The Dream Is Alive

[Usili]

“The dreams of yesterday are the hopes of today and the reality of tomorrow.”-Robert Goddard

I: Setting the Stage

For NASA, the mid-1970s had represented a lessening of the activities and work that it had once been in the 1960s in the push of the Space Race. No longer was NASA constantly sending men into space onto the dead president's task of reaching towards the moon, but in a mere holding pattern as work and effort progressed into the Space Shuttle. It had come about in the wake of the lunar landings for what NASA would do after. There had been several different hopes, from the continuation of the lunar landings, to the building of a base on the moon, and even to that of a landing on Mars! But what would emerge from the fights since the first of the lunar landings would be that of a new program to follow that of the Apollo Program, that of the Space Shuttle.

The Space Shuttle represented the hope (whether it would pan out or not) of getting a cheap and affordable lift to space. But while the Shuttle was termed and given the moniker of the 'Space Transportation System', it did not represent that of the system as it had been envisioned and proposed. The biggest hoped addition for NASA was that of the eventual building of a space station, with which the Space Shuttle could travel to and from. But while NASA agreed that a Space Station was the next step for the space program, the question was one of how to approach it, which represented the conflict between NASA's main two flight centers, Johnson Space Center and Marshall Space Flight Center.

For the two flight centers, the differences between them were night and day on how to move forward for it. For Johnson Space Center, they viewed the development of the space station of one that should be pushed for and built all in 'one go' in working to get it all together at once; in comparison, Marshall Space Flight Center viewed the development of the space station should be 'build as you go' in working towards building it step by step. As the progress on the Space Shuttle was starting to slowly culminate, the rivalry between Johnson and Marshall was slowly stepping up again on the future development of a space station. While the questions did ensue over what the principal focus of the space station was to be, it would be the work towards Spacelab that would set the next steps forward for NASA.

Spacelab was that of a 'sortie laboratory', and one that had emerged from the capabilities offered by that of the Space Shuttle in terms of being able to bring payloads up and then be able to bring them back down safely again. The concept of the 'sortie laboratory' itself had emerged out of the proposed space station studies from the Space Task Group as the focus shifted towards the idea of the Space Station to the Space Shuttle. The sortie laboratory was a 'short-sleeve' [1] laboratory that could be carried in the payload bay of the Shuttle to do a variety of experiments while in orbit before being brought back to Earth for the next mission. Beyond that however, Spacelab represented an international commitment to the Space Shuttle, with the ESRO (European Space and Research Organization) having committed to the development of it while NASA agreed to flying it and purchase additional ones as needed.

The lead flight center that had been assigned the tasks of dealing with Spacelab and assisting the ESRO had been that of Marshall, because of Johnson Space Center being involved with the technical management of the Space Shuttle and because of the work that was being done by Marshall on Skylab. In the view of then-MFSC Director Rocco Petrone, Spacelab could serve as a central focus for NASA experiment development and mission management, and the continued idea of Spacelab would serve as a focus point in the Manned Orbital Systems Concept Study done by McDonnell Douglas on behalf of Marshall in 1975. It would be specifically mentioned that the proposed modules should be developed based off the existing Spacelab architecture, but the proposed Study would not be continued and merely left as one of the emerging design studies for a proposed Shuttle-built space station.

For NASA, the 1976 elections would see the reelection of President Ford [2] and numerous major NASA supporters in Congress [3] and indicate that there would at least be the maintaining of Congressional support and Presidential support towards NASA. It was hoped that with the President's vocal support of a 'Viking 3' mission, along with public support following the Viking 1 and 2 landings and the roll out of the Space Shuttle Enterprise that it would present itself as an increase in the budget. However, only time would tell if that would pan out or not.


[1] 'short-sleeve' refers to the operation of it, with it being able to be operated without the need to don extravehicular suits.

[2] The 1976 presidential election would see the ticket of Ford/Dole beat the ticket of Carter/Mondale by an electoral college vote of 273-265, while losing the popular vote by more than one million votes.

[3] Among all of NASA's most major supporters being reelected, the most important would be that of Senator Frank Moss from Utah, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, who would defeat former Assistant Interior Secretary Jack Carlson by a vote of 50.3-49.2%.

 

[Usili]

So for those unaware of where this title is from, it was said by John Young after the landing of STS-1, and this timeline is basically meant around where the Space Shuttle does 'better'.

 

[Zioneer]

This is the second version of your second term Ford/space TL, right? Looks good so far!

And Frank Moss sticking around is great, of course.

 

[Usili]

II: Seeking a Commitment

For Administrator Fletcher, his efforts through the 'transition' would be aimed at trying to hold back from any further proposed cuts to the NASA budget in the finalization of the budget along with trying to restore cut spending to future planetary programs. For the Administrator, his single meeting with President Ford and Director Lynn (of the OMB) over the budget would principally be aimed at resisting any other cuts while trying to restore additional funding to proposed planetary science programs. The appeal would be partially successful. Any additional cuts on NASA by OMB were thankfully prevented, along with the addition of five million to the follow-on Mars Viking study, but no money would be directed towards funding of the proposed Lunar Polar Orbiter. To the displeasure of both NASA and the OMB, there was no still clear indication for the number of Orbiters to be acquired and flown.

In the meantime for NASA, other changes were happening during the transition period between the President's first and second terms along with the beginning of his second term for NASA. Increased rumors and speculation had emerged throughout the news over the potential for the 'return' of the National Space Council which was to be headed by Vice President Dole, and to also help determine American space policy into the 1980s. This would emerge from rumor into reality with the creation of the National Space Council on April 19th, and was designated to include the Vice President, the NASA Administrator and a series of other major officials [1]. In remarks made by President Ford on the creation of the National Space Council that it would, “help set into motion a guidance for American space policies into the 1980s with the end of development on the Space Shuttle.” The President's remarks would give some at NASA hope for where the course of the National Space Council might proceed, but if it was, it was much more of a very cautionary hope considering recent history.

