The Kampakuate
Spanish policies towards Japan were initially aimed at merely protecting the Pacific trade routes, unlike the Portuguese who had actual interests in spreading Christianity in the country and trading with the Japanese themselves. The success of the Kirishitan rebellion forced a reappraisal of Spanish policies in light of the new political situation. The Kyushuns were profiting through the relationship with foreign merchants, who were able to take control of the trade of Japanese silver for Chinese silk bought from the cash-hungry Southern Ming. The Japanese shogunate, isolated from foreign trade, found itself increasingly impoverished and suffering from internal unrest. For the Portugeuse and Spanish, there was an interest in supporting the Kyushun kampakuate in it's goal of uniting Japan under it's new order, for unlike the Tokugawa bakufu he did not fear the influence of Iberian religious orders but welcomed them as providing ideological support. After 1637 there was a large influx of Spanish members of the Mendicant orders into Kyushu, such as the Augustinians, Franciscans and Dominicans. Franciscan "barefoot friars" who learned Japanese and went out amongst the people had a great effect on the conversion rate and did much to turn the common people in favour of the foreigners. This stood in stark contrast with the previous behaviour of the Jesuit priests, who had been linked so closely with the Portuguese traders that they had become known as mere bullion-broker priests.
The prospects of a friendly and allied Japan able to support Spain in Asia and help to protect the trans-Pacific trade lanes were tantalizing, not to mention bringing thousands of heathen souls into the light of Catholicism. Free access to the ports of Japan was considered preferable to the continued use of Manila as a way-station: better able to service the ships and crew and at less of a threat from Dutch and English depredations thanks to local support. However, it did mean that there was a serious interest in completing the kampakuate conquest of Japan. The threat of the Tokugawa reopening relations with the Dutch or English in order to secure weapons or other support was too great. And the possible rewards of a Spanish-Japanese alliance against the English and Dutch were too great. The Kyushuns themselves hoped that the Spanish would teach them Western ship-building, mining and cartographical techniques. This was of great concern to the Portugeuse, who feared that the Japanese might take over the profitable silk-silver trade with China for themselves. The Spanish, however, did not fear a Japanese threat to the Pacific trade and saw the potential in building Japan up as a naval power in order to have a powerful ally in the East in order to expel the English and Dutch and cow the other Asian powers into submission.
The fact, however, remains that future historians of the West often exaggerated the true effect of Iberian support for the success of the Kyushun kampakuate. While European weapons were appreciated and mercenaries from the Spanish Empire had an often colourful impact on the war, Spain's abilities to directly impact the civil war were limited. Man for man, Spanish mercenaries were often inferior fighters to the Japanese. Spain, meanwhile, was distracted by wars in Europe itself which severely limited it's ability and will to render direct assistance. The true advantages for the kampakuate were in the realms of logistics, wherein access to outside trade and the development of European vessels gave a naval edge over the shogunate. Blame can also be placed upon Iemitsu himself, who became increasingly paranoid and erratic. Fearing betrayal, he overcompensated by forcing the daimyo and/or their families to remain in the capital away from their domains. This caused dissension within his own ranks.
Matters were confused in 1640 when rebellion broke out in Portugal, suddenly complicating the state of affairs in Kyushu. Spanish pressure was brought to bear locally, and the Portuguese merchants and Jesuits found themselves suddenly expelled from Japan entirely. This actually suited the Kyushuns as much as the Spanish: it cut the Portuguese off from their most valuable trading route, the silk-silver trade between China and Japan. This weakened Portugal, as well as allowing the Kyushuns to fill the vacuum. The Kyushuns even went so far as to confiscate several Portuguese vessels in port and deport their crews via Chinese junks bound for Macau. The Spanish were happy enough dominating the other silk-silver route, that spanning the Pacific. The Spanish also made ridiculous profits from the Pacific trade, but with friendly ports and free access in Kyushu, the former routes that went through Manila were neglecred. This was to have an effect on the development of the Philippines as Manila declined in importance: older plans to establish vast plantations and mining there were revived as a way to increase profit, while ship-building by order for the kampakuate was also a source of income.
