There Remains Hope - A Civil War TL

[James P. Simms]

Chapter I: Tough times call for tough measures​

The meeting of the Confederate Cabinet on 18 December 1864 was unusually heated. The main topic of discussion was General John Bell Hood's dispatch of the previous day, which reported the defeat of the Army of Tennessee at the gates of Nashville and the loss of 50 artillery pieces and ordnance wagons. Secretary of War James Seddon had served his President Jefferson Davis and the entire Southern government loyally and faithfully in recent years and had never exposed himself unseemly in his speaking engagements. The normally calm Seddon, however, was now losing his temper in the face of the alarming and depressing latest news. In the midst of the discussion regarding the Army of Tennessee's now limited ability to act, he abruptly rose and addressed the assembled group. Seddon impressively pointed out that the war would be disastrous in the present situation. He had almost worn himself out in the past months and had permanently ruined his health without being able to bring about a positive turnaround, which could be justified on the one hand by the resistance to consultation of parts of the government and on the other hand by the mixing of private animosities with the conduct of government business. He announced that he was about to resign if his subsequent demands were not implemented in the interest of the entire country and its continued existence.

Seddon demanded the immediate appointment of General Robert E. Lee as general-in-chief of the entire Confederate army and the transfer of command of all troops in Tennessee, Georgia, Florida and South Carolina to General Joseph E. Johnston. Johnston, he argued, should rally every able-bodied man within his reach in South Carolina to stop Sherman and watch Lee's back. Both Johnston and Lee would have to be provided with the support of the entire government to immediately and irreversibly transfer every available man who was in the service of the state militias or reserves into Confederate service at their will. This was in his opinion the only way to turn the tide once more.
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Stunned silence descended on the cabinet and all eyes turned to the president, who wavered for minutes before speaking. Though Davis saw the request as an attempt to infringe on his constitutional designation as commander-in-chief, he handled the matter tactfully. Thanking Seddon for his frank words, he assured, that whenever it shall be found practicable by General Lee to assume command of all the armies of the Confederate States without withdrawing from the direct command of the Army of Northern Virginia, he would deem it promotive of the public interest to place him in that command and he would be happy to know that by doing so he was responding to Seddon's expressed desire.

While Davis, who has had to deal with recalcitrant and unwilling governors since the beginning of his term, had no problems whatsoever with supporting the direct enlistment of militiamen and reservists, the staffing of Joseph E. Johnston cost him massive overcoming. The president's feelings towards Johnston could almost be described as hatred. But soberly considered, there were no other options left. Hood had obviously failed and Lieutenant General William J. Hardee had also failed to stop Sherman's advance into Georgia. General Richard Taylor, though energetic and popular, was completely occupied with his duties in Alabama and Mississippi, while Davis trusted the command abilities of General Pierre Beauregard even less than he trusted the disagreeable Johnston. Gritting his teeth, he therefore also agreed to this concession.

In a dialogue between Davis and Lee on 19 December 1864, the latter was initially hostile to his promotion. In order to save the continuity of his government, Davis talked to Lee for almost an hour without interruption until the latter agreed to take over as general-in-chief. In return, the Virginian demanded both the greatest possible freedom of action and backing before Congress, as well as the replacement of the incompetent Commissary General Lucius B. Northrop by Colonel Isaac St. John. In this respect, too, the pressured Davis finally agreed, which is why serious changes in the course of Confederate warfare were initiated in the last days of the end of 1864.

 

[James P. Simms]

Chapter II: Gordon goes South ​

Before dawn on December 8th Major General John B. Gordon's old division as well as the troops now commanded by Brigadier General John Pegram had been on the move from the Shenandoah Valley towards Petersburg. On reaching the city, it fell to those men to hold the extreme right of Lee`s infantry. In front of this exposed wing was a dense pine forest that served to conceal the movements of troops and made artillery practically useless.

Behind Gordon's position was the South Side Railroad, the last of the ling commercial arteriesthat had not been cut. Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant saw that to cut it was to starve Lee's army and therefore his constant aim was to seize and sever it. Gordon`s instructions were to prevent this at any cost. The winter rains, snows and boggy roads however prevented major battles to ensue during December, although occasional demonstrations of Grant's purpose occured and the Federals managed to keep the weary Confederates alert night and day.

Bringing back reconvalescents and the lightly wounded, Gordon was able to nurture his shrunken ranks back to a decent level. Mainly focussing on his old division, while being under the impression to relinquish command of the 2nd Corps back to Lieutenant General Jubal A. Early as soon as the latter's duties in the Valley ended, Gordon raised his ranks to around 2,800 men in the three brigades commanded by Brigadier General Clement A. Evans, Brigadier General William Terry and Colonel William R. Peck.

