Welcome to Third Time’s The Charm. I’ve been meaning to put TTL out for a while but I kept not completing enough of the early phases of it on time so to speak. I knew I wanted to post it on a Yugoslav holiday but kept missing milestones. Thankfully, May gives me lots of options. Labour Day, Victory Over Fascism Day, and Youth Day.
The fact that I'm 2 hours late in my time zone shouldn't matter. Just imagine I'm posting from Mexico City or somewhere else in that time zone.
Happy Youth Day. I suppose you could consider this a birthday present for Tito, though I don't think he'd like it very much.
Below you will find, probably tomorrow evening, the first “real” post of TTL, the opening map, which has been in the map thread already, but before that, what is TTL?
Think of a best case scenario for Yugoslavia after the tensions that led to the war IOTL already started to brew. A late 80s/early 90s best case.
A world where the Yugoslav wars, for the most part, never happened.
Expected questions:
What will you cover?
Just about everything. There’s no strict methodology, it’ll be whatever topic I find interesting in the moment or feel needs to be focused on. Currently I have plans for posts on a range of topics, including Yugoslav and world politics, wars, football (soccer), licence plates, public transit, youth subcultures, news media, web browsers, and snacks.
What vibe are you going for?
It’s not going to be perfect or rosy, but nor is it overly edgy grimdark. It’s somewhere in the middle. Some things are much better than IOTL while others are much worse.
Yugoslavia and the Balkans are doing better than IOTL by a long shot. That said, nationalism, corruption, and moral depravity still exist. Politicians are still working in the interests of themselves and/or their countries or ethnic/religious communities. It’s not all benevolence and cooperation.
Originally TTL was gonna be very sunny and optimistic, but I kept having ideas for interesting developments in global politics that were kind of contrary to that, and felt that a totally optimistic world may be a smidge boring. So TTL is about as dark as OTL on average. Depending on your personal political leanings you may have different ideas about what is better and what is worse, but the average should be comparable regardless of that. There are some elements of this more optimistic version of the TL that I still plan on including.
Hard or soft AH?
If 10 is so well researched and plausible it could be academic speculation and 1 is ASB, I would say I’m aiming for a 6 or 7. Based in research and reasoning, things generally stem from the POD in one way or another, within the bounds of plausibility even if not always THE most likely result, with some room for rule of cool/narrative and lightly steered outcomes. Like I said though, some stuff will be kind of rule of cool, so don't get mad when you see it (or do, I don't care much, it's my TL, but I'd rather you don't stress over it).
What’s the POD?
The POD is basically more moderate people in charge of Serbia and Bosnia by 1991. In Croatia I feel getting a candidate open to Yugoslavia in charge is implausible without a much earlier POD and I really wanted a “last minute best case” situation. This isn’t one of those unrealistic “Union of Reform Forces sweeps, nobody is a nationalist, Yugoslavia goes to the moon” TLs, but more a “moderate nationalists come to a stable enough compromise since most people were fine with Yugoslavia as long as it addressed certain ethnic concerns”.
Do you take questions and suggestions?
Feel free to ask questions and I will answer for sure. Your question may even inspire a post or even a few.
Suggestions are welcome, especially if you have particular knowledge in some field I’m covering (if you feel you know some sport or some region’s politics better than I do, definitely offer feedback). That said, this isn’t a collaborative TL and I ultimately have the final say. If I like something enough, I’ll keep it even despight feedback, but that doesn’t mean feedback isn’t appreciated nor that I’m not open to accepting it on aspects of the TL I’m less set on.
On some posts I may include a “help wanted” section at the end, indicating fields I want to cover but know little about. In this case, I’m looking for information, speculation, and/or reliable sources from more knowledgeable people.
What’s the posting schedule gonna be?
I’ll try to keep it to once every two weeks at first. This should be doable during the summer but IDK what happens when the school year resumes and of course anything else, from getting sick to staying at my cottage which has no internet. To begin with, expect weekly posts.
How will the TL be formatted?
At least in the beginning, TTL will be posted vaguely chronologically. Not strictly month to month or year to year but broadly I’ll eclectically cover one decade’s events and developments, with some in more direct chronological order if they affect each other, before moving on to the next decade. That said, especially for cultural things, I may jump back to flesh stuff out from a previous decade. If something interests me at the moment, I will also drop in random bits of later information amid the chronological posts. The first batch of posts is intended to focus more on Yugoslavia in the early and mid 1990s, before moving back to look at the wider world in the same era.
Not entirely. Changes to the information in them, in some cases their format, and even, in the case of at least the 2010 map, the graphics, have happened in the meantime, and more may still happen. Only what I post and threadmark in this thread is canon.
Will they be posted in the same order?
No. The NAMnet World News/Tanjug/Kino post, for example, won't show up until a bit later. The license plates also won't show up for a while.
Presentation style
Most posts will include, unsurprisingly, a map or graphic, but unlike some M&G TLs, they will almost always include a lot of text. I tend to write long writeups. You can ask for a TL/DR but I can’t guarantee I’ll always have the energy to summarise. That said, when I have the energy, I will provide it. I also try to convey a good amount of information via the graphics, so you should be able to enjoy the TL even if you just skim it. Naturally, you will get more out of it if you read, so obviously, I encourage that.
Titles and subtitles
Most, but not all, posts will have titles and section titles based around song lyrics that fit the events described in the post. The focus is on Yugoslav rock and pop from the 70s to the 90s, but other genres, like rap, 90s ultranationalist turbofolk, 20th century patriotic songs, and more can be expected to show up as well. I will keep it mostly limited to music from the Yugoslav region but I might sometimes pick foreign songs too. I will provide links to the songs when possible. I cannot guarantee their quality, only that their lyrics at least somewhat fit the post.
I worry I’ll disappoint you somehow lmao.
I’m a Serb myself & I know Balkan history & politics decently well, but I worry that there’s some hole in my knowledge that’ll lead TTL to look stupid to fellow Balkaners.
That or you might not like how some figures are characterized.
I worry I’ll disappoint you somehow lmao.
I’m a Serb myself & I know Balkan history & politics decently well, but I worry that there’s some hole in my knowledge that’ll lead TTL to look stupid to fellow Balkaners.
That or you might not like how some figures are characterized.
I was born in Canada but my parents grew up in Sarajevo.
If you see me using ijekavica when I write things in Serbian for TTL, even in Cyrillic, don’t be surprised, that’s my default.
I have two questions.
1-Do you have any plans regarding Turkey?
2-Who will be the leader of Bosnia, I wonder?
Fikret Abdic seems the best known Yugoslavia supporter in Bosnia, but from what I got, he was just an extremely opportunistic businessman with a massive cult of personality in his home region, who simply would have try to make the entire Bosnia his fiefdom.
Good to hear. If you ever have any feedback, feel free to let me know, like I said above.
Ah default settings Serb.
I was born in Canada but my parents grew up in Sarajevo.
If you see me using ijekavica when I write things in Serbian for TTL, even in Cyrillic, don’t be surprised, that’s my default.
Map of Yugoslavia 2011
Karta Jugoslavije 2011e
Карта Југославије 2011е
Od Vardara pa do Triglava Šmrekovca Od Đerdapa pa do Jadrana
Kao niska sjajnog đerdana
Sviletlim suncem obasjana
Ponosito sred Balkana
Jugoslavijo, Jugoslavijo!
(From the Vardar to Triglav Šmrekovac
From Đerdap to the Adriatic
Like a string of radiant pearls*
Lit by a bright sun
Proudly in heart of the Balkans (you stand)
Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia!)
