The outcome of a conventional World War III in 1985

[ebb2k98]

If war had broken out between NATO and the Warsaw Pact (including an invasion of neutral Finland, Sweden, and Austria) in June 1985 without a nuclear holocaust, and including the use of chemical weapons, how long would this war last and what would be the outcome (victory or stalemate)

 

[ObssesedNuker]

It's even odds on all counts for the first few months. After that, probably nuclear war everybody dies.

 

[sloreck]

If the Soviets get to the French border and cross it, the French nukes fly and Mr Atoms eventually has all his friends come out to play. If, somehow, the Soviets look like they are going to throw the US out of Europe, time for Mr Atom. If the Soviets start losing conventionally, NATO goes east of the "iron curtain" and the WP Pact states start rebelling, Mr Atom comes out to play especially if any NATO troops go one centimeter in to Mother Russia. IMHO the only way it doesn't go nuclear at some point is if both sides decide to accept an end that is pretty close to status quo antebellum.

 

[Khanzeer]

In the air probably USSR is worst off in 1985 since late 70s so I'll say NATo win
As no mig29 su27 and only 200 foxhound

If this is 1982 in airpower USSR has a great edge as f16 not widespread and few f15 in Europe proper and Saudis have none and Japanese have none.Mig23 there are almost 1800 fighter versions available

In terms of IRBM best off in 1985 but since no nukes then it's a moot point

 

[Khanzeer]

It's even odds on all counts for the first few months. After that, probably nuclear war everybody dies.

First few months?
The intensity of operations is such that USSR airforce will fold in 2 to 3 wks in 1985 then they forced to go nuclear

 

[ObssesedNuker]

First few months?
The intensity of operations is such that USSR airforce will fold in 2 to 3 wks in 1985 then they forced to go nuclear

Ignoring the fact that it's likely that both sides air forces would be so badly attrited after 2-to-3 weeks given projected loss rates* that neither side would have much air power left, it's likely not the air war that will decide things.

*As a specific example, NATO expected that loss rates in CAS missions alone would be in the double digits, which would not be sustainable beyond the first week without drastic scaleback.

 

[Khanzeer]

Ignoring the fact that it's likely that both sides air forces would be so badly attrited after 2-to-3 weeks given projected loss rates* that neither side would have much air power left, it's likely not the air war that will decide things.

*As a specific example, NATO expected that loss rates in CAS missions alone would be in the double digits, which would not be sustainable beyond a few days.

But NATO has a lot more reserves esp coming in from north America
Quantitative advantage in air too is with the west

 

[Faralis]

Stalemate, followed by status quo pro ante-vellum, or Strangelove ending.

 

[Orcbuster]

Ralph Peters Red army is the best AH book for this scenario. Unlike Clancy he was a military analyst in Germany at the time. In his opinion it was a firm yes that if the soviets had a good day they could certainly pull it off. It was however way too uncertain to say one way or another. In the book the soviets superior operational understanding and military political stability is the major advantage that forces W-germany into a surrender when UK/US threaten with use of nuclear weapons. NORTHAG is pushed back to the netherlands in 3 days.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

But NATO has a lot more reserves esp coming in from north America
Quantitative advantage in air too is with the west

Leaving aside the dubiousness of this claim (NATO at it's best drew slightly above even with the Soviets) it is a total non-answer to the actual problem. Which is that casualties are liable to be too intense for either side to sustain for long.

Additionally, one of the odder lessons that was observed from the Kosovo conflict is that although Serbia's small number of poorly maintained MiG-29s would seem like they'd be just targets for NATO fighters, they and the SAMs did create some space for the Serb ground attack aircraft to operate. Below the NATO CAPs and bombers, the Serbs flew several hundred ground attack sorties into Kosovo with strike aircraft and helicopters. Despite NATO air superiority, none of these aircraft were shot down by NATO planes, although one J-22 did crash, likely from flying at low altitude. The Serbs even got several air to air kills against UAVs, the unsung casualties of Allied Force with 25 lost, 19 to some combination of enemy action (numbers vary a little by source). Because they could be difficult to target with high speed fighters, one innovative tactic used by the Serbs was to fly an Mi-8 up beside a UAV and blow it away with the door gunner. The British lost several Hunters to this method.

Anyway, the lesson this has for a 1985 WW3 scenario is obvious: even if the VVS loses air superiority to NATO, its fighters will be able to continue flying. This would require a mental shift to aerial guerrilla warfare, rather than slamming into NATO head on, however if the Warsaw Pact accepts the truth that they're losing air superiority (which is easier for them then for NATO, as they never relied on airpower in their plans to the extent NATO did), there's still options open to them. Warsaw Pact SAMs are numerous and hard to suppress, would be able to mount defenses of vital locations, make flying over the frontlines hazardous, and inflicting their own attrition. Maskirovka and deception could be mitigate damage from NATO deep strikes. Once dispersed to other bases, small numbers of Soviet strike aircraft armed with ground attack munitions should regularly be able to slip through and do damage or, when armed with air-air munitions, pounce on the occasional NATO strike package and maul it.

Of course the converse is true. In the event that the Warsaw Pact managed to win the air war (possibly to early massed strikes on NATO airbases), there will still be large numbers of NATO strike planes and helicopters operating over the front, striking WP forces.

But because of each sides extensive air defense systems (both on the ground and in the air), it's all liable to be just dropped in the bucket. And it doesn't matter if NATO gets the upper-hand in the air war if it's just in time for Soviet ground forces to roll over their airbases with tanks. There's no better AA weapon then parking your tank on your enemies runway.