When frantic calls for reinforcements by Major General William H. C. Whiting, commander of the District of Cape Fear, reached Lee's desk, the new commander-in-chief was at first inclined to send Major General Robert F. Hoke`s larger division to counter any threats towards Fort Fisher and Wilmington. It came to his mind, however, that Gordon's offensive capabilities and numerous talents were wasted in the static trench warfare around Petersburg and that the Georgian could accomplish better results with a fewer number of men than Hoke. Lee therefore on December 20th, 1864, ordered Gordon to not only take his division to Wilmington, but to attach to his command any troops in the area to see fit. Lee`s main instructions were not only to beat any assault force heading for the Confederacy's last major atlantic port but to exploit any opportunity to throw the Federal plans for the upcoming campaign season into disarray. Gordon gladly obliged and put his men on the roads as quickly as possible. Many of the Georgians and Louisianans of his command welcomed the move, interpreting it as a step towards their beloved and dearly missed homes. Morale ran high throughout the whole command as the troops made their way towards North Carolina.​

 

[James P. Simms]

Chapter III: The Battle of Fort Fisher​

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Situated at the end of Confederate Point some 25 miles south of Wilmington between the Cape Fear River and the Atlantic, Fort Fisher was the guardian angel of the blockade-running fleet. Protection was accorded to the supply line from Europe, primarily Britain, by virtue of the heavy seacoast guns of the large and formidable Fort Fisher. From late 1861, and especially by the summer of 1862 after Colonel William Lamb took command of Fort Fisher, blockade-runners brought a constant stream of food, clothes, shoes, coffee, rifles, ammunition, percussion caps, cannon, medicine, uniforms, accoutrements, and virtually anything to sustain an army and a people. Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, the most successful of all the Confederate armies, was the primary recipient of those supplies. Fort Fisher’s success in protecting the blockade-runners from Union gunboats likely kept the Confederate States alive.

On November 15, 1864, General Braxton Bragg again notified President Davis of rumored Union plans for an amphibious attack on Fort Fisher and especially complained of the small number if troops in the area as well as their lack of experience. He warned that Fort Fisher would be overrun and Wilmington lost if defense of the area depended on home guards, reserves and untried artillery.

With Bragg's concerns about Wilmington and Fort Fisher largely unresolved in late December, General Theophilus Holmes, commander of North Carolina's reserve forces, volunteered his service and Bragg put him in charge of Wilmington while sending Whiting to be with Colonel Lamb directly at the fort.

On December 18, the Federal invasion force left Hampton Roads and sailed towards Fort Fisher. General Benjamin Butler's and the 6,500 soldiers designated to make the landing arrived at the same time when Gordon's troops reached Wilmington on the 23rd.

One day later, an old hulk filled with tons of black powder was detonated near the fort. The explosion, particularly loud in Wilmington, accomplished nothing at Fort Fisher, with the exception of terrifying a battalion of Junior Reserves camped on the beach.

Having failed in an unconventional attempt to reduce Fort Fisher, Admiral David D. Porter's gunboats bombarded the fort in preparation for Butler's amphibious landing.

Major General Whiting arrived at the fort from Wilmington late in the afternoon of Christmas Eve, not to take command from Colonel Lamb, but to assist him and share the fate of the garrison. At about the same time, Brigadier General William Terry's Consolidated Virginia Brigade of John B. Gordon's Division began arriving at the Sugar Loaf defenses, four and five miles north of Fort Fisher. There were heavy guns as well as Whitworth rifles in some of these extensive sand fortifications, and Terry planned to make a stand against the expected Union landing, if he could. As the afternoon wore into dusk, the fleet withdrew from the battle to rest for the night.

Shortly after 2:00 p.m. on Christmas Day, the Union infantry began coming ashore from gigs and launches of the transports. Brigadier General Newton M. Curtis' Brigade of Adelbert Ames’ Division landed and began to form up to advance on the fort. Two other brigades of Ames’ Division came ashore and remained near the landing area, skirmishing with some of Terry’s men who moved out to contest, if only feebly due to paucity of numbers, the Union landing.

As Curtis' troops got to within about 100 yards of the fort, the fleet lifted its fire. Colonel Lamb immediately dispatched his garrison on the land face from bombproofs up to the ramparts to man their guns. Other troops, many of them North Carolina Junior Reserves, were ordered to get down from the parapets to man a heavy log palisade fence about 50 feet north of the base of the fort. As Curtis' men came within musket range in the growing darkness, the troops behind the palisade opened a heavy musketry, while the artillery blasted away with canister and grapeshot.

Butler, observing the twilight fighting, called the attack off, concluding, had the attack been made it would have failed. Division commander Adelbert Ames concurred with his decision. Additionally, the fleet had exhausted its ammunition of all things, and was forced to leave the Cape Fear coast and return to Beaufort, North Carolina to replenish its supply.