Milutin Popović Zahar
Title:
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Population: 20,231,574
GDP: $564.2 billion
GDP per capita: $27,887 (for reference, between Guyana and Lithuania IOTL, better than OTL and TTL Croatia and Poland, around 41st in the world)
Republic profiles:
Republic of [name]:
Anthem: title
President:
Representative:
Ethnic Makeup:
Srbi = Serbs
Albanci = Albanians
Jugosloveni = Yugoslavs
Mađari = Magyars
Romi = Roma
Bošnjaci = Bosniaks
Hrvati = Croats
Gorani = Gorani
Slovaci = Slovaks
Rumuni = Romanians
Bunjevci = Bunjevci
Bošnjaci = Bosniaks
Crnogorci (Srbi) = Montenegrin (Serb)
Crnogorci (Etnički)= Montenegrin (Ethnic)
Makedonci = Macedonians
Turci = Turks
Ostali = Other
Province Profiles:
Autonomous Province of [name]
Premier
Ethnic Makeup:
Other details:
National Flag
Top Government (positions)
President: Ivan Stambolić
Prime Minister: Dušan Bajatović
Foreign Minister: Živadin Jovanović
Interior Minister: Rasim Ljajić
Defence Minister: Dragoljub Ojdanić
Finance Minister: Ejup Ganić
Justice Minister: Hatidža Hadžiosmanović
Minority Rights Minister: Nikola Gruevski
Special Minister for Kosovo and Metohija: Milan Radoičić
Minister for the Economy: Bogoljub Karić
Belgrade:
Federal Okrug of Belgrade
Anthem: Himna Beogradu
President of the Okrug Assembly: Aleksandar Antić
Population: 1,609,067
Key:
1. Federal Okrug of Belgrade (City of Belgrade)
2. Jablanica Lake
Autonomous Provinces and Federal Okrugs
Military Operational Zone (M.O.Z.)
Regions of special security interest (former parts of the M.O.Z. returned to civilian administration
Capital
Republican Capital
Provincial Capital
City
Republican Boundary
Provincial Boundary
Borders of foreign countries
Borders of foreign autonomous regions
*I know đerdan just means necklace, but the lyrics definitely seem to imply a string of pearls, or at least come off better in English that way.
This map is set pretty far in the future of TTL so it is, of all things posted early on, perhaps the most likely to change by the time we get to 2011. There have already been changes to it since it was originally posted, and I am already thinking of changing the year to 2009. See if you can spot all the differences between this and the original map.
There is one thing on this map that is not de facto the case, but rather depicts the situation that the Yugoslav government recognises as legitimate. It's not anything about Kosovo-Metohija. See if you can guess what it is.
U ime svih nas iz pedeset i neke za zakletvu Titu sam spevala stih.
Ne spominjem prošlost ni bitke daleke,
jer rođena sam posle njih.
U nama je sudbina budućih dana
i neki se možda i plaše za nju.
Kroz vene nam protiče krv partizana,
i mi znamo zašto smo tu.
Računajte na nas…
(In the name of all of us born in the 50s
For my oath to Tito, I sang a verse
It makes no mention of the past nor distant battles
Because I was born long after them
In us is the fate of future days
And some may fear for it
But through our veins flows Partisan blood
And we know why we are here.
Count on us…)
Đorđe Balašević
Brotherhood If Not Unity
Bratstvo Ako Ne Jedinstvo
Братство Ако Не Јединство
Preti Nam, Preti Nam Duboki Vir (We are Threatened by a Deep Whirlpool) - Rising Tensions (OTL background):
The late 1980s were a tense time for the peoples of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Following the death of the country’s leader, marshal Josip Broz “Tito” in 1980, it found itself without competent, unifying leadership and tensions old and new began to rear their heads. In the early ‘80s things went on almost as they had before. The early shock and collective mourning for the relatively popular dictator kept people united to a degree but one thought lurked in the back of everyone’s mind: this changes everything. The first voices coming to the fore were the democratic ones. Tito and his improvement of the standard of living may have been for the most part popular, but he had still suppressed free speech, and many opinions, as yet unvoiced, were waiting to make themselves heard, so the push for free press and free elections began almost immediately. Naturally, there were also now calls for a more market-oriented economy along the lines of the wealthier west as well. Among the suppressed opinions lay something else, though. National consciousness had largely been swept under the rug under Tito. A matter of private opinion not voiced in public. “We may be many peoples but we are all Yugoslav brothers working together” was the official, party-approved line of thinking. Well, no more.
Nowhere was this national consciousness more evident than in Croatia. Though it had sought unification with the other South Slavs in the first world war to free itself from Austrian rule, Croatia had, since the beginning, had its doubts about Yugoslavia. It had long worried about domination by the country’s largest group, the Serbs, and had always sought decentralisation. The Socialists had thought that the decentralised model of 6 republics would alleviate these fears, but it did not. Even as early as 1967, Croatian politicians had rebelled against the party over fears of too much Croatian money being funnelled into federal, and, in the fears of many Croats, Serbian coffers. This had resulted in a new, even more decentralised constitution, but, following Tito’s death, it became evident that this was not enough. Tito, being a Croat himself and having fought alongside and formed friendships with many of the Croatian communist leaders in the second world war, had been far more lenient to the nationally-conscious politicians of Croatia than he had been with their counterparts in other republics. This meant that many of the voices behind Croatian national awakening in the ‘80s were the same that had been behind the 1967 Croatian Spring. Well-established, well-connected, experienced politicians like Franjo Tuđman, with a thoroughly developed national agenda. One which increasingly moved towards independence.
Slovenia also began to toy with the idea of independence. Not so much because of a robust nationalist movement as was the case in Croatia or Serbia, but rather because of their great wealth and prosperity. Being the wealthiest and most western-connected republic in the union, some in Slovenia were eager to cut off the dead weight of Yugoslavia and enter the democratic, liberal, and capitalist world of Central Europe where they believed their homeland belonged. Furthermore, speaking a language distinct from the Serbocroatian spoken in Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Montenegro, the Slovenes felt somewhat isolated from what they saw as the core Yugoslav identity. Slovenes had never been terribly invested in nor opposed to Yugoslavia. They were not as active in resisting Austria as Serbs and Croats, but neither were their voices against Yugoslavia ever as loud as Croatian ones. Still, every day, more and more leaned towards a peaceful secession.
Both Slovene and Croatian separatists had enthusiastic support from Western Europe, particularly Germany and France.