While NASA was fighting with Congress over the funding for both the Large Space Telescope and the Jupiter Orbiter Probe, work with the Space Shuttle was progressing. On September 17th, 1976, the first of the Space Shuttles, Enterprise, had rolled out of Palmdale to celebration as the first of the Orbiters. Following the rollout of the Orbiter, it was set to be moved to Edwards Air Force Base where it would undergo the 'Approach and Landing Tests' (ALT), which would encompass four forms: taxi tests (to verify the very low-speed dynamics of the mated vehicles), captive-inert flights (to verify the flight performance and stability of the mated configuration in free flight), captive-active flights (to determine the optimum separation profile based off the captive-inert flights), and the free-flights (to verify the Orbiter subsonic airworthiness and encompassed in testing with the tailcone on and off).

On January 31st, Enterprise would be towed from Palmdale to Edwards Air Force Base where it would begin the series of testing involved in the Approach and Landing Tests. After being mated, taxi tests would be performed on February 15th, and being shown as perfectly fine would be followed by the first 'captive-inert' flight on February 18th. Over the next two weeks, a total of five captive-inert flights would be flown and would indicate no problems present. On June 17th, the first 'captive-active' flight would be flown with Fred W. Haise and Charles Gordon Fullerton at the controls, followed up by one on June 27th flown with Joe H. Engle and Richard H. Truly. The orbiter would be stood down for a total of eleven days for modifications for preparations for free flight, which included “connecting the reserve hydraulic reservoir system, replacing the #1 and #3 APUs, swapping the #5 (spare) GPC, and various minor updates to other on-board systems. [2]” On July 28th, a third and final captive-active flight would be flown with Haise and Fullerton and the free flights now next. On August 14th, the first free flight with Haise and Fullerton would be undertaken to a complete success, and followed up with test flights on September 16th flown by Engle and Truly and September 27th by Haise and Fullerton. The next test flights would be flown without the tailcone, and the fourth test flight would be flown on October 17th by Engle and Truly, and the fifth and final test flight would be flown by Haise and Fullerton on October 28th. The Approach and Landing Tests had been met with a complete success and had for the most part validated that of the data and wind tunnel predictions.

October 18th, 1977
Washington D.C.

The meeting among the members of the National Space Council had been the third of the year, and one that had been rapidly continuing from where it had left off previously that it had been found deadlocked.

“Okay, so let's go with what OMB is suggesting for a fleet of four orbiters. We'll have one flying out of Vandenberg and three flying out of Kennedy. Two Shuttles, OV-103 and OV-104, will be capable of lifting the heaviest payloads that the Department of Defense would need to handle. But what happens if we lose one of them? Immediately, we're going to face issues as a result of a loss of one orbiter for both defense and commercial payloads, not to mention that of scientific missions that are manifested,” Administrator Fletcher spoke in a response to the Director of the OMB.

“And what are the chances of losing an orbiter? Miniscule, right? Not to mention, that the flight rates that provided the basis for the funding of the Shuttle as far as I am aware, would still be fine even with a four orbiter fleet rather than the five orbiter fleet as you suggest,” Director Lynn spoke back, “So considering that the risks of loss of an orbiter are minimal, and that the flight rates for the Shuttle would still hold fine at four orbiters, I don't see any reason for a need of five orbiters.”

“To weigh in from the perspective of Defense on this,” Secretary Rumsfeld began, “Considering the uh... litany of defense payloads that require the Shuttle's payload capability, a loss of an orbiter could present significant problems, especially if it was either OV-103 or OV-104. Such a loss would present significant national security concerns and could be untenable for the required need of defense payloads. I believe Director Bush could choose to weigh in on this?”

“In my view, a fleet of five orbiters presents the best capacity for national security. The loss of a single orbiter, even if it was to be either OV-103 or OV-104 would not result in any loss of national security, whereas with a fleet of four orbiters would present an impact to national security with the loss of an orbiter. This would be quite clear for the necessities of verifying the Soviets are in compliance of SALT II,” Director Bush spoke.

“I'd like to hear from both Scranton and Scowcroft on their opinions on this in terms of national security,” Vice President Dole spoke, weighing in on the matter.

“I think Treasury is going to need to weigh in here on our views of this,” Secretary Connally interrupted, “While the increase on the federal budget is probably going to be minor as a whole, considering the President's directives towards attaining a balanced budget, something like this is going to prove problematic as a whole with the relative increase in NASA's budget compared to the decrease from the other parts of the government.”

“That is being noted Secretary Connally,” the Vice President replied back, “Scowcroft, you want to go ahead on this?”

“Thank you Mr. Vice President. I'd agree with both the Defense Secretary and Director of Central Intelligence that a five shuttle fleet would be the best from a national security perspective. I have a recent memo from the ACDA here,” Brent Scowcroft paused to indicate the piece of paper, “And that in their view, we are going to need to monitor Soviet compliance with SALT II. Considering the statements from the ACDA to ensure Soviet verification, I believe it is imperative to have a five orbiter fleet, most especially in order to ensure a continued compliance of the Soviets with regards to the limits set by SALT II.”