The Federals re-embarked 2,800 of their 3,500 troops that had landed. The balance, 700 men, were stranded as another gale blew in, forcing the transports to move far offshore. Gordon, who had arrived at the Sugar Loaf Line late on 25 December with the rest of his division, grasped the situation immediately and his natural instinct told him to attack the following day. While Peck's Louisianans and Terry's Virginians held Curtis's front in check, Evans's Georgia Brigade swung around the Northerners' right flank and poured a galling fire into their ranks. Without support, with dwindling ammunition and with their backs to the foaming sea, the New Yorkers could only return fire for a few minutes before Curtis raised the white flag and surrendered.

The Union attack on Fort Fisher ended in a huge disaster and was to be the military end for Benjamin Butler. The Northerners suffered over 900 casualties, including nearly 700 prisoners. Neither had the fleet succeeded in damaging the fort's defences, nor could a bridgehead be established. The threat to Wilmington had been averted for the time being.

Order of Battle​

CSA​

MG John B. Gordon, 6,400 men, 12 guns

BG Clement A. Evans' Division, 2,800 men

Col John H. Baker's Brigade, 1,300 men
13, 26, 31, 38, 60, 61st Georgia Infantry, 12th Georgia Infantry Battalion

BG William Terry's Brigade, 900 men
2/4/5/27/33, 10/23/37, 21/25/42/44/48th Virginia Infantry

Col William R. Peck's Brigade, 600 men
1/14, 2, 5/6/7, 8, 9, 10/15th Louisiana Infantry

MG William H. C. Whiting (Post of Ft Fisher) 3,600 men, 12 guns

Col William Lamb (Garrison of Ft Fisher) 2,100 men

Maj James Reilly, 400 men
1st North Carolina Heavy Artillery Battalion Company D, 3rd North Carolina Light Artillery Battalion Company C, 1st North Carolina Artillery Co F, K

Cpt Robert Murphy, 500 men
2nd North Carolina Artillery Company A, B, C, D, E

Cpt Daniel Patterson, 500 men
2 NC Art Co F, G, H, I, K

Cpt James Lane, 400 men
3rd North Carolina Artillery Company D, E, G, K

Cpt William Shaw, 100 men, 4 guns
13th North Carolina Light Artillery Battalion

Cpt A. C. van Benthuysen, 200 men
Confederate States Marines

Col John K. Connally's Brigade, 1,300 men
1, 4, 7, 8th Battalion North Carolina Junior Reserves

Cpt Thomas J Southerland, 100 men, 4 guns

Cpt Andrew B. Paris, 100 men, 4 guns

USA​

MG Benjamin F. Butler, 6,500 men, 10 guns

2nd Division, XXIV Corps, BG Adelbert Ames

1st Brigade, BG Newton M. Curtis
3, 112, 117, 142th New York Infantry

2nd Brigade, Col Galusha Pennypacker
47, 48th New York Infantry, 76, 97, 203rd Pennsylvania Infantry

3rd Brigade, Col Louis Bell
13th Indiana Infantry, 4th New Hampshire Infantry, 115, 169th New York Infantry

Cpt Richard H. Lee
16th Independent Battery New York Light Artillery

3rd Division, XXV Corps, BG Charles J. Paine

2nd Brigade, Col John W. Ames
4, 6, 30, 39th United States Colored Troops

3rd Brigade, Col Elias Wright
1, 5, 10, 37, 107th United States Colored Troops

Lt John Myrick
Battery E, 3rd United States Artillery

 

[James P. Simms]

Chapter IV: The Christmas Raid of 1864​

In the first three years of the Civil War, Confederate cavalrymen established their reputation as flamboyant cavaliers who whipped the Federals battle after battle. Once the war returned to the Shenandoah Valley in the spring and summer of 1864, however, the tide began to turn. By the fall, the odds were stacked against the Confederate horsemen. The new face of the Army of the Potomac's Union cavalry, Major General Philip Sheridan, had seen prime cavalry action as a colonel in the Western Theater. He was a firm and dogged commander who refused to accept defeat. When General Ulysses S. Grant sent Sheridan to the Valley to quell the Confederates, there was no doubt about the outcome. Sheridan's main opponent had been General Jubal A. Early of the Army of the Valley, Lee's hot-headed "Bad Old Man." He was an aggressive commander who worked efficiently and effectively, but his personal bias against using cavalry ultimately aided in his army's defeat in the Valley Campaign. After the humiliating defeat of the Confederate cavalry at Toms Brook on October 9, 1864, many observers were convinced that the grey-clad horsemen were fought out.