Ironically, despite other republics fearing Serbian domination, no group with its own republic in Yugoslavia felt more curtailed than the Serbs. The Serbs were also a group that was, on average, rather patriotic and nationally conscious, however their nationalists had been in an entirely different position to the Croat ones. Firstly, though other ethnicities also had populations in neighbouring republics, no group was more “partitioned” than the Serbs. The mountainous inland region of Lika in Croatia, along with parts of Slavonia were inhabited by Serbs, who made up around 12% of the republic’s population. In Bosnia there were even more, around 32% of the population. Finally, the majority of the population of Montenegro identified simultaneously as “Montenegrins” and Serbs, seeing the former as a subcategory of the latter, and even more identified with the Serbian language and Serbian Orthodox Church. Many Serbs felt that, while most Croats were in Croatia, most Muslims (today’s Bosniaks) in Bosnia, and almost all Macedonians were in Macedonia, Yugoslavia’s administrative divisions had given them the short end of the stick. Even more pressingly, Serbia itself was the only republic that had autonomous provinces within it: Kosovo for its Albanian minority and Vojvodina for a diverse array of minorities in the Pannonian Basin, primarily Hungarians. Importantly, these provinces, mainly Kosovo, as Vojvodina was fairly “loyal” to Serbia, wielded such power in the republic’s politics that their representatives could, for all intents and purposes, veto the decisions of Serbia’s parliament. Though this power was given as a guarantee to the provinces to keep them safe from the central government of the republic, it served primarily to enrage the Serbs, making them feel like subjects to the minorities in their own country, or worse, that a province with deep historic and religious importance to them was acting almost like a separate republic. More than anything, however, the Serbs feared the rising separatist movements, especially in Croatia, worrying that independence would lead to the oppression of the republic’s Serb population. This fear had existed even in the kingdom of Yugoslavia, and had, seemingly, been proven when, upon gaining “independence” for the first time in a thousand years, Croatia came to be governed by the Ustaše, a brutal fascist government installed by the Nazis, which perpetrated a horrific genocide against Serbs along with the more usual targets of the holocaust: Jews and Roma. While the belief that Yugoslavia “oppressed” Serbs remained rather fringe, largely restricted to those in the diaspora descended from Četniks, the issues of provincial autonomy and worries about the treatment of Serbs in an independent Croatia had many Serbs fearing what the future held, with Serbs largely desiring a united and more centralised Yugoslavia.
Among those Serbs who felt their people were downtrodden in Yugoslavia were the Četniks and neo-Četniks. The Četniks were a deeply controversial Serb nationalist, Orthodox Christian conservative monarchist resistance movement during the second world war, noted for their willingness to cooperate with the occupiers temporarily if it meant weakening their communist rivals, the Partisans. Their leadership felt that even in the far more Serb-dominated Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Serbs had been dealt a bad hand, and advocated for an absolutely maximalist greater Serbia. Unsurprisingly, the Četniks were both very unpopular and illegal in the socialist Yugoslavia that the partisans had built, and most fled to the west, however a small minority back home still harboured Četnik sympathies. These were mainly the relatives of Četnik exiles who mainly sided with the Četniks because they felt their Četnik relatives, who they knew or thought of as good people, were unfairly vilified and driven into exile by the communist government. Now, these “cousins from Chicago” started writing back a lot more, some returned from exile after Tito’s death as freedom of expression started to grow. In certain, especially areas, particularly in rural parts of Croatia’s Serb-majority region of Krajina and some social circles in Belgrade, a cult of personality began to build around one of the most controversial Četnik warlords or “dukes”, Momčilo Đujić. Đujić, infamously the most avid collaborator among the Četniks, based out of the United States, promoted a particularly extreme brand of Serbian revanchism and monarchism. He granted the title of duke to popular nationalist, conservative, and anticommunist Serbian politician Vojislav Šešelj. The Serbs remained divided between Yugoslavist and Socialist-leaning centralists who sought a more cohesive Yugoslavia and the conservative, greater-Serbia oriented Četniks, with the former being more popular but less coordinated. The rising star of Serb socialist centralism was Slobodan Milošević, a populist calling for quick and drastic action. Though in the 1980s, he was far from the forefront of politics, rather, he was the increasingly independent protege of the more moderate, more careful, president of Serbia, Ivan Stambolić.
The predominantly Muslim Gheg Albanians in Kosovo and in the West of Macedonia had always been reluctant about being part of Yugoslavia, given that they were not Slavs and had had tensions with their Christian, Slavic neighbours. The problem that their desire for independence posed was that, on top of their historic tensions with the Serbs, the two groups having slaughtered each other at just about any opportunity since the early 1800s, was the importance of Kosovo to Serbian national identity. The land where they gained their religious independence, where their holiest sites lay, and where their forefathers had fought their desperate last stand against the invading Ottomans, whose memory kept their hope alive through five centuries of oppression, was not a place the Serbs would give up without a fight. As hatred grew, Albanian nationalists in Kosovo, including in the Albanian-dominated local police force, began harassing the province’s relatively small Serb population, and Serbs began to cry out for bloody vengeance. The “People’s Movement of Kosovo” advocated for an armed separatist uprising. Naturally, Albania and the Albanian diaspora worldwide were mostly supportive of these movements.
Macedonia, similarly to Slovenia, felt out of place in Yugoslavia as its people did not speak Serbocroatian. They had, prior to the second world war, identified with Bulgaria and sought to secede and join it, but the treatment of Macedonians by Axis Bulgaria had led them to find their own identity, an endeavour eagerly supported by the Yugoslav government. A new political party named after these pro-Bulgarian separatists, but now touting distinct Macedonian nationalism, began to rise to prominence: the VMRO-DPMNE (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization - Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity), alongside many in the Communist party espousing stronger Macedonian national feelings. The Macedonian people and leadership remained more apathetic to secession, due to their cultural closeness to fellow Slavic and Orthodox Serbs and their economic reliance on Yugoslav federal investment, but nonetheless feared Serbian domination and Serbianisation. If a decentralised and ethnically-egalitarian union between the republics could not be achieved to their satisfaction, the Macedonians were geared to secede.
Bosnia’s Muslims had also been growing their national consciousness. They had spent the 20th century trying to figure out where they belonged in the framework of modern nationalities. Many had advocated for identifying as “Muslim Serbs” or “Muslim Croats” but, with Serbs and Croats increasingly making their identities Orthodox and Catholic exclusive respectively, the “Muslims” found themselves comfortably settling into the role of a distinct South Slavic nation. In the Socialist Yugoslavia, this status had been recognized with the addition of the “Muslim” ethnicity to the census. Now, however, many increasingly sought to define themselves beyond just religion, as a more modern nation, especially given the decline in Islamic practice under socialism. They sought to identify themselves with the kingdom of Bosnia and thus have a historical region and state to tie themselves to, and came to push the term “Bosniak” to describe themselves, rather than Muslim. On the other hand, some, with the fall of socialism, sought to return to the religion that made them distinct from their neighbours, and revive the presence of Islam, its laws, and practices, in Bosniak life. The two views were not exclusive and often did overlap. A few who held these views, especially on the more extreme end championed by Alija Izetbegović, sought not only an independent but also an Islamist Bosnia modelled on Pakistan, where Islamic law must be the basis of all government institutions, despite the country’s religious diversity. Even more worrying, Izetbegović insisted that Muslims must constitute a majority in the state, while in Bosnia, Muslims formed a plurality but the two Christian denominations together still formed a majority. The views of Izetbegović were fairly fringe, and the majority of the newly-dubbed Bosniaks continue to favour a secular and united Yugoslavia with simply more autonomy for the republics and Bosniak interests in mind, even often holding socialist-leaning views. Nonetheless, Izetbegović’s extreme rhetoric and growing popularity worried Serbs and Croats alike. Bosniaks were wary of Serb domination in the union, but far less hostility existed between Serbs and Bosniaks than between Serbs and Croats. The SDA, Party of Democratic Action, a big tent Bosniak interest/nationalist party arose to represent all the Bosniaks and within it began a power struggle between moderate separatists, islamists, and yugoslavist autonomists. The Islamist wing had eager supporters in Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
Bosnia and Herzegovina, in its great diversity, presented a unique problem. Apart from the Bosniaks, divided between Islamism and secular nationalism and between separatism and federalism, there were also Bosnian Serbs, overwhelmingly in favour of Yugoslav unity, with a fringe but growing faction seeking to append Serb-majority parts of Bosnia & Herzegovina to Serbia. Meanwhile, Croats in the republic sought to separate alongside Croatia. Particularly, western Herzegovina was known for birthing the most nationalistic Croats in the world, and its rural areas were a den of neo-Ustaša sentiment.