“I think the position of a four versus five orbiter fleet has already been made clear on national security grounds Mr. Vice President,” Secretary Scranton spoke, “But there is also that of the role of the Space Shuttle in terms of American foreign policy and our own allies on it. For example, we have a significant commitment from our European allies on the development of an orbital laboratory for the Space Shuttle that is called... Spacelab I think it was? If we were to demonstrate that we were not to be fully committed to the Space Shuttle, then this could present an increase of strains on our relationship with our European allies in regards to spaceflight. Considering the recent private statements made over diplomatic channels after the ratification of SALT II, there is some cause to be concerned if it helps to worsen our relationship with Western Europe.”

The room paused for a moment before the Vice President broke the silence. “So considering the statements made on that for a four versus five orbiter Shuttle fleet complete, the National Space Council will recommend for the procurement of a five orbiter fleet, with a dissent from both OMB and Treasury on what this would mean for the budget. Moving onto the next item on the agenda...”



[1] The full list of people assigned to the National Space Council include the Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Commerce, Director of Central Intelligence, Director of Office and Management of Budget, Administrator of NASA, Administrator of the Federal Energy Administration, Administrator of the Energy Research and Development Agency, the Chief of Staff, the National Security Adviser, and the President's Science Adviser.

[2] This is quoted from Space Shuttle: The History of the First 100 Missions, Page 211. Much of the segment on the 'Approach and Landing Tests' was sourced from this book in terms of the details.

 

[TheHolyInquisition]

So can we assume the decision on the actual design of the Shuttle went as OTL? Because I believe we're past it now, if my sense of time is right.

 

[Usili]

So can we assume the decision on the actual design of the Shuttle went as OTL? Because I believe we're past it now, if my sense of time is right.

That would be correct.

 

[Jim Smitty]

So we get five shuttles ITL, hot damn. Just don't use them as satellite haulers. That's a waste of missions generally

 

[Usili]

So we get five shuttles ITL, hot damn. Just don't use them as satellite haulers. That's a waste of missions generally

To point out in regards to historical fact, that was the historical plan (and still the pre-existing plan as it stands right now from a historical basis) to use them as 'satellite haulers' pre-Challenger. The Space Shuttle was basically designed to replace expendable launch vehicles and to fly all expendable launch vehicles (as given a monopoly per legislation passed in... 1974 I believe?). Even after the Challenger accident, NASA still had to fly missions for satellite deliveries, such as the TDRS satellites (which I believe were designed to only be launched from the Shuttle payload bay originally) along with a series of both DoD payloads and interplanetary missions which were also specifically designed to be launched only out of the Shuttle.

 

[TimothyC]

So we get five shuttles ITL, hot damn. Just don't use them as satellite haulers. That's a waste of missions generally

The best you can hope for in the 1980s as a part of a plan is a backup expendable in the form of a Titan 34D7/Titan IV / Commercial Titan 3. As Usili said, everything else was programed for the shuttle. Also, Remember the flight rates they were getting to - over a 12 month period in 1985 and 1986, there were 10 successful shuttle flights. They also were getting the turn around times down - Atlantis was on the ground for 54 days in October and November of 1985 (Challenger had a similarly short turn-around between STS-41-B and 41-C the prior year). If the funding is there, you can start to make that the norm. Commercial flights are the only way they could get the payloads up to amortize the costs of the ground crews.

Something to keep in mind about the Fifth orbiter. This is still prior to the decision to refit STA-099 into OV-099, and thus Enterprise is still on the docket. Even with more funding, Enterprise is still more expensive to refit than the STA, which means Challenger is likely to be the second orbiter no mater what. It also means that the decision on structural spares is pushed out into 1984/5 instead of 1983/4 (OV-105 won't come until 1986/87 at best, 1988 is much more likely).

 

[Usili]

III: Steps Forward

Marshall Space Flight Center had since the Manned Orbital Systems Concept Study in 1975 been evaluating proposals for space stations based off Spacelab hardware, but as a lesser focus in terms of a focus on space stations involving Spacelab hardware was on ways to improve Spacelab's operations and flight capability. This had posed more of an interesting question (versus that of the development for a space station on Spacelab hardware), and one that had emerged as a point of competition and contrast between that of Johnson Space Flight Center and that of Marshall Space Flight Center. Both flight centers had begun the same kind of studies on ways towards improving the initial Shuttle flights with Spacelab in hopes of expanding unto a space station. For Marshall, their work would establish the development of a way into improving Spacelab as that of an entirely separate module. Known as the ‘Power Module’, it was proposed to be able to offer a steady twenty-five kilowatts of power to a Spacelab flight, which would allow to both provide more power to Spacelab and associated payloads than the Shuttle could provide via its fuel cells and allow an increase in duration of flight to as long as a month by reducing the amount of power being drawn by the fuel cells. In addition to the expected performance increase to the Spacelab flights, by having it as an entirely separate ‘module’ (rather than as a ‘solar array kit’ as proposed by Johnson) it could offer the capability to function as a ‘free-flyer’ and be able to host a series of experiments that would not be required to be man-tended and needed to remain in space for months at a time.

While the Power Module was intent on increasing the power and extending the duration of Spacelab flights, the capacity for it to act as a free-flyer had paved the way for a major variety of missions or payloads that it could undertake. Yet the biggest unsaid reason for the development of a Power Module by Marshall was simple; the development of a space station for NASA. The Power Module had emphasized Marshall's approach of 'building it as you go' and would represent but the first step for the development of a space station by both free-flying payloads along with the extension of Spacelab flights. The next steps after that would be either the upgrading of the Power Module to allow additional power production (and eventual addition of fixed modules into a space station) or for additional fixed experiments and other associated hardware that could be used in the power being provided by it. Even if the latter option was chosen, the Power Module could be upgraded on orbit and still allow the former option to be taken and developed. Yet for the time being, Marshall found the focus of its own future centered around the Power Module and one that would have to be lobbied for and pushed against whatever Johnson would try to push forth.