 

[Forcon]

Probably an initial Spviet thrust pushes NATO back, but the reinforcements come in and hold the Warsaw Pact somewhere in West Germany. The WARPAC forces do best in thw north, where the terrain was less suited to armoured defence. Denmark falls and the Soviets quite possibly take Hamburg and move along the channel coastline, but are stopped there.

After that NATO counterattacks and pushes the WARPAC to the Polish border, where both sides come to the negotiating table. A coup in the USSR to 'save what's left' is possible. I think there is a reason most 80s WW3 fics have that as their general plot; because it is the most likely way things pan out, except most writers don't have NATO go nuclear at the beggining when things are dire, or rhe Soviets when NATO crosses the IGB.

 

[Orcbuster]

First US reinforcement is one month away at minimum, by that time the war is likely over and NATO knew this. For those reinforcements to have any effect NATO needs several weeks warning, which they are unlikely to get as Soviet doctrine relied on present forces being able to attack with less than a few days preparation and trained for it often enough that such an assembly wouldn't be a good idea for an attack.

 

[Forcon]

First US reinforcement is one month away at minimum.

Not in the Cold War. REFORGER was practiced constantly, and there was a huge amount of pre-positioned equipment sitting in Germany and the Low Countries for III Corps. They'd only have to fly the troops to Europe; much of the equupment was there already.

The snag is that those airfields and airorts wpuld be under enemy air attack.

Even now, the US maintains pre-positioned equipment for a couple of armoured brigades in Europe, in case Vlad gets any ideas in the Baltics, Ukraine, or the Nordic countries.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

First US reinforcement is one month away at minimum.

It depends on what you mean by "first US reinforcements"? Some of the REFORGER forces with POMCUS in Europe could be over in a few weeks or even days. The ones that have to actually get their heavy gear on boats and cross the Atlantic would probably take a month or more, depending on how well the naval war and Soviet strikes on the port facilities go. That said, the advantage in interior lines do mean that Soviet reinforcements can arrive a hell of a lot faster then American ones, even after interdiction attempts are factored in. A lot depends on how much lead-time each side has before the shooting breaks out.

Frankly, I'm of the opinion that there's too many unknowns to say for sure how things would develop in a '85 scenario. As far as I'm concerned, NATO victory, WP victory, or stalemate are all valid possible outcomes. As Sloreck pointed out though, it's rather irrellevant: it all ends in nukes anyways.

 

[Orcbuster]

Not in the Cold War. REFORGER was practiced constantly, and there was a huge amount of pre-positioned equipment sitting in Germany and the Low Countries for III Corps. They'd only have to fly the troops to Europe; much of the equupment was there already.

The snag is that those airfields and airorts wpuld be under enemy air attack.

Even now, the US maintains pre-positioned equipment for a couple of armoured brigades in Europe, in case Vlad gets any ideas in the Baltics, Ukraine, or the Nordic countries.

Reforger was estimated to take a month before assembly produced anything meaningfull. I've seen the estimates. It was the same for US armed forces reinforcements in Norway. Anything heavy will not be ready until a month in even with prepositioned equipment. Best book I've read on the subject is Gullow Gierseth "landsforsvarets krigsplaner under den kalde krigen" which details these things down to the regional level.

This was true for the rest of Europe as well.

Translation: Under Best possible circumstance (likely to take longer) the forces available in Troms would be available after mobilization is as follows.

The Brigade in Northern Norway: Standing.
Brigade 5: 2 days
Brigade 6: 2 days after 1990
Brigade 7: 7 days
UK/NL landing force: 7 days
AMF(L): 6 Days
NAL MEB/CAST Brigade group (these are the ones with prepositioned equipment in question): 30 days
Brigade 15: 2 days (grouped in the Ofoten-Hinnøya area)
Brigade 15: 2 days

 

[Unknown]

For a variation of this, here's a link to the Global War series, which deals with this topic: https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a430248.pdf

 

[Deleted member 90563]

There would be some time to prepare, as massive Soviet troop movements toward the west would be noticed right away, and as someone who actually lived in Germany in the eighties, I can almost guarantee massive popular resistance there with lots of urban warfare. Also don't forget West Germany had at this point had conscription for 30 years and people - justified or not - would assume the Soviet soldiers to behave in a similar manner as they did in '45.

 

[Khanzeer]

even if the VVS loses air superiority to NATO, its fighters will be able to continue flying. This would require a mental shift to aerial guerrilla warfare, rather than slamming into NATO head on,

that is interesting please explain a bit more

I have read accounts of soviet tactics of using older fighters as bait and drawing NATO migCAP into ambush with smaller numbers of their latest fighters or over SAM sites thus trying to inflict dispropotinate attrition
is that what you are saying ? kind of ?

 

[Vanguard45]

Ralph Peters Red army is the best AH book for this scenario. Unlike Clancy he was a military analyst in Germany at the time. In his opinion it was a firm yes that if the soviets had a good day they could certainly pull it off. It was however way too uncertain to say one way or another. In the book the soviets superior operational understanding and military political stability is the major advantage that forces W-germany into a surrender when UK/US threaten with use of nuclear weapons. NORTHAG is pushed back to the netherlands in 3 days.

To be fair to Clancy, Nato managed to get just enough warning to strangle the initial advance. Even so NATO was one or two smashed convoys away from utter ruin

 

[ferdi254]

If the WP could achieve some surprise element they might have a chance otherwise they are completely busted. No defense against F 117 hardly a numerical advantage and a completely incompatible infrastructure in the east