Add to this an economy unsure how to enter a free market world and rampant political corruption landing politically incompetent embezzlers in high offices because of who their cousins were, the country looked on the brink of collapse. The dream of inter-ethnic cooperation and peace in a single country strengthened by unity, the dream that the current generation of adults, whether they liked it or not, had grown up with, looked about to fade. But the edge of the cliff is not the fall. Yugoslavia had not had an easy history, so perhaps it could be brought back from the brink collapse.
As the 90s progressed and nationalist and separatist voices grew louder, so did the pushback. Many young people protested in favour of unity, even as others campaigned for dissolution, and the outcome of this era of Yugoslav history was far less certain than it appeared.
Sumnjaju Neki da Nosi Nas Pogrešan Tok (Some Suspect that the Wrong Current Carries us) - Power Grabs:
On September 16th, 1987, Ivan Stambolić, president of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, sent a letter to the Belgrade branch of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. It could have been the letter that would break his grip on Serbian politics. The letter that issued commands. The letter that sparked spite. But it was not. It was a different letter. One which suggested. Stambolić offered the branch his reasoning for opposing the deposition of its president, Dragiša Pavlović, but ended by asking the branch to “come to its own conclusions, based on the facts he presented and their own understanding of the situation” and promising to support whatever decision the party made. Unbeknownst to him at the time, the branch’s leaders were largely won over and would oppose the motion to depose Pavlović, pushed by Stambolić’s former protege Slobodan Milošević.
On September 18th, the presidency of the Serbian Communist Party met. While Stambolić tried to reconcile his student and his ally, Milošević went on the offensive, proclaiming Pavlović a threat to ideological unity, but his accusations fell on deaf ears. The presidency stood behind Pavlović and it was decided he would not be deposed. A vote was scheduled to “reanalyze Milošević’s role in the party leadership”. Stambolić arranged to have that meeting broadcast live to the public.
On September 24th, 1987, president of the League of Communists of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević was arrested on live television. Accused of “no longer being a representative of the league’s will”, he was deposed as president of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in Serbia. Shortly after, evidence was brought forth of attempts to bribe and even intimidate high ranking party members into supporting him, and of his supposed connection to organised crime in Belgrade which he allegedly used to make his threats. Much of the evidence remains hotly disputed, but some are widely accepted as legitimate, and at the time, they served their purpose. He was expelled from the League of Communists and banned from involvement in politics. In a bid to win over Milošević’s supporters in the public, Stambolić vowed to be hard on Albanian terrorism in Kosovo and that “no negotiations would be had with those who used terror as their bargaining chip”. Still, he also cautioned that “a terrorist is not a civilian, and the two should never be conflated”. Following the meeting, most of Milošević’s closest supporters were removed from their posts, and unbeknownst to the world, one of the bloodiest wars of the late 20th century became far less likely. Stambolić convinced Pavlović to stop talking about negotiation, but at first took only limited actions to curb Kosovo’s autonomy, simply increasing the federal police presence.
The debate that had sparked this scandal was a rather minor one. Both Milošević and Stambolić were Yugoslavist, nationally conscious Socialists who sought to curb Kosovo’s autonomy after the concessions given in the 70s, which they saw as extreme. The difference was in the method. Milošević was, as Stambolić saw it, a hasty, radical, and extreme populist. To gain favour with the masses, he sought to strip the autonomy all at once, in a big, recognizable event, and he sought to suppress his opponents, both Albanian and Serbian, by any means necessary. Stambolić was older and wiser. Every post he had held, Milošević inherited, so he was always a step ahead of Slobodan in his experience. For him, as an established politician, the Kosovo issue did not need to be a publicity stunt. Such a change to the country’s constitution would have to be taken slowly, implemented gradually, and through more legal means. While not averse to the corruption that was widespread in Yugoslavia’s government, Stambolić preferred diplomacy or at worst legal action to open backroom intimidation. Pavlović, an ally of Stambolić’s, had voiced a more moderate stance on Kosovo early on. While his later career would see a shift to a “tough on terror” stance, then at times soften again, early on he was willing to negotiate with those calling for independence, and, importantly, with Kosovar leader Ibrahim Rugova, who had been pushing for Kosovo to become a republic within Yugoslavia. This approach proved unpopular with the majority in Serbia, and the pushback against it had been weaponized by Milošević, and was thus quickly abandoned by Pavlović, likely at Stambolić’s behest. This change makes Pavlović’s actual position on Kosovo hard to gauge.
On June 28th 1989, the 600th anniversary of the battle of Kosovo, Ivan Stambolić spoke before the Gazimestan, an iconic monument on the battlefield. He spoke of the importance of the battle and of the land to Serbia, describing Kosovo as a “land watered by Serbian blood, from which the last flower of our freedom bloomed”, drawing parallels to the second world war, he said “In 1389, we were disunited, there were those among us who betrayed their duty and did not protect their homes, and though their courage was commendable, only small forces from surrounding states came to help. Since then we have fought many times to protect our freedom. In 1941, when our freedom was threatened, not just Serbs, but the many peoples of Yugoslavia, came together to protect it, and won. These two truths are eternal. The first: Kosovo is the altar on which the Serb people sacrificed themselves for liberty! As its very plants grow out of Serbian bones, it is, and will always be the living heart of Serbia. Inseparable and vital! The second: Yugoslavia is the promise that, through collective strength, none of its peoples will ever have to make such a sacrifice again, and as such, must remain united!”. Stambolić did not attempt to paint Yugoslavia or its liberation as a purely Serb endeavour, but sought to frame the Serbian sacrifice at Kosovo as a heroic but ultimately unsuccessful predecessor to the Yugoslav project precisely because alone the Serbs could not protect the freedom of the South Slavs. He walked a fine line of entrenching Kosovo’s importance to the Serbs without angering the other republics. The speech serves as an omen of his future policy which would treat the issue of Kosovo’s autonomy as Serbia’s internal matter which had no bearing on the autonomy of, or role of Serbs in, the other republics. Towards the middle of the speech, Stambolić was approached by a group of Serbs from Kosovo in what some analysts have called a staged display, to expound a number of grievances, including harassment by Albanians in the Kosovo provincial police, discrimination by the provincial government, and unrelenting abuses by the local Albanian population. Stambolić promised “decisive actions to protect the Serbs of Kosovo and restore order and peace between the province’s two largest peoples, including amendments to the constitution”. He finished the speech by saying “were all the Serbs of Kosovo to be expelled from there, and not a single Serb left in the province, it would still, and forever, be an inseparable part of Serbia, for every tree and every stone in the province is the grave-marker of a Serb, the blood and bones of Serbs feed its fertile fields, and lie beneath its towering mountains. Any government that fails to protect its people has failed as a government, and thus abuse of Serbs within the very heart of Serbia cannot be permitted to continue any longer. Order will be restored! You will be protected! The heroes of Kosovo died so that their descendants may live in a free, self governing, and safe Serbia, and we shall ensure that such a Serbia remains a reality, within a free, multiethnic, and united Yugoslavia. Long live the memory of the Battle of Kosovo! Long live the memory of Czar Lazar! Long live Serbia! Long live Yugoslavia!”. The reference to self-governance is widely seen as an attack on the “domination by the provinces” that the 1974 constitution produced, where the autonomous provinces wielded disproportionate power over Serbian politics.