While the effort of design and politics were underway between Johnson and Marshall over the future for NASA after the Shuttle was operational, progress on the Space Shuttle was continuing at the National Space Technology Laboratory (NSTL) [1]. The National Space Technology Laboratory had been assigned the role for testing the Space Shuttle Main Engine and to ensure it was ready for flight. The initial piece for testing had been the ‘Integrated Subsystem Test Bed (ISTB) which was intended as that of a prototype Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) capable of operating up to 50% thrust [2] and for the development of a proper start-up procedure for the Shuttle (this would not be completed until the end of 1978). Throughout 1976, the ISTB would be utilized towards tests of up to 50% thrust (including few of 65% thrust), and as the tests proceeded there was the eventual goal of getting 100% thrust from a development engine (separate from that of the ISTB). Finally in March 1977, a development engine would achieve a total of 100% thrust in a test. While it was necessary to work towards actually maintaining the 100% thrust for an actual flight duration, there was going to be the need to reach the total of 109% thrust, the then rated ‘emergency’ thrust level [3].

Testing of the SSME, as with all new engines, was bound to run into problems and some of the first major issues would come about during a test of 75% power during March. A fire would break out after a fall in the shaft speed in the oxygen turbopump, and investigations would show that the point of origin of the fire had started from a failure from a major liquid-oxygen seal. While the seal was redesigned and put into use, it was but the start of the headaches at the NSTL for the issues with the oxygen turbopumps. In September, another test of a SSME (running at near full power) would see a failure, with the engine having 'shaken' itself apart. The investigation of it would show that the failure of the engine had occurred on both sides of the bearings of the oxygen turbopump shaft. Once more, fixes and redesigns on the SSME were underway in order to prevent such a failure from happening on an actual flight.

As the work and issues with the SSMEs were being handled throughout 1977, parallel work involving the SSMEs was happening at the NSTL with the efforts at readying and preparing the Main Propulsion Test Article (MPTA) for use. The Main Propulsion Test Article was a structural article made up of the Shuttle aft fuselage (where the SSMEs would be mounted), a truss structure making up the basic structure of the mid-fuselage of the Orbiter, and all the associated plumbing to run the SSMEs. Having arrived at the NSTL in June 1977, work on verifying it and combining it with the MPTA's counterpart of the External Tank found itself underway, and by April 1978 it was officially ready for testing of the SSMEs. From May to July, testing of the MPTA found itself underway racking up crucial time for the testing of the engines, and showing no problems. Moving into late August, the testing of the SSME hit its stride, running through more than 5,000 seconds of trouble-free operation, with more than 90% of it spent at or above 100% power. For the program as a whole as 1978 drew to a close, everything seemed to be going fine for the first flight which was targeted for September 1979.


[1] The National Space Technology Laboratory as named in 1974 was originally known as the Mississippi Test Facility and known from 1988 on, as the John C. Stennis Space Center.

[2] The minimum thrust for the SSME would originally be set at 50%, but would later be increased to 65%.

[3] The 109% 'emergency' thrust would be renamed to that of 'full power' as part of planning by NASA to have it available for every flight in order to increase the amount of payload that could be delivered to orbit.

 

[Usili]

IV: Bounding Problems

At the same time as preparation and efforts were underway on the testing of the numerous components of the Shuttle program, NASA found itself involved in the age-old need of working and dealing with both the OMB and Congress to maintain its budget. While the appeal post-transition had mostly kept NASA's budget intact from the OMB for the Fiscal Year 1978 budget, there was a more significant effort involved in trying to deal with Congress to retain the budget and prevent further cuts (most specifically in trying to retain both the Jupiter Orbiter Probe and the Large Space Telescope and prevent the loss of either program). For the next year's budget (FY1979) NASA had maintained budget levels similar to the previous one, again proposing a series of new development starts for planetary programs (the Lunar Polar Observer, a Mars Orbiter-Penetrator mission for 1984, initial start funds for the Inter Solar Planetary Mission (ISPM) and funds for the development of an ion engine for a Halley's Comet mission), alongside an increase in funds to help with the conversion of existing facilities and needed upgrades. The OMB's response to it would deny both the Lunar Polar Observer and the Mars Orbiter-Penetrator while preserving funding for the Inter Solar Planetary Mission citing European commitment to it. In addition to that, the OMB also issued a stinging recommendation for the 'cancellation' of any new technology starts for a Halley's Comet mission and that any such unmanned mission must not see any need for new research and development funding (which was intended to prevent the funding for either a 'solar sail' or 'ion engine' to be used for it). Little other funding had been targeted for the most part by OMB, with NASA seeming to have been caught in a 'holding action' with the Shuttle development, as Administrator Fletcher went to toe with Congress over it. But however the biggest matter which was soon to ensue between NASA, Congress, and the Ford Administration would be that of the matter of the procurement for the five-Orbiter fleet.

The question of the Orbiter procurement for NASA now dealt not with the number of Orbiters to be procured (as had already been established with the official recommendation by the National Space Council for a total of five), but specifically in terms of the fifth orbiter. Following the series of flight tests made by Enterprise, it had been decided in November of 1977 that considering both costs and time it would be both cheaper and faster for the conversion of STA-099 into an Orbiter, rather than the conversion of OV-101 (Enterprise) into a space-worthy vehicle. The decision to convert STA-099 had now presented something of a problem in the planning for a fifth orbiter, since it had seemed that OV-101 would've been converted for flight as the second orbiter, with OV-103, OV-104, and OV-105 to be the new builds to round out the Shuttle fleet to a total of five Orbiters. The question that had now emerged, would OV-101 be converted into the 'fifth' space-worthy Orbiter, or instead would it continue for procurement of OV-105 as the fifth Orbiter?