The next several years saw war ravage much of southern Honshu, until finally a plot hatched between the kampakuate and the Crown Prince Tsuguhito (who hated Tokugawa) in 1642. An internal coup erupted, seeing chaos reign in Edo before the sudden arrival of kampakuate forces allowed the coup leaders to victory. Tokugawa Iemitsu was executed, and the Empress Meisho forced to abdicate in favour of her younger brother. Meeting with Amakusa Shiro, the young Emperor gave his blessing to the office of Kampaku. The most shocking shift to the Japanese was the way Tsuguhito renounced the claims of imperial divinity, which caused scandal. Tsuguhito himself converted to Catholicism and took up Peter, of all things, as his imperial name. The title of Tenno was replaced with the title Kotei, previously used only to denote Chinese emperors (but also now used to describe the Holy Roman Emperor by the Japanese). Regardless, many of the trappings of the imperial cult remained, and there was not much more than a surface coating of Christianity over the sacred position. This would later lead to the rise of heresies that linked the imperial bloodline to Jesus Christ, which caused no end of headaches for Spanish priests but seemed to be tolerated with a wink by the kampakuate itself.
By 1645, Japan was at peace under the kampakuate. Dominating trade with the Southern Ming, Japanese merchants were reviving the old Red Seal ship routes to Vietnam and the East Indies. This largely pleased the Spanish, as it caused threats to the Dutch and English in the region. Japanese ex-samurai, out of place in a Japan at peace, found work as mercenaries in Asia, the Spanish Empire and even as far as Europe. Catholicism was prospering, with more and more converts and greater numbers of Japanese priests being trained to replace the Spanish. However, there were the beginnings of tension. The spirit of the Emperor cult remained. Shinto practices were becoming merged into the folk traditions of Japanese Christianity. Crypto-Buddhist groups that disguised Zen koans as Christian parables were rife, and the Japanese establishment didn't seem to mind them. The Spanish priests were exasperated, but as the two governments remained allies this was a problem that remained on the backburner.
For now, at least. Regardless, attention at this time was being drawn to the west, where the Southern Ming were having interesting times indeed.
Spanish policies towards Japan were initially aimed at merely protecting the Pacific trade routes, unlike the Portuguese who had actual interests in spreading Christianity in the country and trading with the Japanese themselves. The success of the Kirishitan rebellion forced a reappraisal of Spanish policies in light of the new political situation. The Kyushuns were profiting through the relationship with foreign merchants, who were able to take control of the trade of Japanese silver for Chinese silk bought from the cash-hungry Southern Ming. The Japanese shogunate, isolated from foreign trade, found itself increasingly impoverished and suffering from internal unrest. For the Portugeuse and Spanish, there was an interest in supporting the Kyushun kampakuate in it's goal of uniting Japan under it's new order, for unlike the Tokugawa bakufu he did not fear the influence of Iberian religious orders but welcomed them as providing ideological support. After 1637 there was a large influx of Spanish members of the Mendicant orders into Kyushu, such as the Augustinians, Franciscans and Dominicans. Franciscan "barefoot friars" who learned Japanese and went out amongst the people had a great effect on the conversion rate and did much to turn the common people in favour of the foreigners. This stood in stark contrast with the previous behaviour of the Jesuit priests, who had been linked so closely with the Portuguese traders that they had become known as mere bullion-broker priests.
The prospects of a friendly and allied Japan able to support Spain in Asia and help to protect the trans-Pacific trade lanes were tantalizing, not to mention bringing thousands of heathen souls into the light of Catholicism. Free access to the ports of Japan was considered preferable to the continued use of Manila as a way-station: better able to service the ships and crew and at less of a threat from Dutch and English depredations thanks to local support. However, it did mean that there was a serious interest in completing the kampakuate conquest of Japan. The threat of the Tokugawa reopening relations with the Dutch or English in order to secure weapons or other support was too great. And the possible rewards of a Spanish-Japanese alliance against the English and Dutch were too great. The Kyushuns themselves hoped that the Spanish would teach them Western ship-building, mining and cartographical techniques. This was of great concern to the Portugeuse, who feared that the Japanese might take over the profitable silk-silver trade with China for themselves. The Spanish, however, did not fear a Japanese threat to the Pacific trade and saw the potential in building Japan up as a naval power in order to have a powerful ally in the East in order to expel the English and Dutch and cow the other Asian powers into submission.