The first constitutional amendment he passed brough the provincial branch of the Yugoslav militia (police) under tighter control from the Republic's ministry of internal affairs. It also stated that any municipality in the autonomous province was entitled to its own self-contained police force, and that any municipality whose Serb population exceeded 30% would have to have a police force “whose percentage of Serb militiamen would be no smaller than 10% less than the portion of the population which the Serbs represent in that municipality, such that if the Serb population is 30%, the militia must be no less than 20% Serb, for 40%, at least 30% in the militia, and so on”. Far from bringing peace, this development worried ethnic Albanians, but it did guarantee the security of the province’s Serb population for the time being. It was widely criticised as an ethnonationalist move, but the League of Communists of Serbia defended it, saying that “Serbia is a republic of many peoples, but primarily of Serbs, and as Serbs have lately been under threat in their own homeland because of police abuse, certain special protections are required”. Stambolić also redrew municipal boundaries in Kosovo to ensure almost all of the Serb population was within municipalities entitled to special representation in the police force. Not long after, the "10 percent margin law" was extended to include Montenegrins, Bosniaks, Gorani, Janjevci, and Roma. Essentially, any non-Albanian ethnicity. Mass investigations were also made into accounts of abuse, resulting in many arrests. Stambolić also took the opportunity to purge many political opponents in Kosovo for alleged involvement in these abuses, leaving a government that was much friendlier to Stambolić than the general population. Kosovar separatist politicians filled prisons. A few incidents initiated by Serbs took place, but by and large, the populace was not stirred to violence by Stambolić, as the Serbs came to see themselves as being on the side of law and order, and most saw extrajudicial violence as antithetical to that.
Power plays in the other republics were also unfolding. In 1990, Yugoslavia held its first democratic elections, with separatists coming to power in both Slovenia and Croatia. In Bosnia, a coalition of 3 nationalist parties, the Serb Democratic Party, the Croatian Democratic Union, and the Party of Democratic Action, toppled the communists with a platform of Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats "together in our B&H, in Yugoslavia". Autonomist Fikret Abdić of the Party of Democratic Action was elected president of the 3-man presidency. Fellow member of the Presidency and runner up, Alija Izetbegović, a separatist, Bosniak nationalist, and Islamist, attempted to bribe Abdić into resigning the office to him, offering a degree of informal power sharing. Suspecting ulterior motives, Abdić refused the offer. After Izetbegović threatened him, Abdić exposed his actions to the public. The attempt at bribery and intimidation caused Izetbegović’s popularity to plummet. Mirroring Stambolić’s consolidation of power in Serbia, Abdić proposed a bill blacklisting anyone convicted of collaboration with the Nazis from ever holding political office. Izetbegović had been imprisoned for collaboration between 1946 and and 1949 for the collaboration of his organisation, the Young Muslims, with the Bosniak-majority WaffenSS Handschar division. The law had strong support from Abdić’s allies and from Bosnian Serbs. Though clearly specifically targeting Izetbegović, most Bosniak politicians supported the bill, even many of Izetbegović’s own supporters felt they could not afford to appear favourable to Fascism. Croat politicians generally also supported the bill, either out of personal conviction or to preserve their image. In subsequent rhetoric by the Abdić wing of the SDA, Izetbegović and his supporters were depicted as Islamist Fascists who threatened peace in Yugoslavia. Most Serb politicians echoed this sentiment as well, as did many Croats. Both minority groups feared how they would fare in an independent Bosnia run by Izetbegović.
Moramo Čuvati Mir (We Must Preserve Peace) - The Brijuni meeting:
In late June 1991, Croatia and Slovenia declared independence. Serb-majority regions of Croatia proclaimed themselves “Serb Autonomous Provinces” and began raising militias to protect this status. Right wing and far right Serb politicians like Šešelj toured these SAPs, waving Četnik flags and riling up the populace. The Yugoslav government and international community feared war. A European-mediated meeting on the island of Brijoni in Croatia seemed the last hope for peace. The conference was attended by the prime minister of Yugoslavia, a Croat and liberal-capitalist reformer, Ante Marković, and the presidents of the republics, including the increasingly influential Serbian president Ivan Stambolić. Stambolić and Marković agreed to 5 key goals prior to the meeting:
Attempt to preserve the unity of Yugoslavia by finding a compromise that would prevent secession.
If 1 failed, reorganising what was left of Yugoslavia to prevent further secessions
If 1 failed, promoting regional economic and border cooperation, especially between the two seceding republics and Yugoslavia
Negotiating autonomy for the Serbs of Croatia to prevent countersecession
Creating a framework for lasting peace between the ethnicities of Yugoslavia
Point 4 was largely the work of Stambolić, but Marković agreed that without autonomy for Croatian Serbs, the Serbs would not accept the secession and there would be war in Croatia, a war which would inflame ethnic tensions in Yugoslavia further whether or not Yugoslavia got involved. These points were characterised by the slogan “brotherhood if not unity”.
Slovenian independence was easily accepted, with the only concessions being a favourable trade agreement for Yugoslavia and a generous timeframe for the withdrawal of Yugoslav troops, alongside a commitment to later talks on the status of Slovenian residents with citizenship from other republics. To Marković’s disappointment, Slovenia refused to engage in any further integration. The JNA agreed to leave a few armoured vehicles for the fledgling Slovenian Armed Forces. Croatian leader Franjo Tuđman strongly opposed autonomy for the Serbs but under pressure from his backers in Western Europe, with urging from Marković, and finally after the Yugoslav delegation threatened not to recognize Croatian independence, a compromise was reached. German and especially French politicians urged the Croats not to throw away peaceful independence over centralism, but also essentially promised that they would treat autonomy as a temporary arrangement and seek the gradual integration of the Serb regions into Croatian institutions. The Serbian Autonomous Provinces would be reorganised into the Autonomous Republic of Krajina and in exchange Yugoslavia would create an autonomous province for Croats in Western Herzegovina. This concession to the Croats was begrudgingly accepted by Abdić with offers of additional federal grants from Marković and a secret promise from Stambolić to help him work towards reducing the autonomy of the provinces in the new constitution. The negotiations also resulted in a passport-free travel agreement between Croatia and Yugoslavia, allowing citizens of one country to enter the other with just an ID card. The justification was that “many Yugoslav citizens have family and property in Croatia, and many Croatian citizens have family and property in Yugoslavia”. This, along with an agreement on low tarrifs, also allowed pre-existing Yugoslav companies centred in Croatia (some of which were to be handed over to Croatian control) to retain their Yugoslav market with relative ease. It also made travel through Yugoslav Neum, which split Croatian territory in two, possible. Stambolić suggested that the Croatian government might soothe Serb fears about living in a new Croatia by formally denouncing the NDH in a session of parliament, or even to visit Jasenovac. Tuđman refused to do the latter, likely out of his own anti Serb sentiments, but, as a former Partisan himself, was willing to denounce the Ustaše. During its first session, the Croatian parliament issued a formal denunciation written by Tuđman:
“The Croatian government, representing the Croatian people, condemns the murderous regime of the Ustaše installed by the Fascist occupiers in our country. Its campaign of genocide against Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies, and its murder of antifascist Croats were unforgivable sins and are contrary to the desires and goals of the Croatian government and people. The Republic of Croatia is not, and can never imagine itself to be, a successor to the NDH. We always have and will continue to oppose Fascism in all its forms. Freedom from Fascism is an essential component of the freedom of Croatia and the democratic government we are seeking to build.”