An inter-agency meeting (separate from that of the National Space Council) alongside that of a meeting from the National Space Council would work to resolve the debate, and place their own opinions on the matter. The inter-agency meeting would voice the view of procurement of OV-105 citing that “the weight of OV-101, OV-102, and OV-099 would present a detriment for the launch of defense payloads in the event of a loss of either OV-103 or OV-104”. The National Space Council meeting would again come into a debate over national security and economic matters for whether to go with OV-101 or OV-105 for a fifth Orbiter. The decision on whether the conversion of OV-101 or procurement of OV-105 would take place would be left to President Ford considering the divide that existed in the National Space Council over it. President Ford would select the procurement of OV-105 over the conversion of OV-101 as the fifth Orbiter after hearing the testimony from both sides over it.

With the executive decision made by President Ford towards the procurement of OV-105 over the conversion of OV-101, there was still the matter of dealing with the actual appropriations of it by Congress. The debates on appropriations for NASA would resound heavily, specifically in the House Appropriations subcommittee in charge of NASA [1] over why it had been chosen for the funding and construction of a fifth new orbiter (OV-105) rather than the conversion of Enterprise into a fifth orbiter. Both Director Fletcher and Secretary Thomas C. Reed [2] would testify specifically on the need for that of OV-105 rather than that of a conversion of OV-101, with it narrowly passing through the subcommittee for the funding of OV-105. Attempts to strip the funding of OV-105 via amendment to the budget would occur in both House and Senate and fail narrowly each time. For the space agency, they had barely managed to eek out the avoidance of winding up with the conversion of OV-101 to OV-105, or even facing a cut of a fifth Orbiter all together.

With the conclusion of the funding situation handled, NASA prepared for its next major announcement for January of 1979, the naming of the five Orbiters. Since the name change of OV-101 from Constitution to Enterprise, NASA had been working on a proposed naming scheme for the four (and then five) Orbiters in order to announce their names at once. Memos throughout NASA would speculate on potential naming conventions for which all three of the Orbiters could be chosen, such as after famous ships of exploration, American ideals, or named after famous stars. Administrator Fletcher's choice would eventually settle on that of famous ships of exploration, and in early 1979, the five Orbiters would be named as Columbia (OV-102), Challenger (OV-099), Discovery (OV-103), Atlantis (OV-104), and Resolution (OV-105).

However as 1979 began for NASA, the problems began to stack up. In mid January, an SSME test went awry and forced an immediate halt to testing to figure out what had went wrong. The analysis of the test had showed that the failure had started from a simple screw for a main oxygen valve having gone loose and caused the failure of the test, and brought about a new redesign to ensure that those screws wouldn't come out. The delays as a result of the investigation into the SSME failure had pushed the launch date of STS-1 into November of 1979, and concerns were starting to mount over the launch date slipping into 1980. Alongside that of the concerns over the delays of the Shuttle with the most recent SSME failure, the rate of installing the tiles that made up the thermal protection system (TPS) had been lower than expected by Rockwell. Nearly 80% were complete by the time that Columbia was supposed to arrive at Kennedy, and NASA was determined to keep their schedule of getting the Shuttle to the Cape on time. Throughout the end of March, Columbia was flown from Edwards to Kennedy where she would be expected to finish her tile installation and then hopefully onto flight. Unfortunately for NASA, testing of the thermal protection system had rapidly thrown a wrench into things. In April of 1979 it had been identified that on certain areas of the Space Shuttle, the tensile strength of the tiles seemed as if they were not going to be guaranteed to stay on for a single flight, and a solution would have to be found. The first flight of the Shuttle program, STS-1, had now officially slipped into 1980 with no potential launch date in sight for the program as NASA worked desperately to fix the tile problem that had sprouted.


[1] The House Appropriations subcommittee in charge of NASA would be the Housing and Urban Development—Independent Agencies Subcommittee.

[2] Thomas C. Reed was the Secretary of the Air Force in addition to being that of the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office.

 

[TheHolyInquisition]

[1] The House Appropriations subcommittee in charge of NASA would be the Housing and Urban Development—Independent Agencies Subcommittee.

What line of twisted logic lead to that decision?

The first flight of the Shuttle program, STS-1, had now officially slipped into 1980 with no potential launch date in sight for the program as NASA worked desperately to fix the tile problem that had sprouted.

The dream may be alive, but it's looking oddly pale right now...

 

[Usili]

What line of twisted logic lead to that decision?

Per this oral history, it was originally the Independent Agencies Subcommittee, and then wound up seeing both HUD and (later) the VA added to it for both the House and Senate. It's only been since the mid-2000s I believe that NASA has been under a new subcommittee for both House and Senate, the Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies.

 

[Usili]

V: Number One On the Runway

As the Space Shuttle program entered into mid-1979, it had found itself in trouble. An SSME failure had hit the program first, by delaying the first flight into 1980 and in addition further delaying the minimum amount of seconds of operation before flight. Then came the news over the tiles. The fact that NASA was now having to deal with figuring out a way to make sure that the tiles wouldn’t come off during the first flight was a ‘gut-punch’ to the space agency. NASA would rapidly begin a search for a solution to the tile program, so that the tiles were bonded to the Orbiter and would not come off during flight. By August, NASA had managed to figure out a solution dealing with the way the tiles were bonded to the felt pads they were connected to. An analysis indicated that each of the individual components making up the connection of the thermal protection system (TPS) to the Orbiter were fine (the tile, the SIP, and two layers of adhesive) but when they were combined together it was shown that they lost about half of the combined strength of it all. The reason for the loss in strength had been traced to ‘stiff spots’ present in the felt pads that the tiles were connected to.

