administration.
Leonard Wood had hoped to avoid racial issues as President. He knew that it would be a major political risk that he would have rather not deal with in the White House. There were other issues more important to him. To that end, whenever complaints were made about an African-American in a civil service position, President Wood pushed for them to be quietly dismissed if some plausible grounds for dismissal not directly related to the color of their skin could be found. He was more than willing to do this on his own, but he did not want to make it a big issue for fear of the outrage it might spark amongst progressive and strongly anti-segregation Republicans. He also had not had dinner with any African-Americans in his time in office - until August 1911.
President Wood invited his predecessor to dinner, along with a few other close friends. The intention was for each man to bring his wife, but Mrs. Roosevelt suddenly became ill. It was with that fateful illness that former President Roosevelt took it upon himself to bring Booker T. Washington to the White House with him for dinner. President Wood was taken by surprise, and met the next morning with scathing editorials from southern and Democratic-leaning papers.
The President was forced into defending Washington’s visit, and President Roosevelt persuaded him to defend the jobs of African-Americans who were doing good work in civil service positions. While many civil rights leaders were unimpressed by Wood’s half-hearted defense of Washington and overture to them, it helped the President win back the confidence of other progressive Republicans less intimately involved in the civil rights movement.
In the final months of 1911 and the opening months of 1912, then, the President signed into law a flurry of progressive legislation - restricting child and women labor hours, granting greater powers for the executive branch to intervene in and arbitrate disputes between labor and business in key industries, passing health standards on a number of food products, expanding the national parks, etc. While Leonard Wood had stumbled in his first few years in the White House, by the Spring of 1912 he had found his footing - and just in the knick of time for the next election.