The first draft of the statement, which was illegally released by one of Tuđman’s aides in 2003, ended with the famous Partisan slogan “Death to Fascism, Freedom to the People”, but Tuđman ultimately decided not to include it. Another aspect of the initial draft was reversing the order of the victim groups, such that it said “Gypsies, Jews, and Serbs”, believed to be an intentional subversion of the usual order to downplay Serb victimhood, however, it was omitted. Tuđman, for the rest of his life, refused to comment on the first draft apart from the fact that it should never have been made public, but his aide quoted him as saying (regarding the ordering of the victims) “if I am to commit to this stupidity, I might as well do it fully. This will piss people off no matter what, I might as well calm down those Chetniks in the hills, and get peace in exchange”. The parliamentary condemnation statement was extremely controversial among the diaspora and many in Croatia, leading to mass burnings of Tuđman’s portrait at rallies in Canada and the United States, with many accusing him of “pandering to the Serbs” or even “bending to Serbian whims” and “betraying campaign promises” after having run on an explicitly Croat-chauvinist, anti-Serb platform. Herzegovinian-Canadian Croat activist Gojko Šušak, who came from a family of Ustaše and had shaken hands with Tuđman during his 1987 visit to Canada, publicly washed his hands at one of these rallies, saying “I do not wish for any Communist, Serb-serving dirt to remain on my hands from that encounter”. One of Tuđman’s close friends said in a private statement that Tuđman’s decision was ultimately made under pressure from the European community, as European, especially British and French officials, saw these token gestures and Serb autonomy as “small prices to pay for peaceful and seamless independence”, with
The Brijuni meetings also resulted in a mutual non-aggression treaty between Yugoslavia, Slovenia, and Croatia, with the stipulation that Yugoslavia could declare war on Croatia if it threatened the autonomy that the agreement granted the Serbs of Krajina. That final stipulation was Stambolić’s work and gained him much popularity among Serbs but worried other ethnic groups, with Abdić remarking that Yugoslavia does not need to guarantee the safety of Serbs in other countries. Stambolić retorted that Yugoslavia would protect Bosniaks and Macdonians abroad as well, if they were ever threatened.
Tuđman and future Croatian leaders would at various points attempt to chip away at the rights guaranteed to the Serbs in the Brijoni Accords (Brijonski Sporazum), stoking major political crises in the Balkans.
Sudbina Budučih Dana (The Fate of Future Days) - Reform and the new constitution:
The Brijuni accords left Yugoslavia diminished, and made the need for change abundantly clear. With Croatia and Slovenia out of the country, Serbia, Montenegro, and Serbia’s autonomous provinces, all of which were mostly controlled by Serb politicians, and in some cases nationalists, had enough votes in the Chamber of Republics and Provinces to pass laws through the chamber without input from the non-Serb republics and their autonomous provinces. The government convened to write up a new constitution.
The first and most foundational compromise with Bosnia and Macedonia was the formation of the Council of Republics, a third chamber of parliament, providing final approval to bills, similarly to how a British monarch does, only actually wielding this power. This council would consist of four members, one per republic, so the Serbs could not push through any agenda without the consent of at least one of the other republics and the other republics could not push through any agenda that is totally antagonistic to the Serbs. It also cut the autonomous provinces out of the process. While this part of the constitution was widely criticised as undemocratic, and effectively allowed the 4 representatives of the republics to veto parliament and control the legislative process, the new constitution also represented the first time Yugoslavs could directly vote for their president and parliament, and the four representatives of the republics were also appointed by democratically elected presidents of the republics. The exclusion of autonomous provinces from the new council was strongly favoured by Bosnia along with the Serb bloc. Republics also received an additional 10 representatives each in the Federal Chamber and 2 each in the Chamber of Republics and Provinces, which was renamed the Senate. Autonomous provinces received no increase in representation, further shifting the balance of power in favour of the republics. The Federal Chamber would be subject to new elections every 5 years, while Senators would serve 10 year terms to allow for more experienced voices.
The new constitution gave much authority to the republics, took much away from the autonomous provinces, and centralised authority in the president and executive rather than legislative assemblies on both a republican and federal level. It took much inspiration from the United States and Canada in its changes to the previous Yugoslav constitution. Absolutely all foreign and military affairs as well as currency, post, citizenship, taxes for federal projects and federally subsidised intra republican projects, high level criminal law, banking, copyright, and rules of the road fell under federal law. The federal government would also control healthcare for those in a republic other than the one in which they are registered (though this mainly consisted of paying the republic they’re in to provide whatever treatment they need). Language of government and education falls under the republic, with the republic granting its autonomous provinces language rights as it sees fit. Educational curricula, taxes for intra-republican projects not subsidised federally, social programs like healthcare (public health insurance), public education, government housing, and welfare also fell under Republic authority. Property law, prisons, civil law, and marriage are also devolved to the Republics. The Republics are also able to control certain criminal laws but are subject to ratification by a federal court, so republics can differ, for example, on sentences for major crimes or on whether certain smaller things are crimes so long as their choices are ruled constitutional.
The autonomous provinces lost their right to veto decisions that do not disproportionately or exclusively affect them, this happened in both the federal and republican parliaments. The language of the Gorani, Našinski, was made co-equal with Serbocroatian, Turkish, and Albanian. The Recognition of Našinski as a language was controversial among linguists, as it was already debated whether it was a Torlakian Serbian dialect, a dialect of Macedonian, or a distinct language. Among the Serbian public, however, promoting the Gorani, a Slavic Muslim minority who had long been suppressed by the Albanians, was seen as a useful way to build alliances with other minorities in Kosovo-Metohija against the Albanians. The internal autonomy of the provinces was for the most part unaltered, retaining highly autonomous branches of most republican institutions, and only their influence on the affairs of higher order territorial units was changed. The major difference was that the provincial powers were enshrined as being devolved, unlike those of the republics which were inherent. Republics were to be sovereign, provinces gained their autonomy through legislation. The right to self-determination was also clarified to belong to republics, rather than the vaguely termed "peoples", so only a republic could secede, with a vote of at least 65% for. The League of Communists was to play no role in politics other than as a party, and quickly broke up into a diverse array of leftist parties. Bunjevci, Šokci, and Janjevci were also granted the status of constituent ethnicities of Vojvodina and Kosovo-Metohija, separate from Croats, in a move widely denounced by Croatian politicians but accepted in Yugoslav circles.