The solution for this would be found in a ‘densification’ between the tiles and the felt pads. The densification process would fill the void between the fibers next to the felt pad with a special slurry mixtures that would remove the ‘stiff spots’ present. The densification process however was quite arduous, requiring both the removal and re-addition of the waterproofing on the tiles, air-drying the tiles for twenty-four hours after the slurry mixture was ‘painted’ on the back of them, and then requiring to ‘bake’ the tiles in an oven. Nonetheless, the slurry mixture would act as a new layer on the bottom of the tile acting as a ‘plate’ to eliminate the stiff spots on the felt pads. However, there was a downside to the tile densification process. It would require the removal of all the tiles so that they could be densified and then reinstalled back on the Orbiter.

Because of the amount of time that would need to be taken to both remove and then reinstall all the tiles, a challenge emerged in order to save as many of the installed tiles as possible while also ensuring that those tiles that remained installed would have a structural margin safe enough for flight. The solution developed for this would be known as the ‘tile proof test’. The tile proof test involving applying a load to the installed tile equivalent to 125% of the maximum flight stress that would be experienced by that tile at the highest point of stress. While the process would help to save thousands of installed tiles, it would also reveal those tiles that had an inadequate flight strength and would need to be replaced. In addition to the tile proof test, there were other methods designed to help strengthen the tiles while they were still attached. This entailed the use of something known as ‘gap fillers’ to help fill the space between the tiles to prevent them from rotating by shock waves of air during reentry and coming off. For the ‘thick’ tiles on the underside of the Orbiter, they could be added as needed, but for the small thin tiles where it was not possible, the gap fillers would be directly bonded to the tiles.

At the same time as work on replacing the tiles were occurring, the Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory were performing a series of tests to review the Orbiter for potential heating concerns. The tests would reveal that the OMS pod were going to be deflecting much more heat than had been expected, and because of the existing tiles being relatively weak under existing loads, there were concerns that it could fracture and separate from the Orbiter during reentry. Because of the tiles having already been installed to the OMS pods, a solution was developed in order to be able to prevent their fracture and separation from reentry. The 8-by-8 inch tile would be ‘diced’ into nine equal parts while it was still attached to the OMS pod and to ensure that it would neither damage the tile nor the structure of the OMS pod underneath it. [1]

As the work on the tiles progressed, significant efforts were also underway for the SSMEs. While it had arguably been completed in terms of the ‘developmental’ testing following the failure of a test engine in mid-January, it was now the goal of the program in making sure that the engine was capable of flight. John A. Yardley, the Associate Administrator for Space Flight had set the directive of achieving 65,000 seconds of single-engine test operation for the SSME prior to flight. By the end of 1978, only 34,118 seconds had been completed of single engine testing, and prior to the tile issue having emerged it had seemed as if they would barely get the needed 65,000 seconds of testing prior to flight. In addition to the requirement for the 65,000 seconds of single engine testing, there was also that of directive to ensure that the engines could run for a full flight duration without failure, alongside the testing for the variety of abort modes if needed.

As the testings resumed on the SSME, issues would again sprout on the SSME and the need to fix those new issues that had sprouted up. The issues would sprout up most often on the MPTA where you had three of the SSMEs to test for flight configuration. For example during one test, a failure from one engine would show a need of redesign on a main fuel valve while a failure from another engine during that same test while throttling down would highlight the issue of a hydrogen tube in a nozzle breaking (this was principally to help cool the engine). While work would commence on redesigning the hydrogen lines (by stiffening them) to prevent another failure like that happening, it would be uncovered that improper welding had contributed to the failure of the nozzle (with a series of fixes to those nozzles that had seen the improper welding job). But the issues and failures with the SSMEs would decrease further and further and by February, 1980, the SSME had managed to achieve a total of the 65,000 seconds of testing, passing the requirements set by Associate Administrator Yardley. But the Space Shuttle was still not ready for flight as work continued to progress at Kennedy for the replacement of tiles for Columbia.

Throughout the rest of 1980 work continued on preparing the Shuttle for her eventual first flight as the launch date continued to slip throughout 1980 and then into 1981. While progress was being made on the tiles, it was felt at times that progress was going nowhere as it was being found that the same amount of tiles were being installed as were being removed (if not taking off more than being installed by those newly-installed tiles having failed the tile proof test). But despite that, the steady progress/march towards flight continued as the amount of tiles that had to be installed continued to chart downwards. Both the External Tank and the Solid Rocket Boosters had finished their testing, and the SSME, one of the most troublesome pieces of the program had found itself running smoothly, performing multiple full duration burns [2] along with performing the kind of burns necessary in the event of an engine-out scenario and the associated abort mode [3].

By the start of November, the work had been finished and Columbia was rolled out to the Vehicle Assembly Building to be stacked and mated to the Solid Rocket Boosters and External Tank. After nine years of development and seeming setbacks, the Space Shuttle’s first flight, STS-1, was set for March 10th. The Space Shuttle was ready to go.


[1] The section on the TPS and the tile replacement is explicitly referenced from Space Shuttle: The History of the First 100 Missions, Page 239-240, in part considering the specific details on the densification process and other associated details to help with dealing the issues encountered.

[2] Prior to the launch of STS-1, more than one hundred thousand seconds of testing of the SSME would be completed.