Concluding the bloodiest year of the war for Brigadier General Alfred T. A. Torbert's Cavalry Corps, the troopers were looking forward to going into winter camp near Winchester in time for the holidays. After all, they had weathered hard fighting in multiple major battles in two different campaigns in two different areas over the course of the year. General Early’s army had been soundly defeated, and there were no Confederate forces of any strength remaining in the Shenandoah Valley the week before Christmas. Although General Sheridan had written somewhat dismissively to General Grant on the usefulness of cutting the Central Railroad to interdict Confederate supplies between the Shenandoah Valley and Richmond, he ordered a raid against it on December 18, 1864. In case there were any Confederate forces in the area, he ordered General Custer to take his division south through the Valley at the same time Torbert was departing with the other two divisions of the cavalry.

Torbert started from Winchester on the 19th of December, with the First and Second Divisions of Cavalry, with 30 wagons and four pieces of artillery, about 5,000 men, across the Blue Ridge. On the night of the 19th he camped in Chester Gap, crossing both branches of the Shenandoah River during heavy rains. December 20, the Federals crossed the Blue Ridge, marched via Little Washington, Gaines’ Cross-Roads, and Sperryville, in the direction of Criglersville. Second Division was camping on the Hughes River and the First Division on the Hazel.

On December 21, at daylight the march was resumed, in a hail and snow storm which lasted all day. At Madison Court House, the Federal First division encountered Colonel William L. Jackson’s brigade of rebel cavalry, and drove them from the town, with slight loss. One day later, Torbert's divisions reached the bridge over the Rapidan, at Liberty Mills. The leading elements were subjected to a severe fire from men behind breastworks on the opposite bank, consisting of some of the flooring of the bridge that had been removed. Immediately after reaching the river the bridge was fired by an explosion and soon destroyed. The ford, wich was a bad one, was barricaded and defended by men in rifle pits belonging to Brigadier General John McCausland's and Colonel Jackson's commands and artillery in position behind earthworks. Finally two columns were started, one to the right and one to the left to flank the Confederate positions. Two brigades of the First Division – First and Second, Second Brigade leading, commanded by Colonel Thomas C. Devin – were to cross at Willis’ Ford, about two miles above Liberty Mills, and come down on the Stanardsville and Orange Court-House road. One brigade Second Division, Colonel Capehart commanding, was to cross at Cave’s Ford, about three miles below Liberty Mills, and come up on the Orange Court-House and Stanardsville road. It was not until just dark when the right column came in sight and immediately charged the rebels, driving them across the Gordonsville pike and in the direction of Orange Court House.

On December 23, at daylight McCausland and Jackson were again engaged, lost two of their artillery pieces and were driven to within two miles and a half of Gordonsville to the top of the gap in Southwest Mountain. Therethe pass was narrow and the Confederates were strongly posted behind rails and earth breastworks, where a few men could hold three times their number in check. Torbert attacked the position with nearly 2,500 men, but was repulsed and heavily punished.

Impressed by the fierce opposition, Torbert decided to withdraw and at once crossed to the north bank of the Rapidan. That afternoon and evening the Federals marched to Madison Court House and Robertson’s River. About thirty prisoners who had been taken were not able to keep up with the cavalry and got liberated by Jackson's advance elements following after Torbert. Continiously retreating, the Federals reached their camps on December 28 without having accomplished their goals of cutting the railroad.

The Confederates, on the other hand, cavalry from Major General Lunsford L. Lomax's division, had fought bitterly and bravely despite their inferior numbers and advanced demoralisation. 102 killed, wounded and missing from Torbert's two divisions contrasted with barely two dozen losses on the Confederate side. Moreover, Brigadier General Thomas L. Rosser had already succeeded in stopping Custer's advance on 22 December, driving the Federals back and taking about 40 prisoners. Accordingly, the Confederate cavalry had not been completely crushed in the Valley yet.​

Order of Battle​

CSA​

MG Lunsford L. Lomax, 2,000 men, 12 guns

BG John McCausland, 800 men
14, 16, 17, 21, 22nd Virginia Cavalry

Col William L. Jackson, 900 men
2nd Maryland Cavalry Battalion, 19, 20, 26th Virginia Cavalry, 37th Virginia Cavalry Battalion

Artillery, 300 men, 12 guns
2nd Maryland Artillery, 100 men, 4 guns
Ashby's Virginia Artillery, 50 men, 2 guns
Lurty's Virginia Horse Artillery, 50 men, 2 guns
Lynchburg Beauregard's Artillery, 50 men, 2 guns
1st Stuart Virginia Horse Artillery, 50 men, 2 guns

USA​

BG Alfred T. A. Torbert, 5,000 men, 4 guns

First Division, BG Wesley Merritt

1st Brigade, Col Peter Stagg
1, 5, 6, 7th Michigan Cavalry

2nd Brigade, Col Thomas C. Devin
4, 6, 9, 19th New York Cavalry, 17, 20th Pennsylvania Cavalry

Reserve Brigade, BG Alfred Gibbs
2nd Massachusetts Cavalry, 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry, 1st Rhode Island Cavalry, 1, 2, 5th US Cavalry