Yugoslavist Croats were left in an interesting position by the Brijoni Accords, and none in a stranger position than Yugoslav prime minister Ante Marković. He quickly resigned as prime minister to allow for Yugoslavia’s first federal election under the new constitution, seeing it as inappropriate for an unelected man from what was now a foreign country to govern. However, he remained in Yugoslavia, being immediately naturalised and holding a variety of political positions. Any citizen of Croatia or Slovenia wishing to remain a Yugoslav citizen was automatically accepted, following the example of Marković’s naturalisation, though most chose to remain in their home countries, with some taking dual citizenships. The overwhelming majority of Croatians remaining Yugoslav citizens were still ethnic Serbs from Croatia. Most people simply did not want to leave their homes, and the popular sentiment among Croatian Yugoslavists was to remain in Croatia and push their home country towards closer relations with Yugoslavia and, in the minds of some, future reunification. Marković, though never running for prime minister or president, was initially extremely popular, particularly for his successful economic reforms. As such, he quickly found his way into the cabinet as minister of finance. His early success in stopping inflation and ensuring peace gained him much popularity, but Marković would become extremely controversial as his career progressed. His lean towards a free market caused trouble for state-owned and newly-privatised industries which struggled to compete with foreign companies. His close relationship with the United States was also somewhat controversial. Though the US was well liked in Yugoslavia, Marković offered particularly good deals to American companies, so his opponents liked to accuse him of “selling Yugoslavia into economic slavery” and being an American spy. German companies, already expanding into Eastern Europe, similarly benefitted from Marković’s reforms at the detriment of local businesses, and, with much of Yugoslav national mythology revolving around the world wars, Germany was seen somewhat as a traditional enemy. Ultimately, he was sacked in 1998 and replaced by Borislav Milačić, a Stambolić loyalist with more socialist leanings. Marković remained a member of parliament, however, running with the pro-European, Left-Liberal Union of Reform Forces. The economy under his successors was regulated more than under Marković, establishing the mixed but market-focused economy that Yugoslavia has retained to this day. The economy substantially improved after Marković’s fall, leading many to view his sacking as the right choice, and he is primarily remembered as a good diplomat, and a decent but overly stubborn economist. However he still has many supporters, and external analysts largely view him more favourably than the Yugoslav public. Marković’s supporters note that the economic decline had already flattened out by the time he was sacked, and attribute the upturn not to the Stambolić faction’s policies, but to the emergence of more robust Yugoslav private enterprises. However, the mass industrialization program under Stambolić and his allies, aimed at compensating for the loss of the more industrialised republics of Croatia and Slovenia, are also widely considered beneficial, even by the most loyal Marković supporters.
The first presidential election, to nobody’s surprise, ended with Stambolić as president of Yugoslavia. Apart from his wide support among Serbs (even despite hardline nationalists favouring Vojislav Šešelj’s Radicals over him), his non-threatening attitudes towards other republics, and simply being the only sufficiently charismatic and established candidate running on the broadly popular Yugoslavist platform, all bought him support. Stambolić wielded the most power of any Yugoslav politician since Tito, and spent much of his career in the same balancing act that Tito had had to perform between keeping Serbs happy and calming fears of Serb domination in the other republics. The notable difference, of course, was that Stambolić himself was a Serb. Luckily for him, his personal pet project of Kosovo did not infringe on the desires of the non-Serb republics, and was even viewed favourably by Bosniaks who wished to similarly curtail Western Herzegovina’s autonomy, and Macedonians who worried about the restlessness of their own Albanian minority. The Bosniaks at the time were largely blaming Tuđman and the Croat Marković, rather than Stamblić, for Western Herzegovina’s autonomy, despite Stambolić’s involvement in the negotiations. This was yet another great boost for his popularity. Beyond the usual core-periphery balancing, Stambolić oversaw Yugoslavia’s first steps not only into a democracy of sorts but also into a unipolar, American world, a world without the USSR. Stambolić wrote extensively about this new position in a book titled “The Third Pole in a Unipolar World”, where he detailed his vision for the future. He was concerned primarily with Yugoslavia’s position in Europe and within the non-aligned movement. Regarding Europe, Stambolić expressed the view that “Eastern and Western Europe no longer stand divided by obsessive ideological rivalries, and with social-democratic movements strengthening in Western Europe and market economies sprouting in the East, we are reaching a comfortable middle ground, which will allow all of Europe to cooperate, should it so desire”. Following this, Stambolić promoted membership in the European Union, a fairly popular position. He also added that “For Yugoslavia, the fall of the Soviet bloc comes as something of a blessing, as it opens up many opportunities for cooperation between the economically and culturally similar Balkan states that would previously been curtailed by Soviet-Yugoslav tensions which the Russians pulled their Balkan puppets into.” Stambolić’s position on the non-aligned movement would come to dominate Yugoslav foreign policy in the early 21st century. He desired that Yugoslavia and the movement as a whole, in the post-Soviet era, be “friendly with, but not subservient to, the United States. Retaining their independence in a world increasingly bowing to US interests, without the hostility presented by the USSR in previous decades”. While this was not dissimilar to previous Yugoslav policy, the necessity of friendship with the United States became emphasised and the ability to retain at least economic independence would be drastically reduced until Russia began to recover its economic power in the late 2000s and, the rapidly rising China became a more feasible counterbalance. Balkan and European cooperation would be a major Yugoslav policy goal going forward, and trade with Germany and the US would steadily increase, albeit with more protectionism than had been seen under Marković. Yugoslavia would go so far as to hold joint military exercises with the United States, but as yet has not joined NATO, and condemns some US military actions. The retention of military independence would be another great priority of the various Stambolić administrations.
The article refers to Ante Marković as the president, while he is in fact the Prime Minister. This is a translation error on the part of author Serge Schmemann, as the Serbocroatian title for Prime Minister is President of Government (as opposed to President of State)
What’s up with Milo Đukanović? Why is Montenegro being presented as in line with Serb politics while he rules it?
In the 90s, Milo was a Serb ultranationalist Milošević supporter who hated chess because the Croatian coat of arms is a checkerboard, a very involved communist in the 80s, and is now a Montenegrin nationalist with anti-Serb tendencies. Throughout it all he was ambitious, corrupt, and while always espousing socialism, lived as lavish a lifestyle as he could. Đukanović is fundamentally an opportunist who adjusts his stances to maintain power. Yes, I dislike Milo. Further discussion is for PMs or chat. ITTL, he stays in line with the official “centralised but tolerant Serbia, egalitarian Yugoslavia, brotherhood and unity, Serb patriotism among Serbs without forcing Serb domination in the union” policies of the government for most of his career. He will step out of line later in the timeline, but rather differently than he did in ours.
Why is Tuđman willing to do the things he does ITTL?
Well, part of it is that the west is backing the pro-Serb compromise and unlike when a similar offer was made IOTL, neither he nor the West is at war with Yugoslavia, there is simply less bad blood. While Tuđman was pretty petty when it came to reconciliation with the Serbs over WWII (downplaying holocaust numbers, intentionally reversing the Serbs, Jews, and Roma order when talking about it to make Serbs out to have lost fewer people), ITTL he isn’t operating in the same climate. Yugoslavia isn’t run by a Serb supporting Krajina separatism, and again, he’s not in the middle of a war against Serbs. I have no doubt in my mind that Tuđman hated Serbs and that this is all done reluctantly, but he certainly wasn't extreme enough to refuse to denounce fascists nor stubborn enough to reject a compromise that would prevent war and has the support of all his foreign backers. Finally, of course, there is no war to push him to more radical positions. Though he was already quite nationalistic IOTL, it certainly increased over the course of the war as he came to rely on cooperation with the far right more and more and massacres increased hatred on both sides. I may not like Tuđman, he was a hardline nationalist for sure but he wasn’t a cartoon villain, he’s a politician, and when the only people backing your independence say “take the deal or lose our support”, you know which path any rational person will take.
Furthermore, the close relations with Yugoslavia post-independence were actually favoured by over 90% of Croats prior to the war, and would be clearly economically beneficial, thus that plan would be an easy way to steal votes from the more ethnically moderate and Yugoslav friendly Social Democrats.
With Croatia independent, who is the current (acting) President of the Presidency (at least until a new constitution could be drafted) after Croatia’s secession as the Yugoslav President of the Presidency was from Croatia?
With Croatia independent, who is the current (acting) President of the Presidency (at least until a new constitution could be drafted) after Croatia’s secession as the Yugoslav President of the Presidency was from Croatia?