[3] In the event of an engine-out scenario from launch to separation of the ET, a series of abort modes would be available. No abort could be made until after the SRBs had finished burning and could be separated from the vehicle. Starting at T+2:10, the 'Return to Launch Site (RTLS)' abort mode could be selected. The 'RTLS' abort mode would be available through the first four minutes of flight, and then as originally proposed would be followed by that of the 'Abort Once Around (AOA)' (in which it would abort and then land at Edwards after a single orbit) or 'Abort to Orbit (ATO)' (having arrived at a lower orbit than expected). In between the RTLS abort mode and the ATO abort mode, the Shuttle would be expected to be ditched. In the lead-up to STS-1, Dick Truly and Joe Engle would develop a new abort mode to prevent such a ditching known as the 'Trans Atlantic Landing (TAL)' abort mode. This abort mode would be available starting at a later point then when the RTLS abort mode could be initiated, but would extend up to the AOA/ATO abort mode selection along with being safer for the Space Shuttle (in terms of the flight path and stresses on the Orbiter). However, because of the development of the TAL abort mode, it would not be available in the Shuttle flight software through the orbital test flights and would be expected to be hand-flown by the flight crews (it would be available starting in the first operational mission).

 

[Usili]

VI: Fire in the Sky

Kennedy Space Center
March 15th, 1981

The crowd of journalists at the press site stood watching from across the water at the Space Shuttle, standing at the launch pad, nearly entirely white from the Solid Rocket Boosters to the External Tank and to Columbia herself. “Coming up on just two minutes away from launch,” the Public Affairs Officer spoke, “T-minus two minutes mark and counting.”

A nervous energy filled the crowd, Columbia having been so close to launch on the 10th, but then having been halted because of a timing issue between the Shuttle’s main computers and backup. The launch of the Space Shuttle seemed so close as the next words of the PAO came out, “T-minus one minute and twenty seconds, we can see the purges of the main engine as we prepare for ignition.”

The Space Shuttle stood waiting on the pad, ready and eager for flight as the next series of comments came from the PAO, “T-minus one minute mark and counting. The firing system for the sound suppression water will be armed in just a few seconds.”

And for the crowd of journalists, the energy shot forth even further as they waited for the launch of the America’s next manned spacecraft. “T-minus forty-five seconds and counting.”

“T-minus twenty-seven seconds, we have gone for redundant set sequencer start.” Then came the words indicating (per a brief from one of the NASA employees) that if an abort was made that it’d have to go back much further to a ‘stable’ configuration. The tension in the crowd was anxious as the Shuttle continued towards what would hopefully be its first flight.

“T-minus fifteen, fourteen, thirteen, ten, nine, eight, seven, six, five, four, we’ve gone for main engine start, we have main engine start.”

The sound of the main engines of the Space Shuttle rumbled and echoed from the launch pad, the sight of steam and smoke emerging from the three main engines from the Shuttle. Then came the sudden roar of a more ferocious noise from the launch pad, and a much greater sight of smoke from the launch pad, as something began to emerge and leap from the launch pad, with the words of the PAO echoing as the crowd stood in sight of the launch.

“And we have liftoff of America’s first Space Shuttle!”

_____-_____-_____-_____-_____-_____-_____-_____-_____-_____-_____-_____-_____-_____-_____-_____-_____-_____-_____-_____​

It had been nearly two years from when STS-1 had originally been scheduled for launch, but Columbia had finally set forth roaring into space. Columbia had undergone an extensive testing schedule prior to launch, including a month spent at the Vehicle Assembly Building (from early November to mid December), before finally rolling out to LC-39A for the continued series of tests prior to launch. This had included a twenty second firing of the main engines (known as the ‘Full Readiness Firing’) to ensure the SSMEs ran smoothly, and everything had appeared on time for the launch on the 10th. However issues with the Shuttle’s five General Processing Computers (GPCs), in regards to a ‘timing’ issue between the four main and the one backup had forced a delay in order to fix the issue, with poor weather conditions having delayed it from what was expected to be a twenty-four hour fix to one lasting five days. Finally on March 15th, the Space Shuttle had launched.

STS-1 was entailed as the first of four planned ‘orbital flight tests’ [1] to be flown by the Shuttle program prior to it becoming operational. The primary mission for STS-1 was both the safe ascent and then the safe return of both the Orbiter and her crew, astronauts John Young and Bob Crippen. It was entailed as a two-day mission, in which both Young and Crippen would check out the primary Space Shuttle systems along with other associated testing in orbit while verifying everything from launch and ascent to reentry and landing of the Orbiter was fine in terms of flight characteristics. Inside the payload bay of Columbia, the Development Flight Instrument (DFI) was present as the first ‘payload’ of the Space Shuttle, meant to perform measurements and recordings of the Space Shuttle during all phases of flight (from launch to orbit to landing).

For both Young and Crippen, the ascent of Columbia had been nominal, although it had flown a slightly steeper trajectory than what had been expected by the time SRB separation had occurred. The ascent had lasted eight minutes and thirty-five seconds, and beyond that of flying the steeper trajectory with the SRBs, everything had gone a-okay. After a pair of burns by the Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) circularizing Columbia’s orbit, the next step for Young and Crippen were the opening of the payload bay doors in order to deploy the radiators that would keep the Shuttle cool. Throughout the rest of the day and the next, tests would be continued to perform in orbit, with Flight Day 3 scheduled for the preparation for the deorbit burn and return home. Among the most important of preparations was to make sure that the payload bay doors could close successfully. If they could not, Crippen was scheduled to perform an emergency one-man EVA to manually winch them shut [2]. The EVA would be proven to not be needed as both payload bay doors would be shut successfully.