Second Division, Col William H. Powell

1st Brigade, Col Alpheus Moore
8th Ohio Cavalry, 14, 22nd Pennsylvania Cavalry

2nd Brigade, Col Henry Capehart
1st New York Cavalry, 1, 2, 3rd West Virginia Cavalry

Division Artillery
Battery L, 5th US Artillery

 

[James P. Simms]

Chapter V: The Battle of Anthony's Hill​

Major General Nathan B. Forrest had been assigned by General John B. Hood to the command of the rear guard of the Army of Tennessee, which was in flight following the military disaster experienced at the Battle of Nashville on December 15–16, 1864. After evacuating Pulaski, Tennessee, on the evening of December 24, Forrest was confronted with the problem of slowing Major General James H. Wilson's aggressive pursuit enough so that the Confederate army could complete the final miles of its retreat to the Tennessee River.

Believing he was pursuing an enemy ripe for capture, Wilson had his troops on the road early on Christmas Day. By mid-afternoon Colonel Thomas J. Harrison's brigade of Brigadier General Richard W. Johnson's cavalry division had come upon strongly entrenched Confederates at the head of a heavily wooded and deep ravine, through which ran the road. All across the hill’s heights and down along its ridges Forrest had posted Walthall’s decimated brigades of Featherston and Palmer, with Jackson’s cavalry covering the flanks. Two infantry brigades were placed in reserve under protection of timber breastworks. A line of skirmishers lay hidden along the slopes. Well concealed, Forrest waited calmly. Around 1:00 p.m. Harrison’s dismounted regiments of the Seventh Ohio, the Sixteenth Illinois, and the Fifth Iowa made their way over the ground, advancing in broken ranks and driving back the skirmishers posted on the hillsides.

Leaving the impression that they were isolated and that the main body of the guard was absent, the Confederate skirmish line withdrew into a gap between the hills, allowing the dismounted Federal cavalry to approach to within fifty deadly paces. Drawing closer, Harrison was forced to an uneasy standstill. Something was amiss. Things were all too quiet. Pausing briefly, he peered through the thick mist, waiting for Wilson’s support of Brigadier Generals Hatch, Croxton, and Hammond to arrive before attempting a general advance. Suddenly it seemed as if the whole hillside exploded in their faces. A terrible blast of artillery hidden in the dense woods was loosed, raking the Federals’ exposed ranks with canister. At the same instant, Walthall’s skirmishers released a ferocious volley upon the scattered Union lines, extending from their front to their exposed flank, immediately succeeded by an even deadlier blast from the main line of Confederate infantry.

Shocked by Forrest’s fierce barrage, Harrison’s dismounted cavalry began a feeble resistance, quickly falling back to the rear in confusion. Simultaneously, several hundred of Walthall’s rear guard infantry leaped over the barricades and emerged from the woods, rushing forward and compelling Harrison’s immediate withdrawal, killing and capturing many while taking an artillery piece of the 4th U.S. Artillery. In a headlong charge Walthall’s brigades drove the bluecoats back through the way they had come, disordered and bewildered at such an avalanche of fire and lead. Soon after the initial onrush of Walthall’s infantry, the Eighth Indiana regrouped, and returned fire, halting the Confederates.

By 4:00 p.m. the fighting had subsided. Recognizing the rapidly approaching columns of enemy cavalry regiments of Hatch’s division pressing his flanks, Forrest quickly called off the chase and ordered a timely retreat. Moving swiftly, the rear guard slipped away, carrying off a number of prisoners, the captured artillery piece from Company I, Fourth U.S. Artillery, with its eight horses, and three hundred cavalry horses.​

Order of Battle​

CSA​

MG Nathan B. Forrest, 2,800 men

BG William H. Jackson, 2,100 men

BG Frank C. Armstrong, 1,400 men
1, 2, 28, Ballentine's Mississippi Cavalry

BG Lawrence S. Ross, 700 men
3, 6, 9th Texas Cavalry, 1st Texas Legion

MG Edward C. Walthall, 700 men

Col Joseph B. Palmer, 300 men
60th North Carolina Infantry, 3/18, 23/26/45, 32nd Tennessee Infantry, 54, 63rd Virginia Infantry

BG Winfield S. Featherston, 400 men
1, 3, 22, 31, 33, 40th Mississippi Infantry, 1st Mississippi Infantry Battalion

USA​

MG James H. Wilson, 3,400 men, 6 guns

BG Richard W. Johnson's Division, 1,200 men

Col Thomas J. Harrison, 1,100 men
8th Indiana Cavalry, 16th Illinois Cavalry, 5th Iowa Cavalry, 7th Ohio Cavalry

Battery I, 4th US Artillery, 100 men, 6 guns

BG Edward Hatch's Division , 2,200 men

Col Datus E. Coon, 2,200 men
6, 7, 9th Illinois Cavalry, 2nd Iowa Cavalry, 12th Tennessee Cavalry Battalion