I figure it’s left up to a vote of the remaining members of the presidency after Mesić is gone.
Probably Tupurkovski to assuage fears of Serb domination. Chosing Bosnia’s Bogičević would be an issue since he’s a Serb, while choosing the representative of a province, especially Kosovo-Metohija (where I figure Bajramović is still installed as a Serbian yes man) would probably still be seen as “too insulting” by Serbs. Of course Jović or the Montenegrin representative (be that Bućin or someone new like Kostić) would be seen as Serbs taking charge, which would scare the Bosniaks and Macedonians in the fragile period between the secession of Croatia and Slovenia and the new constitution.
The presidency is not long for this world though, abolished in the new constitution, with its closest successor being the Council of Republics I suppose, but a single president being set up (possible thanks to guarantees protecting the great devolution of power that Republics benefit from and personal cooperation agreements between the leadership of the remaining republics).
Considering ethnic and tensions in Kosovo and the military zone in the 2011 map, might as well note a certain Ratko Mladic (OTL’s Butcher of Bosnia) was a Colonel stationed in Kosovo in June 1991 IOTL.
I have two questions.
1-Do you have any plans regarding Turkey?
2-Who will be the leader of Bosnia, I wonder?
Fikret Abdic seems the best known Yugoslavia supporter in Bosnia, but from what I got, he was just an extremely opportunistic businessman with a massive cult of personality in his home region, who simply would have try to make the entire Bosnia his fiefdom.
1) nothing much yet. Turkey and Yugoslavia might be reasonably friendly ITTL, being both friendly with the west but not necessarily fully toeing the Western line and of course, Bosniaks and the handful of politically overrepresented Gorani that exist would play a major role in strengthening relations with Turkey. I have some plans for Cuprus which both Turkey and Yugoslavia will be involved in. As for wider affairs though, I have not though too much about Turkey yet.
2) There are other big figures that would be pro Yugoslav ITTL, like Adil Zulfikarpašić (as he was open to negotiations about staying in Yugoslavia but wanted guarantees for Bosniaks.) who is also big in the SDA and represents its somewhat more traditionalist and conservative wing, being the heir of an old money Ottoman-era noble family. That said, Abdić remains the most charismatic and popular option, like I mentioned in the post, he actually had more support than Alija until the war started.
Regarding his actions, he had his positives too. While he was opportunistic and corrupt, he was very into investing hin his community around Kladuša and later would likely extend that to Bosnia as a whole. He believed that investing in infrastructure, schools, and other things with his own private money (and now likely also state money) would give him access to better workers for Agrokomerc & as president of the republic, this likely also extends to “preparing competent new government workers”. Of course it also builds his cult of personality. There’s a reason many in Kladuša still call him daddy.
As you can see on the map, he gets power and keeps it for a while. His grip on Bosnia is tight but his almost monarchial rule is competent and fairly benevolent, albeit corrupt, with a clear dominant party situation among the Bosniaks. His reputation is mixed.
A decent majority of Bosniaks and even some Bosnian Serbs lovingly call him Babo (daddy), but he has critics. They will often call him Abdić-Aga or Parizer-Paša, both intending to compare him to Ottoman lords. The latter makes fun of his agricultural and food conglomerate, with its ubiquitous, cheap, chicken parizer salami, which every grocery store has & which SDA public cafeterias for the poor give out. The association with Parizer has also given rise to a small but loud grassroots, anti-Abdić youth movement called ANTIPA (Anti-Parizerska Akcija) whose graffiti you will find in many Bosnian cities.
These are my current thoughts at least. Until they appear in a threadmarked post though, they are not necessarily canon.
Considering ethnic and tensions in Kosovo and the military zone in the 2011 map, might as well note a certain Ratko Mladic (OTL’s Butcher of Bosnia) was a Colonel stationed in Kosovo in June 1991 IOTL.
Yes I’m well aware of his presence. The military district is a later phenomenon, so given the (relative) peace for a time, Mladić is likely to keep getting promoted. I’m debating whether he will remain stationed in Priština or be moved elsewhere, but given that until then he showed as many signs of competence as he could in peacetime, the government might want to keep him in a place where the army will likely soon be needed.
I’m not sure exactly what I’m gonna do with him, but he is probably gonna be there, and be decently high ranking. That said, while his brutality will likely rear its head, rest easy knowing that it will be much more restrained ITTL. He answers to a chain of command here, rather than being the too commander as he was in the VRS, and he works for a state that is much more conscious of its international image, not a breakaway proto state with no diplomatic relations to begin with. So will he do bad things? Probably. Will they be as bad as IOTL? There’s a good chance they won’t, or at least that there will be some response by Yugoslavia’s own army & government.
Yes I’m well aware of his presence. The military district is a later phenomenon, so given the (relative) peace for a time, Mladić is likely to keep getting promoted. I’m debating whether he will remain stationed in Priština or be moved elsewhere, but given that until then he showed as many signs of competence as he could in peacetime, the government might want to keep him in a place where the army will likely soon be needed.
I’m not sure exactly what I’m gonna do with him, but he is probably gonna be there, and be decently high ranking. That said, while his brutality will likely rear its head, rest easy knowing that it will be much more restrained ITTL. He answers to a chain of command here, rather than being the too commander as he was in the VRS, and he works for a state that is much more conscious of its international image, not a breakaway proto state with no diplomatic relations to begin with. So will he do bad things? Probably. Will they be as bad as IOTL? There’s a good chance they won’t, or at least that there will be some response by Yugoslavia’s own army & government.
Good to know. And speaking of which, what would become of Radovan Karadžić ITTL then? I’m betting he ends up a close ally of Vojislav Šešelj ITTL, but still.
1) nothing much yet. Turkey and Yugoslavia might be reasonably friendly ITTL, being both friendly with the west but not necessarily fully toeing the Western line and of course, Bosniaks and the handful of politically overrepresented Gorani that exist would play a major role in strengthening relations with Turkey. I have some plans for Cuprus which both Turkey and Yugoslavia will be involved in. As for wider affairs though, I have not though too much about Turkey yet.
On September 16th, 1987, Ivan Stambolić, president of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, sent a letter to the Belgrade branch of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. It could have been the letter that would break his grip on Serbian politics. The letter that issued commands. The letter that sparked spite. But it was not. It was a different letter. One which suggested. Stambolić offered the branch his reasoning for opposing the deposition of its president, Dragiša Pavlović, but ended by asking the branch to “come to its own conclusions, based on the facts he presented and their own understanding of the situation” and promising to support whatever decision the party made. Unbeknownst to him at the time, the branch’s leaders were largely won over and would oppose the motion to depose Pavlović, pushed by Stambolić’s former protege Slobodan Milošević.
On September 18th, the presidency of the Serbian Communist Party met. While Stambolić tried to reconcile his student and his ally, Milošević went on the offensive, proclaiming Pavlović a threat to ideological unity, but his accusations fell on deaf ears. The presidency stood behind Pavlović and it was decided he would not be deposed. A vote was scheduled to “reanalyze Milošević’s role in the party leadership”. Stambolić arranged to have that meeting broadcast live to the public.
On September 24th, 1987, president of the League of Communists of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević was arrested on live television.
So TTL's PoD is Stambolić using the other letter and Milosević never reaching the highest echelon of power,thus no enforcement of Rankovićism,Serbianisation of Yugoslavia and alienation of non-Serbs. No wonder Yugoslavia in TTTC (Third Time's the Charm) survives.