For the crew of Columbia, the time now came for reentry, the only other part that had yet to actually be tested (like that of both launch and ascent). During reentry, the Space Shuttle was required to ‘bleed off’ the excess speed that was accrued from being in orbit so as to prevent it from generating into lift from the wings of the Orbiter and both prolonging the reentry and causing it to ‘skip’ along the atmosphere. The required bleed offs of excess speed were known as ‘roll reversals’, and for both Young and Crippen they would be faced with the kind of testing that Ames Research Center had been unable to replicate (because the available wind-tunnels could not reach the actual speed that the Space Shuttle would be coming in at during reentry). During the roll reversals, Young and Crippen would wind up confronting that the expected airflows over the wings and OMS pods had been unpredicted. The usage of the RCS thrusters during the roll reversals that had been meant to ‘stabilize’ the orbiter were also contributing to the unpredicted airflows (and potential loss of control). Thankfully, it had managed to stay within tolerances for the first (and highest inclined roll reversal). It was not the first issue encountered during reentry, as the second found itself in the unexpectedly high deflection of the body flap during reentry. The body flap on the Orbiter was used for the most part for providing pitch control to the Space Shuttle’s elevons during reentry in order to maintain the forty-degree angle of attack during reentry [3]. It had been expected in testing that the body flap would deflect to seven degrees during reentry, but to the significant concern of Young and Crippen, it had reached as high as sixteen degrees during reentry [4]. Despite the initial issues encountered from thee first roll reversal and the concerns over the body flap, Columbia had wound up getting through reentry successfully before proceeding towards a smooth landing at Edwards Air Force Base. The first flight of the Space Shuttle had concluded successfully, with John Young remarking after landing, “This is the world’s greatest all electric flying machine. I’ll tell you that. It was super!”

The review and aftermath of STS-1 however had shown that compared to how it had seemed to be successful, it was arguably anything but. On ignition of the solid rocket boosters, it had been under-estimated for the amount of force that would be created resulting in an over-pressure wave from the solid rocket boosters that had struck the Orbiter on launch [5], resulting in the deflection of the body flap at six degrees (unknown to either John Young or Bob Crippen on Columbia or any of the NASA personnel watching the launch until after STS-1 had landed) [6] alongside that of damage to the struts in the forward reaction control system (FRCS) [7]. The post-launch fixes to LC-39A and the launch procedure would include both increasing the water suppression system at the pad (in part due to the underestimation of force from the SRBs) and also that of the ignition of the SSMEs at launch. On ignition of the SSMEs, the entire stack proceeded to do a ‘twang’ motion, which if doing without the ignition of the SRBs saw the entire stack lean with the angle of thrust from the SRBs then away before finally going back to a ‘vertical’ poise. In the case of STS-1, the ignition of the SSMEs had occurred at T-3.8 seconds, seeing the stack leaning towards the ignition and then at a ‘vertical’ position before the ignition of the SRBs. For STS-2 and every flight after, the SSMEs would be ignited at T-6.6 seconds to allow the stack to perform a full ‘twang’ motion (of leaning forwards and then backwards) before the ignition of the SRBs. The modification of the SSME ignition was seen as having contributed in part to the overpressure wave that had been generated at launch.

But nevertheless, the conclusion of STS-1 had proven the Space Shuttle program was indeed structurally fine and had gone from what had been a design that had not been tested from launch through reentry to one that had been successfully done. For NASA, it’s future following the launch of the first Space Shuttle would rest with the new Administration that had won in 1980. For much of NASA, it was still a question as to where the future of the space agency would set sail towards. Would it be akin to that of a ‘steady as it goes’, with only marginal improvements as the Space Shuttle began operation? Or would it be setting NASA towards a new goal to complete, like how the 1960s had been for the Apollo Program and the 1970s had been for the Space Shuttle? Only time would tell for NASA.


[1] The original 1979 flight schedule had called for a series of six orbital flight tests before continued delays with the Space Shuttle cut back two of the orbital flight tests for a total culmination of four in all. It should be noted that at the time, the fifth and sixth orbital flight tests proposed testing of hardware which were not necessary needed to enter into ‘operational’ service, including both an EVA and testing of satellite deployment.

[2] The capacity to manually ‘winch’ the payload bay doors shut in an emergency EVA would be available for every Shuttle flight, having been built into the design of the Shuttle.

[3] The body flap was also vital for protecting the three SSMEs from the thermal heat during reentry.

[4] The maximum angle of deflection the body flap could go to was twenty-one degrees. If the Space Shuttle still needed further deflection to maintain a forty degree angle of attack of reentry, it would’ve posed problems.

[5] The over-pressure wave in part was also contributed in part to a ‘delay’ of timing from the Shuttle GPCs to the SRBs along with that of the ‘twang’ (the entire stack moving with the motion of the SSMEs, then back and then in a vertical position) created from the ignition of the SSMEs.

[6] After the deflection of the body flap had been discovered after landing, John Young had said that if he had known about it after launch, he would’ve brought the Space Shuttle to a safe altitude after SRB separation and then ejected.

[7] The damage to the struts on the FRCS would not be discovered until processing began for STS-2, contributing in part to the delays between STS-1 and STS-2.

 

[Usili]

While there is no update for that of this week, I will no longer be updating this timeline on alternatehistory. Because of a significant disagreement with that of recent administrative decisions along with that of comments made by that of the administrator, I will cease posting any of my own creative works on alternatehistory and will be posting them on both Sea Lion Press and Sufficient Velocity. I will be continuing to update this timeline on both of those sites, with the link to the timeline on Sea Lion Press here (the writing forum on SLP is registered users only) and the link to the timeline on Sufficient Velocity here, and I would encourage people to continue reading on both of those sites.

If you are interested as to why I am doing this, feel free to PM me on here or either of those two sites.