The fact, however, remains that future historians of the West often exaggerated the true effect of Iberian support for the success of the Kyushun kampakuate. While European weapons were appreciated and mercenaries from the Spanish Empire had an often colourful impact on the war, Spain's abilities to directly impact the civil war were limited. Man for man, Spanish mercenaries were often inferior fighters to the Japanese. Spain, meanwhile, was distracted by wars in Europe itself which severely limited it's ability and will to render direct assistance. The true advantages for the kampakuate were in the realms of logistics, wherein access to outside trade and the development of European vessels gave a naval edge over the shogunate. Blame can also be placed upon Iemitsu himself, who became increasingly paranoid and erratic. Fearing betrayal, he overcompensated by forcing the daimyo and/or their families to remain in the capital away from their domains. This caused dissension within his own ranks.
Matters were confused in 1640 when rebellion broke out in Portugal, suddenly complicating the state of affairs in Kyushu. Spanish pressure was brought to bear locally, and the Portuguese merchants and Jesuits found themselves suddenly expelled from Japan entirely. This actually suited the Kyushuns as much as the Spanish: it cut the Portuguese off from their most valuable trading route, the silk-silver trade between China and Japan. This weakened Portugal, as well as allowing the Kyushuns to fill the vacuum. The Kyushuns even went so far as to confiscate several Portuguese vessels in port and deport their crews via Chinese junks bound for Macau. The Spanish were happy enough dominating the other silk-silver route, that spanning the Pacific. The Spanish also made ridiculous profits from the Pacific trade, but with friendly ports and free access in Kyushu, the former routes that went through Manila were neglecred. This was to have an effect on the development of the Philippines as Manila declined in importance: older plans to establish vast plantations and mining there were revived as a way to increase profit, while ship-building by order for the kampakuate was also a source of income.
The next several years saw war ravage much of southern Honshu, until finally a plot hatched between the kampakuate and the Crown Prince Tsuguhito (who hated Tokugawa) in 1642. An internal coup erupted, seeing chaos reign in Edo before the sudden arrival of kampakuate forces allowed the coup leaders to victory. Tokugawa Iemitsu was executed, and the Empress Meisho forced to abdicate in favour of her younger brother. Meeting with Amakusa Shiro, the young Emperor gave his blessing to the office of Kampaku. The most shocking shift to the Japanese was the way Tsuguhito renounced the claims of imperial divinity, which caused scandal. Tsuguhito himself converted to Catholicism and took up Peter, of all things, as his imperial name. The title of Tenno was replaced with the title Kotei, previously used only to denote Chinese emperors (but also now used to describe the Holy Roman Emperor by the Japanese). Regardless, many of the trappings of the imperial cult remained, and there was not much more than a surface coating of Christianity over the sacred position. This would later lead to the rise of heresies that linked the imperial bloodline to Jesus Christ, which caused no end of headaches for Spanish priests but seemed to be tolerated with a wink by the kampakuate itself.
By 1645, Japan was at peace under the kampakuate. Dominating trade with the Southern Ming, Japanese merchants were reviving the old Red Seal ship routes to Vietnam and the East Indies. This largely pleased the Spanish, as it caused threats to the Dutch and English in the region. Japanese ex-samurai, out of place in a Japan at peace, found work as mercenaries in Asia, the Spanish Empire and even as far as Europe. Catholicism was prospering, with more and more converts and greater numbers of Japanese priests being trained to replace the Spanish. However, there were the beginnings of tension. The spirit of the Emperor cult remained. Shinto practices were becoming merged into the folk traditions of Japanese Christianity. Crypto-Buddhist groups that disguised Zen koans as Christian parables were rife, and the Japanese establishment didn't seem to mind them. The Spanish priests were exasperated, but as the two governments remained allies this was a problem that remained on the backburner.
For now, at least. Regardless, attention at this time was being drawn to the west, where the Southern Ming were having interesting times indeed.