 

[James P. Simms]

Chapter VI: The Battle of Sugar Creek​

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Early the following morning on December 26, Wilson's troopers, still not satisfied, made their appearance, and the Confederate infantry again made dispositions to receive them. The Rebels had rested and had hastily put up some breastworks and were in waiting. The fog still covered the whole front. Brigadier General Daniel H. Reynolds’ 200 Arkansans occupied the level valley between the gentle rise and the stream, the Tennessee forces (the remnants of Maney's and Strahl's brigades commanded by Colonel Hume R. Feild) were situated on the hillock and on to the left where the stream ran right up against the bluff with Ector's Brigade under Colonel David Coleman in support . The Federals, Brigadier General John H. Hammond's Brigade, came in force, crossed the bridge, and moved in line of battle, and some came opposite Feild’s left. The fog was very dense and the bluecoats, therefore, approached very cautiously. When they came near enough, the firing commenced vigorously on the Confederate right and left, and the Rebels held their position until the Federal troopers came right near them. Then the order to advance was given, and a rapid charge was made that hurled back the dismounted cavalry, who had uncautiously come too near, and just where Forrest wished them to be.

Immediately in the infantry's rear, Ross had the 1st Texas Legion and the Ninth Texas drawn up in column of fours to charge, if an opportunity should occur. After Walthall began his charge, the Legion and Ninth Texas were ordered forward, and passing through the infantry crossed the creek in the face of a terrible fire, overthrew all opposition on the farther side, and pursued the thoroughly routed Hammond nearly a mile, capturing prisoners and horses alike.

Again out of respect for oncoming Federal cavalry support, Forrest soon called off the chase but held his position until midday, securing the army’s unhindered crossing of the Tennessee River into safety.​

Order of Battle​

CSA​

MG Nathan B. Forrest, 1,500 men

BG William H. Jackson, 700 men

BG Lawrence S. Ross, 700 men
3, 6, 9th Texas Cavalry, 1st Texas Legion

MG Edward C. Walthall, 800 men

Col Hume R. Feild, 300 men
4/6/9/50, 1/27, 8/16/28th Tennessee Infantry (Maney's old brigade), 200 men
4/5/31/33/38, 19/24/41st Tennessee Infantry (Strahl's old brigade), 100 men

BG Daniel H. Reynolds, 200 men
1, 2nd Arkansas Mounted Rifles, 4, 9, 25th Arkansas Infantry

Col David Coleman, 300 men
29, 39th North Carolina Infantry, 9th Texas Infantry, 10, 14, 32nd Texas Cavalry (dismounted)

USA​

MG James H. Wilson, 1,900 men

BG Joseph F. Knipe, 1,900 men

BG John H. Hammond, 1,900 men
2, 4th Tennessee Cavalry, 9, 10th Indiana Cavalry, 19th Pennsylvania Cavalry

 

[James P. Simms]

Chapter VII: Grant's Plans for 1865​

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For the year 1865, Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant was determined to deal a death blow to the Confederacy. He sought to achieve this as a continuation of the successful campaigns of 1864. Major General William T. Sherman's Grand Army of the West, which had taken Savannah around Christmas without much resistance and without a fight, was to advance promptly through South Carolina and North Carolina, weather permitting, to cut a swathe through the Confederate heartland. Major General George Stoneman was to invade western North Carolina from East Tennessee with cavalry forces, destroying key infrastructure and demoralising the population. For the Shenandoah Valley, Major General Phillip Sheridan was to promptly clear out the remnants of Jubal Early's Army of the Valley and support Grant at Petersburg, who continued to besiege Lee there with the Army of the Potomac and the Army of the James. In the Western Theater, Major General Edward R. S. Canby was to join the Army of West Mississippi with occupation forces in Florida to capture Mobile. Meanwhile, Major General James H. Wilson was to move with his cavalry corps against the armaments industry of the South at Selma and Montgomery. Troops across the Mississippi were to further reinforce their positions in Arkansas and halt any Confederate troop movements.

The heavy defeat at Fort Fisher had dealt Grant a not inconsiderable setback in his own efforts against Petersburg. As long as supplies reached Lee's lines via Wilmington, no measurable attrition of the rebels was to be expected. The entrenchments and trench lines were formidable and difficult to break by direct attack. In direct response to the news of the defeated attack on the fort, Grant had at first impulsively thought of re-enlisting a larger number of men under a different commander. However, as the problem of a vulnerable bridgehead remained acute and the rebels had already taken many prisoners there, Grant, after consultation with some officers, considered it unjustifiable to take any further risk. This was especially true in view of the fact that Sherman would soon resume his march, which had suffered considerably fewer casualties in the past months through Georgia than Grant had suffered in the Fort Fisher expedition.​

 

[James P. Simms]

