BTW? By the time of Philippine Sea, US CAP was damned deadly.
Usertron, agreed. I do consider the CAP at the Marianas Turkey Shoot to be the bench-mark for such things. In case it got lost in the shuffle, I was musing that against a strike like this, more AA wouldn't be enough. To really butcher this kind of anti-shipping strike you need radar, good fighters, and the CIC to tie the two together. AA has its role, but interception makes such a difference. As Friedman pounded into my rather hard head, with CIC & Radar it was possible to concentrate carriers together and achieve concentration of offensive and defensive power sufficient to offset the risk of concentrating assets.
Actually, 21% of their torpedo bombers and 14% of their dive bombers to date, but there will be more that won't make it home, and yet more that won't be able to take off again once they have (added to those from Midway that have suffered the same fate). Does that add up to 1/4? Possibly for the Vals, but I suspect more like 1/3 for the Kates.
MattII, I was counting all strikes and all aircraft, and rounding.
OOB
117 Nakajima B5N torpedo bombers
101 Aichi D3A dive bombers
130 Mitsubishi A6M fighters
CA Tone & Chikuma search aircraft (atleast 8)
(348 planes)
0430
Initial Attack on Midway Launched
48 Nakajima B5N torpedo bombers
48 Aichi D3A dive bombers
40 Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighters - escort
CAP
29 Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighters
8 CA search aircraft
0600 Initial Attack on Midway Intercepted
Losses
10 Nakajima B5N torpedo bombers
7 Aichi D3A dive bombers
7 Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighters
+ unknown number damaged
0700 1st Wave Midway Attack on KB
CAP losses
2 Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighters
~ 0830 Japanese Anti-Shipping Strike Launched
50 Nakajima B5N torpedo bombers
45 Aichi D3A dive bombers
40 Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighters
0920 TF17 Detects Japanese Strike
IJN Losses
23 Nakajima B5N torpedo bombers
15 Aichi D3A dive bombers
2 Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighters
----
Casualties to date
33 Nakajima B5N torpedo bombers - 28.2%
22 Aichi D3A dive bombers - 21.8%
11 Mitsubishi A6M fighters - 8.5%
55 of 218 strike aircraft - 25.2%
Remaining Aircraft
84 Nakajima B5N torpedo bombers
79 Aichi D3A dive bombers
119 Mitsubishi A6M fighters
I would say that your estimate of the Japanese being down at least a quarter of their Kates and a quarter of their Vals was a reasonable one. Frankly, depending on battle damage and the effect of casualties on unit cohesion, the Japanese may well be down about half their striking power for the foreseeable future. Not really a fair trade for the damage to Yorktown, Ticonderoga, and the Midway strike package, but nothing to be sneered at.
stevep & ModernKiwi - Many thanks for the input. What I was thinking about was that it would make sense the scouting element fell out of favor, as Gannt notes. However, at Philippine Sea, although the IJN had a definite drop-off in quality, they still represented a real and significant threat to the USN. That being the case, I was unsure what balance they would strike between their new fighters, their new dive-bombers, and their new torpedo-bombers. Of course, the more I think about it, the more naive it seems to be to speak in terms of air-groups as fixed.
They changed the air groups, for the US it was swapping out the scout squadron for a fighter squadron and with the Essex and their larger capacity the increase was all fighters. When they started running out of big thinks to sink it was a Hellcat, Corsair, Avenger mix with the Corsair as fighter bomber, lots of them.
[Snip]
Many thanks Gannt. I didn't have time to do an in-depth check on the composition in mid-44. The only air-group numbers that stand out in my mind are the Midways (presumably immediately post-war) with a roughly 50/50 balance between Corsairs and Helldivers, and the early war balance of a squadron each of fighters, dive-bombers, scouts/dive-bombers, and torpedo planes. I understand the logic of each but I wasn't sure what logic prevailed in mid-44.