Soviet navy had very little chance of interdicting the NATO sloc in 80s or ever , nothing is getting past GIUK gapTo be fair to Clancy, Nato managed to get just enough warning to strangle the initial advance. Even so NATO was one or two smashed convoys away from utter ruin
They first flew in 81 and almost made it to Libya in 86.F117 in 1985 ?
You're Norwegian info is spot on.Reforger was estimated to take a month before assembly produced anything meaningfull. I've seen the estimates. It was the same for US armed forces reinforcements in Norway. Anything heavy will not be ready until a month in even with prepositioned equipment. Best book I've read on the subject is Gullow Gierseth "landsforsvarets krigsplaner under den kalde krigen" which details these things down to the regional level.
This was true for the rest of Europe as well.
Translation: Under Best possible circumstance (likely to take longer) the forces available in Troms would be available after mobilization is as follows.
The Brigade in Northern Norway: Standing.
Brigade 5: 2 days
Brigade 6: 2 days after 1990
Brigade 7: 7 days
UK/NL landing force: 7 days
AMF(L): 6 Days
NAL MEB/CAST Brigade group (these are the ones with prepositioned equipment in question): 30 days
Brigade 15: 2 days (grouped in the Ofoten-Hinnøya area)
Brigade 15: 2 days
I do not agree with that.To be fair to Clancy, Nato managed to get just enough warning to strangle the initial advance. Even so NATO was one or two smashed convoys away from utter ruin
I do not agree with that.
Clancy gave NATO enough warning to:
a) Smash pretty much all Spetsnaz ops in Germany. Had this not been accomplished you could expect NATO to have been in serious trouble. I believe "Red Line" by Walt Gragg describes how vulnerable NATO communications were, if the Soviets had managed to take out some key installations in Europe. Killing off some NATO generals may have also helped the Soviet war effort alot. And of course all sorts of assymetric warfare would be helpful too, like troops with portable SAMs sitting outside NATO bases. Additionally in Red Storm Rising the Soviets used their air mobile troops to take Iceland and nothing more than that. Many NATO war planners feared that the Soviets would use them in continental Europe. This is well described in fiction.
b) Smash the bridges. And actually almost all the bridges. This had a dramatic effect on the Soviet momentum of attack.
c) Kill off the front-line Soveit airforce. I believe several hundred Soviet aircraft were destroyed on the ground during the opening moves of Red Storm Rising.
Put all together, I believed Clancy actually HAD to that in order to write a novel, where NATO could managed to stop the Soviet assault within Germany. Without these factors the Soviets would have been in Frankfurt in a (couple of) week(s) or so...
On the other hand, in order not to make it too easy for NATO, Clancy gave the Soviets other edges: Iceland taken with minimal casualties, neutralizing one carrier battle group early on, France staying out of the conflict, all quiet in the Balkans.
But how many were operational by 1985 ?They first flew in 81 and almost made it to Libya in 86.
French forces fought fully in Red Storm Rising. They lost a carrier in that naval air battle and were mentioned multiple times during the story as being involved: prisoners from the Pharris transfered to them, French ports seeing convoys arrive and Mirages over Germany all spring to mind. You must be thinking of a different tale.France staying out of the conflict
I recall that France didn‘t commit as many troops in Gernany, as it was supposed to. Or did I get that wrong too?French forces fought fully in Red Storm Rising. They lost a carrier in that naval air battle and were mentioned multiple times during the story as being involved: prisoners from the Pharris transfered to them, French ports seeing convoys arrive and Mirages over Germany all spring to mind. You must be thinking of a different tale.
I don´t remember something like. The problem with the book is, thats its mostly about Iceland and naval warfare: Germany is to some degree just a sideshow. We get a closer look at Alfeld, we hear something about Hamburg, but we get nothing (strangly for a american book) nothing about the Fulda Gape and the Nürnburg corridor, places were most likely the bulk of french forces would be used.I recall that France didn‘t commit as many troops in Gernany, as it was supposed to. Or did I get that wrong too?
I read something about the WP-exercise "Sojus-83", which was following an "attack out of the barracks"-scenario. Preparation would need to start D-11, moblisation of GDR-reserves D-6, leving barracks D-1. At some places like Jutland, attacks couldn´t start before D+2. This seems all like a rather risky gamble, which would fall apart, if the strategic surprise failed. It seems already 1983 the Soviets were running out of ideas to defeat NATO.The ability of the WP to launch a BOOB (bolt out of the blue) attack on NATO was basically zero. There were a lot of indicators that would be noticed and set off alarm bells. Issues with staffing, training, logistics and so forth need to be addressed by the WP - a scenario where on 2-3 days prep they attack out of the barracks, while technically feasible, really is not in the cards as a winning strategy. The issue on the NATO side is how do they respond when the indicators are screaming "WP coming". To use an obvious example, if NATO has 2-3 weeks of "warning" but holds off on things like REFORGER and activation of reserves then the "warning" time is wasted and the WP troops do well. IMHO the Soviets will be doing their best to obfuscate the build up, claim it is troop rotations/readiness exercise etc. Obviously if the tension level has been ramping up, NATO will be more likely to respond promptly. If things are basically quiet, response will be slower.
The east-german NVA expected to lose 35% of their planes in a week.by 1985
how much losses are to be expected by WP when they launch attacks on NATO airbases ?
Were there any studies / projections done on this ?