Chapter VIII: Changes in the Valley​

It would certainly not be an exaggeration to describe the relationship between Lieutenant General Jubal A. Early and the Valley District Cavalry as strained. Rather, the emotional state of the commander of the Army of the Valley could be described as contempt for the mounted arm of his forces. At Third Winchester and Fisher's Hill, Early had gained the impression that the irregular mounted units, the majority of which came from the mountain regions, were unreliable, disorganised and cowardly. Although they were confronted in each case with numerically far superior enemy forces, at least the accusation of indiscipline could not be dismissed. With the onset of winter and the supply difficulties, especially with regard to fodder for the mounts, Early slowly but surely began to run out of patience. Lee's appointment as commander-in-chief came at the right time at the end of December 1864. The relationship between the two men was characterised by mutual respect and deep affection, even though Lee had not always been able to cope with Early's whims and profanity. However, Early was eager to fight and did not shy away from great challenges, which made him a subordinate entirely in Lee's spirit.

In the early days of 1865, the Army of the Valley was no more than a paper tiger. With the withdrawal of the 2nd Corps and the transfer of Brigadier General John Echols to Western Virginia and East Tennessee, only about 2,000 infantrymen remained in the Shenandoah Valley under Brigadier General Gabriel C. Wharton, in addition to cavalry forces of dubious value and several battalions of artillery. Early, finding himself virtually unable to seriously confront Major General Philip Sheridan, who was operating against him, therefore approached Lee with a proposal. Citing the difficulties of supplying the cavalry in the burned out Valley, Early requested that Major General Lunsford Lomax (whom he considered incompetent) and the brigades of Brigadier General Henry B. Davidson and Colonel William L. Jackson (whom he considered no more than horse thieves in torn uniforms) be detached to the defensive positions of Richmond in exchange for a trade of some of the infantry units operating there. Lee was quite comfortable with this idea, as Early described in detail that his trusted mounted leaders John D. Imboden and John McCausland, who had grown on him through their performances at New Market and Lynchburg, as well as the talented Thomas Rosser, would enable him, along with some fresh forces, to take the offensive against Sheridan again.

With the failure at Cedar Creek still fresh in his mind, Lee asked Early that no unnecessary risks be taken and that any regiment detached from elsewhere to support Sheridan already be considered a success. To reaffirm his confidence in his "Bald Old Man", he forwarded the brigades of Colonel Robert M. Mayo and Colonel John M. Hughs from the Department of Richmond to Early and gave command of this small division to his eldest son, Brigadier General George Washington Custis Lee.​

 

[James P. Simms]

Chapter IX: To prepare for Sherman's coming​

After the re-promotion of Joseph E. Johnston to lead the Army of Tennessee and all other western formations that were to stand in William T. Sherman's way, General Pierre G. T. Beauregard felt reminded of 1861, when he had acted as Johnston's second-in-command at the First Battle of Bull Run. The pompous descent Frenchman was thus once again placed in the thankless position of a recipient of orders without any concrete power to shape them.

Beauregard felt the first effects when, around the turn of the year, Johnston revealed to him his plan for the start of the campaign season. The field commander planned a concentration of all available forces at Columbia, South Carolina, to intercept Sherman before he could advance into North Carolina and consequently into Lee's rear. Since securing Charleston harbour seemed almost as important as stopping Sherman's army, Johnston ordered Beauregard to take command of the city he was so familiar with and to assemble there all the troops that were not fit for an open field battle against Union veterans. Johnston argued that Sherman had already failed to take a fortified town by assault during the Vicksburg campaign and that a direct attack was therefore very unlikely. For this reason, Johnston also withdrew the majority of the regular troops from the Charleston region and gathered them into two brigades under Colonel Alfred Rhett and Brigadier General Stephen Elliot Jr. at Columbia.

Beauregard knew that protest would be futile and therefore tried to make a virtue out of necessity. He virtually disbanded South Carolina's seven military districts with the stroke of a pen and ordered every able-bodied man who could carry a gun to Charleston. Beauregard succeeded in massing a total of 4,900 men in two infantry brigades, a cavalry brigade and a considerable number of guns for the defence, although the fighting strength of the assembled troops did not objectively meet any military standards. Only the strong entrenchments of the city and the deterrent effect of organised troops were in the Creole's favour.

The First Brigade was led by Brigadier General Roswell S. Ripley and was composed of the Charleston and Fort Sumter garrisons, arsenal forces, Local Defence Forces and the few remaining Heavy Artillerymen. Criticized for his performance at Antietam, Ripley in early 1863 had returned to South Carolina and had taken charge of the First Military District. His men had constructed a series of improved defenses around the harbour city.

Brigadier General James Chesnut Jr. led the Second Brigade, which consisted essentially of one regiment and five battalions of State Reserves. In a last ditch effort, South Carolina had called up the militia units. Boys under 17 and men over 44 were called up in May 1864 (Senior Reserves). In November, these units were converted to regular Confederate units and South Carolina called up the last reserves, boys 16 years old and younger (Junior Reserves). Those were now to serve the parapets of Charleston.

The Cavalry Forces were under the command of Brigadier General Evander M. Law, who had fallen into disrepute under Longstreet, and consisted essentially of the 3rd South Carolina Cavalry and a few independent companies. While his infantry brigade had fought in the Siege of Petersburg, Law had been transferred to brigade command in Lieutenant General Wade Hampton's Cavalry Corps and therefore brought a certain amount of cavalry experience with him.

In terms of light artillery, the Confederates had six batteries with a total of 22 guns at their disposal for the defence of Charleston.

Order of Battle​

Charleston Defenses, Gen Pierre G. T. Beauregard, 4,900 men, 22 guns​

BG Roswell S. Ripley’s Brigade, 1,700 men
Fort Sumter & Charleston Garrison, Charleston Arsenal Battalion, Charbonnier’s, Dotterer’s Charleston Local Defense Force Company, Boyce Guards Local Defense Force Company, Chestatee Georgia Heavy Artillery, German South Carolina Artillery Battalion, Company B (Heavy Artillery), 21st South Carolina Artillery, Company F (Heavy Artillery)

BG James Chesnut jr’s Brigade, 1,800 men
1st Regiment Charleston Reserves, Cunningham’s South Carolina Reserves Battalion, 3, 4, 5, 8th South Carolina Senior Reserves Battalion

BG Evander M. Law’s Brigade, 800 men
3rd South Carolina Cavalry, Keitt’s, Steele’s South Carolina Cavalry Company, Harleston’s South Carolina Cavalry Detachment

Light Artillery, 600 men, 22 guns
Marion South Carolina Light Artillery, Palmetto South Carolina Artillery Battalion, Company A, F, Johnson’s South Carolina Horse Artillery, LaFayette South Carolina Light Artillery, Macbeth South Carolina Artillery

 

[James P. Simms]

Chapter X: Uncle Billy starts again​

According to the plans arranged with Grant, Major General William T. Sherman would divide his army into two wings, as he was accustomed to on his March to the Sea. At the outset of the spring campaign, he would feint toward Augusta, Georgia, and its gunpowder works to the west, and toward Charleston, South Carolina, the cradle of Secession to the east, forcing the Confederates to divide their forces to defend the two important points. He would then advance via Columbia, South Carolina, to the east coast, preferably Wilmington, North Carolina, to resupply his army before resuming the march to Raleigh in the early spring.

On January 2, 1865, Sherman directed his two wing commanders, Major Generals Oliver O. Howard and Henry W. Slocum, to advance their armies into South Carolina. In mid-January, Howard’s Army of the Tennessee obtained a lodgment at Pocotaligo, while Slocum’s Army of Georgia, preceded by Major General Judson Kilpatrick’s 3rd Cavalry Division, began crossing the Savannah River at Sister’s Ferry. As on the March to the Sea, Howard’s command was the army’s right wing and Slocum’s the left wing. Before Slocum could complete his crossing however, the winter rains set in. The ensuing flood carried off a number of pontoon bridge and transformed the roads into swampland. The flooding of the Savannah River forced Sherman to postpone the opening of his campaign until February 1865.

When Sherman began his Carolinas campaign on February 1, 1865, his army group numbered around 60,100 officers and men with 68 pieces of artillery. The core of this army consisted of veteran volunteers who had enlisted during the first two years of the war and then reenlisted in 1864 after their former terms had expired.

Sherman’s grand army consisted of four infantry corps and one cavalry division, the XV Corps and XVII Corps in the Army of the Tennessee, the XIV Corps and XX Corps in the Army of Georgia, and the 3rd Cavalry Division. Most regiments were of western origin, although many XX Corps units had served in the Army of the Potomac before their transfer to the western theater in the fall of 1863. Since September 1864, Sherman’s army group had captured Atlanta and Savannah and had marched unchecked through the vast and plentyful farming region of Georgia, encountering only weak and scattered opposition. By early 1865, the faith of his soldiers in “Uncle Billy” Sherman was absolute.​

Order of Battle​

Army Group, MG William T. Sherman, 60,100 men, 68 guns​

Right Wing, MG Oliver O. Howard, 27,800 men, 32 guns
XV Army Corps, MG John A. Logan, 15,800 men, 16 guns
XVII Army Corps, MG Francis P. Blair jr., 12,000 men, 16 guns

Left Wing, MG Henry W. Slocum, 27,800 men, 32 guns
XIV Army Corps, MG Jefferson C. Davis, 14,400 men, 16 guns
XX Army Corps, MG Alpheus S. Williams, 13,400 men, 16 guns

Cavalry, MG Judson Kilpatrick, 4,500 men, 4 guns